From:
Shea,
James
Sent:
Wednesday,
March 23,
2011
5:57
PM
To:
RST01 Hoc; RST07
Hoc;
RST05
Hoc
Cc:
Brown, Michael;
Norton,
Charles;
Brown,
Eva;
Ruland,
William;
Nelson,
Robert;
Plasse,
Richard;
Brittner,Donald;
James
Shea;
Reckley,William;
Holahan,
Gary
Subject:
What
We
would
Do
(The
US BWR
Operating Community)
As
former
Operators
/
STA
/
SRO,
CRO
at
Oyster
Creek
NGS
and Emergency
Director
at
JAF,
we
could
not help but
watch
in
horror
as
our
sister
plantswere
destroyed
following
the
earthquakeand
tsunami.
Knowing
thechallenges the operators
faced
I
and
myBWR
colleagues at
the
NRC
are
thinkinghow
we
would
haveresponded
to
these
incredible
beyond
design
basis events.
Also we
should
start
formulating
a
basis
of
lessons
learnedthat
could
be
shared
with
the
US BWR
fleetas
well
as
all
nuclear
plants
to
potentially
advise
our
licensees
and
all
U.S.
stakeholders
on
these
events
and
how
the
U.S.
Fleet
would
or
could
cope
in
this situation.
Aslisted
in
our
talking
points
developed
by
the
RST
team
last
week
some
of
the
engineered systemsthat
the
US
plantshave
available
mayhave prevented
this
event.
These
include:
1)
Multiple AC
power
supplies
available
from
On-Site
and
Off-Siteincluding
AC
sources
required
by
SBO
rule
50.63.
EDGs
with
protected
fuel
supply required
by
TechnicalSpecifications.
Gravity
feed
from
main
fuel
oil
tank
with
double
pipe
protection
and
leak
detection
capability.
2)
Diesel
Driven
Fire-Pumps
that
could
be
lined
up
to
Core
Spray
System
(probably
taken
out
in
tsunami).
However,if
in
the
US
a
plant
needed
to
replace
the
Diesel
Driven Fire
Pumps
our
guess
is
thatthey
could
have
been
sent
to
a
stricken site
within
a
24
hr
time
frame.
3)
Hardened
Vent
to
ventcontainment outside
the
Reactor
Building,
to
prevent catastrophic
explosion inside
the
reactor
buildingwhich
affectsthe
structural
viability
of
the
spent
fuel
pools.4)
EOPs
/
SAMGs to
ensure
that
the containment(s)
Primary
and
Secondary
is
protected.
5) B5b
pumps
andequipment
readily
available
from
on-site
or
off-site
nuclear plants.
PotentialOperatorActions
in
the
US
Given
that the
Fuchishima
Diiachi(FD)
plants
may
have
nothad
some
of
the
features
listed
above(hardened
vent
ect.) and
since the
AC
power
failed
catastrophically
these
areactions
we believe
the
US
operators
would
have
taken
based
on
extensive
training
for
these
type
events
including
trainingon
BDBE
that
involve
the
SAMG
procedures.Theseare
actions
that operators
may
havetaken
in
lieu
of
the above
mitigative
features
to
prevent
extensive
fuel
damage
or
containment
failure.
These
actions
assume
that
all
rod
entered
thecore
to
an
extent
greater
than
position
04,
whichwould by
definition
mean
that
reactor
is Shut-Down.
A)
Remove
Shutdown
Decay Heat Using
ISO
Condenser
Operationor
RCICI
HPCI
Operation
to
prevent core
damaae.
1
1)
Isolation
Condenser
in
FD
Unit
I -
Operators
would
have
attempted
to
fill
ISO
Cond.
whichwould
have
cooledthe
Rx
to
approximately350F
or hot
shutdown
or
when
Rx
pressure
is
reduced
below
25
psig.
ReactorPower
would
be
less
than
1-2%
aftertenminutes and
less
than
1%
after
two
hours.
Fill
Iso.
Condenser
by
any
means,
which would
have
prevented
any
fuel
damage
and therefore
H2
generation,
in
the
following
order:
a.
ISO-Condenser
Initial
Inventory
(Designed
to
remove
6%
Rx
Power
and
has
an
inventory
of
at
least
2
hoursand
realistically
would
last
for
additional
time
(several
hours)
given
the
low
energy
requirementafter shutdown.
Manual
or
DC
operation
of
Condensate
Valve
as
necessary
to
preserve water
inventory.
It
appears
as
though
FD
Unit
1
was
able
to cool
in
this
manner
for
several
hours
past
the design
basisconservative
design basis.
b.
B5b
Pumps
could
have
provided
the
necessary
flow
to ISO
Cond. approximately100gpm after
2
hrs and approx
15
gpm
after
several
hours.
Suction
from
various
sources
including
CST,Torus,
Condenser
and
Sea
Water.
c. Run
Sandpiper
(air
operated
pump)
pumps
with
available
air
headerpressure
could
possibly
tap
into
condenser
inventory
near
the
Air
Compressor Header.
d.
Continue
torun
sandpiper
pumps
from
available
N2
bottles
used
for
overpressure
on
Clean-up
system surge
tank
CRD
accumulator
make
up
bottles.
