UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOISEASTERN DIVISIONLINDA SHELTON and)Case Number 06 C 4259)Plaintiff)Honorable Judge Joan H. Lefkowv.))ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL LISA)MADIGAN, et al.)Amended Complaint filed 1-14-10Defendants)MEMORANDUM OF LAW - JURISDICTIONDefendant, Pro Se, respectfully presents to this Honorable Court thefollowing memorandum of law concerning statutes and case law regarding total andcomplete lack of prosecutorial and judicial jurisdiction of sham prosecutors andjudges in this case.Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity unless they totally lack subject-matter or personal jurisdiction in the case. A judge acting without subject-matterjurisdiction is acting without judicial authority. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821) The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer actsunder a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution”, he "comesinto conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in thatcase stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in hisperson to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power toimpart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of theUnited States." [Emphasis supplied in original].State officials may be sued as individuals in § 1983 actions. Brokaw v. MercerCounty, 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000).Plaintiff alleges that the prosecutors and judges sued in this case totally lackedsubject matter jurisdiction and therefore pursued this prosecution and presidedover this prosecution without any legal authority as individuals and trespassersof the Constitution of the United States. The sham prosecutors had noconstitutional or statutory authority or jurisdiction to bring the Medicaid vendorfraud charge. The court had no subject matter jurisdiction because the indictmentwas legally insufficient and failed to state a charge, the charges were void as aviolation of the Supremacy clause, the charges were void due to vagueness, andtherefore there was a total and complete failure to charge a crime.INDICTMENT LEGALLY INSUFFICIENTThe indictments were fatally flawed because:It was beyond the statute of limitations according to Rodrigue v. Olin EmployeesCreditUnion,406 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2005). It was fatally flawed, vague and did not givesufficient notice of the acts alleged. It just stated that there is a scheme tosubmit fraudulent invoices to Medicaid. It DID NOT identify which invoices, fromwhich dates, from which patients, for what services, performed where, servicesprovided by whom, what was “fraudulent” about the invoices (patient name, patientdate of birth, patient address, patient Medicaid number, service provided,diagnosis, place of service, doctor's or provider's signature), who signed theinvoices, who submitted the invoices, how they were submitted, or what the“scheme” entailed. According to Illinois law, as follows, it is not sufficient tomake a vague general statement quoting the criminal statute when the language ofthe statute does not articulate a specific offense. The indictment mustsufficiently detail an overt act. For example: an indictment stating only that“Jones committed a murder” would be legally insufficient, without the who, what,

where, and when.The act of billing Medicaid for a physician’s or her employee’s services isnot so simple. First the physician must sign up with Medicaid as a provider andreceive a provider number. Then the physician must sign an electronic partnertrading agreement with BC/BS so that they can receive the invoice over the wire.The physician signs a contract with a billing agent so that the agent can convertthe patient encounter form or fee slip to an electronic invoice and send it overthe wire to BC/BS, the Medicaid adjudicator. The physician must sign a power ofattorney form so that the billing agent may electronically sign the physician’sname on the invoice. A patient encounter form is filled out when the physiciansees the patient. Then the form is transmitted to the billing agent. The invoiceis generated and sent to BC/BS, who then sends it to Illinois Medicaid. Then ILMedicaid sends a check to the physician or their alternate payee, if the physiciansigned an alternate payee agreement. Clearly there are many steps which may besubject to ID theft and forgery. If there is fraud, it must be specified as towhich of these series of acts were fraudulent and documented that the other actswere actually performed by the physician and not forged by someone else. Defendantalleges that to simply charge a physician with the following vague statement was alegally insufficient indictment.“on or about June 2000, continuing through April 2002 . . . the defendant, infurtherance of a single intention and design, on behalf of herself and/or RightFrame of Mind, Inc., [a fictional entity], willfully, by means of false statementsand representation, and to obtain payments under the Public Aid Code in amountsgreater than that which the defendant and/or Right Frame of Mind, Inc., wereentitle to, caused false billing invoices to be submitted to the IllinoisDepartment of Public Aid, and based on said false billing invoices caused theIllinois Department of Public Aid to authorize payments to Right Frame of Mind,Inc., in a greater amount than that to which the defendant and/or Right Frame ofMind, Inc., were entitled”- indictment against Linda Shelton in 05 CR 17571In Illinois, an indictment must be reasonably certain enough to apprise adefendant of the charges against him, enable him to prepare a defense, and permita conviction or acquittal to serve as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for thesame offense. People v. Greico, 255 N.E.2d 897, 898-899 (Ill. 1970) A defendanthas a fundamental right to be informed of the "nature and cause" of the chargesagainst him or her. People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 51 (1994).In Illinois this fundamental right is given substance by statute and incorporatedinto section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/111--3(West 1998)). 