Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Standard view
Full view
of .
Save to My Library
Look up keyword
Like this
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
How Do Cartels Operate

How Do Cartels Operate

Ratings: (0)|Views: 10 |Likes:
Published by Andeman

More info:

Published by: Andeman on Jul 29, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial


Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less





Foundations and Trends
inMicroeconomicsVol. 2, No 1 (2006) 1–105c
2006 J.E. Harrington, Jr.DOI: 10.1561/0700000021
How Do Cartels Operate?
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA, joe.harrington@jhu.edu 
This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20European Commission decisions over 2000–2004. It describes the prop-erties of a collusive outcome in terms of the setting of price and amarket allocation, monitoring of agreements with respect to price butmore importantly sales, punishment methods for enforcing an agree-ment and also the use of buy-backs to compensate cartel members,methods for responding to external disruptions from non-cartel sup-pliers and handling over-zealous sales representatives, and operationalprocedures in terms of the frequency of meetings and the cartel’s orga-nizational structure.
A recent paper reviewed various approaches to detecting collusion usingpatterns in firm behavior (Harrington, 2006). The efficacy of lookingfor patterns in prices and quantities relies on knowing what to look for.What does cartel behavior look like? How is it distinguishable fromcompetitive behavior? Towards better addressing those questions, thispaper delves deeper into cartels and explores how they operate. Howa collusive outcome – in terms of price and an allocation of marketsupply – is determined. How a collusive outcome is monitored andenforced. How often a cartel meets and how a cartel’s organizationalstructure is designed. The hope is that such an exercise will produce abetter understanding of how cartels operate and generate a richer setof collusive markers based on market data.This paper does not engage in an empirical analysis as it is normallyconceived. Rather, the approach is to glean what one can from about 20cartels for which there is detailed information.
Though we will not beable to draw any definitive (that is, statistically significant) conclusionsand indeed any claims are necessarily speculative, this is partially offset
It is more in the style of the classic studies by Stocking and Watkins (1946, 1948) andHay and Kelly (1974).
3by being able to offer finer details about cartels which will suggest aricher set of collusive markers.
It needs to be emphasized that thecase studies are largely confined to providing information during theepisode of collusion. Thus, claims about how cartel behavior differsfrom competitive behavior will either rely on using general knowledge of competitive behavior (rather than knowledge about how this particularindustry behaves when firms are not colluding) or reported informationabout how the colluding firms sought to change their practices.In addition to making progress on identifying collusive markers, thisanalysis may also have implications for future directions in the theory of cartels. By identifying empirical regularities and institutional featuresof hard-core cartels, this information can be used to guide theoreticalmodelling. The next big step in the theory of collusion is apt to be theconstruction of models of hard-core cartels that take account of themanner in which firms coordinate and communicate and the realitiesof dealing with firm asymmetries. As firms run the risk of incurringpenalties by engaging in explicit collusion, a simple revealed preferenceargument tells us that the outcomes under explicit collusion must bedifferent from those under tacit collusion. What is needed are modelsthat are designed for hard-core cartels and this requires using the richinstitutional detail that case studies offer.
The primary source material for this study are European Commis-sion decisions over 2000–2004.
These cases comprise cartel activitygoing back to the 1970s though largely cover activity in the 1980s and90s. While the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice reg-ularly issues Press Releases, these are typical one or two pages in lengthwhich provide minimal details as to how cartels actually function. Incontrast, the European Commission decisions can range from 30 to over200 pages and provide vast information on the manner in which firms
By a collusive marker I mean some property of firm behavior which is much more consistentwith collusion than with competition.
One might argue that explicit collusion may only entail meeting once to coordinate onbehavioral rules that are identical to what would have emerged under tacit collusion. Tothe contrary, hard-core cartels meet frequently and regularly. Firms are then continuallyrunning the risk of discovery and presumably they do so because these meetings generatemore profitable outcomes than tacit collusion.
One decision, seamless steel tubes, is actually from December 1999.

You're Reading a Free Preview

/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->