Additional
bottles
could
have
been
availableat
all
the
FD
sites.
e.
Any
other
means
feasible.
2)
RCIC/HPCI
System
Operation
for
Units 2
& 3
a.
RCIC/HPCI
ran
for
several
hours
at
FD
Units2
&
3
this
system
in
the
US
has
local
manual
procedures
to
operate
the governor.
No
power
needed:
use
mech. yarway
vessel
indicatorsandan
operator disconnects
certain
linkages
from RCIC
then
manually
open
steam
admission
valve.
As
long
as
reactor
has
motive
steam
RCIC
should
keep the
vessel
covered
as
long
as
a
source
of
water
to
the
RCIC/HPCI Turbine
is
available.
(Reference
from
Operation at
Fitzpatrick
NGS.
This
EOP operation
mode
may
have
extended
the
cooling
at
FD
Units
2&3
if
themanual
procedures
were
in
placeand
baring
other
complications
that
could
have
failed
the turbinesmechanically.
In
the
Japancase
theymayhave
not
had
this
manualEOPmode
of
operation
in
which
they
would
depend
on
station
vital
batterypower
lasting
approximately
6-8
hrs
to run
the
turbine
governors,unless somehowreplenished.
Reports were
coming
in
on
a
call
for
batteries
at
these
Units
during
the
early
part
of
the
event.
B)
Maintain
Adequate
Core
Coolincq(ACC)
for
as
long
as
possible
Using
theabove method(s)
(A),
as
per
EOP should
enable
adequate
core
cooling
(ACC)
as
long
as
no
other
complication
occurs such
that
reactor
water
inventory
could
not
be determined or
indication
that
water
level
(such
as
containment
pressure
increase
indicating
LOCA
condition)
could not
bemaintained
above the
point
of
Steam
Cooling
example at
OC
would
be
-30in
TAF.
At
that
point
operators
would
have
opened
EMRVs
to
get
last
shot
of
steam
cooling.
Emergency
Depressurize
and
inject
any
source
of
water
to
vessel
including
low
pressure
fire
water
as
available.
[
Note
if
ACC
is
maintained
for
greater
than
2
hrs
following
shutdown
the
possibility of
a
breach
of
Rx
Vessel
is
greatly reduced.
If
ACC
could
be maintained
for
several days
such
as
in
the
case
of DP unit
2
on
RICI
followed
by
any
amount
of
feedthe
probability
of
Vessel
Breech
is
miniscule.
Once
ACC
is
lost
injectto
depressurizedvessel
with
anything
at
hand
while
simultaneously
injecting
water
into
containment
to
mitigate
fuel
release
x-vessel.
Exit
EOP
andenter
SAMG
(Containment
Flooding)
C)
Protect
Primary
and
Secondary
Containment
Integrity
and
maintain
the
Vessel
depressurized
If
thereactor
could
not maintain
ACC
and restoring On-Site and
Off-Site
power
was
notimminent
then
Operators
would
havestarted
a
process
to
ensure
containment
integrity
by
following
the
SAMG's
Entry
into
SAMGswould
be directed
by
H2
/
02
sample
from
the
Primary
Cont
control EOP
and Level/Power
Control
EOP
would
direct
operators
into
a
General Emergencyand
entry
into
the
SAMGs
where
primary
containment
flooding would
proceed.
Ventthe
Primary
Containmentusing
hardened
Vent
regardless
of
off-site
dose
consequence
to
ensure
containment
integrity
(priority
would
be
from
the Torus
to
scrub
the
radioisotopes),
flood
the
containment
by
any
means
to cool
vessel
and prevent
release
ofmolten
materials
from
the
reactor
vessel.
Shed
battery
loads
to
ensure
that
maximum
battery
use
for
the
EMRV
(to
maintain
vessel
depressurized
-
this
appears
to
be
the
primary
issue at
FDUnit-2
battery power
failed
which
tripped
the
RCIC/HPCI
System
and
failed
closedthe
EMRVs.
D)
10CFR
50.54x
Possible
Actions
(10
CFR
50.54(x)
states
that
a
licensee
may
takereasonable
action
thatdeparts
from
a
license
condition or
a technical specification
in
an
emergency)Given
the
extremeconditions
seen
on-site
at
FD,
and
the assumptionthat
they
did
not
have hardenedvents,
an
alternate
make-up
to
ISO
Condenser
or
a
manual
non-battery
power
procedure
to
runRCIC/HPCI
System the
following
aresome
speculative actionsthat
US
Operators
may
have
taken
to
Preclude the
loss
of
the Reactor
Building(s)
and
subsequently
the
spent
fuel pool
which
appears
to
be
the
primary
source
of
the
radioactive
release
for
the
FD
site.
3)
Crackopen ContainmentVents
immediately
after
Black-Out
to
ensure
a
continuous ventpath(Hardened
Ventnot
Available)
Consider
venting
from
Rx
Bid
to
ContainmentVacuumBreaker
which
is
near
railway
roll-up
door
toburp
in
small
amounts
the
H2
and
mix
with
outside
air.
Much
of
the
particulate
aerosol
shouldbe
scrubbed
by
theTorus.
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