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Personal Morality and Political Morality
Alex Harris
Deontological liberals, of both egalitarian and libertarian varieties, often distinguish between two types or two different levels of morality. Some argue that justice, the moral principles governing (at least) the state,
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is the concern of liberal political philosophy. Another sort of morality – labeled “conceptions of the good,”
1
“comprehensive doctrines,”
2
 or simply“what we commonly call morality”
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– operates in a different sphere and is generally held to betrumped by considerations of justice. While many liberal philosophers, such as G.A. Cohen,
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Susan Okin,
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 and Thomas Nagel,
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debate about the firmness of this distinction, libertarian philosophers should take it very seriously. In this paper, I will explore the two realms of morality(which I call “political” and “personal” morality), showing the possibilities and limitations indistinguishing them from one another. In Part I, I formulate definitions of personal and politicalmorality and show that a libertarian conception of justice requires absolutism in the sphere of  political morality and neutralism in the sphere of personal morality. I discuss the appeal of  personal moral neutralism (PMN), the view that people should be free to pursue their own personal morality, for libertarians. In Part II, I explore the limitations to PMN; in particular, Iargue that, while the desire to leave people free to lead their own lives is at the heart of manylibertarians’ reasons for holding their political beliefs, PMN can never be sufficient to establishthe truth of the libertarian conception of justice. In Part III, I demonstrate the usefulness of PMN.
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It is important to distinguish the view that political morality and personal morality are separate spheres from theview that principles of justice apply only to the state or the “basic structure of society,” (Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice, revised edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999. pp. 6-10.) a view Liam Murphy labels“dualism.” (Murphy, Liam. “Institutions and the Demands of Justice.”
 Philosophy & Public Affairs
. Vol. 27, No. 4.1999. p. 254.) Even monists (those who believe that justice governs all interpersonal interactions), like libertarians,can distinguish between the demands that
 justice
(or political morality) makes and the very different sort of demandsmade by one’s personal morality. (Indeed, Murphy’s argument for monism only applies to end-result theories of  justce. Murphy argues that it would be inconsistent to believe in an end-result theory, like the difference principle,without caring about whether that result, like maximizing the position of the worst-off class in society, is actuallyachieved. Libertarianism is not an end-result theory; there is no result that the libertarian state is to achieve.)
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I employ PMN to formulate an ideal libertarian response to one crucial policy question – that of  borders and immigration. In the end, I will conclude that PMN is a useful
description
of libertarianism, but cannot stand on its own, as outside conceptions are needed to clarify andestablish the distinction between personal and political morality.Part IBefore jumping ahead, however, it is crucial to set out working definitions of the terms of the discussion. “Political morality,” as I use the term here, is the set of moral principles dictatingwhen it is and is not just to use force. Thus, in the case of libertarian political philosophy, political morality is the set of moral principles (i.e., acquisition, transfer, and rectification – plusmoral equality and its expression through equal treatment by the state) which libertarianismentails; it is just the libertarian conception of justice.
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I call political morality’s counterpart“personal morality,” since unlike political morality, whose principles apply the same everywhere,a personal morality attaches to a particular individual. Fred’s personal morality is his own; Jill’s personal morality only has appeal to Fred insofar as it accords with his own moral reasoning.Personal morality is difficult to define. Personal morality can be described loosely as “how oneleads one’s life,” the decisions that one makes for oneself – what to do (and not to do) with one’sown holdings, what agreements to reach (and not to reach) with others, with whom to (and notto) interact in certain ways. This includes both interpersonal decisions and decisions that do notinvolve others at all. (For example, some hold that what a person does alone, e.g. whether shedevelops her talents or becomes a couch potato, is a “moral” issue.) Call this the “broad”conception of personal morality. Indeed, on this formulation, there is no limit to what actions can be called “personal moral” decisions – every choice is a choice about how to use one’s body or 
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This, I should note, is a strange definition. Many individual actions, such as bar fights, fall within the realm of  political morality. I choose the name “political morality” because
no other 
type of morality can legitimately describewhat the state may do, whereas personal morality
does
govern what individuals may do. What makes the state thestate is that it governs the just retaliatory use of force.
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 property, even imminently minor choices like whether to order masaman curry or tom kha gaiwhen at a Thai restaurant.However, this broad conception is not exactly the sense that libertarians mean when theyclaim that libertarianism leaves people maximally free to lead their own lives. As Shelly Kaganshows, the assertion that libertarianism maximizes liberty is hollow on its own; it requires afurther clarification (and justification) of what liberty means.
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For a libertarian, personal moralityincludes any principle that anyone holds to be of “moral” significance
that does not require for its realization the violation of a dictate of political morality
– any “moral” choice
except for unjustly using force
. This definition, the “libertarian conception of personal morality,” requiresfurther justification, as we shall see later.Someone is a “neutralist” in the personal moral sphere (is a “personal moral neutralist,” believes in “personal moral neutralism,” PMN) if she holds that people
 should be free to choose
their own personal morality, consistent with the ability of others to do the same. I leave open for now the question of what sense of “personal morality” one is discussing or what one means bythe crucial phrase “should be free to choose.” To a libertarian, to be free to choose a personalmorality means to be able to live by any personal morality (in the libertarian sense) one desires,without being subject to force because of those decisions entailed by one’s personal morality.Thus, any
individual 
libertarian will have her own personal morality to live by, and she mightthink that others should live by it too, but she will (as a libertarian) think that no one should
use force
upon others for their personal moral decisions, even those others who have chosen thewrong personal morality. The libertarian is like the free speech advocate who proclaims thatthough she disagrees with a person’s view, she will defend to the death his right to say it. If thelibertarian thought that one should use force to punish or discourage
 personal moral 
decisions3
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