Personal Morality and Political Morality
Alex Harris
Deontological liberals, of both egalitarian and libertarian varieties, often distinguish between two types or two different levels of morality. Some argue that justice, the moral principles governing (at least) the state,
is the concern of liberal political philosophy. Another sort of morality – labeled “conceptions of the good,”
“comprehensive doctrines,”
or simply“what we commonly call morality”
– operates in a different sphere and is generally held to betrumped by considerations of justice. While many liberal philosophers, such as G.A. Cohen,
Susan Okin,
debate about the firmness of this distinction, libertarian philosophers should take it very seriously. In this paper, I will explore the two realms of morality(which I call “political” and “personal” morality), showing the possibilities and limitations indistinguishing them from one another. In Part I, I formulate definitions of personal and politicalmorality and show that a libertarian conception of justice requires absolutism in the sphere of political morality and neutralism in the sphere of personal morality. I discuss the appeal of personal moral neutralism (PMN), the view that people should be free to pursue their own personal morality, for libertarians. In Part II, I explore the limitations to PMN; in particular, Iargue that, while the desire to leave people free to lead their own lives is at the heart of manylibertarians’ reasons for holding their political beliefs, PMN can never be sufficient to establishthe truth of the libertarian conception of justice. In Part III, I demonstrate the usefulness of PMN.
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It is important to distinguish the view that political morality and personal morality are separate spheres from theview that principles of justice apply only to the state or the “basic structure of society,” (Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice, revised edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999. pp. 6-10.) a view Liam Murphy labels“dualism.” (Murphy, Liam. “Institutions and the Demands of Justice.”
Philosophy & Public Affairs
. Vol. 27, No. 4.1999. p. 254.) Even monists (those who believe that justice governs all interpersonal interactions), like libertarians,can distinguish between the demands that
justice
(or political morality) makes and the very different sort of demandsmade by one’s personal morality. (Indeed, Murphy’s argument for monism only applies to end-result theories of justce. Murphy argues that it would be inconsistent to believe in an end-result theory, like the difference principle,without caring about whether that result, like maximizing the position of the worst-off class in society, is actuallyachieved. Libertarianism is not an end-result theory; there is no result that the libertarian state is to achieve.)
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