• Embed Doc
  • Copy Link
  • Readcast
  • Collections
  • CommentGo Back
Download
 
 
Page 1
 
ON LIBERTY
byJohn Stuart Mill
 (1859)
CHAPTER I
 
INTRODUCTORY
 THE subject of this Essay is not
the so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunatelyopposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or SocialLiberty: the nature and limits of the powerwhich can be legitimately exercised bysociety over the individual. A questionseldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, ingeneral terms, but which profoundlyinfluences the practical controversies of theage by its latent presence, and is likely soonto make itself recognized as the vitalquestion of the future. It is so far from beingnew, that, in a certain sense, it has dividedmankind, almost from the remotest ages, butin the stage of progress into which the morecivilized portions of the species have nowentered, it presents itself under newconditions, and requires a different and morefundamental treatment. The strugglebetween Liberty and Authority is the mostconspicuous feature in the portions of historywith which we are earliest familiar,particularly in that of Greece, Rome, andEngland. But in old times this contest wasbetween subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government. By liberty,was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. The rulers were conceived(except in some of the popular governmentsof Greece) as in a necessarily antagonisticposition to the people whom they ruled. Theyconsisted of a governing One, or a governingtribe or caste, who derived their authorityfrom inheritance or conquest; who, at allevents, did not hold it at the pleasure of thegoverned, and whose supremacy men didnot venture, perhaps did not desire, tocontest, whatever precautions might betaken against its oppressive exercise. Theirpower was regarded as necessary, but alsoas highly dangerous; as a weapon which theywould attempt to use against their subjects,no less than against external enemies. Toprevent the weaker members of thecommunity from being preyed upon byinnumerable vultures, it was needful thatthere should be an animal of prey strongerthan the rest, commissioned to keep themdown. But as the king of the vultures wouldbe no less bent upon preying upon the flockthan any of the minor harpies, it wasindispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against his beak and claws. The aim,therefore, of patriots, was to set limits to thepower which the ruler should be suffered toexercise over the community; and thislimitation was what they meant by liberty. Itwas attempted in two ways. First, byobtaining a recognition of certain immunities,called political liberties or rights, which it wasto be regarded as a breach of duty in theruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe,specific resistance, or general rebellion, washeld to be justifiable. A second, andgenerally a later expedient, was theestablishment of constitutional checks; bywhich the consent of the community, or of abody of some sort supposed to represent itsinterests, was made a necessary condition tosome of the more important acts of thegoverning power. To the first of these modesof limitation, the ruling power, in mostEuropean countries, was compelled, more orless, to submit. It was not so with thesecond; and to attain this, or when alreadyin some degree possessed, to attain it morecompletely, became everywhere the principalobject of the lovers of liberty. And so long asmankind were content to combat one enemyby another, and to be ruled by a master, oncondition of being guaranteed more or less
 
