The Collected Works of Ludwig Witt Gen Stein

Embed Doc
Copy Link
Readcast
Collections

CommentGo Back

The Collected Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein

All texts copyright © Blackwell Publishers

1. CONTENTS.

To view the complete table of contents of

The Collected Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein

, click onthe

Contents

icon on the left border of your screen. Click on plus (+) symbols in the Contents window to expandthe list of entries. A minus symbol (-) indicates that a list may not be further expanded. While viewing the contents,click on

Levels

under the

Search

menu to view the Contents at the Book, Chapter, Section (etc.) levels. While in theContents window, you may jump to any location by double-clicking on the line of interest or click on the

Contents

icon to go back to full database view.

2. SEARCH TEXT.

To execute a search, click on the

Query

icon on the left border of your screen, type in yoursearch terms in the

Query For:

window, then click on

OK

to execute your search. The page number of eachparagraph and page break is given in the text; click on

Hidden

under the

View

menu to also view an abbreviationidentifying the work. Two query templates have been provided under the search menu to enable searches of

particular works, or to permit jumping to a particular page of a work.

NOTEBOOKS 1914-1916

Page Break iiPage Break iii

Titlepage

Page iii

NOTEBOOKS1914-1916

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Second Edition

Edited by

G. H. von WRIGHT

and

G. E. M. ANSCOMBE

with an English translation by

G. E. M. ANSCOMBE

Index prepared by

E. D. KLEMKEBASIL BLACKWELLOXFORD

Page Break iv

Copyright Page

Page iv

Copyright © Blackwell Publishers 1998First published 1961Second edition 1979Reprinted 1998

Blackwell Publishers Ltd,108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JFUKBlackwell Publishers Inc.350 Main Street, Malden, Massachusetts 02148USAAll rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of

this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade orotherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of

binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this conditionbeing imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.ISBN 0-631-12499-3Printed in Great Britain by Athenaeum Press Ltd, Gateshead, Tyne & WearThis book is printed on acid-free paper

Page Break 1

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Page 1

THE text of this volume has been completely revised for this edition, and a number of misreadings have beencorrected. These were mostly very small. The most serious one that I have found was the reading of "u.u." ("undumgekehrt) as "u.U" ("unter Umständen"). The diagram on p. 126 has been corrected in accordance with the MS.

Page 1

The second appendix,

Notes on Logic

1913, appears here in a different arrangement from that of the firstedition. That edition used the text published in the

Journal of Philosophy

(Vol. LIV (1957), p. 484) by J. J.Costelloe: he reported having got it from Bertrand Russell in 1914. There was a different text which the editors had,and which they had also got from Russell. It was clear that the Costelloe version was a slightly corrected totalrearrangement of that text under headings, and we assumed that it had been made by Wittgenstein himself.

Page 1

A debt of gratitude is owing to Brian McGuinness, not only for having pointed out some errors of

transcription in the first edition, but also for having proved that the Costelloe version was constructed by Russell.The other one is therefore closer to Wittgenstein, the first part of it being his own dictation in English and the rest atranslation by Russell of material dictated by Wittgenstein in German. Mr. McGuinness' article giving the evidencefor this can be found in the

Revue Internationale de Philosophie

, no. 102 (1972).

Page 1

In the first edition a number of passages of symbolism, in one case with accompanying text, were omittedbecause nothing could be made of them: they were presumably experimental, but it seemed impossible to interpretthem. Nor would it always have been clear what was an exact transcription of them. Photographs of them are printedhere as a fourth appendix.

Page 1

At the 20th of December 1914 there was a rough line of adjacent crayonned patches, using 7 colours. Thiswas treated as a mere doodle in the first edition, and so it may be. But, having regard to the subject matter of

meaning and negation, which is the topic of the surrounding text, it is possible that there is here an anticipation of

Philosophical Investigations

§ 48. A representation of it is printed on the dust cover of this edition.

Page Break 2

[Notebooks: Main Body]

22.8.14.

Page 2

Logic must take care of itself. [

See

5.473.]

Page 2

If syntactical rules for functions can be set up

at all

, then the whole theory of things, properties, etc., issuperfluous. It is also all too obvious that this theory isn't what is in question either in the

Grundgesetze

, or in

Principia Mathematica

. Once more: logic must take care of itself. A

possible

sign must also be capable of

signifying. Everything that is possible at all, is also legitimate. Let us remember the explanation why "Socrates isPlato" is nonsense. That is, because

we

have not made an arbitrary specification, NOT because a sign is, shall we say,illegitimate in itself! [

Cf

. 5.473.]

2.9.14.

Page 2

It must in a certain sense be impossible for us to go wrong in logic. This is already partly expressed bysaying: Logic must take care of itself. This is an extremely profound and important insight. [

Cf

. 5.473.]

Page 2

Frege says: Every well-formed sentence must make sense; and I say: Every possible sentence is well-formed,and if it does not make sense that can only come of our not having

given

any meaning to certain of its parts. Evenwhen we believe we have done so. [

Cf

. 5.4733.]

3.9.14.

Page 2

How is it reconcilable with the task of philosophy, that logic should take care of itself? If, for example, weask: Is such and such a fact of the subject-predicate form?, we must surely know what we mean by"subject-predicate form". We must know

whether

there is such a form at all. How can we know this? "From thesigns". But how? For we haven't got any

signs

of this form. We may indeed say: We have signs that behave likesigns of the subject-predicate form, but does that mean that there really must be facts of this form? That is, whenthose signs are completely analysed? And here the question arises again: Does such a complete analysis exist?

And if not

: then what is the task of philosophy?!!?

Page 2

Then can we ask ourselves: Does the subject-predicate form exist? Does the relational form exist? Do any of

the forms exist at all that

Page Break 3

Russell and I were always talking about? (Russell would say: "Yes! that's self-evident."

Ha

!)

Page 3

Then: if

everything

that needs to be shewn is shewn by the existence of subject-predicate SENTENCES etc.,the task of philosophy is different from what I originally supposed. But if that is not how it is, then what is lackingwould have to be shewn by means of some kind of experience, and that I regard as out of the question.

Page 3

The obscurity

obviously

resides in the question: what does the logical identity of sign and thing signifiedreally consist in? And this question is (

once more

) a main aspect of the whole philosophical problem.

Page 3

Let some philosophical question be given: e.g., whether "A is good" is a subject-predicate proposition; orwhether "A is brighter than B" is a relational proposition.

How can such a question be settled at all

? What sort of

evidence can satisfy me that--

for example

--the first question must be answered in the affirmative? (This is anextremely important question.) Is the only evidence here once more

that extremely dubious

"

self-evidence

"? Let'stake a question quite like that one, which however is simpler and more fundamental, namely the following: Is a pointin our visual field a

simple object

, a

thing

? Up to now I have always regarded such questions as the realphilosophical ones: and so for sure they are in some sense--but once more what evidence could settle a question of

this sort at all? Is there not a mistake in formulation here, for it looks as if

nothing at all

were self-evident to me onthis question; it looks as if I could say definitively that these questions could never be settled at all.

4.9.14.

Page 3

If the existence of the subject-predicate

sentence

does not show everything needful, then it could surely onlybe shewn by the existence of some particular fact of that form. And acquaintance with such a fact cannot beessential for logic.

Page 3

Suppose we had a sign that

actually

was of the subject-predicate form, would this be somehow better suited

of 00

Leave a Comment