Past history and recent intelligence have shown that New York City (NYC), a critical node of the U.S. economy, is clearly in the terrorist's crosshairs. In order to reduce the probability, lessen the risk, and minimize the consequences of a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD), or "dirty bomb," attack, NYC's first responders must be adequately prepared for its seemingly inevitable occurrence. This particular type of attack on NYC has the potential to create immense panic and confusion on behalf of the general public. Adding to the complexity of the problem is the notion that, since 9/11, the expected actions taken by employees in NYC high-rise office buildings in response to shelter-in-place instructions can be extremely difficult to predict. Therefore, a proposed public awareness campaign and a shelter-in-place plan are two cost-effective and easily implemented terrorism preparedness programs that would build the confidence and increase the capability of the citizenry. Since an RDD incident would likely result in a major inter-agency emergency operation, the unification of command, control, and coordination among NYC's first responder community is an essential element to its overall success. Hence, an informed and collaborative response by both public and private sector entities could potentially reduce casualties and save lives.
CONTENTS * I. INTRODUCTION * A. PROBLEM STATEMENT * B. LITERATURE REVIEW * C. METHOD * II. THREATS * A. CURRENT TRENDS IN NYC TERRORISM * 1. Introduction * 2. Recent History * 3. Types of Terrorist Groups * 4. Types of Attacks of Greatest Concern * 5. Conclusion * III. VULNERABILITIES * A. THE INEVITABLE RDD ATTACK * 1. Introduction * 2. Risk-based Funding * 3. Nuclear Terrorism * 4. New York City's Vulnerabilities * 5. Implications for the U.S. * 6. Conclusion * IV. PREVENTION AND RESPONSE * A. FIRST RESPONDER APPLICATION OF RADIATION DETECTION TECHNOLOGY * 1. Introduction * 2. Personal Radiation Detectors * 3. Hand-Held Survey Meters * 4. Radionuclide Identifier Devices * 5. Radiation Portal Monitors * 6. Conclusion * V. PUBLIC AWARENESS * A. MANAGING RADIOLOGICAL FEAR THROUGH PUBLIC EDUCATION AND RISK COMMUNICATION * 1. Introduction * 2. Fear of Radiation * 3. Pre-event Fear Management * 4. Event Fear Management * 5. Conclusion * VI. SHELTERING-IN-PLACE * A. MANHATTAN SHELTER-IN-PLACE FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS * 1. Introduction * 2. Key Assumptions * 3. Public Reaction to Instructions * 4. First Responder Guidance * 5. FDNY Sheltering-in-place Survey * 6. Recommendations * 7. Conclusion * VII. INTER-AGENCY COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COOPERATION * A. CITYWIDE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CIMS) POLICY IMPLICATIONS * 1. Introduction * 2. Historical Background * 3. Pros * 4. Cons * 5. Political Ramifications * 6. Policy Recommendations * 7. Conclusion * VIII. CONCLUSIONS * A. STRATEGIC PLAN - INCREASING NYC'S "DIRTY BOMB" PREPAREDNESS * 1. Specific Strategic Goal * 2. Fundamental Issues * 3. New Lines of Business * 4. Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes * 5. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) * 6. Benchmarking * 7. Implementing the Plan * 8. Strategic Initiatives * 9. Alternatives * 10. Conclusion * B. PROBLEMS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH * LIST OF REFERENCES
Similar to "Dirty Bomb" Attack: Assessing New York City's Level of Preparedness from a First Responder's Perspective - RDD Threats, Terrorists, Nuclear Terrorism, Meters and Monitors, Sheltering in Place