 
Page 2
 
efficaciously against his tyranny, they did notcarry their aspirations beyond this point.A time, however, came in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it anecessity of nature that their governorsshould be an independent power, opposed ininterest to themselves. It appeared to themmuch better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants ordelegates, revocable at their pleasure. Inthat way alone, it seemed, could they havecomplete security that the powers of government would never be abused to theirdisadvantage. By degrees, this new demandfor elective and temporary rulers became theprominent object of the exertions of thepopular party, wherever any such partyexisted; and superseded, to a considerableextent, the previous efforts to limit thepower of rulers. As the struggle proceededfor making the ruling power emanate fromthe periodical choice of the ruled, somepersons began to think that too muchimportance had been attached to thelimitation of the power itself. That (it mightseem) was a resource against rulers whoseinterests were habitually opposed to those of the people. What was now wanted was, thatthe rulers should be identified with thepeople; that their interest and will should bethe interest and will of the nation. The nationdid not need to be protected against its ownwill. There was no fear of its tyrannizing overitself. Let the rulers be effectually responsibleto it, promptly removable by it, and it couldafford to trust them with power of which itcould itself dictate the use to be made. Theirpower was but the nation's own power,concentrated, and in a form convenient forexercise. This mode of thought, or ratherperhaps of feeling, was common among thelast generation of European liberalism, in theContinental section of which, it stillapparently predominates. Those who admitany limit to what a government may do,except in the case of such governments asthey think ought not to exist, stand out asbrilliant exceptions among the politicalthinkers of the Continent. A similar tone of sentiment might by this time have beenprevalent in our own country, if thecircumstances which for a time encouraged ithad continued unaltered.But, in political and philosophical theories, aswell as in persons, success discloses faultsand infirmities which failure might haveconcealed from observation. The notion, thatthe people have no need to limit their powerover themselves, might seem axiomatic,when popular government was a thing onlydreamed about, or read of as having existedat some distant period of the past. Neitherwas that notion necessarily disturbed by suchtemporary aberrations as those of the FrenchRevolution, the worst of which were the workof an usurping few, and which, in any case,belonged, not to the permanent working of popular institutions, but to a sudden andconvulsive outbreak against monarchical andaristocratic despotism. In time, however, ademocratic republic came to occupy a largeportion of the earth's surface, and madeitself felt as one of the most powerfulmembers of the community of nations; andelective and responsible government becamesubject to the observations and criticismswhich wait upon a great existing fact. It wasnow perceived that such phrases as "self-government," and "the power of the peopleover themselves," do not express the truestate of the case. The "people" who exercisethe power, are not always the same peoplewith those over whom it is exercised, and the"self-government" spoken of, is not thegovernment of each by himself, but of eachby all the rest. The will of the people,moreover, practically means, the will of themost numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those whosucceed in making themselves accepted asthe majority; the people, consequently, maydesire to oppress a part of their number; and
 
 
Page 3
 
precautions are as much needed against this,as against any other abuse of power. Thelimitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals, loses none of its importance when the holders of power areregularly accountable to the community, thatis, to the strongest party therein. This viewof things, recommending itself equally to theintelligence of thinkers and to the inclinationof those important classes in Europeansociety to whose real or supposed interestsdemocracy is adverse, has had no difficultyin establishing itself; and in politicalspeculations "the tyranny of the majority" isnow generally included among the evilsagainst which society requires to be on itsguard.Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of themajority was at first, and is still vulgarly,held in dread, chiefly as operating throughthe acts of the public authorities. Butreflecting persons perceived that whensociety is itself the tyran--society collectively,over the separate individuals who composeit--its means of tyrannizing are not restrictedto the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can anddoes execute its own mandates: and if itissues wrong mandates instead of right, orany mandates at all in things with which itought not to meddle, it practises a socialtyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usuallyupheld by such extreme penalties, it leavesfewer means of escape, penetrating muchmore deeply into the details of life, andenslaving the soul itself. Protection,therefore, against the tyranny of themagistrate is not enough; there needsprotection also against the tyranny of theprevailing opinion and feeling; against thetendency of society to impose, by othermeans than civil penalties, its own ideas andpractices as rules of conduct on those whodissent from them; to fetter thedevelopment, and, if possible, prevent theformation, of any individuality not inharmony with its ways, and compel allcharacters to fashion themselves upon themodel of its own. There is a limit to thelegitimate interference of collective opinionwith individual independence; and to findthat limit, and maintain it againstencroachment, is as indispensable to a goodcondition of human affairs, as protectionagainst political despotism.But though this proposition is not likely to becontested in general terms, the practicalquestion, where to place the limit--how tomake the fitting adjustment betweenindividual independence and social control--isa subject on which nearly everything remainsto be done. All that makes existence valuableto any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people.Some rules of conduct, therefore, must beimposed, by law in the first place, and byopinion on many things which are not fitsubjects for the operation of law. What theserules should be, is the principal question inhuman affairs; but if we except a few of themost obvious cases, it is one of those whichleast progress has been made in resolving.No two ages, and scarcely any two countries,have decided it alike; and the decision of oneage or country is a wonder to another. Yetthe people of any given age and country nomore suspect any difficulty in it, than if itwere a subject on which mankind had alwaysbeen agreed. The rules which obtain amongthemselves appear to them self-evident andself-justifying. This all but universal illusion isone of the examples of the magical influenceof custom, which is not only, as the proverbsays a second nature, but is continuallymistaken for the first. The effect of custom,in preventing any misgiving respecting therules of conduct which mankind impose onone another, is all the more completebecause the subject is one on which it is notgenerally considered necessary that reasonsshould be given, either by one person to
of 00

Leave a Comment

You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...
You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...