PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
G.W.F. Hegel
Translated by William Wallace
This page copyright © 2001 Blackmask Online.http://www.blackmask.comINTRODUCTION
•
•
•
SUB−SECTIONB. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
A. ART
•
B. REVEALED RELIGION(1)
•
C. PHILOSOPHY
•
Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences
INTRODUCTION
¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the most 'concrete' of sciences. Thesignificance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself − whether we look at it in itself or under thehistorical circumstances of its first utterance − is not to promote mere self−knowledge in respect of theparticular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commandsmeans that of man's genuine reality − of what is essentially and ultimately true and real − of mind as the trueand essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called knowledge of men − the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passions, and foibles of other men, and lay barewhat are called the recesses of the human heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unlesson the assumption that we know the universal − man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And foranother, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and untrue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach theunderlying essence of them all − the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been already alluded to in theIntroduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing metaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive)psychology, on the other hand, deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, whenobservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, suchpsychology was worked on the same lines as other sciences. In this way it came about that the metaphysicaltheory was kept outside the inductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment ordetail: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional common− sense metaphysicswith its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., and rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment.
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND1
Leave a Comment