Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Emiliya Radeva
1.
What
in
your
estimation,
did
Quaker
really
buy
in
acquiring
the
Snapple
brand?
When
Quaker
acquired
Snapple
in
1994,
the
food
company
bought
a
strong
brand
with
a
high
potential
in
the
alternative
beverage
category
and
rapidly
growing
sales
for
the
past
four
years
(p.
4).
It
bought
the
tangible
characteristics
of
the
brand,
such
as
the
Snapple
brand
name,
the
logo,
and
the
intangible
relationships
with
Stern,
Limbaugh,
and
Wendy
Kaufman
(p.
6).
Quaker
also
acquired
the
so-called
brand
knowledge
(that
is
the
web
of
associations
that
the
consumers
have
learned
and
connected
to
the
brand
in
their
memories)
(Keinan
&
Avery,
Understanding
Brands,
p.
2).
However,
since
Quaker
was
a
big
food
company
with
a
traditional
professional
approach
to
marketing,
it
could
not
acquire
the
near
cult
(p.
1)
image
of
Snapple
(that
is
Snapples
distinctive
status
in
the
minds
of
the
consumers
was
based
mainly
on
the
idea
that
the
brand
was
managed
by
inexperienced
anticorporate
minded
people,
with
whom
consumers
could
identify.
2.
How
did
the
Snapple
brand
change
when
it
was
acquired?
According
to
Holt,
all
marketing
mix
elements
directly
impact
branding
and
can
destroy
value
if
they
are
not
managed
properly
(Holt,
Brands
and
Branding,
p.
9).
In
my
view,
Quakers
three
years
in
charge
of
Snapple
diminished
the
brands
value
by
changing
its
brand
meaning
and
brand
strength
(Fournier
et
al.,
When
Brands
Resonate,
p.
36)
and
transforming
it
from
a
purposefully
amateurish
brand
(Holt
&
Cameron,
p.
147)
to
a
more
typical
corporate
brand
practicing
traditional
marketing
initiatives.
First,
Snapple
lost
some
of
its
existing
customers
due
to
the
change
in
its
distribution
strategy.
Quaker
believed
that
Snapple
could
be
pushed
through
Gatorades
distribution
system
of
supermarkets
and
other
larger
outlets.
However,
Quakers
distribution
competences
could
not
be
leveraged
to
push
Snapple
because
the
image
of
the
two
brands
was
very
distinct.
Snapples
alternative
image
had
been
supported
by
the
fact
it
had
been
sold
through
small
sized
and
independent
distributors
(p.
3).
The
change
in
the
packaging
(introduction
of
larger
pack
sizes,
p.
6)
was
not
only
an
obstacle
for
a
more
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Emiliya Radeva
efficient distribution, it also did not fit the Snapple image of an on the go beverage (Exhibit 6, p. 15). Quaker also changed the way Snapple communicated with consumers. The company decided to promote the product, abandoning eccentric advertising campaigns in favor of a more conservative approach. Just like the founders story, Wendy Kaufman exemplified the model of come-from-nowhere, make-it-big-time, success for Snapple drinkers and they associated her with the brand (Exhibit 6). However, Quaker discontinued Snapples campaign featuring Wendy (p. 6), and terminated both relationships with Stern and Limbaugh. These changes slowly killed Snapples myth that was substantial to Snapples status as an iconic brand (Holt, How Brands Become Icons, p. 33). Ultimately, Quaker failed to hold onto Snapples brand value because it did not understand the essence of its brand identity. Snapple had always been promoted as a New Age and fashionable alternative to standard soft drink brands (p. 2). Snapple was fast losing its innovative image, along with its customer base. When Quaker sold Snapple to Triarc, the brand was in a deep sales slide (about 35 percent decline in sales the period 1994-1997) (p. 6). And the moral of the story is - when brand and culture fall out of alignment, both brand and corporate owner are likely to suffer.
3.
By
the
end
of
the
case,
the
Snapple
drinker
is
being
defined
as
anyone
who
has
lips
and
management
is
considering
developing
products
before
establishing
target
segments.
What
do
you
think
of
this
idea?
What
would
Holt,
Fournier,
Rust,
or
others
you
have
read
this
term
think
of
this
approach?
As
CCT
theorists,
many
of
the
authors
discussed
in
this
term,
would
most
likely
disagree
with
the
suggested
management
approach.
I
think
Holt
would
view
it
as
an
antipode
to
his
idea
that,
in
order
to
succeed,
brands
should
be
culturally
relevant.
According
to
him
in
its
earlier
years
Snapple
has
profited
from
cultural
innovations
by
becoming
relevant
to
the
consumers
(Holt
&
Cameron,
Cultural
Strategy,
p.
2).
Fournier
would
not
have
liked
the
idea
either
since
she
believes
in
co-creation
(that
is
the
collaboration
between
consumers
and
companies
to
create
a
product
that
consumers
really
want,
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Emiliya Radeva
rather than products companies want to sell them) (Fournier et al., p. 46). Weinsteins management approach would only confirm Rusts apprehension that despite all the talk about customer focus among managers, brands are often managed in a way where customers are serving brands, and not vice versa (Rust et al., Customer-Centered Brand Management, p. 2). The idea of defining the Snapple user in such a broad way would contradict with his view that brands should be designed as narrow as possible to enhance the clarity and the value of the brand in customers eyes (Rust et al., p. 6). He would instead recommend making decisions about the Snapple brand subservient to decisions about customer relationships (Rust et al., p. 5). Nakai would argue that Weinsteins strategy would fail due to the brand barriers it implies (such as lack of insight, lack of focus, and lack of an idea). First of all, the approach ignores the insightful research findings by the New Jersey group (Exhibit 6). Second, by not segmenting the market and not focusing on a specific segment, Triarc risks to run after two hares [and] catch neither. Third, there is no clear idea as to who the customers are, and how would the brand delight them (Nakai, Why Does Branding Fail, p. 273-278). In my view, the idea of this strategy is to build products from scratch without any particular target market in mind. The Snapple brand would be used only because it is popular to the distribution channel and among consumers are aware of it. But without a clear view of who the target consumer of the product will be, I think Triarc could easily introduce a new brand without risking to additionally harm the Snapple image. According to the contemporary view of branding, it is crucial to find a healthy balance between maintaining a consistent brand image and updating brand associations to keep the brand relevant with the consumer (Keinan & Avery, p. 3). And what the suggested strategy implies is neither a consistent way of managing the brand, nor an update to stay relevant with the market.
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