UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIACIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. SA CV12-01092 DMG (JCx) Date August 13, 2012Title Orly Taitz v. Kathleen Sebelius, et al.
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
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993 (9th Cir. 1994). A personal bias has been defined as “an attitude toward petitioner that issignificantly different from and more particularized than the normal, general feelings of society at large.”
Mims v. Shapp
, 541 F.2d 415, 417 (3d Cir. 1976). The words “bias or prejudice” have been describedas those that “connote a favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow
Liteky v. United States
, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994) (italics in original). The opinion can bewrongful or inappropriate either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that thesubject ought not to possess, or because it is excessive in degree.
The standard for recusal under § 455(b)(5)(iii) follows the same approach described withrespect to § 455(b)(1):courts appear to weigh two factors in deciding whether to recuse under this provision:the remoteness of the interest and its extent or degree. Thus if a judge is a stockholderin a company, and a decision in a case against another company in the same industrywill have a substantial effect on all companies in the industry, the judge should recuse. Ifa judge, or a corporation in which the judge owns stock, has a business relation with aparty to a case, disqualification will turn on whether that business relation will be affectedby the case. Similar questions will arise if a judge is a ratepayer to a party to aproceeding.13D W
§ 3547 (3d ed.) (footnotes omitted).
IV. AnalysisA. Plaintiff’s Claim of Bias Is Without Merit
Taitz has failed to show a basis for recusal under any of the foregoing standards. The Motiondepends on a single theory for disqualification: That because Judge Gee was nominated and appointedby President Obama, she is disqualified to consider the issues in this case because they relate to hisPresidency and could in some manner bring into question the validity of her appointment as a district judge. Taitz cites no authority in support of these positions and the Court has found none. Every federaldistrict judge holds office for a term of good behavior. U.S.
. art. III, § 1. This provision isdesigned to ensure an independent judiciary.
United States v. Hatter
, 532 U.S. 557, 567-68 (2001); T
. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Since the establishment of the doctrine of judicial review in
Marbury v. Madison
, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), members of the federal judiciary have presided overmany cases in which an issue presented has been whether an action of the Legislative or ExecutiveBranch violated the Constitution.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
, the Supreme Court equated the bias or prejudice tests of 28 U.S.C. § 144 and § 455(b)(1). JusticeScalia, speaking for the Court, explained that § 455(b)(1) “entirely duplicated the grounds of recusal set forth in§ 144 (‘bias or prejudice’) but (1) made them applicable to all justices, judges, and magistrates (and not justdistrict judges), and (2) placed the obligation to identify the existence of those grounds on the judge himself,rather than requiring recusal only in response to a party affidavit.”
, 510 U.S at 548.
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