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Rise of Hermeneutics Wilhelm Dilthey
The Rise of Hermeneutics WilhelmDilthey Note from the translator: In the "exi...
TheRiseofHermeneuticsWilhelmDilthey
Notefromthe translator: In the"existential historicism" ofWilhelmDilthey (1833-1911)weseemto touchtheveryfonsetorigoof thatgreatGermanhistoriography,with itsaccompanyingdevelopmentsinphilologyandarthistory,withwhichhiswork wascontemporaneous:1there canindeedbe nohistory worthyof thename that does not breathesomethinglike hisspiritualenthusiasmforthetracesthatlifehasleftbehindit,somethingofhisvisionaryinstinctfor all the forms ofliving activitypreservedand stillinstinctwithin themonuments ofthepast.Dilthey'sownvoluminous and oftenfragmentarywritingsturnalmostexclusivelyaround thesupreme mysteryof thehistoriographicalact:thatVerstehenorunderstandingwhich,far frombeingasubjectiveorpurelyintuitiveleap, impliesawholecomplexprocedureofintellectualreconstruction(Nachbildung,Nachfiihlung,Nacherleben, Nachverstdindnis,tousehischaracteristicterminology)2In hislife-longeffort,notonlytosolve,butalsoandessentiallytodefine,theproblem, Diltheycountedamonghispredecessorsandpre-cursorstheforgottentheoreticiansoftheancienttraditionsofclassicalandBiblicalhermeneutics,as well as thepractitionersofthat modemphilologythatreached itsclimaxinthesystemofFriedrichSchleiermacher(1768-I834)."The RiseofHermeneutics"
(1900),
originating largelyfromDilthey'sresearch into the lifeandworkofSchleiermacher,stillconstitutesone ofthemostsatisfactorybrief accounts ofthehistoryandsignificanceof hermeneutictheory.3Itmayalso be read as anintroduc-tion toDilthey'sownconceptofVerstehen,nowseen astheunificationofthe twomainrivaltendencies-grammaticalandpsychological-thatdominatedthe historicaldevelopmentofthattheory.Dilthey'sthought,forallitssuggestive powerandsubsequentin-fluence,cannotbe said to have achieved ultimatephilosophicalcoherence
IFor anaccountofDilthey'srelationshiptorival theories ofhistoryandculture,seeRudolfA.Makkreel,"WilhelmDiltheyandtheNeo-Kantians:The Distinctionof theGeisteswissenschaftenandtheKulturwissenschaften,"Journal oftheHistoryofPhilosophy,VII,4(October,1969),423-40.2InDasVerstehen,3vols.(Tiibingen,1926-1933),JoachimWachprovidesahistoryof thedevelopmentof thisconceptbeforeDilthey.3Diltheyis leastadequateinhis accountofpatristicand medievalexegesis;thereader isreferredto suchmodernstudies as themonumentalExe'gsemddidvaleof HenrideLubac,4vols.(Paris,1959-I964).
230NEW LITERARYHISTORY
orsystematization;4norisitdifficult toformulateseriousobjectionstoit.Profoundlyanti-Hegelianandanti-dialectical,itmaybe understoodas anattempttoforgesome workablenon-relativistic alternative toMarx'sunnamable historicalmaterialism.Yet indoingso,Dilthey,forallhishostilitytopositivism,finds himselfobligedtocometo terms withhisto~ricalvariety throughthehypothesisofatypologyof theWeltanschauungen-ahypothesiswhichendsupsubsuming historyasadisciplinebeneaththenewlyemergentscienceofpsychology.Wemayalso measure thelimitsofhisunderstandingof thehistoricalunderstandingbypointingoutthat,unlike hiscontemporaryNietzsche,Diltheyfailed tomakeaplaceforfalseconsciousness,andforall thosedeviousmechanismsofcensorshipandmauvaisefoithatinterposethemselves betweenourown conscious-ness andthe realitiesofthepast.Eventhe doctrineof Verstehen itselfisnot withoutits ownshort-comings;and wemaywellfeeltodaythat thusconstrued,thedilemma isinsoluble;thatwherethesubjectisthusinitiallyandirrevocably separatedfromitsobject,or theunderstandingmonad from themonadunderstood,noamountoftheoreticalordescriptiveingenuitycanputthembacktogetheragain.Anysuccessfultheoryofunderstandingmustinotherwordsbeginafterthefact,inthepresenceofanunderstandingoraninterpretationalreadyrealized. YetevenDilthey'sfalsestartremainsindispensibletoanyadequatestatementof theproblem;and therevivalofinterestin our owntime inthephenomenonofhistoricalunderstandingandinterpretationisenoughtodemonstratethatthe issuesthatDiltheybelieved tobe centralhavenot beensupersededbutatbesttemporarilyadjourned.
