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Book Title: Judgment Misguided: Intuition and Error in Public Decision Making. Contributors: Jonathan Baron - author. Publisher: Oxford UniversityPress. Place of Publication: New York. Publication Year: 1998. Page Number: 227

JUDGMENT MISGUIDED

Intuition and Error in Public Decision Making

Baron JonathanNew York Oxford Oxford University Press 1998-iii-Oxford University PressOxford New YorkAthens Auckland Bangkok Bogota BombayBuenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Dar es SalaamDelhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul KarachiKuala Lumpur Madras Madrid MelbourneMexico City Nairobi Paris SingaporeTaipei Tokyo Toronto Warsawand associated companies inBerlin IbadanCopyright © 1998 by Oxford University Press, Inc.Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University PressAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataBaron, Jonathan, 1944-Judgment misguided : intuition and error in public decision making /Jonathan Baron.p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 0-19-511108-71. Public administration--Decision making. 2. Policy sciences.I. Title.JF 1525.D4B365 1998352.3′3--dc21 98-111381 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2Printed in the United States of Americaon acid-free paper-iv-

Preface

This book presents my current thinking about what is important in the psychology of thinking and decision making and how it relates to questionsof public interest. I try to provide sufficient references so that an academic reader could track down the source of these ideas. The ideas here area continuation of those presented in an article I wrote for

Behavioral and Brain Sciences

in 1994, titled

"Nonconsequentialist Decisions."

I would like this to be read by everyone concerned with public affairs or the psychology of thinking and decision making. That is, of course, toomuch to expect.In attempting to reach a somewhat wider audience than usual for me, I have tried to simplify the presentation by eliminating some of the usualacademic qualifications, such as "It could be argued that X" when I really mean to say that I think X is true. I have also put references inendnotes so as not to clutter the text.

I am grateful for specific comments and general advice in the early stages of this project from Paul Rozin, Martin Seligman, and Karen Steinberg.Helpful comments on specific chapters came from Willett Kempton, Howard Kunreuther, Howard Margolis, Jay Schulkin, Karen Steinberg, andPeter Ubel. Judy Baron, David Baron, Deborah Frisch, Joshua Greene, Robert Jervis, and Joan Bossert and Nancy Hoagland (at Oxford UniversityPress) provided helpful comments on the whole book. Mark Spranca convinced me of the importance of the intuition of naturalism, and HowardMargolis strengthened my belief that intuitions can affect public outcomes. Before and during the writing of this book, my research has beensupported by the National Science Foundation. David Baron helped with typesetting, which was done with LATEX2e in Adobe Palatino font.-v-

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ContentsCHAPTER 1Introduction

1

Intuitions

2

Some Intuitions of Interest

8

Common Patterns

9

The Role of Psychology

Consequences, Consequentialism, and Utilitarianism

Summary and Outlook

CHAPTER 2All the Fish in the Sea

The Tragedy of the Commons

Unfairness

Autonomy

Wishful Thinking

Ozone and Freon

Global Warming

Conclusion

CHAPTER 3Benefits and Burdens

The Utilitarian Approach

Can Equality Go Too Far?

Taxation as Theft?

Elasticity: Taxes to Change Behavior

54-vii-

Self-destructive Behavior

56

Taking Property58Changing the Rules of the Game60Fair Distribution: Health Insurance and Genetics62Unrealistic Optimism66Conclusión66CHAPTER 4Nationalism and Group Loyalty

Self-interest and Group Interest

Scholarships

Immigration

Foreign Aid

International Agreements

Conclusion

CHAPTER 5My-side Bias and Violent Conflict

My-side Bias and Overconfidence

Paranoia, Cults, and Strange Beliefs

Violent Conflict: Hindus versus Muslims

Conclusion

CHAPTER 6Do No Harm

Trade

Opposition to Reform

Conclusion

CHAPTER 7Risk

A Case of Risk: Drugs and Vaccines

The Public versus the Experts

The Delaney Clause

Nuclear Power and Nuclear Waste

Lawsuits

How to Think about Risk

Conclusion

126-viii-

CHAPTER 8Too Many People129Recent History of the Debate135The Current Debate137The Mexico City Policy146Conclusión148CHAPTER 9Naturalism and the Sanctity of Life

Abortion and Nature

A Pro-choice Argument

Abortion in Practice

Ending Life

Naturalism and Birth Control

Tampering with Life

Conclusion

CHAPTER 10What Is to Be Done?

Thinking about Citizenship

Trust

Politicians and Government Officials

Reporters and Interest Groups

The Rules of Campaigns

Corporations

Education

The Internet as a Forum

Parents

Conclusion

Notes

References

Index

223-ix-

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JUDGEMENT MISGUIDED

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CHAPTER 1 Introduction

One way to make decisions is to weigh our options on the basis of their expected effects. We would favor options that we expected to have betteroutcomes. We do not always make decisions this way. Instead, we apply various intuitive rules to our decisions, rules that do not refer tooutcomes alone. We also apply these rules when we evaluate the decisions of others, including government officials.For example, we often consider the harm caused by our actions to be more serious and more to be avoided than harm caused by our omissions.We avoid positive options that have negative side effects, even if the positives outweigh the negatives. The resulting bias against helpful action isoften reinforced by similar biases in favor of the status quo, of what is natural, or of what others have autonomously chosen. When we thinkabout decisions affecting large groups of people, we tend to favor groups we belong to--such as nations or races--at the expense of outsiders.We judge fairness within these groups, attending less to the larger groups that contain them. Our judgments of fairness and justice are based ona kind of balancing--an eye for an eye--even when we could foresee that this attitude would make things worse on the whole.The point of this book is that we should not be surprised when these intuitions--played out in the public sphere through the actions of individualsand government officials alike--lead to outcomes that are worse than the best we could have, often substantially worse. After all, these intuitionsare not based on the principle of achieving the best. Sometimes they may lead to the best despite their apparent design, but this is not typical. If we want a better world, one relatively inexpensive-1-way to get it is to improve the way we make decisions. We need to think more about their effects, and less about the rules that might guidethem.Consider again the intuitive bias against causing harm through action, as opposed to omission. As a result of this intuition, some people avoidtaking protective measures that might cause harm, even though the same measures are more likely to prevent harm. When a vaccine-such asthe DPT vaccine (diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus)-causes rare but serious side effects or death, people resist using it because they want toavoid these effects, even though the vaccine can prevent a disease that is more likely and equally serious and deadly. Government officials resistrequiring the vaccine. It is not that the government officials are wise but capitulate to public demands. They make the same intuitive judgment.

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