• Embed Doc
  • Copy Link
  • Readcast
  • Collections
  • CommentGo Back
Download
 
Page 1 of 22
Considering Iraq: a Balanced Retrospective, Future Framework &Lessons for Other Areas
 By Dave Livingston. Dave is a management consultant with almost 30 years of experience with analyzing complex business problems and developing solutions and new businesses. He blogs on public affairs at his blog Parts, Systems, Structures and Outcomes(  http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/ ) where he attempts to apply that toolkit to current affairs and public policy.
We propose a test, offer up a toolkit for thinking about “nation-building” and, hopefully, provide somelessons for the current situation in Afghanistan. The test we propose is this – can we analyze complexsocio-political policy problems by providing a useful framework? Or are we forever doomed to betrapped by simple answers, ideologies and shibboleths. In the current debates in the US over Healthcareand other policies certain partisans have staked out positions that are almost entirely polemical, whereslogans and pejorative labels are being substituted for analysis, disciplined decision-making and civility.Yet we could just as easily have made those same statements about foreign policy debates during theBush Administration where harsh criticisms were driven as much by ill-considered emotion as they wereby reasoned, informed and experienced policy-making. In three other essays we look at the warp andwoof of those issues by looking at the policies we think are required across the board (Crisis in thePublic Square [http://www.scribd.com/doc/19153835/Crisis-in-the-Public-Square-Thinking-About-Futures-Policy-and-Politics], the role of values and public leadership in moderating debates andensuring a positive outcome (Heroes, Leaders and Public Morality[http://www.scribd.com/doc/19370588/Heroes-Leaders-and-Public-Morality-Values-and-a-Healthy-Public-Square] and a general approach to thinking about the future of the Middle East and US strategicpolicy (Middle East Solutions [http://www.scribd.com/doc/19012245/Middle-East-Solutions-Issues-Relationships-Frameworks-and-Approaches].Just for the record the later piece sets a broader strategic context for this piece and argues that the ME isa vital national interest for the US because our, and the world economy, is utterly reliant on ME energysupplies. That means that stability and progress in Afghanistan is important and, even more so, that astable and prosperous Pakistan is a vital strategic goal. Further, as we debate these sorts of issues, weshould recognize that the Bush and Obama administrations have more continuity than differences ontheir policies. What’s evolved are changes in strategies, doctrine, operations and resource commitments.Also just for the record we thought that going into Iraq was necessary, in our national interest – for thesesame reasons, badly flawed in execution thru nearly malfesant executive management but eventuallyreversed itself thru that same leadership, a huge shift in strategy, doctrine and operations and laid thefoundations of a successful effort. One that could see a viable and independent state emerge in a criticalpart of the world.But don’t take our word for it – read the following essays that start with fundamental questions, ask what are the alternatives, frameworks, status & outlooks and strategies required. We’ll also note that ourstart on this piece of work predated any public knowledge or discussion of a change in Iraqi strategy andworked out to be an accurate assessment. We’ve got a long way to go but the game has been changed forthe better. That means this framework provides a useful toolkit and blueprint for future planning. Wealso would like to suggest that a similar approach is required, with adaptation and customization itshould go without saying, to Afghanistan. And, with major changes, to Pakistan, ever the entire MiddleEast. Which the essay collection of ME Solutions attempts to apply.
 
