Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
1Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
Kilos Bayan

Kilos Bayan

Ratings: (0)|Views: 20|Likes:

More info:

Published by: Areo Angelo Banquerigo on Jul 17, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

02/23/2014

pdf

text

original

 
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
 ManilaEN BANC
G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO,EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSECUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO,
petitioners,vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING
 
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
respondents
.
 R E S O L U T I O N
MENDOZA,
 J.:
 Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They insist that the decision in the first case has already settled (1) whetherpetitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine CharitySweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. Consequently,petitioners contend, these questions can no longer be reopened.Because two members of the Court did not consider themselves bound by the decision in the first case, petitioners suggest that the two,in joining the dissenters in the first case in reexamining the questions in the present case, acted otherwise than according to law. Theycite the following statement in the opinion of the Court:The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members sustainingpetitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous onethat is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there have been changes in themembership of the Court, with the retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of thisopinion and Justice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling as topetitioners' standing.Petitioners claim that this statement "conveys a none too subtle suggestion, perhaps a Freudian slip, that the two newappointees, regardless of the merit of the Decision in the first Kilosbayan case against the lotto (Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona,232 SCRA 110 (1994)) must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters in the first caseand constitute the new majority in the second lotto case." And petitioners ask, "
why should it be so? 
"Petitioners ask a question to which they have made up an answer. Their attempt at psychoanalysis, detecting a Freudian slip where noneexists, may be more revealing of their own unexpressed wish to find motives where there are none which they can impute to some
 
members of the Court.For the truth is that the statement is no more than an effort to
explain
 
rather than to
justify 
 
the majority's decision to overrule theruling in the previous case. It is simply meant to explain that because the five members of the Court who dissented in the first case (Melo,Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan,
 JJ 
.) and the two new members (Mendoza and Francisco,
 JJ 
.) thought the previous ruling to beerroneous
and 
its reexamination not to be barred by
stare decisis
,
res judicata
or conclusiveness of judgment, or law of the case, it washardly tenable for petitioners to insist on the first ruling.Consequently to petitioners' question "
What is the glue that holds them together 
," implying some ulterior motives on the part of the newmajority in reexamining the two questions, the answer is: None, except a conviction on the part of the five, who had been members of theCourt at the time they dissented in the first case, and the two new members that the previous ruling was erroneous. The eighth Justice(Padilla,
 J 
.) on the other hand agrees with the seven Justices that the ELA is in a real sense a lease agreement and therefore does not violate R.A. No. 1169.
 
The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz,
 J 
.) and one of thedissenters (Bidin,
 J 
.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the first case was later reversed.It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two questions is barred because the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation made a "
formal commitmen
not to ask for a reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case and instead submit a newagreement that would be in conformity with the PCSO Charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) and with the Decision of the Supreme Court 
 
in the first Kilosbayan case against on-line, hi-tech lotto."To be sure, a new contract was entered into which the majority of the Court finds has been purged of the features which made the first contract objectionable. Moreover, what the PCSO said in its manifestation in the first case was the following:1. They are no longer filing a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated May 5, 1994,a copy of which was received on May 6, 1994.2. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently negotiating a new lease agreement consistent with the authority of PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) and conformable with the pronouncements of this Honorable Court in its Decision of May 5, 1995.The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as the PCSO.There was thus no "formal commitment"
but 
only a manifestation
 
that the parties were not filing a motion for reconsideration. Evenif the parties made a "formal commitment," the six (6) dissenting Justices certainly could not be bound thereby not to insist on theircontrary view on the question of standing. Much less were the two new members bound by any "formal commitment" made by theparties. They believed that the ruling in the first case was erroneous. Since in their view reexamination was not barred by the doctrineof 
stare decisis
,
res judicata
or conclusiveness of judgment or law of the case, they voted the way they did with the remaining five (5)dissenters in the first case to form a new majority of eight.Petitioners ask, "
Why should this be so? 
" Because, as explained in the decision, the first decision was erroneous
and 
no legal doctrine stoodin the way of its reexamination. It can, therefore, be asked "with equal candor": "Why should this
not 
be so?"Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested, if not reversed, in a subsequent case because of change in the membership of a court.In 1957, this Court, voting 6-5, held in
Feliciano v 
.
Aquinas
, G.R. No. L-10201, Sept. 23, 1957 that the phrase "at the time of the election" in§2174 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 meant that a candidate for municipal elective position must be at least 23 years of ageon the
date of the election
. On the other hand, the dissenters argued that it was enough if he attained that age on the day he assumedoffice.Less than three years later, the same question was before the Court again, as a candidate for municipal councilor stated under oath in hercertificate of candidacy that she was eligible for that position although she attained the requisite age (23 years) only when she assumedoffice. The question was whether she could be prosecuted for falsification. In
People v 
.
Yang
, 107 Phi. 888 (1960), the Court ruled she
 
