NYPD Annual Firearms Discharge Report

2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT
ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT

2010

RAYMONDW.KELLY
POLICECOMMISSIONER
2011,NYPD
THISPAGEINTENTIONALLYLEFTBLANK
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT TABLEOFCONTENTS
PAGE EXECUTIVESUMMARY........................................................................................................................ vii GLOSSARYOFTERMS.......................................................................................................................... viii THEANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGESREPORT:ANINTRODUCTION........................................... xi 2010FIREARMSDISCHARGESCOPE............................................................................................... xiii HISTORICALSNAPSHOT19992009.................................................................................................. xiv 2010FIREARMSDISCHARGESNAPSHOT.......................................................................................... xv USEOFFORCE......................................................................................................................................xvii THEINVESTIGATIONANDREVIEWPROCESS................................................................................ xxi ANATOMYOFAFIREARMSDISCHARGEINVESTIGATION............................................................... xxv
ANALYSISOF2010FIREARMSDISCHARGESBYCATEGORY
INTENTIONALDISCHARGEADVERSARIALCONFLICT
OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................................... 3 REASONSFORDISCHARGES........................................................................................................... 3 DATESANDTIMESOFDISCHARGES............................................................................................... 3 LOCATIONSOFDISCHARGES......................................................................................................... 3 REASONSOFFICERINVOLVED........................................................................................................ 6 OFFICERRESTRAINT....................................................................................................................... 7 OFFICERPEDIGREE......................................................................................................................... 9 SUBJECTPEDIGREE........................................................................................................................ 12 INCIDENTOUTCOMES................................................................................................................... 15 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................. 18
INTENTIONALDISCHARGEANIMALATTACK
OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................................... 21 REASONSFORDISCHARGES........................................................................................................... 21 DATESANDTIMESOFDISCHARGES............................................................................................... 21 LOCATIONSOFDISCHARGES......................................................................................................... 22 REASONSOFFICERINVOLVED........................................................................................................ 23 OFFICERRESTRAINT....................................................................................................................... 26 OFFICERPEDIGREE......................................................................................................................... 27 INCIDENTOUTCOMES................................................................................................................... 29 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................. 29 UNINTENTIONALDISCHARGE OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................................... 31 REASONSFORDISCHARGES........................................................................................................... 31 PURELYUNINTENTIONALDISCHARGES......................................................................................... 31 UNINTENTIONALDISCHARGEADVERSARIALCONFLICT............................................................ 32
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PAGE ANALYSISOF2010FIREARMSDISCHARGESBYCATEGORYcontinued UNAUTHORIZEDUSEOFAFIREARM OVERVIEW....................................................................................................................................... 35 SUICIDE............................................................................................................................................ 35 DISCHARGEBYOTHERTHANOFFICER............................................................................................ 35 OTHER............................................................................................................................................. 35 OUTCOME....................................................................................................................................... 35 APPENDIX HISTORICALDATA................................................................................................................................. 41 FIREARMSTRAINING............................................................................................................................ 44 ADVERSARIALCONFLICTRESULTINGINASUBJECTSDEMISE....................................................... 47 SUBJECTSSHOTBYPOLICEBYRACE/ETHNICITY,SINCE1997........................................................ 51 SUPPLEMENTALDATA........................................................................ 53
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT TABLES,CHARTS,ANDFIGURES
A.1 A.2 A.3 A.4 A.5 A.6 A.7 A.8 A.9 A.10 A.11 A.12 A.13 A.14 A.15 A.16 A.17 A.18 A.19 A.20 A.21 A.22 B.1 B.2 B.3 B.4 B.5 B.6 B.7 B.8
PAGE FirearmsDischargeScope........................................................................................................ xiii HistoricalSnapshotbyCategory,20002010.......................................................................... xiv TotalIncidentsforYear,20002010........................................................................................ xiv AdversarialConflict,20002010.............................................................................................. xiv UnintentionalDischarge,20002010...................................................................................... xiv AnimalAttack,20002010....................................................................................................... xiv Comparison,2009to2010....................................................................................................... xv BreakdownbyCategory,2010................................................................................................. xv
INTENTIONALDISCHARGEADVERSARIALCONFLICT
TypeofThreatIntentionalDischargeAdversarialConflict(IDAC)....................................... PrecinctswithMorethanOneIDACIncident......................................................................... IDACIncidentsByBorough..................................................................................................... MAP:LocationsofIDACvsLocationsofCriminalShootings,2010........................................ CriminalShootingsvsIDACIncidents,FrequencybyBorough............................................... CriminalShootingsvsIDACIncidents,PercentagebyBorough.............................................. OfficersOndutyAssignments................................................................................................ OfficersActionsPriortoOndutyShooting............................................................................ ShotsFiredbyOfficers............................................................................................................. ShotsFiredperIncident........................................................................................................... DistanceinFeetof38ReportingOfficers................................................................................ Race/EthnicityofOfficers........................................................................................................ YearsofService........................................................................................................................ RankofOfficersInvolvedinIDACIncidents........................................................................... Race/Ethnicityof34SubjectsInvolvedinIDACIncidents...................................................... Race/Ethnicityof9SubjectsFiringonOfficers........................................................................ 31KnownSubjectswithPriorArrests...................................................................................... SubjectsInvolvedinIDACIncidentsvsPersonsArrestedforFirearmsPossession,2010...... SubjectsWhoFiredonPolicevsCriminalShootingSuspects,2010........................................ WeaponsPossessed/UsedbySubjects.................................................................................... ActionsofSubjectsShotandKilled.......................................................................................... ActionsofSubjectsShotandInjured.......................................................................................
INTENTIONALDISCHARGEANIMALATTACK
OverviewTable........................................................................................................................ IntentionalDischargeAnimalAttackIncidents(IDAA),byTour............................................ JurisdictionofIncidents........................................................................................................... IDAAIncidentsbyBorough..................................................................................................... LocationsofAnimalAttacks..................................................................................................... MAP:Locationsof2010IDAAIncidents(27Incidents).......................................................... TypeofJobtoWhichOfficerWasAssigned............................................................................ Command/PrecinctofAssignment,TwoorMoreOfficers......................................................
3 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 10 11 11 12 13 13 14 14 15 17 17 21 22 22 23 23 24 25 25
2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT TABLES,CHARTS,ANDFIGURES
B.9 B.10 B.11 B.12 B.13 B.14 C.1 D.1 PAGE INTENTIONALDISCHARGEANIMALATTACKcontinued OfficerAssignment(38Officers)................................................................................................. 25 ShotsFiredperOfficer................................................................................................................ 26 ShotsFiredperIncident.............................................................................................................. 26 Race/EthnicityofOfficers........................................................................................................... 27 RankofOfficersInvolvedinIDAAIncidents............................................................................... 28 YearsofService........................................................................................................................... 29 UNINTENTIONALDISCHARGE Findings,AllUnintentionalDischarges........................................................................................ 33 UNAUTHORIZEDUSEOFAFIREARM Suicide/Attempt,2001to2010 35
41 41 42 42 43 43 45 51 51 52 53 53 53 54 54 56 57
APPENDIX
OfficersShotandInjuredbySubjects,19712010..................................................................... OfficersShotandKilledbySubjects,19712010........................................................................ SubjectsShotandInjuredbyOfficers,19712010..................................................................... SubjectsShotandKilledbyOfficers,19712010........................................................................ TotalShotsFired,19712010..................................................................................................... TotalIncidents,19712010......................................................................................................... CenterMass................................................................................................................................ SubjectsShotbyNYPDOfficersbyRace/Ethnicity,Trends,19972010..................................... GunfireinNewYorkCitybyRace/Ethnicity,2010...................................................................... SubjectsShotbyPolicebyRace/Ethnicity,Tables,,19992010................................................. DischargeIncidentsbyDayofWeek........................................................................................... DischargeIncidentsbyTour........................................................................................................ DischargeIncidentsbyMonth.................................................................................................... DischargeIncidentsbyBorough.................................................................................................. DischargeIncidentsbyPrecinct.................................................................................................. DischargeIncidentsbyDutyStatus............................................................................................. BreakdownbyIncident,2010.....................................................................................................
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT EXECUTIVESUMMARY
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
In 2010, the New York City Police Department saw a 13 percent decrease in the number of firearms discharges from 2009: 92 total incidents in 2010, down from 106in2009.Thisisthesmallestnumberoffirearmsdischargessincetherecording ofpoliceshootingsintheCitybegan.Furthermore,themostseriouscategoryofdis chargesshootings involving adversarial conflict with a subjectexperienced an even larger decline, down 30 percent from 2009. In a city of 8.2 million people, fromaDepartmentofnearly35,000uniformedmemberswhointeractedwithciti zensinapproximately23millioninstances,52officerswereinvolvedin33incidents of intentional firearms discharges during an adversarial conflict, with 16 subjects injuredandeightkilled.Thesenumbersareallrecordlows. The figures are a testament to police officers restraint, diligence, and honorable performanceofduty.Buttheyalsoshowthatthedrasticreductioninviolentcrime overthepastdecadehasmeantthatcriminalsandpoliceenterintoconflictlessof ten. NeithertheDepartmentnortheofficeronthestreetcanaffordcomplacency,how ever. Perpetrators shot and injured two officers in 2010one of whom survived becauseofhisbulletresistantvest.
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT GLOSSARYOFTERMS
Officer Subject Civilian FirearmsDischarge For this publication, refers to a sworn Uniformed Member of the NewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentofanyrank. A person engaged in adversarial conflict with an officer or a third party,inwhichtheconflictresultsinafirearmsdischarge. Apersonwhoisnotthesubjectintheadversarialconflictbutisin cludedasavictim,bystander,and/orinjuredperson. An incidentin which an officer of the New York City Police Depart mentdischargesanyfirearm,orwhenafirearmbelongingtoanoffi ceroftheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentisdischargedbyanyper son.Thisdoesnotincludeadischargeduringanauthorizedtraining sessionnorwhilelawfullyengagedintargetpracticeorhunting.Ad ditionally, it does not include a firearms discharge at a firearms safetystationwithinaDepartmentfacility.
IntentionalFirearms A firearms discharge in which an officer intentionally discharges a DischargeAdversar firearm in defense of self or another during an adversarial conflict ialConflict with a subject. May include firearms discharges that are inside the scope of the officers employment but outside Department guide lines. This does not include discharging a firearm against an animal attack. IntentionalFirearms DischargeAnimal Attack IntentionalFirearms DischargeNoCon flict UnintentionalFire armsDischarge UnauthorizedUseof aFirearm A firearms discharge in which an officer intentionally discharges a firearmindefenseofselforanotheragainstananimalattack.May includefirearmsdischargesthatareinsidethescopeoftheofficers employmentbutoutsideDepartmentguidelines. A firearms discharge in which an officer intentionally discharges a firearmtosummonassistance.Mayincludefirearmsdischargesthat aredeterminedtobelegallyjustifiedbutoutsideDepartmentguide lines. Afirearmsdischargeinwhichanofficerdischargesafirearmwithout intent,regardlessofthecircumstance.Commonlyknownasanacci dentaldischarge. Afirearmsdischargethatisconsideredunauthorizedandisnotlisted asanintentionalfirearmsdischarge.Intheseinstancesthefirearmis being discharged without proper legal justification and/or outside thescopeoftheofficersemployment.Thisincludesinstanceswhen anunauthorizedpersondischargesanofficersfirearm.
Use/threatentheUse Acontributingfactorinwhichasubjectdischargesorthreatensthe dischargeofafirearmbydisplayingafirearmorwhatreasonablyap ofaFirearm pearstobeafirearm,orbysimulatingafirearmormakingagesture indicativeofthreateningtheuseofafirearm. Firearm For this publication, includes any pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, or variationofsuch.
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT GLOSSARYOFTERMS
ImitationFirearm For this publication, includes any instrument that is designed by themanufacturerormodifiedbyapersontoappearasifitwerea firearm.Thisincludesairpistols,toyguns,propguns,andreplicas.
Use/threatentheUseof A contributing factor in which a subject cuts, stabs, or slashes a person with any cutting instrument or threatens or attempts to aCuttingInstrument dothesamewhilearmedwithacuttinginstrumentorwhatrea sonablyappearstobeacuttinginstrument. CuttingInstrument For this publication, includes any knife, razor, sword, or other sharpedgedinstrument,suchasabrokenbottle.
Use/threatentheUseof A contributing factor in which a subject strikes another person withabluntinstrumentorthreatensorattemptstodothesame aBluntInstrument whilearmedwithabluntinstrumentorwhatreasonablyappears tobeabluntinstrument. BluntInstrument For this publication, includes any solid bat, stick, pipe, metal knuckles,orotherinstrumentthat,whenusedasaweapon,can causebluntforcetraumatoanindividual.Thisincludesautomo bilesandunbrokenbottles.
Use/threatentheUseof An incident in which an unarmed subject or subjects physically OverwhelmingPhysical attackapersonorthreatenorattempttodothesame,andwhile Force doingsoputthepersonatriskofseriousphysicalinjuryordeath. Thisincludesgangattacksandattemptingtopushapersonfroma roof or train platform. This also includes attempting to take an officersfirearm. ProactivePolicing Instancesinwhichofficersengageinoperationsoractivitiesthat actively seek out violators of the law. This includes undercover operations,trafficenforcement,checkpoints,verticals,streetnar cotics enforcement, warrant execution, qualityoflife enforce ment,andAntiCrimeoperations. Instancesinwhichofficersrespondtoacallforservicefromthe public.Thisincludescallsofamanwithagun,crimesinprogress, domestic disputes, and qualityoflife complaints. This also in cludescallsforserviceinwhichproactivepoliceunitsrespond. Instancesinwhichofficersarenotengaginginproactiveorreac tivepolicingbutaresetuponbyasubject.Thisincludesoffduty instances when the officer is a victim of a crime (e.g., robbery, burglary,assault),orinvolvedinanaltercationthatisescalatedby thesubject(e.g.,atrafficincident,aneighbordispute).Thisalso incorporates instances in which onduty officers are performing administrative or nonpatrol assignments (e.g., guarding a pris oner,processingreports,securingalocation).
ReactivePolicing
Attacked
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT INTRODUCTION
THEANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGE REPORT:ANINTRODUCTION
One of the most abrupt, dynamic, and po tentiallytraumaticincidentsthatcanhappen inapoliceofficerscareeristhelineofduty discharge of his or her firearm. As much as handcuffs, the uniform, or the shield, the gun is a symbol of the officers authority. It is, moreover, a physical embodiment of the officers responsibility. The weapon on an officershipisaconstantreminderforoffi cer and citizen alikeof the officers role andthetrustsocietyhasgiven. More than forty years ago, the New York CityPoliceDepartmentadoptedDepartment Order SOP 9 (s.69) and began to collect in depth documentation of discharges during hostileencounters,forthestatedpurposeof [increasing] the safety potential of each memberoftheforce.Thepolicyquicklyex panded beyond policeinvolved combat, however, and came to include the study of all firearms discharges by police. Since the early 1970s, the NYPD has endeavored to recordandevaluateeveryinstanceinwhich an officer discharges his or her weapon, whether the discharge occurs purposefully, accidentally,or,inrareinstances,criminally. The SOP 9 process has been demonstrably effective.Whenannualrecordkeepingbegan in 1971, there were 12 NYPD officers shot and killed by another person; 47 officers wereshotandinjured.Officers,inturn,shot and mortally wounded 93 subjects, and an other 221 subjects were injured by police gunfire. These statistics are difficult to con ceive of today. In 2010, two NYPD officers wereshotbycriminalsubjects,whilepolice shot and mortally wounded eight subjects, and injured 16. Four decades of annual analyses have altered the way officers re spond to, engage in, and even assess the need for firearms discharges. Information gleaned from the annual reports has saved the lives of citizens and officers alike, and there has been Departmentwide change tactical, strategic, and culturalwith regard to how officers use and control their fire arms. The Department has made restraint thenorm. Today, the reports serve an additional but equally important role: they are statistical enginesforthedevelopmentoftraining,the adoptionofnewtechnologies,andeventhe deployment of Department assets. New in structional scenarios are implemented from these reports, new hardwarefrom bullet resistant vests to speed loaders to semi automatic handguns to conductedenergy devicesisintroduced. Tracking how, when, where, and why offi cers discharge their weapons is an invalu able tool for working towards the Depart ments ultimate goal of guaranteeing that, for every discharge, no option exists other thantheuseofafirearm.
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT INTRODUCTION
CATEGORIES
