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It is interesting that the goal of tyranny is clearly stated in an early 1880 newseditorial that relates to the election of Garfield. In it you will notice the lastword in all caps: REX.!The Sentinel said it best: "Garfield's rule will be the transitory period betweenState Sovereignty and National Sovereignty. The United States Senate will give wayto a National Senate. State Constitutions and the United States Senate are relicsof State Sovereignty and implements of treason. Garfield's Presidency will be theRegency of Stalwartism; after that: REX."As is evident in this paragraph, the need to affect a National Senate was seen asessential in the conquest of State Sovereignty and reigning in what can only beconsidered as a Monarchist government, or a Monarchist Oligarchy. Indeed, JamesGarfield himself said it very clear when he proclaimed the following words:"The influence of Jefferson's Democratic principles is rapidly waning, while theprinciples of Hamilton are rapidly increasing. Power has been gravitating towardthe Central Government." -James Garfield, July 3rd, 1881.The full effect of this vile desire and criminal act was not realized until alittle over 30 years later in 1913 when three major pieces of legislations werepassed; those being the 16th, 17th Amendments and the Federal Reserve Act. In thatyear, the realization of the Nationalized Senate, indeed the Nationalized CentralGovernment was all but completed by the actions of traitors to the Republic.The Exemplary Mr. Madison stated: "If indeed it be right, that among a peoplethoroughly incorporated [not absorbed] into one nation, every district ought tohave a proportional share in the government, and that among independent andsovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequalin size, ought to have an equal share in the common councils, it does not appearto be without some reason that in a compound republic, partaking both of thenational and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture ofthe principles of proportional and equal representation. In this spirit it may beremarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutionalrecognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, andan instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality oughtto be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are notless solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improperconsolidation of the States into one simple republic."Mr. Madison is very clear, that there is an extremely important reason behindplacing layers of separation within the structure of a government that is bound bya "simple league", Sovereign and Independent States, each sharing in the commoncouncil of both through their individual Senators appointed by the States toserve, not the nation, but the respective States.Mr. Madison goes on to say: "Another advantage accruing from this ingredient inthe constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove againstimproper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without theconcurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of theStates. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may insome instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defensewhich it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be more rational, if anyinterests common to them, and distinct from those of the other States, wouldotherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always beable, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of thisprerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of law-making seemto be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible

that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than itappears to many in contemplation.Mr. Madison clearly states that the structural requirement of Senators who areanswerable to their respective States is imperative to the maintenance of bothchecks and balances within the structure as a whole and to protect the Will of thePeople through the ancillary Sovereignty of the States. Additionally, thisstructure was also an essential element in preventing potential excesses inlegislation.Mr. Madison then gives a more thorough explanation of the reasons behind theparticular Constitutional Structure of the Republic:"First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a lessdegree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget theirobligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust.In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly,distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases asalutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people, byrequiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation orperfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient.This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well understoodin the United States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. Iwill barely remark, that as the improbability of sinister combinations will be inproportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must bepolitic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance, which willconsist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principlesof republican government.You will notice Mr. Madison states, in no uncertain terms, that by requiring twoseparate and distinct bodies, as in the House of Representatives and the Senate,that such a structure not only provides a vital check on government in general,but it also doubles the security of the People themselves by requiring concurrenceof those bodies. Such concurrence would provide a necessary check to potentialambitions, usurpations and corruption that could easily occur if there was but onebody or if the two mirrored one another.With the passage of the 17th Amendment, that is exactly what happened. The Senatewas taken out of the hands of the State Legislatures, in a way it was transformednot only into a democratized unit, but it was also nationalized making it littlemore then a de facto branch within the centralized government. By placing theSenate on the open market of direct elections, the Senate no longer was aninstitution that could and did counter-balance the House of Representatives, butit was no longer a check on the general federal governments ability define its ownsovereignty over the State Republics and thus the People themselves.More importantly, the more damaging effect was that the Senate was no longeranswerable to the State Legislatures. This one act of nationalization of theSenate allowed for the neutralization of all claims, and thus powers, by theStates to their former Sovereignty and their ability to uphold that key componentof the delegation from the States of a portion of their Sovereignty to the federalgovernment. Since a Senator was now only answerable to the People in directelection, he or she could not easily be chastised, recalled or impeached by theState Legislature. This was an essential power of the individual Statelegislatures and indeed of the People themselves. As it is, the States have noreal representation within Congress itself, because like the House ofRepresentatives, the Senate is now only answerable to the People by the electoralprocess and are, in a very real sense, on the open market of influences.

Under such a system, there is particularly one type of influence upon the Senatethat exceeds all others and that influence is of the federal government. TheSenate has, in essence, become nothing more than an arm of the federal governmentand is far more likely to be in agreement with the desires of the generalgovernment instead of the People or the States.As it is, the Senate is an isolated power that does little but assist in theconcentrate the power of the federal government, centralizing its authority andexpanding its ability to usurp any power it deems fit and necessary in order toadvance its own will without the Consent of the People even though it was thePeople themselves that elected the Senate.At present, the States must compete along with other Lobbyist and SpecialInterests for the ear of the Senate. The Repeal of the 17th Amendment would be aneffective measure to decentralize the power of the federal government and would,in a very powerful measure, establish a direct line between the Sovereign StateRepublics and the general federal government. The States currently must directtheir request and concerns to numerous agencies, stepping through a labyrinth ofbureaucracies in order to attain an audience. The State Republics have little ofthe Constitutional Authority or Power as provided and enumerated within theConstitution. In a very real sense, the States have been relegated to sub-components of the general government and thereby answerable to the entire power-structure of the general federal government.Second. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of allsingle and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violentpassions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and perniciousresolutions. Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and fromproceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of othernations. But a position that will not be contradicted need not be proved. All thatneed be remarked is, that a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itselfto be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought,moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authorityby a tenure of considerable duration.In the above statement, Mr. Madison makes it perfectly clear that along with theother essential workings of the Senate, that by providing for an indirect electionby the People through the State Legislatures the Senate would be yet another checkon the potential for radical, wasteful and useless legislation. As we have seenover the decades, the Senate has been a virtual Petri Dish of all manner of novelideas and legislations, most of which have proved not in the best interest of thisCountry or its People. By placing the responsibility of the appointment of theSenate to the State Legislatures, such illegitimate and unwise legislativeexcesses can be avoided, or at least diverted by the power of the StateLegislatures to recall their Senator to explain such excesses in the Senate.In the following, Mr. Madison gave the reason for government, good government: "Agood government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government,which is the happiness of the people; secondly, knowledge of the means by whichthat object can be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both thesequalities; most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert,that in American governments too little attention has been paid to the last. Thefederal Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, itprovides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first."As seen the reason for good government is fidelity to the object of government andthat is the Happiness of the People. Additionally, the only way to attain that

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The Nationalization of the U.S. Senate and The 17th Amendment

It is interesting that the goal of tyranny is clearly stated in an early 1880 news editorial that relates to the election of Garfield. In it you will notice the last word in all... (More)

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