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Bio-thentic Card: Authentication Concept For RFID Card

Bio-thentic Card: Authentication Concept For RFID Card

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Published by ijcsis
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a technology that employs basic identifier of an object embedded in a chip, transmitted via radio wave, for identification. An RFID Card responds to query/interrogation irrespective of ‘Who’ holds the Card; like a key to a door. Since an attacker can possess the card, access to such object can therefore be easily compromised. This security breach is classified as an unauthorized use of Card, and it forms the bedrock for RFID Card compromise especially in access control. As an on-card authentication mechanism, this research proposed a concept termed Bio-thentic Card, which can be adopted to prevent this single point of failure of RFID Card. The Bio-thentic Card was fabricated, tested and assessed in line with the known threats, and attacks; and it was observed to proffer substantive solution to unauthorized use of RFID Card vulnerability.
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a technology that employs basic identifier of an object embedded in a chip, transmitted via radio wave, for identification. An RFID Card responds to query/interrogation irrespective of ‘Who’ holds the Card; like a key to a door. Since an attacker can possess the card, access to such object can therefore be easily compromised. This security breach is classified as an unauthorized use of Card, and it forms the bedrock for RFID Card compromise especially in access control. As an on-card authentication mechanism, this research proposed a concept termed Bio-thentic Card, which can be adopted to prevent this single point of failure of RFID Card. The Bio-thentic Card was fabricated, tested and assessed in line with the known threats, and attacks; and it was observed to proffer substantive solution to unauthorized use of RFID Card vulnerability.

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 BIO-THENTIC CARD: AUTHENTICATION CONCEPT  FOR RFID CARD
 Ikuesan Richard Adeyemi
 Dept. computer science and information system
Universiti Teknologi, MalaysiaJohor Bahru, Malaysia
 Norafida Bt, Ithnin
 Dept. computer science and information system
Universiti Teknologi, MalaysiaJohor Bahru, Malaysia
Abstract
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a technology thatemploys basic identifier of an object embedded in a chip,transmitted via radio wave, for identification. An RFID Cardresponds to query/interrogation irrespective of ‘
Who
’ holds theCard; like a key to a door. Since an attacker can possess thecard, access to such object can therefore be easilycompromised. This security breach is classified as anunauthorized use of Card, and it forms the bedrock for RFIDCard compromise especially in access control. As an on-cardauthentication mechanism, this research proposed a concepttermed Bio-Thentic Card, which can be adopted to prevent thissingle point of failure of RFID Card. The Bio-Thentic Card wasfabricated, tested and assessed in line with the known threats,and attacks; and it was observed to proffer substantive solutionto unauthorized use of RFID Card vulnerability.
Key words
: Vulnerability, unauthorized, mitigation,authentication, communication, access control systemI.
 
INTRODUCTIONRadio frequency identification (RFID) technology is atechnology that has gained wider adoption into the humaneveryday life since its first usage in identification friend or foe(IFF) during the II world war 
[1, 3]
. RFID is characterized by itsubiquitous nature, flexibility, mobility and integratability,which has contributed to its adoption in places such as accesscontrol system, conveyor control system, banking notes, itemidentification e.t.c. While RFID pros have greatly improveother technology, its cons has also generated series of securityand privacy challenges
[2, 3, 6]
some to the detriment of thesystem being integrated into
[4, 5]
. However, such challenges arenot limited to only RFID systems, but peculiar to RFIDsystems, are attacks such as relay attack, cloning, clandestinetracking, unauthorized tag read, and unauthorized tag use
[2, 6, 8]
 . Un-authorization of card use is a general challenge in accesscontrol system; hence, most systems would require a secondarycontrol mechanism.However, the integration of the RFID tag into access controlCard otherwise known as RFID Card has further complicatedthe challenges in access control cards leading to greater trade-offs in security and privacy
[3, 6,7, 8]
. Access control RFID carddo not provide on-card authentication system hence is openlyvulnerable to attacks that breach the confidentiality of a securedsystem. RFID Card responds to interrogation from an RFIDReader irrespective of ‘
who
’ holds the card, or whether thesubject has the required privilege to do so. This lack of authorization priori to interrogation can be said to be the principal point of failure of the RFID Card. For instance,consider the situation where an unauthorized subject withmalicious intent or the otherwise, gains access to a classifieddata through a stolen RFID Card and consequently jeopardizethe confidentiality of the system under protection. It suffixes tonote that, to the best of our knowledge, no knowncountermeasure addressed this single point of failure of theRFID Card.However, mitigating this critical point of failure is not as trivialas it sounds. Faraday shield model in [1] is popular method(aluminum-foiled wallet for example) of shielding the RFIDCard from unauthorized tag reading, thus enhancing the privacy protection of the RFID tag. The unauthorized tag use as appliedto RFID Card is the main goal of this paper as analyzed in [31].The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section IIhighlights the related research works on RFID tag withreference to its physical layer, discusses the principal point of failure of the RFID Card. Section III introduces the conceptused in this study, detailed the design and result of this study.Section IV presents the analysis and the conclusion of thisconcept.II.
 