The2010AnnualFirearmsDischargeReport issubdividedintofivecategories.Eachcate goryisanalyzedbasedonlyontheinforma tioninthatcategory.ThisallowstheDepart menttobetterunderstandaspecifictypeof incident and adjust training and policy to continuetoreducethoseincidents. Firearms discharges are broken down into fivecategories. INTENTIONAL DISCHARGEADVERSARIAL CON FLICT: when an officer intentionally dis charges his or her firearm during a con frontationwithasubject INTENTIONAL DISCHARGEANIMAL ATTACK: when an officer intentionally discharges his or her firearm to defend against an animalattack UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE: when an offi cer unintentionally discharges his or her firearm UNAUTHORIZEDUSE OF AFIREARM:whenan officerdischargeshisorherfirearmout sidethescopeofhisorheremployment, or when another person illegally dis chargesanofficersfirearm MISTAKENIDENTITY:whenanofficerinten tionally fires on another officer in the mistakenbeliefthattheotherofficerisa criminalsubject Thefollowingpagespresentanoverviewof the laws and policies that relate to an offi cersabilitytouseforce,adelineationofthe Departments investigatory process for offi cerinvolved shootings, and an analysis of the years firearms discharges, grouped ac cordingtothecategoriesabove.Thisreport containsinformationcompiledfromprelimi nary and final shooting reports, detective case files, medical examiner reports, Fire arms Discharge Assault Reports, arrest and complaintreports,FirearmsAnalysisSection reports, Firearms Discharge Review Board findings, and previous yearly firearms dis charge reports, as well as information com plied from city and state computer data basesandofficialwebsites. Itshouldbenotedthat,insofarasstatistical analysisisconcerned,thesmallsamplestud ied for this document92 discharge inci dentstotal,only33oftheminthecategory of adversarial conflictlimits the predic tive value and conclusions that may be de rived.
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT FIREARMSDISCHARGESCOPE
CATEGORY
NEWYORKCITY TOTALPOPULATION (U.S.Census,April1,2010) NYPD TOTALOFFICERSTAFFING (2010yearendtotal) TOTALCIVILIANCONTACTS(APPROXIMATE) TOTALRADIORECEIVEDASSIGNMENTS RADIOASSIGNMENTSINVOLVINGWEAPONS ARRESTSINVOLVINGWEAPONSUSED/DISPLAYED/POSSESSED GUNARRESTS CRIMINALSHOOTINGINCIDENTS OFFICERSFIRINGDURINGINCIDENTSOFINTENTIONALPOLICE DISCHARGEDURINGADVERSARIALCONFLICT INCIDENTSOFINTENTIONALPOLICEDISCHARGE DURINGADVERSARIALCONFLICT SUBJECTSSHOTANDINJURED SUBJECTSSHOTANDKILLED OFFICERSSHOTANDINJURED OFFICERSSHOTANDKILLED NOTE:allnumbersareforCY2010
TOTALNUMBER
8,175,133
34,565 23,000,000 4,481,440 206,874 28,880 6,021 1,473 52 33 16 8 2 0
NOTE:Thenumbersandpercentagesdescribedinthisreportareoftenroundedtothenearestwholenumberandareprelimi naryandsubjecttofurtherreview.
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT HISTORICALSNAPSHOT20002010
CATEGORY ADVERSARIALCONFLICT ANIMALATTACK UNINTENTIONALDISCHARGE MISTAKENIDENTITY UNAUTHORIZEDUSEFIREARM** SUICIDE/ATTEMPT TOTALINCIDENTSFORYEAR 2000 63 39 26 0 1 5 134 2001 57 40 27 0 7 5 136 2002 55 38 24 0 0 2 119 2003 61 35 25 0 2 7 130 2004 51 26 27 0 5 5 114 2005 59 32 25 0 6 3 125 2006 59 30 26 1 8 3 127 2007 45 39 15 0 6 6 111 2008 49 30 15 0 3 8 105 2009 47 28 *23 1 4 3 *106 2010 33 30 21 0 6 2 92
*Thesenumbersweremodifiedfromlastyearsreportstoincludeapreviouslyunreportedincident. **Thiscategorywasmodifiedin2005toincludeincidentsinwhichanofficersfirearmisdischargedbypersons otherthantheofficer(e.g.,afamilymemberaccidentallydischargestheweapon,aperpetratorgainscontrolof anofficersfirearmanddischargesit,etc.).
TOTALINCIDENTSFORYEAR
134 136 119 130 114 125 127 111 105 106
63
ADVERSARIALCONFLICT
57 55 61 51 59 59 45 49 47 33
92
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
ANIMALATTACK
39 40 38 35 26 39 32 30 30 28 30
UNINTENTIONALDISCHARGE
26 27 24 25 27 25 26 15 15 23 21
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT FIREARMSDISCHARGESNAPSHOT
CATEGORY INTENTIONALDISCHARGEADVERSARIALCONFLICT INTENTIONALDISCHARGEANIMALATTACK MISTAKENIDENTITY UNINTENTIONALDISCHARGE UNAUTHORIZEDUSEOFFIREARM TOTALFIREARMDISCHARGESFORYEAR TOTALOFFICERSFIRING(includesallcategories) TOTALSHOTSFIRED(includesallcategories) TOTALOFFICERSSHOTANDINJUREDBYSUBJECT TOTALOFFICERSSHOTANDKILLEDBYSUBJECT TOTALSUBJECTSSHOTANDINJUREDBYOFFICER TOTALSUBJECTSSHOTANDKILLEDBYOFFICER 2009 47 28 1 *23 7 *106 *131 *297 0 0 20 12 2010 %CHANGE 33 30% 30 7% 0 N/A 21 9% 8 14% 92 13% 115 12% 368 24% 2 N/A 0 0 16 20% 8 33%
*Numbermodifiedfromlastyearsreporttoincludepreviouslyunreportedincident
BYCATEGORY
INTENTIONALDISCHARGEADVERSARIALCONFLICT SUBJECTUSED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFAFIREARM SUBJECTUSED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFACUTTINGINSTRUMENT SUBJECTUSED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFABLUNTOBJECT SUBJECTUSED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFOVERWHELMINGPHYSICALFORCE OFFICERPERCEIVEDTHREATOFDEADLYPHYSICALFORCE TOTAL INTENTIONALDISCHARGEANIMALATTACK DOGATTACK OTHERANIMALATTACK TOTAL UNINTENTIONALDISCHARGE DURINGADVERSARIALCONFLICT HANDLINGFIREARM TOTAL UNAUTHORIZEDUSEOFFIREARM SUICIDE ATTEMPTEDSUICIDE UNAUTHORIZEDINTENTIONALDISCHARGE UNAUTHORIZEDPERSONDISCHARGEDOFFICER'SFIREARM TOTAL 2010
21 8 1 1 2
33 2010 29 1 30 2010 6 15 21 2010
2 0 2 4
8
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT USEOFFORCE
USEOFFORCE
Police officers are among a select few to whom society has granted the right to use forceinthecourseoftheirduty.UnderNew York State law, police may use force to ef fect arrest or prevent escape, as well as to protect property or people. With certain very specific exceptions, a private citizens ability to resort to force is limited to self defense and is also predicated on first ex hausting all attempts at retreat. Police, on the other hand, are not only obligated to stand their ground, but required to pursue fleeing malefactors and use force, if neces sary,toterminatethatflight. Anofficersroleencompassesservice,crime control,andordermaintenance,andthelast two regularly require officers to issue in structions and orders. Compliance in these mattersisnotoptional.Thevastmajorityof policeencountersinvolvenothingmorethan words, but when words are insufficient when people choose to ignore or actively resistpoliceofficershaveanascendingar rayofforceoptionstocompelotherstosub mittotheirlawfulauthority. These options extend from professional presence up through verbal force, physical force, nonimpact weapons (e.g., pepper spray), impact weapons like batons, and, finally,deadlyphysicalforce.Alloftheseare toolsattheofficersdisposal,andtheofficer is under no obligation to move sequentially from one to the next; he or she may jump from verbal force to pointing a firearmor viceversaifthesituationdictates. But an officers permission to use force is notunlimited.Accordingtobothfederaland statelaw,aswellastheDepartmentsregu lations, officers may exercise only as much force as they believe to be reasonably nec essary. Reasonableness, more than any otherfactor,isthemostsalientaspectofan officerslegitimateuseofforce. In federal case law, both Tennessee v. Gar ner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and Graham v. Con nor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) delineate a stan dard of objective reasonable ness (Graham) that restricts an officers prerogative to compel or constrain another citizen.Tennesseev.Garner,whiledisallow ing the use of deadly physical force against any felon, affirmed an officers right to use forceagainstcertainsuspects,statingthatif a fleeing suspect were to inflict or threaten anyone with serious physical harm, the use of deadly force would pass constitutional muster. The New York State Penal Law, for its part, allows an officer to use physical force only whenheorshereasonablybelievessuchto be necessary to effect arrest, prevent es cape, or defend a person or property from harm.Andthestatelimitsanofficersability to exercise deadly physical force even fur therPenalLaw35.30(1)providesthatpo lice may only use deadly physical force against a subject in three very specific in stances:1)whenthesubjecthascommitted or is attempting to commit a felony and is usingorabouttousephysicalforceagainsta person,orwhenthesubjecthascommitted or is attempting to commit kidnapping, ar son,escape,orburglary;2)whenanarmed felonresistsarrestorflees;and3)whenthe use of deadly physical force is necessary to defendapersonfromwhattheofficerrea sonably believes to be the use or imminent
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useofdeadlyphysicalforce. The use of deadly physical force, then, is properlyrestrictedbystatute.ButNYPDpol icyrepresentsanevenmorestringentguide line, and the Department goes further than the law in its efforts to control the use of force by its personnel. State law, for exam ple, allows the use of deadly physical force to protect property (e.g., to prevent or ter minate arson or burglary); the Department doesnot.NYPDpolicyemphasizesthatonly theamountofforcenecessarytoovercome resistance will be used, and warns that EXCESSIVE FORCE WILL NOT BE TOLER ATED(PatrolGuide20311).Specificallyre gardingtheuseofdeadlyphysicalforce,the NYPD states that Uniformed members of the service should use only the minimal amountofforcenecessarytoprotecthuman life(PatrolGuide20312). GUIDELINESFORTHEUSEOFFIREARMS To this end, the Department promulgates ninerulesthatguideaNewYorkCitypolice officer in his or her use of deadly physical force.Theyareasfollows:
Police officers shall not use deadly physical force against another person unless they have probable cause to believe they must protect themselves or another person pre sent from imminent death or serious physi calinjury. Police officers shall not discharge their weapons when doing so will unnecessarily endangerinnocentpersons. Police officers shall not discharge their weaponsindefenseofproperty. Police officers shall not discharge their weaponstosubdueafleeingfelonwhopre sentsnothreatofimminentdeathorserious physicalinjurytothemselvesoranotherper sonpresent. Policeofficersshallnotfirewarningshots. Police officers shall not discharge their fire armstosummonassistanceexceptinemer gency situations when someones personal safety is endangered and unless no other reasonablemeansisavailable. Police officers shall not discharge their fire arms at or from a moving vehicle unless deadly physical force is being used against thepoliceofficeroranotherpersonpresent, bymeansotherthanamovingvehicle. Police officers shall not discharge their fire armsatadogorotheranimalexcepttopro tect themselves or another person from physicalinjuryandthereisnootherreason ablemeanstoeliminatethethreat. Police officers shall not, under any circum stances, cock a firearm. Firearms must be fireddoubleactionatalltimes.
REASONABLENESS Inthefinaltelling,bothlegalstandardsand the Departments expectations assess the appropriateness of an officers exercise of deadly physical force based on reasonable ness. Police are regularly exposed to highly stressful,dangeroussituations,andtherisks they face and the experience they gain are appreciated and conceded by those who write and interpret the law. In Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921), Justice Holmesnotedthatdetachedreflectioncan notbedemandedinthepresenceofanup lifted knife. Sixtyeight years later, the Su preme Court wrote, in Graham v. Connor, that The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the per spective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. And in People v. Benjamin, 51
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NY2d 267, 271, the New York courts wrote Itwould,indeed,beabsurdtosuggestthat apoliceofficerhastoawaittheglintofsteel beforehecanacttopreservehissafety. These rulings explicitly acknowledge the strain under which officers make lifeor deathuseofforcedecisions.Thelawshould and does provide latitude for those who carry the shield and protect the common good. TRAINING Latitude is not unrestricted discretion, of course,butratheranadmissionthatreason ableness is fluid. In order to make the right conclusion about whether and how to use deadly force, an officer in these situations relies on nerve, judgment, and skill, but mostofall,ontraining.Itistrainingthatsets theofficerapartfromthecivilian,andisan anchor in those dangerous situations that mostpeopleneverface. The main purpose of the Annual Firearms Discharge Report is to ensure that the NYPDstrainingisthebestitcanbe.
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT THEINVESTIGATIONANDREVIEWPROCESS
INVESTIGATION
TheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentrecog nizes the serious nature of policeinvolved firearms discharges, and it seeks to record and evaluate every such incident.The man date for such recordkeeping was first pub lishedinDepartmentOrderSOP9(s.1969), but the intervening forty years have greatly refined the NYPDs process. Today, investi gations are conducted in accordance with twoguidingdocuments:1)PatrolGuidePro cedure 21229; and 2) a handbook entitled TheFirearmsDischargesInvestigationMan ual;TheNYPDguidetothepreparationofa ShootingIncidentReport. THESHOOTINGTEAM When an officer discharges his or her fire arm, on or offduty, or when a firearm owned by an officer is discharged, a patrol supervisor responds to the incident and takes charge of the scene and secures and inspectstheinvolvedofficersfirearm.Heor she also immediately notifies the chain of command.APatrolBoroughShootingTeam, ledbyashootingteamleaderintherankof captain, is then dispatched. The shooting team is an ad hoc entity that may be com prisedofpersonnelfrominvestigatoryunits, communityaffairsunits,theEmergencySer vice Unit, the Firearms and Tactics Section, and/or any other personnel whose training or expertise may prove valuable to the pendinginvestigation. Theshootingteamleader,underthesuper vision of an Inspector, undertakes an in depthexaminationofthedischargeincident, and begins by contacting and conferring with the District Attorney. In many in stancesincluding nearly every instance in whichasubjectiskilledorinjuredtheDis trict Attorney will advise that any officer who fired should not be interviewed, in or der to preserve the integrity of the Grand Juryprocess.WhetherornottheDistrictAt torney allows an interview, the shooting team leader will, in every instance, direct the officer who fired to prepare a Firearms Discharge/AssaultReport,orFDAR. Ifadischargecausesdeathorinjury,theof ficer who fired is required to submit to a Breathalyzertest.Heorsheisalsoautomati cally reassigned to an administrative posi tion for a minimum of the next three con secutive work days. Investigations into dis chargesthatcausedeathorinjuryaresuper visedbyexecutivesintherankofChief. If the discharge incident appears legally or administratively problematic, or if malfea sance is suspected, the shootingteam leader, in conjunction with personnel from the Internal Affairs Bureau, will remove the shooting officers weapon and modify or suspend his or her duty status. An officers weapon must also be removed in all in stances of selfinflicted injury (absent ex tenuatingcircumstances). Each shooting investigation is thorough and exhaustive, and includes canvasses, area searches, witness interviews, subject inter views, evidence collection, crimescene sketches and investigation, hospital visits, and firearms/ballistics analyses. Afterwards, allavailableinvestigatoryresultsarecollated into a Shooting Incident Report and for wardedtotheChiefofDepartment,ordinar ilywithin24hoursoftheincident.
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THESHOOTINGINCIDENTREPORT Apreliminaryreportwrittenusuallywithin 8hours of the incidentoutlines, as much aspossible,theshootingincident;however, the rapidly evolving nature of shooting in vestigations means information contained therein is unavoidably preliminary. The pri mary means of mitigating this is the use of the Firearms Discharge Investigation Man ual. The manual, in its current incarnation, is a 72page instruction booklet that provides a template by which shootingteam leaders can produce accurate, datarich Shooting Incident Reports in a timely manner. It en suresthatpertinentquestionsareaskedand relevant avenues of investigation are pur sued,eveninthewakeofadynamic,some times chaotic incident. Firearms discharges, especially those that occur during adversar ial conflict, can be tremendously complex events.TheFirearmsDischargeInvestigation Manual functions as a checklist, promoting bothuniformityandspecificity. Each Shooting Incident Report should end with a statement, made with appropriate caveats, assessing whether or not the dis charge was consistent with Department guidelines and whether or not the involved officers should be subject to Departmental discipline. Often, if involved officers have not been interviewed, the shootingteam leader may not make a determination, but rather state that the investigation is ongo ing. This does not preclude the shooting teamleaderfromofferingatentativedeter mination, however, nor from commenting on the apparent tactics utilized during the incident. THEFINALREPORT Within 90 days of the incident, the com mandingofficerofeithertheprecinctofoc currence or the applicable Borough Investi gation Unit prepares a finalized version of the Shooting Incident Report. This final re port is a reiteration of the original, but in cludes any clarifications or reevaluations thatmayhavebeendevelopedinthemean time. Because of the speed with which the initial report is prepared, tentative data is unavoidable. Accordingly, the final report will contain material that was not initially available to the shootingteam leader (e.g., detectives case files, forensic results, and medicalreports).Andbecauseinformationis more extant, more complete subjective as sessmentsarepossible. Generally, with regard to discharges that occurduringadversarialconflictandinvolve injuryordeathtoasubject,thefinalreport cannotbefinishedwithinthe90dayperiod. Instead, it must wait until the investigation intotheincidenthasbeencompleted,orat least until the district attorney from the countyofoccurrencehaspermittedtheoffi cer or officers who shot to be interviewed. At times it must wait even longer, until all relevant legal proceedings have been con cluded. When a final report is delayedwhether because of ongoing legal proceedings or in complete investigationsthe Borough In vestigation Unit submits monthly interim status reports. Once the final report is fin ished, however, it is forwarded, through channels,totheChiefofDepartment.
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REVIEW
After a firearms discharge has been investi gated and the final report has been pre pared,andaftertheDistrictAttorneysoffice has determined whether the incident re quires prosecutorial action, the NYPD initi atesatertiaryexaminationinordertoassess the event from a procedural and training perspectiveand,ifnecessary,toimposedis cipline. This third layer of oversight is the purview of the Firearms Discharge Advisory Board and the Firearms Discharge Review Board. THEBOROUGHFIREARMSDISCHARGE ADVISORYBOARD The review of firearms discharges is two tiered, and conducted at the borough and executive levels. Members of the borough Firearms Discharge Advisory Board are su pervisors assigned to the borough in which the incident took place. This board further scrutinizes the incident, with the benefit of new material contained in the final report. Based on the accumulated evidence, the borough Firearms Discharge Advisory Board issues preliminary findings regarding whetherornottheofficersactionsviolated theDepartmentsfirearmsguidelinesoruse offorce policy. The preliminary findings, alongwithapreliminarydisciplinaryrecom mendation,areappendedtothefinalreport andpresentedtotheChiefofDepartments Firearms Discharge Review Board for deter mination. THECHIEFOFDEPARTMENTS FIREARMSDISCHARGEREVIEWBOARD The Departments Firearms Discharge Re viewBoardisthepenultimatearbiterofany given discharge incident. It issues determi nations concerning the tactics used during the incident, the propriety of the officers actions, and the disciplinary action to be taken. The Review Board gives due consid eration to and often concurs with the origi nal recommendations of the shootingteam leadersandthesubsequentfindingsandrec ommendations of the borough Advisory Board,butinsomecasesitoverrides,alters, or clarifies the preceding assessments and arrives at new, more accurate findings or moreappropriatedisciplinaryresults. The Chief of Department then produces a Final Summary Reporta single document thatmemorializesandsynthesizesthewhole of the exhaustive investigation and review processandpresentsittothePoliceCom missioner. THEPOLICECOMMISSIONER The final decision in all matters related to these incidents rests with the Police Com missioner.Usingtherecommendationsfrom both the Advisory and the Review Boards, the Police Commissioner makes a final de terminationastotheincident. OncetheCommissionerhasissuedthisfinal determination, the incident is considered closed. The results of the 2010 findings are publishedthroughoutthisreport.
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT ANATOMYOFAFIREARMSDISCHARGEINVESTIGATION
Anofficerdischargesafirearmora firearmownedbyanofficerisdis charged. Asupervisorresponds,securesthe sceneandthefirearminquestion,and makespropernotifications. AShootingTeamisestablishedanda shootingteamleader(Captain)re spondstoconductaninvestigation.
Ifthedischargeresultsininjury,the InternalAffairsBureauCommand CenterisnotifiedandIABmembers respondtoassistintheinvestigation; additionally,theofficerwhofired mustsubmittoaBreathalyzertest. TheDistrictAttorneyisnotifiedinall casesandconductsaseparateinves tigation(ifwarranted).TheDAmay presentthecasetoaGrandJuryto determinejustification. TheDutyChiefisnotifiedandre spondstosuperviseinvestigations fordischargesthatresultinaseri ousinjurybygunfireordeathto anyoneorwhenanofficerisinjured bygunfire. Themorningaftertheshooting incident,theapplicableBorough ChieforBureauChiefandexecu tivestaffmeetwithandbriefthe PoliceCommissioner.
TheDutyInspectorrespondsandsu pervisestheinvestigation. Theshootingteamleaderpreparesa preliminaryShootingIncidentReport, whichissubmittedtotheChiefof Department. TheCommandingOfficerofthepre cinctofoccurrenceoroftheBorough InvestigationsUnitpreparesafinal reportwithin90daysandsubmitsit totheChiefofDepartment. TheBoroughFirearmsDischarge AdvisoryBoardformallyreviewsthe incidentandsubmitspreliminary findingsandrecommendationsto theChiefofDepartment.
TheChiefofDepartmentFirearms DischargeReviewBoardreviewsthe incidentandBoroughAdvisoryBoard findingsandrecommendationsand thenmakesadetermination.
Iftheofficerreceiveschargesand specificationsthecaseissenttothe DepartmentAdvocateforaDepart mentTrial. Inallmattersrelatedtotheincident, thefinaldeterminationrestswiththe PoliceCommissioner.
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2010FIREARMSDISCHARGES BYCATEGORY

