INET COUNCIL ON THE EURO ZONE CRISIS
INETeconomics.org
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Institute For
New Economic Thinking
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Solvingthecurrentcrisisisnotazero-sumgame.Instead,itisawin-winchoiceforbothcreditoranddebtorcountries.
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Theeconomicandpoliticallossesthataeurobreakupwillbringaboutarelikelytobeanorderofmagnitudelargerthanthepotentialtransfersrequiredtosolvethelegacyproblems.However,lackoftrustbetweencreditorsanddebtorsisstoppingthemfromarrivingatmutuallybeneficialsolutions.Forexample,ifthedeficitcountriescouldcrediblycommittofiscalrulesthatbringtheratioofnationaldebttoGDPdowntoreasonablelevelsinthelongrun,thenthesurpluscountrieswouldhavelittleobjectiontonewdebtissuesintheshortruntosupportcountercyclicalfiscalpoliciesinthedeficitcountries,sincetheseadditionaldebtswouldbetemporaryandcouldberepaid.Theproblemisthatitisdifficultforthedeficitcountriestomakeacrediblelong-termcommitmenttofiscalprudencesincethatwouldbindfuturevoters.Whatisneededarecreativewaystosolvethisproblembymakingsupportavailableinsufficientamounts,butalsoundersafeguardsandconditionsthatarebothperceivedasfairbydebtorcountryvotersandcrediblebycreditorcountryvotersandthefinancialmarkets.4.
Althoughtheycontainedstepsintherightdirection,themeasuresannouncedbyeurozonepolicymakersonJune29andagainonJuly9didnotmeetthisthreshold.AgreeingonatimetableforcreatingasingleeuroareabankingsupervisorybodyandsubsequentlyallowingdirectbankrecapitalisationfromtheESMwouldhelptoaddresscriticalshortcomingsoftheeurozonedesignandthecrisisresponsesofar.However,thesummitdidnotpresentaconvincingplantostopthedownwardeconomicspiralinthedeficitcountries.StabilisingbondyieldsbasedonlyonexistingESMresourcesandinvestmentprojectsfinancedmainlybyexistingE.U.structuralfundsandtheEIBdonotadduptoaconvincingpackage.Furthermore,thesummitofferednosharedvisionforthelongrunbeyondtheagreementoncommonEuropeanbankingsupervision.Butsuchavisionisneededtorestorethecredibilityofthecurrencyunionintheeyesofbothinvestorsandthegeneralpublic,andhencetorestoreconfidenceingovernmentbondmarketsandstopcapitalflightfromthedeficitcountries.
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Anewstrategywhichrecognizeslargecommongains
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Acomprehensiveactionplanmustmeetfourobjectives.
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ItmustrestorefaithintheeuroareaandtheEuropeanUnionthroughacrediblepromiseofabettertomorrowthatholdstheprospectforgreaterwelfareandmorestability
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Itmuststabiliseinterestcostsandreversethedeclineofoutputandemploymentinthedeficitcountries;
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Itmustbeconducivetoareductionindebtlevelsoverthemediumterm–includingpublicdebtinItalyandprivatedebtinSpain,butalsoelsewhere–andsupportthecontinuedreductionofbalanceofpaymentimbalanceswithintheeurozone;
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Thisnoteusestheterms“surpluscountries”,“creditorcountries”,or“north”interchangeablytorefertocountriessuchasAustria,Finland,Germany,Netherlands,andtheSlovakRepublic;and“deficitcountries”,“debtorcountries”,“crisiscountries”or“south”toreferprimarilytoItalyandSpain.Ireland,Portugal,Greece,andCypruscouldalsobeconsideredtobeinthisgroup,buttheirsituationissomewhatdifferentbecausetheyareinIMF-EUsupportedadjustmentprogrammes.Weavoidthe“centre”versus“periphery”terminologythathasbecomeengrainedinthelastyearbecauseacountrysuchasItalyistoocentraltoEurope–geographically,economically,andhistorically–tobeconsideredpartofthe“periphery”.