23 was the reports of UNMOVIC which would be the element for 20100727pm-blix

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1 (2.00 pm)2 SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Good afternoon and welcome. Welcome to3 everyone this afternoon. Our witness is Dr Hans Blix.4 You, Sir, served as the Executive Chairman for the5 United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection6 Commission, which I think we are allowed to call7 UNMOVIC, from 1 March 2000 until the end of June 2003.8 As Chairman of UNMOVIC you had overall responsibility9 for the inspection process in Iraq. The process itself10 ran, we understand, from 27 November 2002 until11 18 March 2003, just two days before the commencement of12 military action.13 We hope to look today at some detail about the14 inspection process, the context in which it took place15 and the stage it had reached by the time the inspectors16 were withdrawn from Iraq on 18 March 2003.17 Now I say on every occasion and I repeat it this18 afternoon, we recognise that witnesses give evidence19 based on their recollection of events and we of course20 check what we hear against papers to which we have21 access and which we are still receiving.22 I remind every witness on each occasion you will23 later be asked to sign a transcript of the evidence to24 the effect that the evidence they have given is25 truthful, fair and accurate.1

1 With those preliminaries out of the way I will ask2 Sir Martin to Gilbert to open the questions. Martin?3 SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Dr Blix, we would like to begin by4 looking at the history of inspections in Iraq and in5 particular the legacy of the UNSCOM inspections in the6 1990s that set the context for UNMOVIC's creation and7 your subsequent work. You were of course at the time8 the Director General of the International Atomic Energy9 Agency, which also played a significant part in Iraq.10 We have of course read your “Disarming Iraq” and all11 your reports. Could you start by explaining to us what12 the WMD-related obligations of Iraq were following the13 conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War and the adoption of14 UNSCR 871

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?15 DR BLIX: Right. Yes. They were set out in resolution 68716 of 1991 and Iraq was to declare its weapons of mass

1 altogether from their income.2 Now the resolution 687 also foresaw that when3 everything was destroyed and eliminated there would be4 monitoring by UN inspection and there was no time limit5 set for that. So they assume that the ban on import or6 weapons would remain for an indefinite period of time.7 At least it was not decided when. Secondly, that8 monitoring would be there for a very long time.9 Now the means to verify the Iraqi declarations were10 by the right to go anywhere and to request to see11 anybody, and to check with exporters and to receive12 intelligence from national intelligence organisations.13 The thought was at the time that it would be14 a relatively short time for disarmament, that it would15 be quick, that the sanctions would be so effective that16 Iraq would declare everything.17 That proved a false assumption. The Iraqis did not18 declare any biological programme at all and they first19 denied there was a nuclear programme, but very shortly20 thereafter they came up with some declaration and they21 enlarged it as we went along.22 Now due to this lack of cooperation by the Iraqis,23 the suspicions arose. There was no confidence at all24 between UNSCOM and IAEA on one side and the Iraqis on the25 other. A verification developed from a checking of3

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