2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT INTENTIONALDISCHARGEADVERSARIALCONFLICT
OVERVIEW
There were 33 incidents of intentional fire arms discharge during an adversarial conflict in 2010. This represents a 30 percent de crease from 2009. Fiftytwo officers inten tionallyfiredtheirweaponsduringtheseinci dents,down24percentfrom2009. Four officers were injured by gunfire during these incidents. Two were shot by subjects andtwowereshotbyotherofficersowingto crossfire.* No officers were killed during theseincidents. There were 34 subjects involved in these 33 conflicts. Sixteen subjects were injured and eightsubjectswerekilled. overwhelmingphysicalforce(3percent)[see FigureA.1]. DATESANDTIMESOFDISCHARGES Adversarialconflict incidents in 2010 oc curred evenly over the four quarters of the year. Each quarter had between seven and nineincidents.FiveincidentsoccurredinOc tober, but each month had at least one inci dent. The distribution was fairly equal over the three platoons, or police shifts, with ten oc curringinthefirstplatoon,teninthesecond, and13inthethird.Thirtypercentoftheinci dentsoccurredonMondays.
LOCATIONSOFDISCHARGES
Of the 33 incidents, three discharges took placeinoronNewYorkCityHousingAuthor ity(NYCHA)premises,and30occurredinthe jurisdictionofthepatrolprecincts.
REASONSFORDISCHARGES
Officers intentionally discharging their fire armsduringadversarialconflictdidsotode fendthemselvesorothersfromthethreatof seriousphysicalinjuryordeath. Inthemajorityoftheseincidents(64percent) thethreatcameintheformofafirearm.Offi cersalsoactedtodefendthemselvesoroth ers from the use or threat of a blunt instru ment (3 percent), the use or threat of a cut ting instrument (24 percent), a perceived threat (6 percent), or the use or threat of
*CrossfireincidentsaredistinguishedfromMistaken IdentityDischargesbytheshootingofficersintent:in crossfireincidents,theofficerwhofireddidnotintend toshoottheofficerheorshestruck,whereasin incidentsofmistakenidentity,theshootingofficeris purposefullyfiringuponthesubjectofficerinthe mistakenbeliefthatthesubjectofficerisa perpetrator.Acrossfireincidentalwaysinvolvesinjury ordeath;mistakenidentityincidentscaninvolvea dischargewithnohits.Therewerenomistaken identityincidentsin2010.SeetheMistakenIdentity chapter,page37.
TYPEOFTHREAT INTENTIONALDISCHARGE ADVERSARIALCONFLICT(IDAC) (33INCIDENTS)

3% 3% 6%
24% 64%
USED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFAFIREARM USED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFACUTTINGINSTRUMENT USED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFABLUNTOBJECT USED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFOVERWHELMINGPHYSICALFORCE USED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFDEADLYPHYSICALFORCE
FigureA.1
Formanagementpurposes,thePoliceDepart mentdividesNewYorkCitysfivegeographic boroughs or counties into eight Patrol Bor oughs. Each of these patrol boroughs has eight to 12 police precincts, with the excep tionofStatenIsland,whichhasthree. Half of the incidents occurred in Brooklyn, with eight incidents in Brooklyn South and eightincidentsinBrooklynNorth.Seveninci dents occurred in The Bronx. Percentages of dischargesperborougharedepictedinFigure A.3,below. Theseincidentstookplacein25separatepre cincts, down from 27 in 2009. Six precincts experienced two incidents (down from 11 in 2009),andthe67Precincthadthree(asitdid in2009)[seeFigureA.2]. Twothirdsoftheincidentsoccurredoutside. LOCATIONSOFCRIMINALSHOOTINGS When the locations of policeinvolved shoot ingsarecomparedtothelocationsofcriminal shootings in 2010, an explicit association ap pears.Themaponthenextpage[FigureA.4] depictsthepreciselocationofthecitys1,473 criminalshootings(representedbyblueaster isks) and overlays them with all 33 incidents of intentional discharge during adversarial conflict (represented by red dots) that oc curredin2010. Themapshows,veryclearly, thatpolicegowheretheyareneeded:police firearms discharges occur in those areas of thecitymostplaguedbygunviolence.
PRECINCTSWITHMORETHANONE IDACINCIDENT,2010 34 40 41 67 73 75 79 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
FigureA.2
IDACINCIDENTSBYBOROUGH(33INCIDENTS)
QUEENSNORTH 3% QUEENSSOUTH 9%
MANHATTAN SOUTH 3% MANHATTAN NORTH 15%
BROOKLYN NORTH 25%
BRONX 21%
BROOKLYN SOUTH 24%