725 ILCS 5/111 3 states: “111 3. Form of charge. (a) A charge shallbe in writing and allege the commission of an offense by: . . . . (3) Settingforth the nature and elements of the offense charged;” [emphasis added] SeeMeyers, 158 Ill. 2d at 51; People v. Davis, 281 Ill. App. 3d 984, 987 (1996). Whenthe sufficiency of a charging instrument is challenged in a pretrial motion, theinquiry upon review is whether the instrument strictly complies with section 111--3. Davis, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 987.When the language of a statute which constitutes a charge against the defendantdefines the acts prohibited, no further particularity is necessary. People v.Kamsler, 214 N.E.2d 562, 566 (Ill. 1966) An indictment is not flawed because theovert act could be described in greater detail. City of Chicago v. Powell, 735N.E.2d 119, 125 (Ill.App.1st Dist, 2000) CITING People v. Meyers, 630 N.E.2d 811(Ill. 1994). Rather an indictment is sufficient so long that it would enable adefendant to prepare a defense. Id.Ordinarily, the requirements of section 111-3 are met when the counts of acomplaint follow the statutory language in setting out the nature and elements ofan offense. Davis, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 987. The relevant inquiry is not whether acharging instrument could have described an offense with more particularity, butwhether there is sufficient particularity to allow the defendant to prepare adefense. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d at 54. A charging instrument is a preliminary

pleading, and it need not contain more than a cursory statement of the facts.People v. Smith, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 497. However, it must state some facts.If the charging instrument meets the minimum requirements of section 111--3(a) but(combined with any discovery the State furnishes) is insufficient to allow thedefendant to prepare a defense, he or she can--and should--seek a bill ofparticulars. Smith, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 498; People v. Intercoastal Realty, Inc.,148 Ill. App. 3d 964, 971 (1986). An indictment need not state the exact meansused in committing a charged offense if that means is not an integral part of theoffense. Grieco, 255 N.E.2d 899; SEE People v. Brogan, 816 N.E.2d 643, 654(Ill.App.1st, 2004) (defendant's argument that the indictment failed to apprisehim of the details of how the overt act was carried out failed because theargument focused on the nature of the proof rather than the nature of theoffense.) However, if the means is an integral part of the offense, the indictmentneeds to state these means.When the language of a statute does not articulate a specific offense, theindictment must articulate a specific overt act. People v. Potter, 125 N.E.2d 510(Ill. 1995) In Potter, the defendant was charged with reckless driving. Theindictment specifically stated that the defendant drove recklessly by speeding.The defendant was therefore not left to question whether the reckless conduct wasrunning a red light, driving at night without his lights on, or one of a myriad ofother possibly dangerous driving manners. However, there are numerous cases wherethe reviewing courts ruled that the indictment did not articulate a specific overtact , and therefore, these indictments were fatally defective.This case is another example of a legally insufficient and therefore voidindictment. Therefore, the case was not properly before the trial court and thecourt had no jurisdiction.SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE COURTA Judge may not claim jurisdiction by fiat. All orders or judgments issuedby a judge in a court of limited jurisdiction must contain the findings of thecourt showing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, not allegations thatthe court has jurisdiction. “. . . in a special statutory proceeding an order mustcontain the jurisdictional findings prescribed by statute.” In re Jennings, 68Ill.2d 125, 368 N.E.2d 864 (1977) A judge’s allegation that he has subject-matterjurisdiction is only an allegation. Lombard v. Elmore, 134 Ill.App.3d 898, 480N.E.2d 1329 (1st Dist. 1985), Hill v. Daily, 28 Ill.App.3d 202, 204, 328 N.E.2d142 (1975). Inspection of the record of the case is the controlling factor. If therecord of the case does not support subject-matter jurisdiction, then the judgehas acted without subject-matter jurisdiction. “If it could not legally hear thematter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the powercan add nothing to its authority, - it had no authority to make that finding.” ThePeople v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) Without the specific finding ofjurisdiction by the court in an order or judgment, the order or judgment does notcomply with the law and is void. The finding can not be merely an unsupportedallegation.The law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even beforereversal. “Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond thatpower delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly incontravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. Theyare not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” Vallely v.Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920)A court has no jurisdiction where the public policy of the State of Illinoisis violated [a crime must be alleged and state ALL the elements of the offense forthe complaint to be valid], People v. Meyers, 158 Ill.2d 46, 51 (1994); Martin-Tregona v. Roderick, 29 Ill.App.3d 553, 331 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1975).Courts may not attempt to resolve controversies which are not properlypresented to them for, if they should do so, it would violate not only theprecepts of Constitutional due process, but would fly in the face of the American