ZAMBIAN ECONOMIST

Ideas for a better Zambia

THE CASE FOR A STRONGER HOUSE OF CHIEFS

President Sata‟s

decision to create a ministry dedicated to traditional affairs provides aunique opportunity to review the constitutional position of the House of Chiefs and how it fitsin with broader national development. Under current arrangements the House of Chiefscontinues to be merely an "advisory body" that carries no weight. The RepublicanConstitution states under article 130 and 131:

There shall be a House of Chiefs for the Republic which shall be an advisory body to the Government on traditional, customary and any other matters referred to it by the President.Notwithstanding [Article 130], the House of Chiefs may : (a) consider and discuss any Bill dealing with, or touching on, custom or tradition before it is introduced into the National Assembly; (b) initiate, discuss and decide on matters that relate to customary law and practice; (c) consider and discuss any other matter referred to it for its consideration by the President or approved by the President for consideration by the House; and (d) submit resolutions on any Bill or other matter referred to it to the President, and the President shall cause such resolutions to be laid before the National Assembly.

The House of Chiefs has no legal tooth and serves mainly as a talking shop for chiefs. Thisunderlines the criticism once expressed by Chief Puta that the failure by the then MMDadministration to take seriously recommendations by the House of Chiefs had reduced it to a

“

mere white elephant”

As currently constituted the second chamber is not functioning as itshould and in fact continues to drain resources from the national coffers that could be betterchannel in fighting poverty.The absence of credible power has also had another unintended effect. It has created asituation where very few credible chiefs take House of Chiefs matters seriously, leading to ade facto house of lemons. The poor reputation of the House of Chiefs has led to good chiefsstaying outside because it is not worth their time and effort, despite the enticing allowances.The exit of credible chiefs from the second chamber has given way to corrupt and illiteratechiefs who are attracted to the chamber in equal measure. In short

it‟s a

classic

“

market forlemons

”

, with only the bad eggs left in the business. It

‟

s no surprise therefore that over thelast decade the House of Chiefs has largely been dominated by corrupt and politicallycaptured chiefs. Corruption is always rife in advisory bodies because such entities are usedby the Executive to reward political friends in exchange for staying in power, as waswitnessed under the MMD rule with its many electoral endorsements from traditional leaders.The case for reform has never been more urgent. However in reforming the

House of Chiefs

we must first ask a broader question

–

what role, if any, should there be for culture /

traditions in Zambia‟s development model? Answering that question requires us to firstdefine what we mean by “development” and then assess

the role that

“culture / traditions”

should play, if any, in shaping that development.The standard approach to development issues has tended to see economic improvement asthe essence of development. Economic growth expands choices and improves socialwelfare. Development comes essentially to mean higher and higher growth. A large amountof time is spent finding ways in which national economic growth can be enhanced. Current

consensus points to the need to develop “open institutions” that are much more suited

tohigher quality growth e.g. greater democratic institutions. Under this largely

“western” modelthere‟s no special role for

cultural or religious functions. Where such exists, these mustnecessarily be subservient to higher ideals of n

ational growth. There‟s certainly merit in the

ZAMBIAN ECONOMIST

Ideas for a better Zambia

standard model that Zambia has unreservedly embraced over the last two decades.However, for development to be meaningful to our people it must be owned by them. Stateddifferently, it must have an intrinsic Zambian definition, especially at the

local level

.The problem with the standard western centric development model is that it

presupposes

thenature and

meaning of “development” for every Zambian and seeks to realign national

institutions accordingly to deliver those ideals (i.e. high quality growth). However, it is quitefeasible that an

alternative definition

of development may command different requirementson the type of local institutions that delivers that development. It is arguable that until that isdone Zambians will never see development. Indeed, the reason why people are not

experiencing

the benefits of current national growth spurt is not only that the growth patternsare unequal, and increasing, but also that Zambians have inherently different

expectations

ofwhat development means to them. Real development is not something that can be deliveredfrom the top down, it must be defined from the bottom-up. It is not something that can bedefined by bureaucrats in Lusaka. It must emerge from our villages in Kashikishi and otherplaces. It requires an explicit

local approach

.Development therefore rightly understood is the increase in the freedom of localcommunities to determine their own destiny, consistent with their cultural and social beliefs.To have genuine development Zambia needs to put in place policies that allow each localityto maximise these developmental freedoms. This requires two important steps. First, eachdistrict / constituency needs to define its vision of development is and how it would like tosee that delivered. Secondly, each locality needs to ask itself what local institutions it wantsto put in place to help deliver that development.Now it might be the case that Mwansabombwe residents

may see “development”

in terms ofgreater emphasis on traditional norms (e.g. less democratic openness) combined withparticipatory budgeting, but with minimal emphasis on economic growth. Mufulira residentsmay have the opposite view (more democratic openness and growth, but erosion oftraditional forms), with Kapiri Mponshi residents opting for a mid way house between twoextremes. The important point is that we should allow each area to define their vision ofdevelopment and the appropriate local institutions that accords to their goals. It should notbe the role of central government to super impose its world view on local people. Such anapproach does not deliver development because only local people really know whatdevelopment means for them. In some cases, they will reject democratic openness and in

some others they‟ll embrace it.