could
not 
. Justice, later Chief Justice, Benison, who dissented in the first case,
Feliciano v 
.
 Aquinas
,
supra
, wrote the opinion of the Court,holding that while the statement that the accused was eligible was "inexact or erroneous, according to the majority in the Feliciano case,"the accused could not be held liable for falsification, becausethe question [whether the law really required candidates to have the required age on the day of the election orwhether it was sufficient that they attained it at the beginning of the term of office]
has not been discussed anew 
,
despite the presence of new members
; we simply
assume
for the purpose of this decision that the doctrinestands.Thus because in the meantime there had been a change in the membership of the Court with the retirement of two members (Recess andFlex,
 JJ 
.) who had taken part in the decision in the first case and their replacement by new members (Barrera and Gutierrez-David,
 JJ 
.)and the fact that the vote in the first case was a narrow one (6 to 5), the Court allowed that the continuing validity of its ruling in the first case might well be doubted. For this reason it gave the accused the benefit of the doubt that she had acted in the good faith belief that it was sufficient that she was 23 years of age when she assumed office.In that case, the change in the membership of the Court and the possibility of change in the ruling were noted without anyone
muchless would-be psychoanalysts
finding in the statement of the Court any Freudian slip. The possibility of change in the rule as a result of change in membership was accepted as a sufficient reason for finding good faith and lack of criminal intent on the part of the accused.Indeed, a change in the composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an erroneous decision. This was the lesson of 
Knox 
.
Lee
, 12 Wall. 457 (1871). The Legal Tender Acts, which were passed during the Civil War, made U.S. notes (greenbacks) legal tender forthe payment of debts, public or private, with certain exceptions. The validity of the acts, as applied to preexisting debts, was challengedin
Hepburn v 
.
Griswold 
, 8 Wall. 603 (1869). The Court was then composed of only eight (8) Justices because of Congressional effort to
 
limit the appointing power of President Johnson. Voting 5-3, the Court declared the acts void. Chief Justice Chase wrote the opinion of theCourt in which four others, including Justice Grier, concurred. Justices Miller, Swayne and Davis dissented. A private memorandum left bythe dissenting Justices described how an effort was made "to convince an aged and infirm member of the court [Justice Grier] that he hadnot understood the question on which he voted," with the result that what was originally a 4-4 vote was converted into a majority (5-3)for holding the acts invalid.On the day the decision was announced, President Grant nominated to the Court William Strong and Joseph P. Bradley to fill the vacancycaused by the resignation of Justice Grier and to restore the membership of the Court to nine. In 1871,
Hepburn v 
.
Griswold 
was overruledin the Legal Tender Cases, as
Knox v 
.
Lee
came to be known, in an opinion by Justice Strong, with a dissenting opinion by Chief JusticeChase and the three other surviving members of the former majority. There were allegations that the new Justices were appointed fortheir known views on the validity of the Legal Tender Acts, just as there were others who defended the character and independence of the new Justices. History has vindicated the overruling of the Hepburn case by the new majority. The Legal Tender Cases proved to be theCourt's means of salvation from what Chief Justice Hughes later described as one of the Court's "self-inflicted wounds."
1
 We now consider the specific grounds for petitioners' motion for reconsideration.I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of constitutionality in this case, the rule concerning
real party in interest 
,applicable to private litigation rather than the more liberal rule on
standing
, applies to petitioners. Two objections are made against that ruling: (1) that the constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief fromthe courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that theConstitution, by guaranteeing to independent people's organizations "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,political and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, §16), grants them standing to sue on constitutional grounds.The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:Art. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and property, and the
 promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Id 
., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency andthe
development of moral character 
shall receive the support of the Government.
Id 
., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect theirphysical,
moral, spiritual 
, intellectual,
and social well-being
. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism andnationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id 
., §17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to fosterpatriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but 
 
only provide
 guidelines for legislative or executive action
. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why wesaid with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.Gambling is not illegal
 per se
. . . .
It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit 
." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234
 
SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO andthe PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, whichpetitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise.Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in thiscase. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people topursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful andlawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making
 
shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§ 15-16)These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only
real parties in interest 
or
those with standing
, as the case may be, mayinvoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case andcontroversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just anyparty.

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->