IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIADICK ANTHONY HELLER, et al.,)Case No. 03-CV-0213-EGS)Plaintiffs,)

DECLARATION OF

)

ALAN GURA

v.))DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,))Defendants.) ____________________________________)

DECLARATION OF ALAN GURA

I, Alan Gura, am competent to state and declare the following based on my personalknowledge.1.I earned my Juris Doctor degree from Georgetown University in 1995, the year inwhich I was first admitted to practice law. I earned my Bachelor of Arts degreefrom Cornell University in 1992. I am a member of the California, District of Columbia, and Virginia bars.2.Upon graduation from law school, I clerked for the Hon. Terrence W. Boyle onthe United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.Subsequently, I served as a Deputy Attorney General for the State of California, inthe Civil Division of the California Department of Justice. Based in the LosAngeles office, I covered courts throughout southern and central California. I wastasked with first-chair responsibility for representing the state and its employees ina broad array of matters, in trial and on appeal. I handled dozens of cases, ranging

from aviation to privacy rights, but the heaviest component of my workloadconsisted of civil rights work under Section 1983.3.From 1998 to 2000, I worked at the Washington, D.C. offices of Sidley & Austinas an associate, where I continued working on civil rights cases in addition tovarious commercial litigation matters. From early 2000 through early 2001, Iserved as Counsel to the United States Senate Judiciary Committee,Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight. I first opened my own practice in2001, focusing primarily in civil rights and intellectual property litigation. Thesize of our firm has fluctuated over the years, but my practice has always retaineda significant amount of pro bono and reduced rate civil rights litigation. Althoughthis work is personally rewarding, it is difficult to sustain as civil rights plaintiffsare, as a rule, never able to afford representation. Even in cases where acontingency fee arrangement might be possible owing to the availability of moneydamages, these cases are usually made feasible by the prospect of recovering feesunder fee shifting provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We do not have astandard set hourly rate charged to all clients. Fees vary from matter to matter, based on a host of factors, with many matters handled on a flat-fee, contingency,or blended basis. My clients include victims of police brutality and incompetence(including on occasion Defendants’ victims), non-profit organizations, andcreative individuals with copyright claims that could not be viable absent the fee-shifting provision of 17 U.S.C. § 505.4.I have been published in various legal and general interest publications, includingthe Texas Review of Law and Politics, the

Los Angeles Daily Journal

Legal

Times

, the

American Enterprise

, and

Washington Jewish Week

, for which I author a column on a monthly basis.5.In setting the fee arrangement for this litigation, it was never my intention torecover anything close to a market rate from Robert Levy, nor did I believe thatRobert Levy should bear such a burden, especially as he had volunteered to payfor the costs of the litigation personally. I took a calculated risk in setting anominal, fixed, and capped rate that was quickly exhausted.6.My proposal to Mr. Levy for becoming involved in the litigation was set forth inan email I sent him December 11, 2002 at 1:38 PM, which provides in pertinent part: “I am interested in taking on this project, but cannot do so on a [completelyfree] pro bono basis. I am, however, sympathetic to the cause and sensitive to theneed to limit the cost of this venture. I am therefore willing to work for areduced, flat fee of [redacted] plus expenses . . . .In the event fees are recoveredunder section 1988, Bivens, or EAJA, I would keep any fees recovered in excessof [redacted]. Fee rights would be assigned to my firm and could not be waived by the clients. . . .” Subsequently Mr. Levy and I agreed to my proposed flat fee,comprised of a cap and reduced rate. Dividing that fee, in dollars, by the number of hours worked yields a single digit number, and the final payment under thisarrangement was received in mid-2003.7.I could not have taken the litigation absent the prospect of recovering fees fromthe city under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and I always believed that if we were to achieveour ultimate goal – securing the Second Amendment as an individual right beforethe Supreme Court – that this would merit an enhancement under Section 1988’s