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124
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foreign affairs
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Volume
83
No.
6
Pervez Hoodbhoy
have nominally been in charge in Pakistan,there has never been much doubt about who actually makes decisions there. Inaddition to holding political power, thePakistani army controls vast commercialand industrial interests and owns massiverural and urban properties. As Cohenremarks, “regardless of what may be de-sirable, the army will continue to set thelimits on what is possible in Pakistan.”General Pervez Musharraf, the coun-try’s current chief executive, seized powerin a bloodless coup in 1999, and there havesince been several attempts on his life.After each, the media has warned of anuclear state careening out of control, with radical Islamists fighting to get intothe driver’s seat. Cohen rightly dismissesthis view as alarmist. If the general werekilled, the army establishment wouldquickly replace Musharraf with anothersenior o⁄cer, and various measures—theinstallation of former Citibank executiveShaukat Aziz as prime minister, mostnotably—have recently been undertakento protect against a leadership crisis.Cohen also breaks with Musharraf’sstaunchest international backers, who“see him as a wise and modern leader, asecular man who is not afraid to supportthe West or to oªer peace to India, anda man who can hold back the onrush of demagogues and Islamic extremists.”Cohen notes that “no serious Pakistanianalyst sees Musharraf in these terms. ...If he resembles any past Pakistani leader,it is General Yahya Khan—also a well-intentioned general who did the UnitedStates a great favor.” The question of why the warrior class was never tamed by civilian rule pointsback to the founding of the Pakistanistate. As the respected Pakistani scholarEqbal Ahmad has emphasized, the civil-ian system of power was never regardedby Pakistan’s citizens as just, appropriate,or authoritative. And despite Jinnah’sdeclarations, the idea of Pakistan wasunclear from the start. Lacking any clearbasis for legitimacy or direction, the statequickly aligned with the powerful landedclass: the army leadership and the economicelite joined forces to claim authority in anation without definition or cohesion.In subsequent years, the governmentmaintained the feudal structure of society and entered into a manifestly exploitativerelationship with Pakistan’s poor eastern wing (which became Bangladesh in1971 after a short but bloody war). Evennow, bonded labor is common, and many peasants live in conditions close to slavery.Politicians, with the exception of themercurial demagogue Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,have made no attempt at reform, ignoringthe hearts and minds of the masses infavor of cultivating elite favor and pursuingquick financial gain. The result has been ideologicalconfusion, civilian helplessness, and anenvironment eminently hospitable toputsches. Indeed, no elected governmenthas completed its term in Pakistan’s 57-year history. Pakistani generals expresscontempt for the civilian order and stead-fastly hold that “what is good for thearmy is good for Pakistan,” and Pakistanisociety is thoroughly militarized. Bumperstickers read, “The Finest Men Join thePakistan Army”; tanks parade on thestreets of Islamabad while jet aircraftscreech overhead; discarded naval guns,artillery pieces, and fighter aircraft adornpublic plazas. It is even a criminal oªenseto “criticize the armed forces of Pakistanor to bring them into disaªection.”
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