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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFor the Seventh Circuit
United States of America, )Case Nos. 02-4222 & 02-4224Appellees-Plaintiff ))Appeal from United States Districtvs. )Court for the Southern District of )Illinois, Case No. 00 CR 30021Robert T. Mitrione & Marla A. DeVore )Appellants-Defendants )Hon. Jeanne E. Scott PresidingBy )Linda L. Shelton )Intervenor )
INTERVENOR’S PETITION, UNDER 60(b)(4), TO RECONSIDER RULINGIN MITRIONE DUE TO VOIDNESS
 NOW COMES, Linda Shelton, Intervenor pro se, who respectfully petitions thisHonorable Court under F.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) to reconsider its ruling in United States v. Mitrione,357 F.3d 712 (7
th
Cir. 2004), concerning substitute billing, because it was based on error of factand is therefore void. In Mitrione the Court sadly, grossly, erroneously, through judicial error,greatly harmed an innocent talented and dedicated public servant, defendant, who was providingessential services to Medicaid patients in Springfield Illinois at the time, by ruling that theyaffirm the erroneous decision of the District Court of the Southern District of Illinois, whichamounts to the District Court overturning State and Federal legislation that was constitutional.The jurisdiction of the court is invoked to reconsider this Honorable Courts order in thiscase which was based on erroneous “facts” which therefore cause the order to be questioned asvoid. Void orders can be questioned in any court at any time. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure60(b)(4) requires that a motion must be made "within a reasonable time" after entry of the judgment. Courts have been exceedingly lenient in defining the term "reasonable time," withregard to voidness challenges. In fact, it has been oft-stated that, for all intents and purposes, a1
 
motion to vacate a default judgment as void "may be made at any time." 12 Moore's FederalPractice § 60.44[c]; McLearn v. Cowen & Co., 660 F.2d 845, 848 (2d Cir.1981); Crosby v. TheBradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir.1963) (judgment vacated as void thirty years after entry).Linda Shelton has standing before this Honorable Court on this issue, as an intervenor, asshe is presently being prosecuted
1
on the same issues of substitute billing in a state case wherethe prosecutor is quoting the Mitrione case, an argument, although only instructive, which causedCircuit Court of Cook County Judge Alonso to rule on February 10, 2009 that “substitute billingis illegal”. Therefore, a decision in Mitrione has direct relevance to intervener’s defense as wellas to the defense and appeals of two other defendants in similar, but state cases, Dr. MaishaHamilton Bennett and Naomi Jennings, both of who were wrongfully prosecuted for providingquality mental health services. It is likely that this issue will recur until the damage to societycaused by these rulings regarding substitute billing is resolved. Until resolved the non-statutory bar on substitute billing for psychiatric care, amounts to court ordered violation of the standardof care in psychiatry and access to mental health care to the poor as follows, which violates theintent of the Federal Medicaid Code. This Court’s ruling in Mitrione should be reconsidered andclarified, due to likelihood it is void and due to the fact it is causing great damage to access tocare in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)30(A), as explained as follows.The precedent of this Honorable Court declaring generally that substitute billing is illegalunder Illinois Administrative Rules, but ONLY for psychiatric and not other medical servicesunder Medicaid, but not under any other medical insurance, in view of the fact that > 80 % of 
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Circuit Court of Cook County Case 04 CR 17571 before this Court on Petition for COA due to dismissal of thePetition for Writ of Habeas Corpus before the District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, 08 CV6216.
2
 
 psychiatric and psychological services in the United States are provided by non-physicians,essentially bars Medicaid patients from receiving mental health care, ultimately causingdiscrimination against the poor. This was NOT the intent of the Federal Medicaid Code, as noted by Honorable Judge Lefkow in her ruling in Memisovski v. Maram, [Transfer Binder 2004-2]Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 301,515, in that it violates 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)30(A). Thiskind of discrimination is probably also in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.The defendants in Mitrione argued that the Illinois statutes underlying their convictionsfor Medicaid and Medicare fraud are in conflict with, and therefore preempted by federal law.Judge Scott rejected this argument when it was raised in context of a motion to dismiss thesubstitute billing counts of the indictment, finding that it ignores basic rules of statutoryconstruction. However this decision was in error for reasons that follow. This Honorable Courtruled that it agrees with Judge Scott’s treatment of this issue and have nothing to add to it.
See
United States v. Mitrione, 160 F. Supp. 2d 993 (C.D. Ill. 2001).However, the Seventh Circuit Court is
grossly mistaken
, as NO DECISION, concerningthe Supremacy clause was included in the District Court Decision and there was NODISCUSSION in the District Court’s decision concerning the discretion of the State of Illinois toadopt standards for its medical assistance program contrary to Federal Code. The issue of discretion to adopt more limited standards for State payments for services than in the FederalCode, was only discussed in the government’s response brief to the Seventh Circuit. The SeventhCircuit did not consider the issues of Supremacy or State discretion in their decision except asnoted above. This is a
major and astonishing oversight
by the Seventh Circuit Court and it istruly unbelievable that the United States Supreme Court, by denying certiorari has failed toremedy this travesty of justice. However, such errors of fact and law resulting in voidness are3
of 00

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Dr Linda Shelton

As this case was closed and the mandate from 7th Circuit sent to the District Court in 2005, the 7th Circuit Clerk refused to accept this filing. I will have to make a motion to return the mandate and a motion for leave to be an intervenor, before I can file the above. Also 60(b)(4) petitions apply to District Court not 7th Circuit. So back to the drawing board. My options are to request defendants to ask the District Court to re-open case, move for leave to be an intervenor, then refile this at the District Court level. If denied, appeal to the 7th Circuit. I could also petition the US Supreme Court for leave to file as an intervenor and ask them to address the issue under voidness. There is no time limitations to bring the issue of voidness before a court. Then rewrite this pleading as a motion to void the 7th Circuit Court and original District Court decisions.

reply03 / 03 / 2009
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