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Presentation- The Case for Action

Presentation- The Case for Action

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Published by pbgrist
Originally located here: http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/International_security_affairs/terrorism/09-F-1807%20The%20Case%20for%20Action%20-%20Iraq.pdf
Originally located here: http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/International_security_affairs/terrorism/09-F-1807%20The%20Case%20for%20Action%20-%20Iraq.pdf

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Published by: pbgrist on Jul 19, 2012
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12
Sep
02
Presentation-
The Case
for
Action
Jntro: Looking at
Iraq
through the
Lens
of9/11
We
are
rightfully
concerned
about
the
fai1ures-
intelligence
and
policy-
that
made
9/11
possible.
ln
retrospect,
we
have
no
difficulty asking:
..
why didn't
they connect
the
dots?"
(Pre 9/11, there
wasn't
a
"smoking
gun"
-let
alone one that
pointed
to
Washington and
New
York.)
We have
more
information
now
about what Iraq might
dothan we had
last
year
about
al
Qaida might
do.
Implication:
we
have
to
be
willing
to "connect
the
dots
.
now-
can't
wait
for the
"smoking
gun."
I.
Iraq
poses
a
serious
andgrowing
threat
to the
US
The nature
of
the
regime-
a
totalitarian
regime
led by
a
megalomaniac tyrant
"
\~~
-r~
~~
f.iu...
~
This is terrible
for the people
oflraq.
":lx:."i~
_
•1
-a
But it
has
an important
foreign
policy implication
-
Iraq
under
Saddam
ltas
demonstrated tremendous
geopoJiticalambition,
as
shown
by
his
invasions
of
IranandKuwait.
~~
~
~
~
v£;...r--
Wants
to
be
thenew pan-Arab leader
(ala
Nasser
or
Saladin).
Iraq's
continuing
pursuitof
WMD.
To
evaluate
Iraq's
continuing pursuit
ofWMD,
we
have
to
make use
of
many types
of
evidence-
specific intelligence
itemsare
onlypart
of
the
story.
Also have
to
look
at
history,including
history
of
actual
use
of
CW.
We
have
to assess
the
strength
of
Iraq's
motivation
to
acquire WMD.
In addition,
Iraq
isvery
good at
denial
and
deception-
as
we
learned
after
the
Gulf
War.
We
were surprised
at
how many
WMD-related
facilities
we
hadn't
known
about.
 
SI!:CRE/1'
We must
take
thisinto
account
in
assessing
the
intelligence evidencethat
we have
available.
Experience
tells
us
that
what we
have
found
is
only
a
small
part
of
what
actually
is
there.
[Note
that DIA
has an excellent denial and deception
briefing.]
History
Iraq's
pursuit
ofWMD
has
been
continuing,
and Iraq
has
been
willingto
pay
a
high price
to continue
it.
Had
Saddam cooperated
withUNSCOM in
1991-2,
sanctions would
have
been lifted
very
quickly.
Saddam could
have
allowed inspectors to do their
work at anytime
during
the
last
decade-
and wouldhave
been rewarded for
itby
the
end
of
sanctions,
and
readmission to the intemational community.
Conclusion:
Saddam
places such
a
high value
onpursuit
ofWMD
that
he
hasbeen willing
to
subject
his
country
to
sanctions
for
a
decade,
just
topreserve
his
programs and
some
ofhis
facilities.
Why?
Goes
back to
the question
of
geopolitical ambition.
With WMD,
and especially
with
nucs,Iraq
would
be
undisputed
leader
of
Arab
world.
Inspections
had
some effect on
Iraq's
pursuit
ofWMD,
but
we
know
thattheprograms continued
eventhen.
(Forexample,
the
1995
defection
of
Kamal Hussein,
Saddam's
son-in-law,
alerted
us toongoing
activity
in
thenuclear
and
biological programs.)
Given no inspectors
since 1998,
and given sufficient
revenue(from
illegal
oil
sales
and
illegal surcharges
on
the
legalsales),
isn't
it
reasonable
to
conclude
that
Iraq'sWMD
programs
have are
continuing,
if
not
accelerating?Nuclear Program
..:if-s:r,'f~~
...;_
~~
~
~
~
.-;o-2V
B
After
Israelis
destroyed
the
Osinik
reactor,
Iraq
embarked on
a
new
projectto
get
fissile
material
-
but
kept ithidden
this
time.
(IAEA, headed by
Hans Blix,
was
completely
fooled.)
S:BCRE'F
2
 
SECRET
After
the
Gulf
War, wediscovered
a
huge project using
electro-magneticisotope
separation (EMIS)
technology-
a
technology
we used
successfully
in
theManhattan
project.
Important
to
consider
that
we
missed
this
project
entirely-
perhaps
because
it
hadn't
occurred
to
us
thatIraq woulduse
a
technology
we
consideredobsolete,
but
which was nevertheless
effective.
(S)
Now,
we
have
discovered
that
Iraq is
trying
to
import aluminum
tubes,
milled
to
very
precisespecifications.
The precise tolerances
suggest
thatthe tubes
are to
be
used
in
theconstruction
ofhigh
speed centrifuges for
uranium gas
enrichment.
(Centrifuges and
EMIS
are
two
of
the
main
methods
forenriching
uranium.)
As
the
President
stated
(UNGA
speech,
12
Sep
02),
"Should
Iraqacquire
fissile
material,
[either
by
purchase
or
through its
own
enrichment
program]
it
would
be
able to
build
a
nuclear weapon within
a
year.".Biological
Another example
of
successful Iraqi denial
and
deception-
Iraq fooled
notonly
our
intelligence,
but
also UNSCOM.
Extent
of
program became clear only
in
1995,
whenSaddam's
son-in-law,
Hussein Kamal,
defected.
Evenafter
the defection,
Iraq continued to understate the extent
of
its
BW
program, according
to
the
UNSCOM
inspectors.
UNSCOM
estimated
that Iraq
had
actually
produced two to
four
times
more agents and
munitions
thanit
declared-
including the
anthrax bacillusand
botulinum
toxin.
Since
departure
of
inspectors
in
1998,
Iraq hasdoneconstruction work
at
facilities
associated with
biological
weapons.
While Iraq hasclaimed
that this
new
capability
is for
civilian purposes,
it exceeds
civilian requirements.
ln
any
case,the
claim
is
hardlypersuasivegiven
Saddam's
tendency
to
ignorebasic
civilian needs.
SECRET
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