2
appropriate judge believes ‘has the
function of issuing arrest warrants inth
at territory.’
3. In
Enander v Governor of HM Prison Brixton
[ 2005] EWHC 3036 (Admin)
Gage LJ held that the expression ‘judicial authority’ in the United Kingdom
legislation must be read against the background of the FrameworkDecision which leaves to the individual member state the right to designate
its own judicial authority. Gage LJ stated: ‘[Counsel for the Applicant]points out that the 2003 Act does not define the terms 'judicial authority'.’He continued: ‘But in my judgment, whilst that is not det
erminative of theproper interpretation, it points towards an acknowledgement that it is left tothe member states to use their own discretion as to what will or will not bedesignated the appropriate 'judicial authority'. In my opinion, any otherinterpretation of the term 'judicial authority' would, as is submitted onbehalf of the Respondent, undermine the whole purpose of mutual trustand cooperation between member states which is expressed in the
Framework Decision.’
4.
Openshaw J concurring observed: ‘T
he essential flaw on the Applicant'sargument, to my mind, is in seeking to define the expression 'judicialauthority' ins 2(2)of the Extradition Act 2003, as if it stood in isolation;whereas, in my judgment, plainly it is to be interpreted in the light of theFramework Decision of the European Union passed on 13 June 2002,which Part 1 of the Act sought to implement. By article 6(3) it is for therequesting state to designate who is the competent judicial authority withinthat state. That concept underpins entirely the cooperation and trustbetween member states on which the whole scheme of the European
Arrest Warrant is based.’
5. The primary responsibility for determining the competence of any personissuing a warrant lies with the designated authority under section 2 of theExtradition Act 2003. In this case the designated authority is the SeriousOrganised Crime Agency (SOCA) which has issued a certificate that the
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