FigureA.3
LOCATIONSOF33INTENTIONALDISCHARGESDURINGADVERSARIAL CONFLICTvsLOCATIONSOF1,473CRIMINALSHOOTINGS,2010
REDINTENTIONALFIREARMSDISCHARGEBYPOLICE DURINGADVERSARIALCONFLICT BLUECRIMINALSHOOTINGS
FigureA.4
As seen in Figure A.6, below, the association also exists with regard to relative rateon a percentagebyborough basis, policeinvolved shootings and criminal shootings are analo gous,aswell.Ofcourse,giventhatthereare nearly 45 criminal shootings for each police dischargecitywide, therates are not entirely parallel. Brooklyn South and the Bronx each sawappreciabledifferencesbetweentheper centagesofthetwocategories. Despitethisassociation,theabsolutenumber of these policedischarge incidents is small when compared to the number of criminal shootings [see Figure A.5]. Only 2 percent of thecitysshootingincidentsinvolvepolice.
CRIMINALSHOOTINGSvsIDAC INCIDENTS,FREQUENCYBYBOROUGH
409
409
230 172 159
26
5 MN BX
8 BS
8 BN
41 4 QS 0 QN
27 0 SI
MS
REASONSOFFICERINVOLVED
Officers become involved in incidents of in tentionaldischargeduringadversarialconflict
CRIMINALSHOOTINGINCIDENTS(1,473) IDACINCIDENTS(33)
FigureA.5
CRIMINALSHOOTINGSvsIDACINCIDENTS, PERCENTAGEBYBOROUGH
28% 24% 21% 16% 11% 12% 28% 24%
15% 12%
2%
3%
3% 0%
2% 0%
MS
MN
BX
BS
BN
QS
QN
IDACINCIDENTS(33)
SI
CRIMINALSHOOTINGS(1,473)
FigureA.6
foravarietyofreasons.TheAnnualFirearms Discharge Report categorizes incidents by whether the officers involved were engaged inreactivepolicework(39percent)orproac tivepolicework(61percent). Ofondutyofficersdischargingtheirfirearms duringtheseincidents,mostwereperforming patrol duties (57 percent). This is unsurpris ing, as the Patrol Bureau forms the Depart mentscoreandisstaffedaccordingly.Anad ditionalthirdofthoseofficersfiringwereas signed AntiCrime units (32 percent), which activelyseekoutarmedcriminalsandviolent perpetrators.Althoughthisisdisproportional to these units small numbersofficers as signedtoAntiCrimemakeuplessthan8per cent of any given precincts headcountit is predictablegiventheunitsmandate[seeFig ureA.7]. The majority of officers who ultimately fired their weapons (53 percent) became involved in the precipitating situation owing to 911 calls. Such callsor radio runs, in police parlancecan involve reports of ongoing or developing conditions or calls for assistance from crimevictims or witnesses. Fifteen per cent of the incidents involved officers con ducting stops based on reasonable suspicion [seeFigureA.8].
OFFICERS'ONDUTY ASSIGNMENTS
(47OFFICERS)
57%
32%
OFFICERRESTRAINT
Of officers discharging their firearms during anadversarialconflict,77percentfiredfiveor fewertimes[seeFigureA.9].Attheotherend of the scale, three officers fired 16 rounds, emptying their firearms. All three of these officers were fired upon before they them
6%
4%
PATROL
ANTICRIME
OCCB
SOD
FigureA.7
OFFICERS'ACTIONSPRIORTOONDUTY SHOOTING
(47OFFICERS)
RESPONDING TO911CALL SQFINCIDENT OBSERVEDPERSONWITH GUN ROUTINE PATROLDUTIES EXECUTING SEARCH WARRANT OBSERVEDOTHER CRIME NARCOTICSENFORCEMENT 2% 2%
FigureA.8
53% 15% 13% 9% 6%
SHOTSFIREDBYOFFICERS (52OFFICERS)
1116 12% 610 12%
15 76%
FigureA.9
selves fired; one of them had been shot and severelyinjuredbythesubjectwithwhomhe exchangedgunfire. Nevertheless,restraintisthenorm.Aquarter of the officers discharging their firearms in adversarialconflict incidents only fired one shot.Andthispatternofcontrolisalsoappar entwhenanalyzingthenumberofshotsfired perincident,ratherthanperofficer.Sixtyper cent of the incidents involved five or fewer shotsbeingfired.In27percentofadversarial conflict incidents, the total number of shots firedbyallpoliceofficersinvolvedwasone.
46 21 19 17 15 13 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 6% 3% 3% 3% 3% 9% 3% 6%
Intotal,236shotswerefiredbyofficersdur ing these incidents, up 28 percent from 2009srecordlowof184shots.Thisincrease islargelyattributabletothefactthat,in2009, noincident involvedaprotractedgunbattle. AnappurtenanceoftheNYPDssmallnumber of shootings is that a single anomalous ex changeofhighvolumegunfirecannoticeably distort the real picture. Because 2010 in cludedtwosuchgunfights,thenumberofto tal shots fired has increased. These two inci dents accounted for almost 30 percent of all the shots fired in adversarial conflict inci dents. When working with such a small number of incidents,shootingofficers,androundsfired, typicaluseofmeansandmedianscanleadto false conclusions. Additionally, as noted above,asingleincidentcansignificantlyskew averages.Forthisreason,withsmallsamples, themodecanbemostrevelatory[seeFigure A.10]. The mode for the number of shots firedbypoliceisone. OBJECTIVECOMPLETIONRATE Similarly, the Department does not calculate
SHOTSFIREDPERINCIDENT (PERCENTOF 33INCIDENTS)
15% 27% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
FigureA.10
average hit percentages. Instead, the objec tivecompletionrateperincidentisemployed asitisbothmoreaccurateandmoreinstruc tive. Like combat itself, the objective completion rateperincidentispass/fail.Whenanofficer properly and lawfully adjudges a threat se vere enough to require the use of his or her firearm, and fires at a specific subject, the most relevant measure is whether he or she ultimately hits and stops the subject. This is theobjectivecompletionrate,anditisdeter minedirrespectiveofthenumberofshotsthe officerfiredatthesubject. Inthese33incidents,officershitatleastone subjectperincident23times,foranobjective completionrateof70percent.Duringthein cidents in which officers were being fired upon,however,theobjectivecompletionrate increasedto78percent. SHOOTINGTECHNIQUE Utilizingatwohandedgrip,standing,andlin ingupatargetusingthefirearmssightsisthe preferred method of discharging a firearm, butitisnotalwayspracticalduringanadver sarial conflict. Of officers reporting their shootingtechniques,therewasanearlyeven split between officers who gripped the fire arm with two hands and those who gripped thefirearmwithonehand.Morethanhalfof officers who reported their stance state that they were standing (58 percent). And al though only 40 percent of officers made any reportofwhetherornottheyhadusedtheir sights, it is notable that only one officer re portedintheaffirmative. Only 25 percent of reporting officers were abletomakeuseofsometypeofcoverdur ingtheincident.Lackofcovercanbeafactor intheneedforafirearmsdischarge. DISTANCE Althoughofficersaretrainedtofireonatar getfromasfarawayas75feet,themajority of adversarial conflict discharges occur when theofficeriscloserthantenfeettothesub ject. Nevertheless, in 2010, one officer re ported firing from a distance of 50 feet. He did not hit the subject. More typically, the greatest percentage of officers fired at a rangeofsixtotenfeet[seeFigureA.11].
OFFICERPEDIGREE
Although approximately 83 percent of the Departments uniformed personnel are males,90percentofofficerswhodischarged their firearms during an adversarial conflict weremales(47of52officers). Withregardtorace,50percentoftheofficers whointentionallydischargedafirearmduring an adversarial conflict were white. This is slightlylessthanthepercentageofwhiteoffi cers employed by the Department (53 per cent)[seeFigureA.12].
DISTANCE(INFT)OF38 REPORTINGOFFICERS
2150 11% 1620 16% 05 26%
1115 8% 610 39%
FigureA.11
RACE/ETHNICITYOFOFFICERS 2010IDAC
50% 53%
23% 16% 2% 5%
25%
26%
ASIAN
BLACK
HISPANIC
WHITE
OFFICERSDISCHARGINGFIREARMS(52)
DEPARTMENTSTAFFING(34,565)
FigureA.12
When compared to Department staffing, black officers who fired were overrepre sentedin2010,constituting16percentofthe Department but 23 percent of shooting offi cers.Hispanicofficerswereslightlyunderrep resented,constituting26percentofstaffbut 25percentoftheofficersfiring. ATTIRE Fewerondutyplainclothesofficersintention allydischargedtheirfirearmsduringadversar ial conflict than did onduty uniformed offi cers (14 plainclothes officers versus 38 uni formedofficers). Sinceplainclothesofficersmakeupasmaller portion of officers in the field than those in uniform, their relative representation in dis charge incidents should not be noteworthy. But this is a break from previous years, in whichthenumberofplainclothesofficersfir ing often equaled and sometimes exceeded the number of uniformed officers doing so, despitethesignificantdisparityintheirover allstaffingpercentages.
2010s reduction in adversarial conflict inci dents is largely due to the decrease in on duty plainclothes officers firing. This is espe ciallytruewithregardtoofficersassignedto the Organized Crime Control Bureau, or OCCB, which includes officers specializing in combatingnarcotics,viceoffenses,andauto relatedcrimes.Overthepastseveralyearsit was observed that OCCB officers were in creasingly involved in onduty discharge inci dents(fromsixofficersin2007,to11officers in2008,to14officersin2009.In2010,how ever,onlythreedischargingofficerswereon dutyOCCBpersonnel. YEARSOFSERVICE Figure A.13 compares yearsofservice distri bution among officers who fired to yearsof service distribution throughout the Depart ment.(TheDepartmentstaffingnumbersonly indicatethepercentageofofficerswhoarein these categories of tenure; they do not indi cate the assignments of those officers, nor their level of exposure to the dangers that increase the likelihood of an intentional po
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YEARSOFSERVICE IDAC2010
38% 31% 31% 22% 16% 12% 8% 2% 17%
21%
1to5
6to10
11to15
16to20
over20
DEPARTMENTSTAFFING2009(34,565)
FigureA.13
lice discharge.) Younger officers, who are more likely to be on patrol in the field, are overrepresented. In 2010, 38 percent of the officerswhodischargedtheirfirearmsduring adversarialconflicthadbetweenoneandfive yearsofservice.Thedecreasemaybeattrib utabletothesmallnumbersofofficershired over the past three years, and the resulting rise in tenure among the Department as a whole. RANK Sixtysevenpercentoftheofficersdischarging their firearms in these incidents were in the rank of police officer [see Figure A.14]. Be cause police officers are the front line, and representthemajorityofofficersresponding toviolentjobsandactivelyseekingoutcrimi nals, this is unsurprising. Additionally, the rank of Police Officer forms the majority of the Department and therefore the pool of officers who may become involved in adver sarialconflictisgreater.
RANKOFOFFICERSINVOLVEDINIDAC INCIDENTS(52OFFICERS)
LIEUTENANT, 6% INSPECTOR, 2%
SERGEANT, 17% DETECTIVE, 8% POLICE OFFICER,67%
FigureA.14
Worthyofnote,however,istheinvolvement of an Inspector in an adversarialconflict dis chargeincidentin2010.Itisrarethatshoot ers come from the ranks above Lieutenant. Still, the Inspectors involvement emphasizes that, for all police officers, the possibility of adversarialconflictneverceasesbeingapart ofthejob.
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POLICEWEAPONS The overwhelming majority of officers dis charged their service weapons during these incidents(87percent).Theremainingofficers firedoffdutyweapons(11percent)orweap onsspecifictotheEmergencyServicesUnit(2 percent).[SeeAppendix]
RACE/ETHNICITYOF34SUBJECTS INVOLVEDINIDACINCIDENTS
Hispanic 26% Asian 6%
SUBJECTPEDIGREE
Therewere34subjectsinvolvedinthe33in cidentsofintentionalpolicedischargeduring adversarialconflict.(Onesubjectwasnotap prehendedbutisknownbygenderandrace.) Thirtythreesubjectsweremaleandonewas female.Ofthe33apprehendedsubjects,ages ranged from 17 to 69, although 61 percent werebetweenoftheagesof17and27. SUBJECTRACE InNYPDpaperworkconcerningsuspects,race is determined by complainants and/or vic tims. In arrest paperwork, the officer filling outthereportgenerallydeterminesthesub jectsrace.Thisdeterminationmaybebased onasubjectsselfidentification,existinggov ernmentissued documentation, racial/ethnic physical characteristics, or other factors. The DepartmentalsosubcategorizesHispanicsas blackHispanicorwhiteHispanicinarrestpa perwork, although the Annual Firearms Dis charge Report combines all Hispanic persons intoasinglegroup. All 34 subjects were identified by race [see FigureA.15].Themajorityofsubjects(53per cent) were black. This percentage is signifi cantly smaller than black suspects represen tation among criminalshooting suspects. In 2010, 74 percent of criminalshooting sus pectswhowereidentifiedbyracewereblack.
White 15%
Black 53%
FigureA.15
Hispanics, on the other hand, are slightly overrepresented among adversarialconflict subjects in comparison to their representa tion among racially identified criminal shooting suspects. Twentysix percent of ad versarialconflict subjects were Hispanic; ap proximately 24 percent of racially identified criminalshootingsuspectswereHispanic[see FigureA.15andFigureA.19]. Amongsubjectswhofiredonofficers,67per cent were black, 22 percent were Hispanic, and 11 percent were white [see Figure A.16 andFigureA.19]. Theracesofpersonsarrestedin2010forfire arms possession are also closely aligned to the races of persons who engaged in adver sarialconflictwithpolice.SeeFigureA.18for avisualrepresentationofthesecomparisons.
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RACE/ETHNICITYOF9SUBJECTS FIRINGONOFFICERS
Hispanic 22%
White 11%
Black 67%
FigureA.16
In summary, in 2010, blacks and Hispanics represent 52 percent of New York Citys population, 98 percent of raciallyidentified criminalshooting suspects, 96 percent of criminalshootingvictims,94percentofthose arrested for firearms possession, 89 percent of those firing on police, and 79 percent of thosefiredonbypolice. PRIORARRESTS A subjects arrest history is usually unknown totheofficeratthetimeofatypicalincident. Nevertheless, arrest history is pertinent. It is indicative of a subjects propensity for crimi nal conduct and capacity for violently con fronting a police officer, and it can evince it self in a subjects bearing, actions, and reac tions. An arrest history, pending charges, or parole status may also make a subject more willingtoattempttoavoidarrestbyconfront ingtheofficer. Of the 33 identified subjects in these inci dents, 94 percent had been previously ar restedand 91 percent had multiple prior arrests[seeFigureA.17].
Foursubjectswereonparoleorprobationat thetimeoftheincidents,andonewasouton bail,awaitingtrialforpossession ofaloaded gun.Twentysixofthesubjectswithpriorar rests had been arrested for violent crimes suchasrobbery,assault,andresistingarrest, andfourhadbeenarrestedformurderorat tempted murder. Fiftytwo percent of the subjects with prior arrests had arrests for weapons possession, including eight subjects arrested for possessing or using a firearm. Thirtysix percent had prior robbery arrests. (It should be noted that individual subjects may be identified in several of the previous categories.)
31KNOWNSUBJECTS WITHPRIORARRESTS
30 2ORMORE PRIORS PRIORVIOLENT CRIMES PRIORWEAPONS POSS. PRIORROBBERY 15 PROBATION, PAROLE,BAIL PRIORMURDER, ATT.MURDER 5
25
20
10
0
NB:Individualsmayberepresentedin morethanonecategory
FigureA.17
13
SUBJECTSINVOLVED INIDACINCIDENTS(34)vs PERSONSARRESTEDFORFIREARMSPOSSESSION (6,021)
67% 53%
26%
27% 15% 6% 6% 1%
Black
Hispanic
White
Asian
SUBJECTSINVOLVED INIDAC
PERSONSARRESTED FORFIREARMSPOSSESSION
FigureA.18
SUBJECTSWHOFIREDONPOLICE(9)vsRACIALLY IDENTIFIEDSHOOTING SUSPECTS(939)

74% 67%
22%
24% 11% 1% 0% 1%
Black
Hispanic SUBJECTSWHOFIRED ONPOLICE
White CRIMINALSHOOTING SUSPECTS
Asian
FigureA.19
14
SUBJECTWEAPONS Thesubjectsintheseincidentsutilizedavari ety of weapons when confronting officers. Themostfrequentlyusedweaponwasafire arm. Twentytwo subjects carried firearms; nine of them fired those weapons. Of the known firearms possessed or used by sub jects, 9mm semiautomatic pistols and .38 caliber revolvers were the most popular, ac counting for 11 of the 20 known firearms used[seeFigureA.20]. Eight incidents involved subjects who at tacked or menaced officers with cutting in struments. Half of these occurred indoors, andsixoftheeightinvolvedemotionallydis turbed persons. In one cuttinginstrument involvedincident,aknifewaswieldedbya69 yearoldbankrobberwho,thepreviousday, hadbeenreleasedfromprisonafter21years incarceration. Officers in three incidents first attempted to use OC spray before being forced to resort to their firearms; a sergeant inanotherincidentdeployedaconducteden ergydevice,orTASER,tonoavail. One subject viciously beat his mother with a frying pan, causing skull and facial fractures. Another emotionally disturbed person at tacked a police car with a cobblestone, and thenattemptedtotakearespondingofficers firearm via overwhelming physical force. In two incidents subjects made purposeful and aggressive gestures indicative of drawing a firearm, and thereby caused the officers to perceiveanimmediatethreat.
INCIDENTOUTCOMES
Of the 33 incidents, 24 resulted in injury or deathtoasubjectorpoliceofficer. OFFICERDEATH No police officer was killed by a perpetrator duringadversarialconflictin2010. OFFICERINJURIES Four officers were injured, however, two se verely. One officer was shot twice in the ab domenandcriticallyinjured.(Thatofficerwas struck in the chest, as well, but saved by his bulletresistant vest.) Another officer was struck in the femoral artery and very nearly exsanguinated. Additionally, two officers werestruckbyfellowpoliceduringaparticu
WEAPONSUSED/POSSESSEDBYSUBJECTS
9mm Knife .38Revolver Machete ImitationFirearm .380SemiAuto UnknownFirearm FryingPan .44Revolver .40SemiAuto .357Revolver .32Revolver .25SemiAuto .22Revolver
10
FigureA.20
15
larlychaoticgunbattle:onewasstrucksuper ficiallyinthehand,andasecondwasstruckin his vest, suffering bluntforce trauma. Two otherofficerswereinjuredbyphysicalassault duringtheseincidents. BULLETRESISTANTVEST Twoofficersweresavedfromroundsthatim pacted their chests by their bulletresistant vests. In only one instance did the body ar moraffecttheoutcomeoftheattack. MALFUNCTION Oneofficer,anoffdutyinvestigatorassigned to OCCB, observed a subject firing on other, uninvolvedindividualsintheBronx.Whenthe officer identified himself and confronted the subject, the subject turned and pointed his firearm at the officer. The officer fired one round, but then experienced a malfunction, He was able to clear the weapon and reac quire the subject. Additionally, a female po lice officer assigned to AntiCrime experi encedamagazinemalfunctionafterfiringon asubjectmenacingherpartnerwithaloaded revolver.Fortunately,shewasabletofireher chambered round, striking and stopping the subject,beforehermagazinedisengagedand fell to the ground. No civilians or officers were injured as a result of these malfunc tions. SUBJECTDEATH Eightsubjectswerekilledbypolicebulletsin 2010. Of these, seven of the eight had prior arrest histories. The one individual with no priorarresthistoryshotapoliceofficerthree times.Fiveoftheeightkilledwereintoxicated or had illegal narcotic or controlled chemical substancesintheirsystemsatthetimeofthe incidents. Fivesubjectswhowerekilledwereinposses sion of firearms; three of these had fired on or shot police. Two menaced officers with knives, and one was attempting to kill his motherwithafryingpan[seeFigureA.21]. Additionally,aninthsubjecttookhisownlife afterfiringupona sergeantandbeingstruck inthelegbyherreturngunfire. Fornarrativesdescribingallincidentsinwhich asubjectwaskilledbypolicegunfire,seethe Appendix. SUBJECTINJURIES Ofthe16subjectswhowereinjuredbypolice gunfire,halfhadfirearms.Fiveofthesubjects fired on police, and one of those five struck and critically injured an officer. Another of thosefiveaburglaronparole,whosecrimi nalhistoryincluded17priorarrestsfiredon afemalesergeant,and,afterbeingstruckby herreturnfire,stoppedinthestreetandtook his own life. Six subjects were shot and in jured after menacing or attacking civilians and/or officers with knives. One subject was wounded after making an aggressive gesture indicativeofdrawingafirearmwhileattempt ingtostealanoffdutysergeantsmotorcycle, andanothersubjectwasshotintheshoulder while attempting to take an officers firearm [seeFigureA.22]. BYSTANDERINJURED Three innocent civilian bystanders were in juredduringaparticularlychaoticgunbattle. Although two perpetrators also fired during theincident,thebystanderswereverypossi bly struck by police rounds. None of the by
16
ASSAULTED MOTHERWITH BLUNT INSTRUMENT, 11%
ACTIONSOFSUBJECTSSHOTANDKILLED DURINGIDAC(8SUBJECTS)
THREATENED OFFICERWITH CUTTING INSTRUMENT, 22%
THREATENED OFFICERWITH FIREARMOR SHOTAT OFFICER, 56%

