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Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan
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Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan
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Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan
Ebook475 pages8 hours

Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan

Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

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The US Government invested millions in Helmand in the 1950s and '60s to transform the barren desert into a veritable oasis - known locally as 'Little America' - and then the money ran out. Four decades later, Helmand was again the focus of US efforts, as waves of Marines descended on the region. Little America tells the story of the long arc of American involvement, and of the campaign to salvage a victory in southern Afghanistan on Obama's watch. Has the war been worth the money and the bloodshed? Through vivid storytelling and on-the-ground reporting, Samuel Johnson Prize-winner, Rajiv Chandrasekeran sets out to find the answer.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateJul 5, 2012
ISBN9781408831816
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Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan
Author

Rajiv Chandrasekaran

Rajiv Chandrasekaran is an assisting managing editor of the Washington Post, where he has worked since 1994. He previously served the Post as a bureau chief in Baghdad, Cairo and Southeast Asia, and as a correspondent covering the war in Afghanistan. He recently completed a term as journalist-in-residence at the International Reporting Project at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, and was a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center. He lives in Washington, D.C.

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  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    Little America analyzes the efforts of US and allied forces to combat the Taliban and “nation build” in Afghanistan. “Little America” refers to a large-scale program carried out in the 1950’s and 1960’s by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to reclaim unproductive land in southwest Afghanistan by an elaborate network of irrigation canals and electric power stations. An American village for the planners and engineers was constructed in the region called “Little America” by the inhabitants. Despite millions of dollars of investment the plan failed. The engineers failed to recognize that the salinity of the water used to irrigate would ultimately make growing crops nearly impossible. The area reverted to its dilapidated and hard scrabble state. Little American exemplifies American overreach and our persistent mistake of presuming that what works in American can – with American “know-how” – be transplanted anywhere. Fast forward 50 years and we find Americans trying yet again to bring prosperity to the region while fighting Taliban insurgents throughout the Helmand province. After the misguided adventure in Iraq subsided in 2008-09 the US switched its focus to Afghanistan. A counter insurgency strategy, successful in Iraq under General David Petraeus, was shifted to Afghanistan. Counter insurgency was aimed at winning the “hearts and minds” of Afghanis through the infusion of massive amount of funds for public works projects. A close corollary was to build the capacity of the national government so that the people would see the government as a desirable alternative to the Taliban. While fighting the Taliban was the key to securing a region the follow along efforts to bring benefits to the people was thought to be the means to secure and maintain the loyalty of the local population.Chandrasekaran spent several years on the ground in the country looking closely at all aspects of this initiative. He concludes that it largely has failed. He looked primarily in Helmand province, a hotbed of Taliban activity whose major city Kandahar was threatened by Taliban takeover. The so-called surge of troops implemented by President Obama early in his first term gave the fighting forces sufficient strength to push the Taliban back. The top military leaders felt that going into the rural areas was a waste of effort, that the most attention should be paid to Kandahar and surrounding environs. The Marine commanders felt otherwise driven by their bias toward offensive actions everywhere throughout the province. This meant that they were capturing control over areas that had little strategic or practical value given the alternative for use of combat resources.The civic works projects, intended to win over the population, largely failed. Communication, coordination and cooperation between the State Department (particularly the USAID) and the military was poor. Massive sums of money were made available with the expectation that projects would be quickly designed and rapidly implemented. It was clear that Obama intended to draw down US involvement in the country and that it must be “saved” in short order so that the US effort could be deemed a success. Adding greatly to the poor outcomes of this well-meaning effort was the utter corruption of the national government. By intending to build a strong and effective Afghanis government the US was forced to work closely with corrupt government officials which meant essentially that we were abetting criminality. While the final outcome is still not known it seems highly doubtful that in the long term a western style ethos of impartial competent governance will prevail.Some astute analysts counseled that a long and steady engagement with Afghanistan could ultimately achieve stability. Clearly, this approach is not acceptable to policy makers in the US and certainly not the general public as well. Should it not be plain after decades of foreign policy failures that American simply cannot tolerate the long pull? We seem to demand quick fixes that don’t create sacrifices or even inconveniences on our part.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    Another great job of interpretive, analytical reporting bu Chandrasekaran. I wish my years in the U.S. Foreign Service did not reinforce the failures of accountability, cooperation, and strategic thought and action that he documents. Unfortunately, everything he writes rings true. More people outside the Beltway should read this book and then demand change based on its lessons.

    1 person found this helpful

  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    As he did in his book on the Green Zone in Iraq, Chandrasekaran blisteringly reveals American arrogance, wastefulness, and infighting leading to incompetent planning and execution of the mission/s (because people disagreed about what the idea was) in Afghanistan. It’s hard to pick out the most awful part, but my candidate is the way that USAID repeatedly stopped projects to get Afghan farmers growing cotton—a cash crop that they really could have sold in-country in place of opium poppies—because Afghan cotton might someday, theoretically, compete with American cotton. Because that’s really much more important than cutting off the Taliban’s funding and providing Afghan farmers with a sustainable crop!

    1 person found this helpful