Page 2 of 22
Table of Contents
7KLQNLQJ$ERXW,UDTD%DODQFHG3HUVSHFWLYH"7KLQNLQJ$ERXW,UDTD%DODQFHG3HUVSHFWLYH"7KLQNLQJ$ERXW,UDTD%DODQFHG3HUVSHFWLYH"7KLQNLQJ$ERXW,UDTD%DODQFHG3HUVSHFWLYH"%LJ4XHVWLRQ:KDW+DSSHQVLI:H/HDYH%LJ4XHVWLRQ:KDW+DSSHQVLI:H/HDYH%LJ4XHVWLRQ:KDW+DSSHQVLI:H/HDYH%LJ4XHVWLRQ:KDW+DSSHQVLI:H/HDYH%LJ4XHVWLRQ:KDW1HHGVWR%H'RQH,I:H6WD\"%LJ4XHVWLRQ:KDW1HHGVWR%H'RQH,I:H6WD\"%LJ4XHVWLRQ:KDW1HHGVWR%H'RQH,I:H6WD\"%LJ4XHVWLRQ:KDW1HHGVWR%H'RQH,I:H6WD\"%LJ4XHVWLRQ:KDW1HHGVWR+DSSHQLQ,UDT"%LJ4XHVWLRQ:KDW1HHGVWR+DSSHQLQ,UDT"%LJ4XHVWLRQ:KDW1HHGVWR+DSSHQLQ,UDT"%LJ4XHVWLRQ:KDW1HHGVWR+DSSHQLQ,UDT"%LJ4XHVWLRQD:KDWV%HHQ+DSSHQLQJ%LJ4XHVWLRQD:KDWV%HHQ+DSSHQLQJ%LJ4XHVWLRQD:KDWV%HHQ+DSSHQLQJ%LJ4XHVWLRQD:KDWV%HHQ+DSSHQLQJLQ,UDTLQ,UDTLQ,UDTLQ,UDT,UDT520(52:WKH6WUDWHJLF&RQWH[WD3LFWXUHDQGD)HZ:RUGV,UDT520(52:WKH6WUDWHJLF&RQWH[WD3LFWXUHDQGD)HZ:RUGV,UDT520(52:WKH6WUDWHJLF&RQWH[WD3LFWXUHDQGD)HZ:RUGV,UDT520(52:WKH6WUDWHJLF&RQWH[WD3LFWXUHDQGD)HZ:RUGV:HHNO\5HDGHU6HS,UDT:HHNO\5HDGHU6HS,UDT:HHNO\5HDGHU6HS,UDT:HHNO\5HDGHU6HS,UDT,UDT6WDWLL5HIUHVKWKH6XUJHLV:RUNLQJ:HOO1RZ:KDW",UDT6WDWLL5HIUHVKWKH6XUJHLV:RUNLQJ:HOO1RZ:KDW",UDT6WDWLL5HIUHVKWKH6XUJHLV:RUNLQJ:HOO1RZ:KDW",UDT6WDWLL5HIUHVKWKH6XUJHLV:RUNLQJ:HOO1RZ:KDW"5HDGLQJV,UDT-XO5HDGLQJV,UDT-XO5HDGLQJV,UDT-XO5HDGLQJV,UDT-XO'HF&DWDVWURSKHWR6XFFHVVWR1RW'HF&DWDVWURSKHWR6XFFHVVWR1RW'HF&DWDVWURSKHWR6XFFHVVWR1RW'HF&DWDVWURSKHWR6XFFHVVWR1RWGLVFXVVHG"GLVFXVVHG"GLVFXVVHG"GLVFXVVHG",UDTWKH(PHUJHQFHRI&HQWUDO$XWKRULW\,UDTWKH(PHUJHQFHRI&HQWUDO$XWKRULW\,UDTWKH(PHUJHQFHRI&HQWUDO$XWKRULW\,UDTWKH(PHUJHQFHRI&HQWUDO$XWKRULW\7KUHH0RUHIRUWKH5RDG,UDQ6LVWDQLDQGWKH%LJ6QDNH7KUHH0RUHIRUWKH5RDG,UDQ6LVWDQLDQGWKH%LJ6QDNH7KUHH0RUHIRUWKH5RDG,UDQ6LVWDQLDQGWKH%LJ6QDNH7KUHH0RUHIRUWKH5RDG,UDQ6LVWDQLDQGWKH%LJ6QDNH7KH5RDG/HVV7UDYHOHG3HWUDHXV,UDTDQG)XWXUHV7KH5RDG/HVV7UDYHOHG3HWUDHXV,UDTDQG)XWXUHV7KH5RDG/HVV7UDYHOHG3HWUDHXV,UDTDQG)XWXUHV7KH5RDG/HVV7UDYHOHG3HWUDHXV,UDTDQG)XWXUHV,UDT5HVDUWXV5HDGLQJV6WDELOLW\3URJUHVVDQG:LOO,UDT5HVDUWXV5HDGLQJV6WDELOLW\3URJUHVVDQG:LOO,UDT5HVDUWXV5HDGLQJV6WDELOLW\3URJUHVVDQG:LOO,UDT5HVDUWXV5HDGLQJV6WDELOLW\3URJUHVVDQG:LOO
 
Page 3 of 22
Thinking About Iraq: a Balanced Perspective?
April 7, 2007http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/2007/04/thinking_about_iraq_a_balanced.html Or is it a partisan debate based on already established, pre-conceived and hardened positions? One basedon domestic political concerns rather than a careful investigation into our own long-term bests interestsand those of Iraq, the Iraqis and the region?With all the back and forth on Iraq it's hard to get the mental distance to think about it clearly and withall the factors weighted, weighed and balanced. And we seem to be more focused on what sounds goodin Peoria, or the Upper West Side for that matter, than on where our own best interests might lie. Veryhard to sort out. But almost all of the discussions seem to me to ignore the long-term consequences andthe risks, irrespective of where you stand on the original decisions.
When we look at major policy issues like this our approach is often an important, indeed critical part of the examination. And especially worth doing if you happen to believe, as I do, that this is one of themost important foreign policy issues that will impact our place in the world for decades. Put that anotherway - the risks are enormous, the consequences of not considering them could be severe and it’s in ourown personal interests to invest a little time in thinking about those issues.
By and large in huge-scale issues of this sort the original and continuing decisions are made based onour (actually politicians and policy-makers) intent for the outcome rather than asking what processes aregoing to be put in motion. There’s one critical question that should be repeated multiple times:
WHAT HAPPENS THEN ?
 That is, what is the next step in our examination, and the next and the next. Thinking beyond stage one –time-consuming, difficult and expensive. But all too often un-intended consequences are not so muchunintended as a failure to ask that question.One can argue that the initial decision likely was taken without such consideration, aside from ‘normal’military planning and post-conflict civil affairs planning. One can further argue that as the conflict hasevolved, major shifts in our opponents strategies and tactics haven’t received the broad examination theydeserve. Though we should recognize the superb efforts, spirit and adaptive ingenuities of our militaryforces. While questioning the broader policy and operational contexts they've struggled to make goodon.
Iraq: the Big Questions
Earlier we tried to ‘set the table’, so-to-speak by carefully outlining the approach to assessing the strategicsituation in Iraq. As important as this is to the well-being of America and the world, and out of respect forourselves, our troops, the Iraqis and the dead and injured, we owe it all of us to be judicious.
 
of 00

Leave a Comment

You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...
You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...