FigureA.21
ACTIONSOFSUBJECTSSHOTANDINJURED DURINGIDAC(16SUBJECTS)
ATTEMPTED TO TAKEOFFICER'S GUN, 6%
OFFICERPERCEIVED THREAT, 6%
FIREDON POLICE OFFICERS, 31%
THREATENED OFFICEROR CIVILIANWITH ACUTTING INSTRUMENT, 38%
THREATENED OFFICEROR CIVILIANWITH FIREARM, 19%

FigureA.22
17
standersinjurieswerelifethreatening. FINDINGS Even when intentional firearms discharges aredeemedjustifiableinacourtoflaw,they arestillreviewedbytheDepartmentfortacti cal concerns and violations of procedure. It must be noted that discipline in these cases doesnotalwaysrelatetotheactualdischarge ofthefirearm,butcanresultfromaviolation ofotherDepartmentprocedures. Allofficerswhodischargetheirfirearmsare sent to a firearmsretraining course, regard lessofthecircumstancesofthedischarge. Atthetimeofthisreport,theactionsof22of the 52 officers involved had been reviewed and findings had been issued. (It must be noted that the Police Commissioner has the authoritytochangethefindingsoffinalized cases.) Amongtheofficersinvolvedinreviewedinci dents, one officerwho was violently as saulted and injured by two wouldbe home invaders on his stoop, then broke away and retrievedhisfirearm,andthenreconfronted the two perpetratorswas held in violation fornotretreatingandsummoningassistance. (Whenonehomeinvadermadeagesturein dicativeofdrawingafirearm,theofficerfired on him. The home invaders were not identi fied or apprehended.) Seven other officers were ordered to additional retraining: four werereinstructedonhowtodealwithbarri caded persons, one was reinstructed on shootingtactics,onewasreinstructedontac ticallyapproachingsuspects,andonewasre instructedonmaintainingproperammunition loads. Thirteenofficersactionsweredeterminedto involvenoviolationandrequirenocorrective action. Finally, one officer, whose discharge was deemed proper, was issued a command disciplineforfailingtocarryaconducteden ergy device as required, although it was de termined that the device would not have been a prudent option in the incident. Re viewsoftheremainingincidentsarepending.
CONCLUSION
There were 33 intentional discharges during adversarialconflictsin2010,involving52offi cers who fired. These conflicts involved 34 subjects,includingninewhofireddirectlyon police. In 2010, there were nearly 1,775 victims of criminalshootingsinNewYorkCity.Thenum ber of intentional firearms discharges by po lice,comparatively,issmall,buteverytimean officer discharges a firearm he or she risks inflicting injury or death on subjects, fellow police officers, or innocent bystanders. Be cause of this, the Department strives to en sure that each incident is thoroughly investi gated and analyzed in order to reduce these events, thereby reducing the likelihood of harmtociviliansandofficersalike. One method of judging the Departments relativesuccessistocomparethenumberof adversarialconflict discharge incidents with the number of arrests of armed individuals made by officers each year. In 2010, New York City police officers made 28,880 weap ons arrests, including 6,021 gun arrests. (These numbers do not include instances in which officers confront armed emotionally disturbed persons and transport those per sons to the hospital rather than arresting them.)
18
In other words, there were nearly 29,000 incidents in which an officer took an armed subjectintocustodywithoutfiringhisorher weapon. There were, on average, 34,565 uniformed officers employed by the NYPD in 2010. Of them, only 520.15 percentintentionally dischargedafirearmatasubject. These officers responded to more than five million calls for service in 2010, of which morethan206,874involvedweapons. Ofthemillionsofdangerouscallsthatthou sands of officers responded to in 2010 (not including proactive incidents during which officerswereactivelyseekingoutcriminals), officers intentionally discharged their fire armsinatotalof33incidents.
19
20
2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT INTENTIONALDISCHARGEANIMALATTACK
OVERVIEW
There were 30 incidents of intentional fire arms discharge during an animal attack in 2010,upthreepercentfrom2009anddown 23percentfrom2000. To contextualize these 30 incidents, it is worth noting that in 2010, police officers respondedtoapproximately28,000callsfor service involving dogs and other animals. It doesnotaccountforincidentsinwhichoffi cers proactively encounter dogs or investi gate incidents that were not processed through911or311. Atotalof38officersintentionallyfiredtheir weapons during these 30 incidents, up 12 percent from 2009. Four officers were di rectlyinvolvedintheattackbutdidnotfire. Allbutoneoftheattacksinvolveddogs.The outlierinvolvedanattackingraccoon. (Itshouldbenotedthatthefollowingstatis tics, graphs, and observations are based on thislimitedsample.) Therewere12officersinjuredintheseinci dents.Nineofficerswerebittenbydogsand threeofficerssufferedinjuriesfromballistic fragments during the attacks. Six civilians were also bitten by dogs in the course of these animalattack incidents. These num Total Incidents Total Animals Involved Total Officers Involved Officers Bitten Civilians Bitten
FigureB.1
bers do not encompass all dog attacks on officersorcivilians,onlydogattackincidents involving intentional firearms discharges by policeofficers. Ofthe32dogsinvolved,19werekilledand seveninjuredduringtheseconflicts.Therac coonwasunharmed.Amoredetailedanaly sis of injuries to all persons and animals in volved will be provided in the following pages.
REASONSFORDISCHARGES
Officers who intentionally discharged their firearmsduringanimalattacksdidsotode fendthemselvesorothersfromthethreatof physical injury, serious physical injury, or death. In all but one of the incidents the threatcameintheformofadogattack. When able, officers attempt to prevent an animal attack using nonlethal options, in cluding batons and OC spray. Emergency ServiceUnitspossessdognoosestorestrain animalsatasafedistance,aswellasCO2pis tols and rifles capable of firing tranquilizer darts containing Ketaset, a veterinary anes thetic. In rapidly evolving situations, how ever, these other options are not always prudent or possible. Nevertheless, a police officeruseshisorherfirearmasalastresort tostopananimalattack.
30 33 38 9 6
DATESANDTIMESOFDISCHARGES
Halfoftheintentionaldischargesduringani mal attacks occurred during the first four months of the year. March saw eight inci dents, the most incidents of any month. Every other month had between one and fourincidents.
21
The first quarter of the year saw 12 inci dents, the second quarter of the year saw five incidents, the third saw six, and the fourthsawsevenincidents. Discharges during animal attacks occurred most often on Friday (37 percent). These incidents occurred most often on the third platoon (47 percent), followed by the first platoon(33percent)andthesecondplatoon (20percent)[seeFigureB.2].
INTENTIONALDISCHARGEANIMAL ATTACK(IDAA)BYTOUR (30INCIDENTS) 1STPLTN 33% 2NDPLTN 20%
20percentofthetime[seeFigureB.3]. The Bronx experienced the most incidents (37percent).Thepiechartonthefollowing page shows the percentages of discharges perpatrolborough[seeFigureB.4]. These incidents took place in 17 separate precincts,withmostofthoseprecinctsonly experiencingasingleincident.Tenprecincts accruedtwoincidents. Of the 30 incidents, 40 percent occurred outdoors.Thisislessthanthe67percentfor adversarial conflicts. The exact locations of the incidents vary from streets and side walkstoroofs,livingrooms,andhallways.
JURISDICTIONOFINCIDENTS
3RDPLTN 47%
91%
FigureB.2
70%
LOCATIONSOFDISCHARGES
All but three of the intentional discharges during animal attacks occurred within the city limits, with 70 percent of the incidents transpiring under the jurisdiction of the pa trolprecincts.Thisisanoticeabledeparture fromintentionaldischargesduringadversar ialconflict.Whileintentionaldischargesdur ing adversarial conflict occurred within Housing jurisdiction only 9 percent of the time, intentional discharges during animal attacks occurred within Housing jurisdiction
20% 10% 0% Outside City Housing Patrol 9% 0% Transit
IDAC(33INCIDENTS)
IDAA(30INCIDENTS)
FigureB.3
22
The plurality of occurrences happened in a residence (33 percent), with seven of those ten incidents occurring in the living room. FigureB.5belowindicatesthelocationsand percentagesoftheincidents. FigureB.6onthenextpagemapstheexact location of all of the intentional discharges duringanimalattacksthatoccurredin2010. ThethreeattacksthatoccurredoutsideNew YorkCityarenotdepicted.
REASONSOFFICERINVOLVED
A variety of reasons led officers to become involved in incidents of intentional dis charges during animal attacks. The most common (26 percent) was effecting an ar rest[seeFigureB.7].Thenextmostfrequent reasons were executing a warrant or re spondingtoanunleashedorviciousdog(21 percenteach).
IDAAINCIDENTS,BYBOROUGH(30INCIDENTS)
StatenIsland 13% BrooklynNorth 34%
QueensNorth 3% OUTSIDECITY 10%
QueensSouth 3% Bronx 37%