This approach raises the inevitable question of how we integrate the constituent parts toform a meaningful whole. The starting point is that we must start with a basic affirmation:

strong societies are those societies which are supported by a tripod of strong markets,strong democratic foundation and religious or cultural institutions

. Despite the limitations ofmarkets high quality growth at the national level is necessary for delivering increasedchoices that improves social welfare. Culture plays a strong and dynamic role in creatingdurable societies. Equally, we hold that democracy has 'intrinsic value' and is important in itsown right. The question is: how do we ensure that our vision of local people driveninstitutions support the emergence of this

strong

national apparatus?It is in answering that question that the role of the House of Chiefs becomes important.Having recognised that the notion of development and culture are interlinked, the next stepis to ensure that

nationally

there‟s a greater affirmation of our traditions by bring them to

centre of decision making. If this logical connection is accepted then, the chieftaincy that arethe very heart of our cultural traditions must be recognised as having a primary role inshaping national life. This would be most viable through reinforcing the chieftaincy in local

ZAMBIAN ECONOMIST

Ideas for a better Zambia

government and ensuring that the House of Chiefs becomes a credible second chamber thatlinks local preferences on traditions to national ideals on high quality growth.The local role of chiefs would be dictated by how localities define development and the levelof emphasis they place on using existing cultural institutions to foster development. Forsome areas, the role of chiefs may open up the possibility of a new model that improves on

role they played during colonialism as “native authorities”, working hand in hand with local

administrators and representatives. The problem at the moment is that everyone in thevillage runs to the chief for justice administration and economic sustenance (more on this infuture essays). Unfortunately many chiefs have no financial budget or clearly defined role inmeeting these needs. The travesty of colonialism is that it reduced the chieftaincy whichprior to that period had served the people so well to an irrelevant spectator. The localgovernment apparatus has continued that parallel approach (government imposed systemand traditional authorities) and with it a huge and inefficient struggle in delivering localdevelopment.

Two important legitimate concerns may be raised regarding this “traditional infusion”. The

first relates to the problem of corrupt local elites in league with traditional leadership whousurp local rules. This issue of course is present in any arrangement, though slightlyamplified in this context. However, it does point to the importance of participatoryapproaches in local governance arrangements. The model suggested above accomplishesthis through fiscally devolving power to the local people which allows them to prioritisespending and make their own decisions

–

based on areas they believe are vital to theirdevelopment pursuit.The second relates to the issue of universal rights. Would the new local apparatus lead todiscrimination against other tribe and, women? Could it lead to perpetuation of tribalism andnational disintegration? The issue of universal rights is handled through national legislation

and relate to observance of rule of law e.g. legislation on the „bill of rights‟

. The suggested

reforms do not change the need to uphold these areas. The question of “tribalism” is more

challenging and demands solutions at the local and national levels, as part of the broaderdebate on tackling corruption and its many variants.At the national level, the key is putting in place a much stronger

House of Chiefs

. A secondchamber, also drawing in religious leaders, would provide checks and balances toParliament. This would be similar to the

House of Lords

in the UK. However, unlike theBritish version, chiefs would have

direct link

to the grass roots since they would operate boththrough chiefdoms and within a revised and integrated local government system. By movingthe chieftaincy to the legislative centre, it would enhance democracy rather than weaken it.For example, under the proposed model land redistribution and reform of customary lawwould be easier to undertake because chiefs would be connected to the centre and with real

administrative power, they would not feel „threatened‟.

Opposition against a stronger

House of Chief

s centres on the “undemocratic” natu

re of suchreforms. This position is misguided because it essentially suffers from

the illusion of pervasive democracy

. Much of what affects our every day existence is thrust on us byunelected people. The entire bureaucracy of government that drafts legislation and buildscomplexity upon complexity in our laws and policies is not elected. Indeed, in Parliament wecontinue to have unelected nominated parliamentarians. The argument also fails because itis built on a presupposition of democracy as a means to an end. As noted the goal is tohave a stronger society, of which the democratic aspect is an important supporting leg. If wecan have a less democratic second chamber that helps deliver that strong society that