I
HAVEELSEWHERE*
discussedtherepresentationofindividuationin art andparticularlyinpoetry.Wehave now to deal with theproblemof thescientificknowledgeofindividualsandindeedtheprincipalforms ofsingularexistenceingeneral.Issuchknowledgepossible,and what meansare at ourdisposalto attain it?It isaproblemof thegreatestsignificance.Actioneverywherepre-supposesourunderstandingofotherpeople;muchof ourhappinessashumanbeingsderivesfromourre-experiencing[Nachfiihlen]ofalienstatesofmind;the entire science ofphilologyandofhistoryisbased
4Withoutminimizingitsconceptual difficulties,H.A.Hodges,in ThePhilosophyofWilhelmDilthey (London, 1952),makesabettercaseforaDiltheyansystemthananyindividualwork ofDiltheyhimself.*In"DieKunstalsersteDarstellungdermenschlich-geschichtlichenWeltinihrerIndividuation,"GesammelteSchriften,V(Stuttgart,x957),273-303 [Trans-lator'snote].
THE RISEOFHERMENEUTICS231
onthepresuppositionthat suchrecomprehension[Nachverstiindnis]ofindividual existencecanberaisedtoobjective validity.The historicalconsciousnessconstructedonthisbasishas enabled modern mantohold theentirepastofhumanitypresentwithinhimself:acrossthelimitsof his own timehepeersintovanishedcultures,appropriatingtheirenergiesandtaking pleasureintheircharm,withaconsequentincrease inhisownhappiness.And ifsystematicallyorganizedhumanstudies[Geisteswissenschaften]are able togoonto derive moregen-erallawsandmore inclusiverelationshipsfrom thisobjective apprehen-sionofindividuallife,nonetheless thepreliminaryoperationsof under-standingandinterpretationform thebasis.Thus,thesedisciplines,likehistoryitself,dependfor theirmethodologicalcertaintyuponwhetherornot theunderstandingof individualexistencemaybe raisedtogen-eralvalidity.Soat the thresholdofhumanstudiesweencounteraproblemspecificto them aloneandquitedistinct fromanythinginvolvedin theapprehensionof nature.Human studies have indeed theadvantageoverthenatural sciencesthattheirobjectisnotsensoryappearanceassuch,nomere reflectionofrealitywithinconsciousness,but isratherfirstand foremost aninnerreality,acoherenceexperiencedfrom within.Yettheverywayinwhich thisrealityisexperiencedwithinusraisesthegravestdiffi-cultiesastoitsobjectiveapprehension.Itisnot thepurposeof thepresentessaytodeal with those difficulties.Moreover,anyinnerexperiencing,throughwhich Ibecome awareofmyowndisposition,can neverbyitselfbringme toaconsciousnessofmyownindividuality.Iexperiencethe latteronly throughacomparisonofmyselfwithotherpeople;at thatpointalone Ibecome aware ofwhatdistinguishesmefromothers,andGoethewasonlytoorightwhen hesaid thatthismostcrucial ofall ourexperiencesisalsoone of the mostdifficult,andthatourinsightinto theextent,nature,andlimitsof ourpowersre-main at bestincomplete.But the existence ofotherpeopleisgivenusonlyfrom theoutside,insensoryevents,gestures,words,andactions.Onlythroughaprocessofreconstruction[Nachbildung]dowe com-pletethissenseperception,whichinitiallytakestheform ofisolatedsigns.Wearethusobligedto translateeverything-therawmaterial,thestructure,the most individualtraits ofsuch acompletion-outofour ownsenseoflife.Thus theproblemis: how canonequiteindividuallystructuredconsciousnessbringanalienindividualityof acompletelydifferenttypetoobjective knowledgethroughsuchre-construction? Whatkindofprocessisthis,inappearancesodifferentfromthe othermodesofobjectiveknowledge?Understanding[Verstehen]is whatwecallthisprocessbywhichan
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Rise of Hermeneutics Wilhelm Dilthey
The Rise of Hermeneutics WilhelmDilthey
Note from the translator: In the "existential historicism" of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) we seem to touch the very fons et ori... (More)
Note from the translator: In the "existential historicism" of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) we seem to touch the very fons et ori... (More)
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