Above,FigureB.4 Below,FigureB.5
LOCATIONOFANIMALATTACKS (30INCIDENTS)
STAIR/HALL/LOBBY ROOF APARTMENT/HOUSE YARD/ALLEY/LOT STREET/SIDEWALK 7% 23% 10% 33% 27%
23
2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT INTENTIONALDISCHARGEANIMALATTACK LOCATIONSOF2010ANIMALATTACKINCIDENTS 27INCIDENTS*
Twoseparateincidentsoccurred inthesamebuilding.
*Doesnotincludethelocationsofthreeincidentsthatoccurredoutsidethecitylimits.
FigureB.6
24
TYPEOFJOBTOWHICHOFFICERWASASSIGNED(38OFFICERS)
VICIOUS/UNLEASHEDDOG NOJOBATTACKED DISPUTE/ASSAULT VERTICAL WARRANTEXECUTION ARREST CANVASS
21% 13% 8% 5% 21% 26% 5%
A large proportion of officers (45 percent) were assigned to precinct and housing patrol duties, which include conducting verticals, effecting ar rests,andrespondingtocallsforservicefromthe public,suchascallsforviciousdogs.Thesetypesof jobs, as mentioned in figure B.7, account for 52 percent of the incidents [see Figure B.9 below for officerassignment]. Figure B.8 indicates the top command or precinct of assignment for officers involved in intentional discharges during animal attacks. Bronx Narcotics officers accounted for 18 percent of the officers involvedin animalattackdischarges,comparedto 4 percent of the officers involved in adversarial conflictincidents.
FigureB.7
COMMAND/PRECINCTOF ASSIGNMENT,2ORMORE OFFICERS
NBBX 47PCT HBBK NBBN 120PCT 79PCT 77PCT 48PCT PSA7 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 7
FigureB.8
OFFICERASSIGNMENT(38OFFICERS)
PATROL DETSQUAD EXECUTINGSEARCHWARRANT HOUSINGPATROL OFFDUTY NARCOTICSBUY ESU
5% 11% 13% 5% 21% 21% 24%
FigureB.9
25
SHOTSFIREDPEROFFICER (38OFFICERS)
3 11% 4 11% 59 16%
SHOTSFIREDPERINCIDENT (30INCIDENTS)
4 10% 6 10% 1013 10%
3 13%
2 26%
1 36%
2 20%
1 37%
FigureB.10
FigureB.11
Oneoffdutyofficer,arrivingathisresidence in Westchester County, observed a raccoon fightingwithaskunk.Whentheraccoonbe cameawareoftheofficer,itabandonedthe skunk and advanced on the officer, hissing. The officer discharged one round, and both theraccoonandskunkfled.
OFFICERRESTRAINT
When officers did discharge their firearms duringananimalattack,thepluralityofoffi cers (37 percent) fired only one time [see FigureB.10]. This pattern of restraint is also apparent when analyzing the number of shots fired per incident. In the majority of animal at tacks (57 percent) officers fired only one or tworounds[seeFigureB.11]. A total of 101 shots were fired by officers during these incidents; this is a 42 percent increase from 2009 but a 29 percent de creasefrom2008.Severalfactorslikelycon tributed to these fluctuations, including changesinthenumberofofficersfiringand the number of incidents involving multiple
dogs. Additionally, three incidents in which morethantenshotswerefiredskewtheto tals. During these 30 incidents, officers hit at least one animal per incident 26 times; this yields an objective completion rate of 87 percent. This is higher than the objective completion rate during adversarial conflict (70 percent) and higher than the objective completion rate of officers under fire (78 percent)[seeOUTCOMEsectionforexplana tion]. SHOOTINGTECHNIQUE Fiftyfour percent of the officers in animal attacks who reported their position, report grippingthefirearmwithtwohands;similar to the 50 percent of officers in adversarial conflict. Seventyfive percent of reporting officers reported that they were unable to utilize coverduringadversarialconflicts.Yet,allof reportingofficersinvolvedinanimalattacks reporthavingnocoverduringthedischarge. Officers who can find cover from an animal
26
attackmaynotfinditnecessarytofire. Animal attacks and adversarial conflict inci dents are usually similar with regard to shooting position. As with adversarial con flicts,themajorityofofficersinvolvedinani malattackincidentsreportbeinginastand ingposition,yetthisyearthenumbershave grownslightlyfurtherapartwith58percent standing during adversarial conflict and 87 percentstandingduringanimalattacks. Halfofthereportingofficersreportutilizing their sights when discharging their firearm during these confrontations, which is dra maticallydifferentfromthesinglereporting officer who used his sights during adversar ialconflict.(Itwasnotedinadversarialcon flictthatonly40percentofofficersmadea notationofsightsuse.) The race of the officers involved in inten tional discharges during animal attacks is slightlydissimilartotheracialmakeupofthe Departments staffing. White officers were overrepresented, comprising 63 percent of officers firing versus 53 percent of Depart mentstaffing.Hispanicofficerswereunder represented, comprising 13 percent of offi cersfiringversus26percentofDepartment staffing. Black officers were over represented, with blacks accounting for 24 percent of officers firing versus 16 percent of Department staffing. No Asian officers firedonanimalsin2010[seeFigureB.12]. ATTIRE Slightly more than half of the officers who discharged their weapons during animal at tacks were attired in uniform (53 percent). Thisisasignificantreductionfromlastyear whentheyrepresentednearly80percentof officers firing. While the number of plain clothes officers discharging their firearm in adversarialconflictincidentshassignificantly
OFFICERPEDIGREE
Twoofthe38officersfiringinanimalattack incidentswerefemale.
RACE/ETHNICITYOFOFFICERS
63% 53%
24% 16% 5% 0%
26% 13%
ASIAN
BLACK
HISPANIC
WHITE
DEPARTMENTUNIFORMSTAFFING2010(34,565)
OFFICERSINVOLVEDINIDAA(38)
FigureB.12
27
YEARSOFSERVICE
47%
31% 21% 23% 18% 17% 11% 8% 3%
21%
1to5
6to10
11to15
16to20
20+
DEPARTMENTUNIFORMSTAFFING2010(34,565)
FigureB.13
decreased in 2010 the number discharging firearms during animal attack have signifi cantly increased. This statistic is driven by plainclothesOCCBofficerswho,in2010,ac counted for 29 percent of officers discharg ingduringanimalattack(theyaccountedfor only nine percent in 2009), yet they have significantly reduced the number of adver sarial conflict discharges in that same year, from26percentin2009toeightpercentin 2010. YEARSOFSERVICE Almost half of the officers who discharged firearmsduringanimalattackshadbetween oneandfiveyearsofservice.Asyearsofser viceincrease,thenumberofintentionaldis charges during animal attacks tends to de crease[seeFigureB.13]. Officersassignedtopatrolareoftenthefirst officerstorespondtodangerousjobsinvolv inganimals,andthemajorityofofficerswith fewerthanfiveyearsofserviceareassigned
topatrolprecinctsperformingthesetypesof duties. The notable exception in 2010 was thelargerpercentageofofficersinthe1620 yearofservicerange.Thisisaresultofsev eral offduty incidents and incidents involv ing supervisors (including a Captain) and precinct detectives, both of which ranks re quiremoretimeinservicethanthatheldby theaveragepoliceofficer. RANK Half of officers discharging their firearms in theseincidentswerepoliceofficers,whoare most likely to perform duties that expose themtoanimalattack[seeFigureB.14].Yet thisisasignificantdecreasefromthe68per cent in 2009. As mentioned earlier, this is alsoaresultoftheincreaseinOCCBofficers discharging their firearms during animal at tack. The number of detectives discharging firearms during these incidents increased from 12 percent in 2009 to 34 percent in 2010.
28
RANKOFOFFICERSINVOLVEDIN IDAAINCIEDNTS(38OFFICERS)
SGT 13% CAPT 3%
PO 50%
DET 34%
FigureB.14
POLICEWEAPONS Officersutilizedtheirserviceweaponsin34 of the 38 incidents. The remaining officers dischargedtheiroffdutyweapons.
INCIDENTOUTCOMES
Of the 30 intentional discharges occurring during animal attacks, 26 resulted in injury ordeathtoatleastoneanimal.Twelveoffi cers were also injured, including nine who werebittenbydogs(upfromthreein2009). Theremainingthreeofficerssufferedballis tic injuries from the shrapnel of the fired bullets. Sixcivilianswerebittenbydogs.Nocivilians were injured by a police discharge during theseincidents. Of the 33 animals involved, 19 were killed and seven injured by police gunfire. All but oneoftheanimalsinvolvedweredogs,with 30ofthe32dogsbeingpitbulls.Oneanimal wasaraccoon.
Whenofficersfiredatattackinganimalsthey hit their targets in 87 percent of the inci dents. This objective completion rate is higher than for adversarial attacks (70 per cent)andhigherthanforofficersunderfire (78 percent). A possible explanation is the distance between officer and animal. Al though in both kinds of attack officers are often attempting to avoid injury by running for cover or physically pushing a subject or animal away, officers in animal attacks are moreoftenwithinarmsreachoftheanimal. All of the officers who reported their dis tancereportbeingfivefeetorclosertothe attackinganimal.Oftheofficerswhofiredin adversarial conflict incidents who reported theirdistancefromthesubject,only26per centwerewithinfivefeetofthesubject. MALFUNCTION No officer reported a firearm malfunction duringananimalattackin2010. FINDINGS All of the intentional firearms discharges during animal attacks in 2010 were investi gatedand,atthetimeofthisreport,58per centofferedfindingsandrecommendations. Of the 22 officers in the completed investi gations, all were found not in violation of procedureorlaw.
CONCLUSION
From among approximately 28,000 calls involving animals answered by thousands of officers, as well as uncounted incidents in which officers came into contact with dogs or other animals, a total of 30 in stancesresultedinofficersdischargingtheir firearms.
29
30
2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT UNINTENTIONALDISCHARGES
OVERVIEW
In2010,therewere22reportedincidentsof unintentional firearms discharge, involving 22officers.Oneoftheseincidentsoccurred in 2009 and was not reported until 2010. Thisincreasesthenumberof2009incidents to 23. Twentyone incidents occurred in 2010. The unreported 2009 incident in volved an offduty officer accidentally dis charging his firearm in his living room. No injuries were sustained from this incident. The officer was suspended for failing to re porttheincident. There were three officers injured in the 21 (2010)incidents.Twowerearesultofbeing struckbydebrisfromthedischargeandone sustained a gunshot wound to the leg. No officerswerekilledasaresultoftheseinci dents. Nociviliansorsubjectswereinjuredorkilled inthesefirearmsdischarges.
PURELYUNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGES
There were 15 incidents in which an officer unintentionally discharged a firearm during timeswhentherewasnoadversarialconflict or animal attack. In 14 incidents only one shot was fired. In one incident the officer unintentionally fired twice. In that incident the first bullet struck the officer and he re actedtothepainbypullingthetriggeragain. LOADING/UNLOADING/HANDLING Halfoftheincidentsoccurredwhiletheoffi cer was unloading the firearm. The other halfoccurredwhiletheofficerwashandling the firearm. The reasons for handling the firearmvaryfrominspectingorcleaningthe firearm,toattemptingtorenderthefirearm safe, to testing the firearms operability. In two incidents the officers were attempting to render a perpetrators firearm safe. An other incident occurred during a forensic analysis of the firearm when the weapon malfunctionedanddischarged.Themajority of incidents occurred at the officers resi denceorapolicefacility.Onlytwoincidents occurred outside, and another occurred in sideapolicevehicle. Itisnotablethatfiveofthe15firearmsdis charged during purely unintentional inci dents involved weapons that were not the officersregularserviceoroffdutyfirearms. (This trend was noted over the last three years,aswell).Thismaystemfromtheoffi cers lack of familiarity with the firearms in question.
REASONFORDISCHARGES
Officers unintentionally discharging their firearms did so in two distinct circum stanceseither purely unintentionally (15 incidents), or unintentionally during adver sarialconflict(sixincidents).Purelyuninten tional discharges occur while the officer is loading, unloading, or otherwise handling thefirearm.Unintentionaldischargesduring adversarialconflictoccurwhiletheofficeris actively engaged in the arrest or apprehen sionofasubject.
31
Also notable is the fact that six of the re maining nine firearms were manufactured by Glock (four model 19s and two model 26s).Thismostlikelyhastodowiththefact thatthehandlermustdepressthetriggerto disassemblethefirearm. PEDIGREEOFOFFICER Pedigree information appears inconsequen tial.Gender,age,race,andassignmentvary atrandomoverthe15incidents.Itisworthy to note that one police recruit unintention allydischargedhisnewlyissuedfirearm.He was suspended for failure to notify the De partmentoftheincident. INJURIES Three officers sustained injuries as a direct result of these 15 purely unintentional dis charges.Oneofficersustainedagunshotin jury to his leg, and one officer sustained a lacerationtotheheadafterbeingstruckby fragmentsofatilethatwasshatteredduring the discharge. The third officer sustained injuriestohiseyeswhenduringforensicop erability testing a round discharged from a defective handgun the officer was attempt ingtorendersafe. FINDINGS Inallbutoneofthecasesforwhichafinding has been determined, the officer has re ceived some sort of discipline or retraining. The one case where the officer was found notinviolationwastheforensictestinginci dentreferredtointheprecedingparagraph. Seethechartonthenextpageforadetailed breakdown of discipline against all officers involvedinunintentionaldischarges. UNINTENTIONALDISCHARGE ADVERSARIALCONFLICT There were six incidents in which officers unintentionally discharged their firearms duringanadversarialconflictin2010.Thisis adecreasefromtheeightincidentsin2009. Inallincidentsonlyoneshotwasfired. REASONFORDISCHARGE Of these six discharges, three involved offi cers chasing a suspect with their firearm in their hand. Two involved officers actively struggling with a perpetrator while holding their firearm. The final incident involved an officer who discharged her firearm when exiting a police vehicle to apprehend a sus pectafteravehiclepursuit. The sample size of this category is so small that no significant conclusions can be de rived. Yet there were some observations worthnoting. In 2009, no incident involved precinct sec tors; all incidents involved specialized units. In2010,allbutoneincidentinvolvedpatrol officers.Allofficersinvolvedwereinuniform andfourofthesixofficerswerefromBrook lyn South precincts. All of the incidents oc curred outdoors. Four of the six firearms wereGlock19sandonewasashotgun.
32
INJURIES There were no firearmsrelated injuries or deathstoofficersasaresultofthesesixinci dents. Although three officers sustained in juriesrelatedtochasingorstrugglingwitha suspect.Nosubjectsorcivilianswereinjured or killed as a result of these unintentional discharges. FINDINGS Only two of the six cases of unintentional discharge during adversarial conflict have been finalized. Both of the officers in those two cases were found in violation and both receivedretraining.Theotherfourcasesare pending. It must be noted that the Police Commissioner has the authority to change the findings of finalized cases. Therefore, thebelowchartispreliminaryandsubjectto furtherreview. FigureC.1belowencompassesthediscipline forallunintentionaldischarges,includingall officers who discharged in the incident. It shouldbenotedthatdisciplinedofficersalso usually receive retraining that may not be reflectedinthechartbelow.
FINDINGS ALLUNINTENTIONALDISCHARGES (21OFFICERS)

Pending 29%
NoViolation NoDiscipline 62%
Violation Discipline 5% NoViolation Retraining 5%

