Libertarian Rights

Libertarian RightsAn Essay PresentedbyAlexander Norman HarristoThe Committee on Degrees in Social Studiesin partial fulfillment of the requirementsfor a degree with honorsof Bachelor of ArtsHarvard CollegeJune 2008

Introduction: Completing

Anarchy, State, and Utopia

Robert Nozick began his most famous and controversial book,

Anarchy, State, and Utopia

, with the words “Individuals have rights, and there are things that no person or group may

do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they

raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do.”

1

Nozick published thisbold opening line in 1974, three years after Rawls published

A Theory of Justice

, the work that

revived political philosophy. Rawls‟ theory is still the basis for much philosophical argument

today. If it can be said that all philosophy is but a footnote to Plato,

2

one can certainly claim thatall contemporary political philosophy is but a fo

otnote to Rawls. Though Rawls‟ philosophy

generated a flurry of alternative theories of justice

–

from other egalitarians, like G.A. Cohen,from communitarians, like Michael Sandel, and from utilitarians, like Peter Singer

–

I will herefocus on the theory offered by Nozick.When Nozick asserted that people have rights, he had in mind a particular set of rights

–

libertarian rights to be free from force, coercion, and fraud. These rights will be the topic of my

thesis. Nozick‟s rights take the form of what

he called “side constraints.” Rights are, in other

words, not a good or a goal to be promoted, but rather absolute prohibitions on action. They

delineate which actions one may never do, regardless of one‟s goals or the good such an action

may do. Rights a

re, as Ronald Dworkin put it, “trumps.”

3

Nozick‟s rights come from his“entitlement theory” of justice.

4

The entitlement theory consists of three parts

–

a theory of justice in initial acquisition (how one can justly come to own formerly-unowned things), a theory

of justice in transfer (how one can justly transfer one‟s property to another), and a theory of

justice in rectification (how one can justly correct past injustices).

5

Nozick spent the greater partof

ASU

discussing justice in transfer, since justice in transfer is the central point of disagreement

between libertarians and liberal-egalitarians. To Nozick, if parties enter into a mutuallyconsensual agreement to exchange their property, the resulting arrangement is always just, forthe transfer was c

onsensual and therefore just. “A distribution is just if it arises from another justdistribution by legitimate means.”

6

Nozick‟s entitlement theory seems particularly appealing. The notion that certain actions

are wrong and must be rectified is roughly the basis behind ordinary criminal law prohibitingtheft, assault, and the like, and ordinary tort law prohibiting breaking of contracts, causing injury,and the like. However, the entitlement theory does not serve as the basis for many philosophicaltheories of distributive justice (justice in who gets what stuff). Many such theories are what

Nozick calls “end

-

state theories” –

that is, they come up with a desired distribution and assessthe justice of actions by their tendency to promote the desired end-state. The problem with end-

state theories, Nozick says, is that they treat distribution as “if things fell from heaven likemanna, and no one had any special entitlement to any portion of it.”

7

This manna-from-heavenargument is a recurring theme in

ASU

. Th

e appeal of Nozick‟s theory is that it assesses the

justice of the

actions themselves

; it claims that some actions simply must not be done, regardlessof the consequences. Side constraints delineate a sphere in which each person is inviolable. AsNozick says:

The moral side constraints upon what we do… reflect the fact of our separate existences. They reflect the

fact that no moral balancing act can take place among us; there is no moral outweighing of one of our livesby others so as to lead to a greater overall

social

good.

8

These constraints, Nozick says, limit not just what people can do to one another in a state of nature, but also what people can do to one another through institutions like the state.

9

Thus,Nozick objects to taxation for purposes other than enforcing side constraints.

10

Taxation is theft.It is people, in a group, demanding money from other individuals and threatening to lock up thenon-compliers. Of course, some will

voluntarily

consent to being taxed. Others, however, will