Dixon, Moon / Military Burdenand Basic Needs 661
generally portrayed themilitary as a modernizingforce in most societiesbecauseof itsabilityto efficiently mobilizeresources for sustainedeconomic growth, maintainthe stability necessaryfor effective policyimplementation, andexercise control over otheractors who wouldthwartchange (see,forexample, Pye, 1964; Halpern,1963; Levy, 1966).Conversely,critics of militaryrule havechargedthat such regimesaremore likely to arrest developmentof the politicalsystem, divert socialand economicresourcestoward nonproductivesectors, andfollowrepressive policies thatultimately turn the organsof government againstthe massesit isdesignedto serveBienen, 1971;Abrahamsson, 1972;Wolpin, 1981). Stillother observers have soughtto reconcile thesecompetingclaimsbyarguing thatthespecificeffectsofmilitaryruledependona nation's level of economic and socialdevelopment(Huntington, 1968;Nordlinger, 1970).Despitetheirplausibility,evidencefrom adecadeofempiricalresearch has shown thatnoneoftheforegoingargumentscan withstandclosescrutiny.Itwouldappearthatthere are fewsystematiccross-national differencesin the socioeconomicperformanceofmilitaryandcivilianregimes (Schmitter,1971, 1973;McKinlayandCohen, 1975,1976; Jackman, 1976;Wolpin, 1981)nor are there differential effectsthatvary bylevel ofdevelopment (Jackman,1976).'As Jackman(1976:1097)hasput it,"thesimple civilian-military governmentdistinctionappearstobeoflittleuseintheexplanationof social change."Ofcourse,amilitary organizationneednotbeinformal controlofthegovernmentto exert influence on socioeconomic outcomes.Infact,many theorists ignoreregime composition altogetherand instead focusdirectlyon theallocationof social and economic resourcestomilitarypurposes.Mostpreviousstudiesof thistypehave examined eithertheeconomicconsequencesofmilitary expenditures(Benoit, 1973, 1978;Kennedy, 1974; Whynes,1979; Ball, 1983;DegerandSmith, 1983;Leontief andDuchin,1983;Biswas andRam,1986)or theaggregateeffects oflarge manpowercommitmentsto themilitary organization(Andreski, 1968;GarnierandHazelrigg, 1973;Weede andTiefenbach,1981; Weede, 1983),althoughthese twocomponentsarerarelyinte-gratedinanytheoretically meaningful way (see,forinstance, Weede,1986).Webelieve therearegoodreasonsfordoingso.As weexplain
1.The few exceptionsto these findingshavecome from studiesrestrictedto regionalsamplesofnations (forinstance,Tannahil, 1976;Berg-Schlosser, 1984). The majorperformancedifferencesbetweenmilitary and civilian regimesareordinarilymorepoliticalthan socioeconomicin character.
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