FigureC.1
33
34
2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT UNAUTHORIZEDUSEOFAFIREARM
OVERVIEW
There were eight firearms discharges in 2010thatweredeemedtobeunauthorized and outside the scope of the officers em ployment. Two of these incidents involved thesuicideofanofficer.Oftheothersixinci dents,fourinvolvedthedischargeofanoffi cers weapon by someone other than the officerandtwoincidentswereunauthorized eventsinwhichtheofficersweresuspended fromserviceandarrested.
DISCHARGEBYOTHERTHANOFFICER
Withregardtothefourincidentsinwhichan officerowned firearm was discharged by a civilian, three of these incidents involved a familymembergainingaccesstoanimprop erlysecuredfirearm.Oneoftheseincidents resultedininjury(theofficersstepsoncom mitted suicide using the firearm) The final incident occurred when a drug suspect was being arrested. During a struggle, the sus pectmomentarilygainedcontroloftheoffi cersfirearmandfiredasingleshot.Noone wasinjuredinthatdischarge.
SUICIDE
Twoofficerscommittedsuicidein2010.This total is down from three officers who took theirownlivesduringthepreviousyear.Itis also a significantly lower figure than repre sentedbythesevenofficerswhocommitted suicide in 2008 (and an eighth officer at temptedsuicideaswell). The details of suicide incidents are not dis cussed in this report, but rather they are studied and investigated by other units withintheDepartment.
OTHER
The final two unauthorized incidents in volved personal disputes between the offi cers and subjects and were deemed unau thorized. Each resulted in the suspension andarrestoftheofficerinvolved.Bothinci dentsresultedininjurytothesubjects.
OUTCOME
8 6 4 2 0 2001
Theunauthorizeduseofafirearmownedby aNewYorkCitypoliceofficerisinvestigated thoroughly,andmoreoftenthannotresults in discipline against SUICIDEORATTEMPT,2001to2010 the officer discharg ing the weapon or the officer charged with the security of the weapon. In cases of serious miscon duct,officersaresus pended, arrested, andeventuallytermi 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 nated for their ac 2008 2009 2010 tions.
FigureD.1
35
36
2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT MISTAKENIDENTITY
DEFINITION
The Department defines an incident of mis taken identity as one in which a New York CitypoliceofficerfiresonanotherNewYork Citypoliceofficerorotherlawenforcement agentinthemistakenbeliefthatthesubject officer is a criminal and poses an imminent physical threat. Mistakenidentity incidents are distinguished from crossfire incidents in thattheshootingofficerispurposefullyand intentionallychoosingtofireonthetargeted officer.Unintentionalcrossfireincidentsand accidental discharges resulting in injury or death to fellow officers are not included in this category. Unauthorized discharges, in whichanofficerinjuresorkillsanotheroffi cerinacriminalmanner(e.g.,domesticinci dents), are also excluded. This definition comports with the New York State Task Force on PoliceonPolice Shootings' defini tionofPoliceonPoliceConfrontations.
2010INCIDENTS
TherewerenoincidentsofMistakenIdentity in2010.
37
38
APPENDIX
40
2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT APPENDIXHISTORICALDATA
OFFICERSSHOTANDINJUREDBYSUBJECTS 19712010
47 40
50
31 26 17 16 11 16 11 17 10 13 13 24 10 26 21 15 24
28 29 19 11 23 15 15 10 11 10
7 7
0 2
12 10
Thesechartsrepresentofficerswhowereshotbycriminalsubjectsanddonotrepresentacci dentalshootings,suicides,unauthorizedshootings,incidentsinwhichofficerswerepersonally involved,ormistakenidentityshootings
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
OFFICERSSHOTANDKILLEDBYSUBJECTS 19712010
7 6 4 6 5 5 4 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 6 5 4 3 2 2 2 3 6
41
SUBJECTSSHOTANDINJUREDBYOFFICERS 19712010
221
145 118 80 87 79 88 78 80 101 91 87 63 48 47 38 36 46 61 72 81 63 58 61 58 48 39 43 32
20 19 24 22 23 26 24 19 18 20 16
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
SUBJECTSSHOTANDKILLEDBYOFFICERS 19712010
93
66 58 41 44 25 30 37 28 25 39 33 33 29 26 18 11 14 24 30 27 24 22 29 26 30 20 19 11 14 11 13 14 11 9 13 10 13 12 8
42
*2009incidentnumberincreasedbyonefrompreviousreports.Thisisduetoapreviouslyunreportedunin tentionaldischargefromthatyear.
2510 1906 2113
TOTALSHOTSFIRED 19712010
TOTALINCIDENTS 19712010
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1728 1146 1193 1094 1112 1176 1073 752 630 528 563 675 831 1036 1254 1150 1040 1222 1152 994 1291 1199 368 297 364 588 541 618 352 503 386 499 504 621 856 1040 1292
994 665 92 106 105 111 127 125 114 130 119 136 134 155 249 253 318 345 331 312 279 332 307 329 251 351 346 369 466 349 375 452 425 394 418 434 379 454 526
810
43
*
2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT APPENDIXFIREARMSTRAINING
OVERVIEW NYPD firearms training emphasizes that the ultimate goal of every police officer is to protectlife.Thismeansalllives,thoseofby standers,victims,andsubjectsandofoffi cers and their fellows, too. One of the grim realitiesofpolicework,however,istheterri ble contradiction that can arise when it be comes necessary to protect life by using deadlyphysicalforce. AccordingtotheNewYorkStatePenalLaw, andinkeepingwiththePatrolGuiderestric tionsdelineatedpreviouslyinthisreport,an officer may use deadly physical force when heorshehasprobablecausetobelievethat suchforceisnecessarytoprotecttheofficer or other persons from imminent death or serious physical injury. (This includes in stancesinwhichasubjectisinpossessionof an object that, because of its appearance and the manner in which the subject holds orusesit,givestheofficerareasonablebe liefthattheobjectiscapableofimminently causing death or serious physical injury e.g., when an officer confronts a subject menacingpeoplewithafirearmthatislater revealedtobeareplica.) SHOOTTOSTOP Onceanofficerhasdeterminedthatdeadly physical force is warranted and necessary, thegoalofusingsuchforceisnottokill,but to stop. Police officers are trained to use deadlyphysicalforcetostopthethreat i.e., to end the subjects ability to threaten imminentdeathorseriousphysicalinjuryto theofficeroranotherperson. If, for example, a missed shot nevertheless causes a subject to cease and desist, then thatoneerrantroundisallthatisnecessary. If a subject is injured and surrenders, then shootingtostophasbeenaccomplished.But sometimes the only means of stopping a subject is one that results in the subjects demise. Stated explicitly, however, POLICE OFFICERS DO NOT SHOOT TO KILLthey aretrainedtoshoottostop. WEAPONSCONTROL NYPD firearms training also emphasizes weapons control. With regard to shooting technique, the mechanics of pistol shooting in a controlled environment include proper grip, sight alignment, sight picture, trigger control, and breath control. All of these re quire a degree of concentration and fine motor skills. Unfortunately, in a combat situation,concentrationandfinemotorskills are sometimes among the first casualties. Training can mitigate this, but officers must betaughttorelyonmechanicalactionsthat employ gross motor skills and have as few componentsaspossible. POPULARCULTUREMISREPRESENTATIONS Oneofthepurposesofthisreportistomake itclearthat,contrarytomediabasedmisim pressions, police officers rarely use their firearmsandshowgreatrestraintwhenthey doso.(TherisibleHollywoodfictionthatpo lice shootings have no consequencethat officers are back on the street immediately afterafirearmsdischarge,thatofficersmay engageinmultipleincidentsonaregularba sisisalsodispelledbythisreport.)Perhaps the worst of popular cultures purposeful inaccuracies concerns the accuracy of pis tols.ThankstothemoviesandTV,manyci
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vilians have a mistaken understanding of policeandtheirfirearms. Action heroes routinely display miraculous precisionwiththeirguns,andtheyroutinely usehandgunsinsteadofriflesorlongguns. Inreallife,handgunsaremuchmorelimited weapons.Theyareshort,makingaxialsight misjudgment more likely, and they lack a third bracing point (such as a rifles butt stock),andarethusmoredifficulttosteady andaim. NYPDPISTOLS There are three pistol models that are au thorized as onduty service weapons for NYPD officers: the Glock 19, the Sig Sauer P226,andtheSmith&Wesson5946.These weaponsaresemiautomatic,chamberedin 9mm, and equipped with 15round maga zines.(Additionally,thereareseveralweap ons authorized for offduty carry, such as theGlock26,Smith&Wesson3914,andthe Beretta8000DMiniCougar.Ahandfulofof ficers carry .38 caliber revolvers; these offi cers are senior members whose weapons have been grandfathered in; revolvers have not been issued as service weapons since 1992.) All NYPD service pistols are double action only (DAO), meaning they have a twostage trigger pull for each round fired (unlikesingleactionweapons,whichcanbe cocked, resulting in a onestage trigger pull, which is smoother and easier). Addi tionally,allNYPDweaponsarealsomodified to have a heavierthanstock 12lb trigger pull; this diminishes the likelihood of unin tentionaldischargesbutalsoaffectsaiming. Nevertheless,itbalancesthefactthatNYPD pistolsdonothavesafeties,andarecarried hot, with a round in the chamber. The NYPD uses a 124 grain, hollowpoint bullet
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CENTERMASS
thatisdesignedtopreventoverpenetration andricochets. CENTERMASS Ersatz experts in police tactics who have neverbeenpoliceofficersoccasionallyclaim that shooting to wound is a valid choice eveninlifeordeathcombatsituations:they are mistaken. Both the impairment of fine motor skills during combat stress and the relative imprecision of pistols contribute to the fact that ALL POLICE OFFICERS ARE TAUGHTTOSHOOTFORCENTERMASS.Po lice officers never aim for a subjects ex tremities;theyfireatcentermass.* *Incasesinwhichasubjectusescoverandpresentsonlya portion of his or her body, officers are trained to use the geometriccenterorbarycenteroftheexposedportionas apointofaiminlieuofcentermass.
The human bodys center mass, also called the center of gravity, is, by definition, the most central and largest area available as a point of aim. Physicians use a quick assess ment tool known as the rule of nines to divide body surface by region. The torso represents one third of a humans surface area,versusamere9percentforanarmor 18 percent for a leg. The torso is also the most stationary portion of the body. Ex tremities, on the other hand, are smaller andfarlessstatic.Armsflail,legspump,and in so doing they become nearly impossible to target. This is exacerbated by the stress anddynamismofacombatsituation. Additionally, shooting a subject in an ex tremity is far less likely to stop him or her thanashottothecentermass.Alegwound, forexample,doeslittletopreventasubject fromcontinuingtouseaknifeorgun.Stop ping a subject from threatening imminent death or serious physical injury to another person is the sole reason an officer utilizes deadlyphysicalforce.
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ADVERSARIALCONFLICTRESULTINGINASUBJECTSDEMISE
In 2010, eight subjects were shot and killed by officers who intentionally discharged their weapons during adversarial conflictthe smallest number of such incidents in the Depart mentsrecordedhistory. Theveryessenceofpoliceworkisthedesiretoprotectlife.Becauseofthis,takingalifein order to protect another is a terrible contradiction, and no officer relishes the prospect of encounterssuchasthese.Whenfacingarmed,violentsuspects,however,theseeventsarea possibilityforwhichofficersmustbeprepared.Thetacticsusedintheseconfrontationscan be analyzed and assessed in order to develop training that can provide officers with more useofforceoptionsorconflictresolutionopportunitiessothat,inthefuture,similarevents mayhavedifferentoutcomes.Ashortnarrativeofeachincidentisfoundbelow.Itisworthy ofnotethatsevenoftheeightsubjectshadpriorarresthistories,andfivewereintoxicated and/orhadcontrolledsubstancesintheirsystemswhentheseincidentsoccurred. Inadditiontotheincidentsbelow,therewasoneadversarialconflictincidentinwhichasub jectfireduponafemalesergeant,andwasstruckinthelegbythesergeantsreturnfire,but thentookhisownlife.Becausethesubjectsdemisewasnottheresultofpolicegunfire,itis notincludedhere. OnFebruary22,at0009hours,intheconfinesofthe40thPrecinct,auniformedsergeantand policeofficerdischargedtheirweaponsatamaleIndiansubjectwhowasbeatinghismother withametalpan.Approximately50minutesearlier,officershadrespondedtothelocationfor awellnesscheck,initiatedbythesubjectsbrother(whoisalsothevictimsson).Althoughthe officerscouldhearadisturbanceinsidethelocation,theywereunabletogainentry.Asuper visor was called to the scene and, via telephone, the subjects brothersuggested contacting thebuildingssuperintendanttogainentry.Thesergeantwasabletoopenthedoorwiththe superintendantskeys,althoughtherewasasecuritychaininplaceaswell.Throughthepartly openeddoor,however,officerswereabletoseethevictim,coveredinbloodandseatedona couch.Theofficersforciblyenteredandthenobservedthesubject,standingoverhisbloodied mother,withthefryingpanraisedasiftostrikeheragain.Whenofficersconfrontedthesub ject,statingPolice!Dontmove!hebrieflyturnedtowardsthem,approached,thenturned backtohismotherandagainpreparedtostrikeher.Theofficersshoutedwarningsagainbut wereignored.Onepoliceofficerandthesergeantthendischargedfourroundsandoneround, respectively,strikingthesubjectandcausinghisdemise.Thesubjecthadanarresthistorythat includedfelonyassaultandresistingarrest. OnMarch8,at1511hours,intheconfinesofthe61stPrecinct,auniformedpoliceofficerre spondedto a911callofamanwithagunpresentinaschoolyard.Witnesseshadseenthe manactingerraticallyandpointingthefirearmatpasserby.Onceatthelocation,theofficer, whowasonsolopatrol,encounteredawhitemalesubjectcarryingasilverfirearm.Withhis
47
firearmdrawn,theofficershoutedPolice!Dontmove! butthesubjectturnedhisbackto theofficer.Astheofficerradioedthathehadthesubjectstopped,thesubjectabruptlyspun andpointedhisfirearmdirectlyattheofficerwhilecursinghim.Theofficerfiredthreerounds, striking thesubject three times, and causing his demise. Subsequently, the subjects firearm wasdeterminedtobeanimitationpistolthathadbeenpaintedsilverandblack.Thesubject hadanarresthistoryforcriminalmischiefandfalsepersonation.Atthetimeoftheincident, thesubjectsbloodalcoholcontentwasthreeandahalftimesthelegallimitfordrivingandhe hadphencyclidine(PCP)inhissystem,aswellasantianxietydrugsandothersubstancescon sistentwithreportsthathehadstolenandthenconsumedsignificantquantitiesofcoughsup pressant. OnMarch22,at1225hours,intheconfinesofthe44thPrecinct,fouruniformedofficersre spondedtoa911callaboutadisputeinvolvingafirearm.UponarrivalattheMorrisaniaAir Rights Houses, the officers were met by a female complainant who had been assaulted and menacedatgunpointbytheadultsonofanelderlywomanforwhomthecomplainantwasa homeattendant.Proceedingtotheelderlywomansapartment,theofficersdiscoveredthat thesubject,amaleHispanic,hadretreatedtoabedroomjustpastthelivingroom.Asecond adultsoninformedthesubjectinEnglishandSpanishthatthepolicewerepresent.Oneofficer approachedthebedroomdoorandforciblyopenedit,atwhichpointthesubjectopenedfire witha.38caliberSmith&Wessonrevolver.Theofficeratthebedroomdoorwasstruckinthe chest,butsavedbyhisbulletresistantvest.Ashefellback,injured,hereturnedfire,butwas alsofireduponagainbythesubject.Inthissecondexchangehewasstrucktwiceinthelower abdomen,beneathhisvest,andseverelyinjured.Heneverthelessreturnedfire,ultimatelydis chargingall16roundsfromhisweapon,andthesubjectfellbackintothebedroom.Thethree otherofficers,whowerealsointhelineoffire,dischargedtwo,one,andtworounds,respec tively,astheydraggedtheirwoundedpartnerbacktothelivingroomandsafety.Atthispoint supervisorsarrivedonscene,andorderedthelocationlockeddownandthewoundedevacu ated. Emergency Services deployed mechanical means and a canine officer to assess the scene,anddeterminedthatthesubjecthadbeenstruckthreetimesandkilled.Hisrevolver, withfourspentroundsandaliveroundinthecylinder,wasrecovered.Thesubjecthadnoar resthistory. OnApril1,at1413hours,intheconfinesofthe72ndPrecinct,plainclothesofficerswerecan vassingforarobberysuspectwithasketchandphotoinhand.TheyobservedamaleHispanic subject who they believed resembled the suspect and attempted to address him from their unmarkedvehicle.Asthevehicleoperatorcalledtothesubject,thetwootherofficersinthe vehicleexitedandpositionedthemselvesatthefrontandrearoftheautomobile.Thesubject suddenlyandaggressivelyapproachedthevehicle,sayingYouwantmyfuckinID?Illshow youmyfuckinID!Atthesametime,hereachedintoabaghewascarryingandwithdrewa silver revolver, which he pointed into the car and at the officer in the drivers seat. A brief struggleensued,butwasendedwhenthefemaleofficerpositionedatthefrontendoftheve hiclefiredasingleround,strikingthesubjectandcausinghisdemise.Thesubjectsweapon,a
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loaded.357caliberRossirevolver,wasrecovered,aswasastolen.44caliberRugerrevolver alsoonhisperson,severalbagsofmarijuana,andinexcessof$2,000inUScurrency.Thesub jecthad39priorarrests,foroffensesincludingrobbery,burglary,andcriminalpossessionof firearms.Thesubjecthadcannabinoidsinhissystematthetimeoftheincident. OnJune24,at0918hours,duringtheexecutionofasearchwarrantintheconfinesofthe41st Precinct,twoofficersdischargedtheirfirearmsatamaleblacksubjectwhofiredononeofthe officers. As an Emergency Services Unit team entered the subjects location for a narcotics warrant,thesubjectattemptedtoescapeviaarearbasementdoor.Hewasinpossessionofa black semiautomatic handgun which he pointed at an officer posted at the rear entrance. That officer fired five rounds at the subject, who then retreated back into the location. An Emergency Services detective armed with an MP5 special weapon took a tactical position withoversightofthebackyard.Onceagainthesubjectagainattemptedtoexit,andnowfired oneroundattheEmergencyServicesdetective.Thedetectivefiredoneroundinreturn,and the subject retreated again into the basement where he was apprehended, having suffered bulletwoundsinhistorsoandleg.Hisloaded9mmHiPointpistolwasrecovered.Thesubject was removed to the hospital where he succumbed to his injuries. The subject had an arrest historythatincludedsexabuse,andhehadalcohol,cannabinoids,cocaine,andlevamisole,a veterinarydewormerthatisusedasacocaineadulterantandhasbeenlinkedtonecrosisand psychosis,inhissystematthetimeoftheincident. OnAugust8,atapproximately0300hours,intheconfinesofthe32ndPrecinct,fourofficers becameinvolvedinanexchangeofgunfirewithtwomaleHispanicsubjects,resultinginthe demiseofonesubjectandinjuriestotheother.Twoofficerswereinjuredduringthisincident, andthreebystanderswerestruckandinjured,aswell.Theeventwasprecipitatedbyafight betweenthetwosubjects,duringwhichthefirstsubjectproducedafirearmandpossiblyfired onthesecondsubject.Policeheardgunfireandresponded:oneuniformedofficerapproached fromthesouthasanunmarkedvehiclewithoneplainclothessergeantandtwoplainclothes officersapproachedfromthenorth.Atsomepoint,thesecondsubjectachievedcontrolofthe firearm, and possibly fired on the first subject. He also discharged a round at the lone uni formed officer, who had now closed to within several feet. The uniformed officer returned fire,whiletheplainclothesofficersattheoppositeendoftheblockalsobegantoshoot.Ofthe tworoundsfiredbytheuniformedofficer,onestruckoneofthetwoplainclothesofficersin the chestthe officer was saved from this crossfire by his bulletresistant vest. The plain clothessergeantdischarged16rounds,andthetwoplainclothesofficersdischarged16rounds and12rounds,respectively.Duringthegunfire,afifthofficer,whodidnotfire,wasstruckin thewristandinjured,andthethreepreviouslymentionedcivilianbystanderswerealsostruck. Ofthecriminalparticipants,thefirstsubjectwasstrucksixtimesandsuccumbedtohisinju ries,andthesecondsubjectwasstruck23times,butsurvived.(Agrandjuryrefusedtoindict thesecondsubjectforfiringontheuniformedofficer.)Thedeceasedsubjecthad13priorar rests, including robbery, burglary, and resisting arrest. The deceased subjects bloodalcohol contentwastwicethelegallimitfordrivingatthetimeofhisdemise.
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On October 3, at approximately 0545 hours, in the confines of the 34th Precinct, ten uni formedofficersrespondedtoaradiorunforaviolentemotionallydisturbedperson.Amale Hispanicsubjecthadcalled911andstatedImreadytokillsomecopsrightnow...Getem,Ill berighthere.Astheyconvergedonthelocation,theyobservedthesubjectwithablackknife inhishand.Maintainingcoverbehindparkedcars,theofficerssurroundedthesubjectandis suedorderstodroptheknife,whichthesubjectignored.Thesubjectmadethreateningstate ments,andactedbelligerently.Asergeantonscenedeployedaconductedenergydevice,but itwasineffectiveandthesubjectwasabletopulltheprongsfromhisbody.Atthistimethe subjectbegantomove,andthesergeantonsceneinstructedtheofficerstomovewithhim while maintaining a proper zone of safety. Two officers, however, found themselves backed against parked vehicles as the subject abruptly changed direction and advanced upon them whileswingingtheknife.Withnomeansofescapeavailable,thetwoofficersdischargedtheir firearms,fiveroundsandfourrounds,respectively.Thesubjectwasstruckmultipletimesand succumbedtohisinjuries.Thesubjecthadanarresthistoryforcrimesincludingrecklessen dangermentanddrugssales,andwasonfederalprobationforherointraffickingatthetimeof theincident. OnDecember22,atapproximately2145hours,intheconfinesofthe104thPrecinct,afemale complainantcalled911tostatethatheradultson,againstwhomshehadanorderofprotec tion, was menacing her with a knife. A uniformed sergeant and five uniformed officers re spondedtothesceneandwerejoinedbyanothersergeantandtwoofficers.Thefirst,larger group proceeded to the backyard of the location, after being informed by the complainant thathersonsometimesfledviaarearwindow.Thesecondgroupwenttothefrontdoorand usedthecomplainantskeystoenter.Inside,theyimmediatelyencounteredamalewhitesub jectarmedwithseveralknives.Thesubjectrushedatthesergeantandtwoofficers,who,with noroomtoretreat,firedthreerounds,fourrounds,andoneround,respectively,strikingand killingthesubject.Aknifewithafiveinchbladewasrecoveredfromthesubjectshand,and twoadditionalkniveswerefoundinhisimmediatevicinity.Thesubjecthadanarresthistory thatincludedassault,criminalpossessionofaweapon,andmenacing.Atthetimeofhisde mise,thesubjecthadabloodalcoholcontenttwoandahalftimesthelegallimitfordriving, andhadantidepressantsandantianxietymedicationsinhissystem.
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT APPENDIXSUBJECTSSHOTBYPOLICERACE/ETHNICITY
SUBJECTSSHOTBYNYPDOFFICERS19972010
40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Linear(WHITE)
Linear(BLACK)
Linear(HISPANIC)
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
6,021PERSONSARRESTEDFORFIREARMS POSSESSION 939RACIALLYIDENTIFIEDCRIMINAL SHOOTINGSUSPECTS 8.2MILLIONPEOPLEINNEWYORKCITY 34SUBJECTSFIREDUPONBYPOLICE 24SUBJECTSHITBYPOLICEGUNFIRE 9SUBJECTSWHOFIREDATPOLICE
PERCENTAGE
ASIAN WHITE HISPANIC BLACK
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT APPENDIXSUBJECTSSHOTBYPOLICERACE/ETHNICITY
WHITE BLACK HISPANIC ASIAN TOTAL
1999
WOUNDED 1 24 7 0 32 KILLED 1 8 2 0 11 0 15 4 1 20
2000
WOUNDED KILLED 6 6 2 0 14 2 11 4 0 17
2001
WOUNDED KILLED 0 9 2 0 11
2002
WOUNDED WHITE BLACK HISPANIC ASIAN TOTAL 0 20 4 0 24 KILLED 0 7 6 0 13 1 12 10 1 24
2003
WOUNDED KILLED 1 13 0 0 14 1 15 7 0 23
2004
WHITE BLACK HISPANIC ASIAN TOTAL
2005
WOUNDED 4 21 3 1 29 KILLED 0 7 2 0 9 1 16 6 0 23
2006
WOUNDED KILLED 1 9 3 0 13 0 9 9 1 19
2007
2008
WOUNDED WHITE BLACK HISPANIC ASIAN TOTAL 0 12 6 0 18 KILLED 2 7 4 0 13 0 14 6 0 20
2009
WOUNDED KILLED 0 8 4 0 12 3 9 3 1 16
2010
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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT APPENDIXSUPPLEMENTALDATA
DAYOFWEEK MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY SUNDAY TOTAL IDAC 10 3 2 4 4 4 6 33 IDAA 6 2 3 4 11 3 1 30 UD 0 4 2 5 6 3 0 20* UUF 4 0 1 1 0 0 2 8 TOTAL 20 9 8 14 21 10 9 91*
*Thedayofweekforoneunintentionaldischargeisunknownbecauseitwasnotreportedbytheofficer.
TOUR 07311530 15312330 23310730 TOTAL IDAC 10 13 10 33 IDAA 6 14 10 30 UD 5 12 3 20* UUF 2 4 2 8 TOTAL 23 43 25 91*
*Thetourforoneunintentionaldischargeisunknownbecauseitwasnotreportedbytheofficer.
MONTH JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER TOTAL IDAC IDAA UD UUF IDAC 1 4 4 4 1 3 3 2 2 5 2 2 33 IDAA 2 2 8 3 2 0 3 1 2 4 1 2 30 UD 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 1 21 UUF 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 2 0 8 TOTAL 5 7 14 9 5 6 9 8 7 10 7 5 92
IntentionalDischargeAdversarialConflict IntentionalDischargeAnimalAttack UnintentionalDischarge UnauthorizedUseofFirearm
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BOROUGH BRONX MANHATTAN QUEENS BROOKLYN STATENISLAND OUTSIDECITY TOTAL IDAC 7 6 4 16 0 0 33 IDAA 11 0 2 10 4 3 30 UD 2 5 3 10 0 1 21 UUF 0 1 2 2 0 3 8 TOTAL 20 12 11 38 4 7 92
MANHATTAN 1stPRECINCT 5thPRECINCT 6thPRECINCT 7thPRECINCT 9thPRECINCT 10thPRECINCT 13thPRECINCT 14thPRECINCT 17thPRECINCT 18thPRECINCT 19thPRECINCT 20thPRECINCT 22ndPRECINCT 23rdPRECINCT 24thPRECINCT 25thPRECINCT 26thPRECINCT 28thPRECINCT 30thPRECINCT 32ndPRECINCT 33rdPRECINCT 34thPRECINCT TOTAL
IDAC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 6
IDAA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UD 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5
UUF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
TOTAL 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 2 12
54
BRONX 40thPRECINCT 41stPRECINCT 42ndPRECINCT 43rdPRECINCT 44thPRECINCT 45thPRECINCT 46thPRECINCT 47thPRECINCT 48thPRECINCT 49thPRECINCT 50thPRECINCT 52ndPRECINCT TOTAL BROOKLYN 60thPRECINCT 61stPRECINCT 62ndPRECINCT 63rdPRECINCT 66thPRECINCT 67thPRECINCT 68thPRECINCT 69thPRECINCT 70thPRECINCT 71stPRECINCT 72ndPRECINCT 73rdPRECINCT 75thPRECINCT 76thPRECINCT 77thPRECINCT 78thPRECINCT 79thPRECINCT 81stPRECINCT 83rdPRECINCT 84thPRECINCT 88thPRECINCT 90thPRECINCT 94thPRECINCT TOTAL IDAC 2 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 IDAC 1 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 16 IDAA 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 11 IDAA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 0 10 UD 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 UD 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 UUF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 UUF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 TOTAL 4 4 2 0 3 1 0 2 2 0 0 2 20 TOTAL 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 0 3 0 4 2 3 0 0 2 0 38
55
STATENISLAND 120thPRECINCT 122ndPRECINCT 123rdPRECINCT TOTAL IDAC 0 0 0 0 IDAA 2 2 0 4 UD 0 0 0 0 UUF 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 2 2 0 4
QUEENS 100thPRECINCT 101stPRECINCT 102ndPRECINCT 103rdPRECINCT 104thPRECINCT 105thPRECINCT 106thPRECINCT 107thPRECINCT 108thPRECINCT 109thPRECINCT 110thPRECINCT 111thPRECINCT 112thPRECINCT 113thPRECINCT 114thPRECINCT 115thPRECINCT TOTAL
IDAC 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4
IDAA 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
UD 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3
UUF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
TOTAL 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 11
DUTYSTATUS ONDUTY OFFDUTY TOTAL(MOSfiring)
IDAC 47 5 52
IDAA 34 4 38
UD 17 4 21
UUF 1 3 4
TOTAL 99 16 115
56
IDAC
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 INJURY INJURY INJURY INJURY INJURY FATAL 5and5 1 INJURY 16,16,2,12 FATAL 1 3 1 4 1 3,8,8 1 10,3,2,2 INJURY INJURY 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 4 15 5and1 1 1 5 1 2 7 1 1 FATAL 1 Male Male Male Female Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Male 16,2,1,2 FATAL 1 Male 2 INJURY 1 Male 1 1 Male Black Hispanic Hispanic Hispanic Black White Black Black Black Asian Black Hispanic Black Black Hispanic Hispanic Black Black Black Hispanic 3 FATAL 1 Male Whites 13 INJURY 1 Male Black 1and4 FATAL 1 Male Asian 27 49 23 20 33 57 32 26 47 31 17 19 19 48 58 21 UNKNOWN 21 23 22 22 26 35 2 INJURY 1 Male White 61 8and2 1 Male Black 22 1 1 Male Black 20 FIREARM FIREARM IMITATION
TYPEOFTHREATFROMSUBJECTSFIREDUPON
OFFICERS SHOTS INVOLVED

INJURY #SUBJECTS FATALITY FIREDUPON
SUBJECT SUBJECT SUBJECT GENDER RACE AGE
SUBJECT WEAPON
FIREARMSUBJECTPOINTEDFIREARM
FIREARMSUBJECTFIREDATOFFICER
BLUNTINSTRUMENTATTACKINGCIVILIAN
FRYINGPAN MACHETE IMITATION FIREARM KNIVES FIREARM FIREARMS FIREARM FIREARM KNIFE FIREARM KNIFE MACHETE FIREARM FIREARM FIREARM UNKNOWN FIREARM FIREARM FIREARM FIREARM FIREARM FIREARM
CUTTINGINSTRUMENTSUBJECTMENACEDOFFICER
FIREARMSUBJECTSHOTCIVILIAN
FIREARMSUBJECTSHOTOFFICER
10
11
FIREARMSUBJECTFIREDATCIVILIAN
12
57
13
14
15
CUTTINGINSTRUMENTSUBJECTATTACKEDOFFICER
16
17
18
19
FIREARMSUBJECTFIREDATCIVILIAN
20
OVERWHELMINGFORCESUBJECTATTACKEDOFFICER
21
FIREARMSUBJECT1FIREDATSUBJECT2
FIREARMSUBJECT2FIREDATOFFICER
22
23
FIREARMSUBJECTFIREDATOFFICERS
24
25
IDAC TYPEOFTHREATFROMSUBJECTSFIREDUPON
2 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 Male 3,4,1 FATAL 1 Male White Hispanic 4 INJURY 1 Male Black 3 INJURY 1 Male Black 5 INJURY 1 Male Black 20 35 35 21 26 6and5 INJURY 1 Male Black 17 2 INJURY 1 Male White 69 5and4 FATAL 1 Male Hispanic 24 KNIFE KNIFE FIREARM FIREARM NONE NONE KNIVES FIREARM
OFFICERS SHOTS INVOLVED
INJURY SUBJECTS FATALITY FIREDUPON
SUBJECT SUBJECT SUBJECT GENDER RACE AGE
SUBJECT WEAPON
26
CUTTINGINSTRUMENTSUBJECTMENACEDOFFICERS
27
28
FIREARMSUBJECTSHOTOFFICER
29
30
OVERWHELMINGFORCESUBJECTGRABBEDGUN
31
PERCEIVEDTHREATSUBJECTSIMULATEDFIREARM
32
CUTTINGINSTRUMENTSUBJECTATTACKEDOFFICERS
33
FIREARMSUBJECTFIREDATCIVILIANS
58

NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment OfficeofManagementAnalysisandPlanning SpecialProjectsTeam CaptainEdwardCarrasco,CommandingOfficer SergeantRonaldJ.Wilhelmy DetectiveJonathanC.W.Murad DetectiveCharlesM.Mills PoliceOfficerCherylShea
NYPD
RAYMONDW.KELLY POLICECOMMISSIONER
MICHAELJ.FARRELL DEPUTYCOMMISSIONER,STRATEGICINITIATIVES

ASSISTANTCHIEFJOHNK.DONOHUE COMMANDINGOFFICER,OFFICEOFMANAGEMENTANALYSISANDPLANNING

NYPD Annual Firearms Discharge Report

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NYPD Annual Firearms Discharge Report

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2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT

34,565 23,000,000 4,481,440 206,874 28,880 6,021 1,473 52 33 16 8 2 0

Anofficerdischargesafirearmora firearmownedbyanofficerisdis charged. Asupervisorresponds,securesthe sceneandthefirearminquestion,and makespropernotifications. AShootingTeamisestablishedanda shootingteamleader(Captain)re spondstoconductaninvestigation.

TheChiefofDepartmentFirearms DischargeReviewBoardreviewsthe incidentandBoroughAdvisoryBoard findingsandrecommendationsand thenmakesadetermination.

Iftheofficerreceiveschargesand specificationsthecaseissenttothe DepartmentAdvocateforaDepart mentTrial. Inallmattersrelatedtotheincident, thefinaldeterminationrestswiththe PoliceCommissioner.

TYPEOFTHREAT INTENTIONALDISCHARGE ADVERSARIALCONFLICT(IDAC) (33INCIDENTS)

USED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFAFIREARM USED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFACUTTINGINSTRUMENT USED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFABLUNTOBJECT USED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFOVERWHELMINGPHYSICALFORCE USED/THREATENEDTHEUSEOFDEADLYPHYSICALFORCE

MANHATTAN SOUTH 3% MANHATTAN NORTH 15%

BROOKLYN NORTH 25%

BROOKLYN SOUTH 24%

REDINTENTIONALFIREARMSDISCHARGEBYPOLICE DURINGADVERSARIALCONFLICT BLUECRIMINALSHOOTINGS

230 172 159

53% 15% 13% 9% 6%

SHOTSFIREDPERINCIDENT (PERCENTOF 33INCIDENTS)

15% 27% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

1115 8% 610 39%

SERGEANT, 17% DETECTIVE, 8% POLICE OFFICER,67%

SUBJECTSWHOFIREDONPOLICE(9)vsRACIALLY IDENTIFIEDSHOOTING SUSPECTS(939)

Hispanic SUBJECTSWHOFIRED ONPOLICE

White CRIMINALSHOOTING SUSPECTS

ASSAULTED MOTHERWITH BLUNT INSTRUMENT, 11%

THREATENED OFFICERWITH CUTTING INSTRUMENT, 22%

THREATENED OFFICERWITH FIREARMOR SHOTAT OFFICER, 56%

FIREDON POLICE OFFICERS, 31%

THREATENED OFFICEROR CIVILIANWITH ACUTTING INSTRUMENT, 38%

THREATENED OFFICEROR CIVILIANWITH FIREARM, 19%

QueensNorth 3% OUTSIDECITY 10%

QueensSouth 3% Bronx 37%

2010ANNUALFIREARMSDISCHARGEREPORT INTENTIONALDISCHARGEANIMALATTACK LOCATIONSOF2010ANIMALATTACKINCIDENTS 27INCIDENTS*

21% 13% 8% 5% 21% 26% 5%

31% 21% 23% 18% 17% 11% 8% 3%

POLICEWEAPONS Officersutilizedtheirserviceweaponsin34 of the 38 incidents. The remaining officers dischargedtheiroffdutyweapons.

FINDINGS ALLUNINTENTIONALDISCHARGES (21OFFICERS)

NoViolation NoDiscipline 62%

Violation Discipline 5% NoViolation Retraining 5%

Thesechartsrepresentofficerswhowereshotbycriminalsubjectsanddonotrepresentacci dentalshootings,suicides,unauthorizedshootings,incidentsinwhichofficerswerepersonally involved,ormistakenidentityshootings

145 118 80 87 79 88 78 80 101 91 87 63 48 47 38 36 46 61 72 81 63 58 61 58 48 39 43 32

ASIAN WHITE HISPANIC BLACK

WHITE BLACK HISPANIC ASIAN TOTAL

WHITE BLACK HISPANIC ASIAN TOTAL

IntentionalDischargeAdversarialConflict IntentionalDischargeAnimalAttack UnintentionalDischarge UnauthorizedUseofFirearm

DUTYSTATUS ONDUTY OFFDUTY TOTAL(MOSfiring)

OFFICERS SHOTS INVOLVED

SUBJECT SUBJECT SUBJECT GENDER RACE AGE

OFFICERS SHOTS INVOLVED

INJURY SUBJECTS FATALITY FIREDUPON

SUBJECT SUBJECT SUBJECT GENDER RACE AGE

NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment OfficeofManagementAnalysisandPlanning SpecialProjectsTeam CaptainEdwardCarrasco,CommandingOfficer SergeantRonaldJ.Wilhelmy DetectiveJonathanC.W.Murad DetectiveCharlesM.Mills PoliceOfficerCherylShea

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