RELATED RESEARCHRFID Card is a composition of antenna unit, memory unit, processing unit, and a tag, which communicates with an RFIDReader wirelessly using the near field coupling principle. Over the past decades researchers have worked extensively on theRFID system but interest on RFID on-card authenticationsystem have received minimal attention. According to [4, 9],the physical layer of the RFID system is the perimeter defenseline for security tightening in RFID system. RFIDauthentication protocols
[10, 11, 12, 13, 14]
are designed to mitigatecommunication attacks between the tag and the Reader.Similarly, various lightweight cryptographic protocols andtechniques
[15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,]
have also been designed to combatsecurity vulnerabilities in the RFID system. However, theseauthentication practices do not apply to the tag end of the
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,Vol. 10, No. 7, July 201263http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ISSN 1947-5500
 
 physical layer of the RFID system. Additionally, techniquessuch as blocker tag
[21]
, RFID guardian
[22]
, RFID zapper 
[23]
,Faraday shield
[30]
and clipped tag
[24]
are mitigation to distanceattacks, which does not necessarily translate affect RFID cardsdue to short range of communication. However, in [25], aframework for user’s authentication procedure was modeledusing fingerprint authentication through reader-systemauthentication process, a similar process to [26] which is adoptsa two-factor authentication system based on combinedfingerprint recognition and smart RF Card verification. Theyhowever failed to address the underlying problem of the on-Card authentication of the RFID card. In [27, 28] differentcategories of RFID card suitable for different securityintegration were designed but they lacked the core and essentialcomponent of card security: user authentication. [31] gives adetailed analysis of the challenges in RFID card with referenceto its physical layer. Table 1 gives the summary of the variouscountermeasures proposed against the physical layer authentication vulnerabilities.
ProposedCounter-Measure
Authentication at Physical-LayerVulnerabilities
   U  n  a  u   t   h  o  r   i  z  e   d   C  a  r   d  r  e  a   d   i  n  g   U  n  a  u   t   h  o  r   i  z  e   d   C  a  r   d   T  a  g  c   l  o  n   i  n  g   R  e   l  a  y  a   t   t  a  c   k   S   k   i  m  m   i  n  g   S  p  o  o   f   i  n  g   U  n  a  u   t   h  o  r   i  z  e   d   k   i   l   l   i  n  g   C   l  a  n   d  e  s   t   i  n  e   t  r  a  c   k   i  n  g   P   h  y  s   i  c  a   l   l  a  y  e  r   I   d  e  n   t   i   f   i  c  a   t   i  o  n
Physical-Layer Identificationtechnique
× ×
× × × × ×
 
Faraday Cage
× × ×
 
 
 
×
Authentication protocol
× ×
 
 
 
 
×
Clipped Tag
× ×
 
 
×
×
Anti-counterfeiting
×
 
 
 
 
× ×
Biometricauthentication
× × × × × × × ×
 
Labeling
ONLY create awareness for users
Controllable Tag
× ×
 
 
 
 
×
The physical layer identification technique
[29]
addressescloning of tags, and proves that no two tags can have the samefingerprint. Furthermore, controllable tag
[27]
addressed the issueof unauthorized tag read, thus curbing one of the principalsource of attacks on RFID tag. However, on-cardauthentication vulnerability, which is a major securitychallenge, have received little or no attention as shown in
Table 1
Countermeasure such as clipped tag, and fingerprint biometricauthentication
[25]
can be combined in a digitalized manner tocurtail this challenge. In the next session we, present our concept of Bio-Thentic Card as a concept of On-Cardauthentication process, which is a combination of digitalizedcontrollable clip tag and fingerprint authentication system.III.
 
ON-CARD AUTHENTICATION CONCEPTThe architecture of the RFID Card reveals thatcommunication between the Card and the Reader is hinged onthe interconnection between the antenna unit and the tag
insideof the
Card. The antenna (usually rectangular spiral) unit of theRFID card is the medium of interaction between the tag of theRFID Card and the RFID Reader. Hence, the connectivity,transmission range and power supply to the RFID tag is afunction of the antenna unit. Suppose we represent thecommunication process as
 p
which is the integration of theantenna unit joints
(A
uj
),
and the RFID tag
(R
).
For the sake of this paper, we represent every other parameter surrounding theRFID tag such as battery, memory unit, as RFID tag. We alsoassume that the antenna unit is the suitable antenna for RFIDcard. The communication process,
 p
is given by
equation (i)
.
 p
 
=
(
 
 R
x
 A
uj
) (1)If 
 A
uj
=
0
,
then, the communication process
 p
 
 presented inequation (
i
) becomes:C
 p
=
(
 
 R
x 0) = 0 (
2
)This illustrates that if the possible contact between the RFIDtag and the antenna unit can be disconnected such that the totalcorresponding antenna unit connection is zero, then, theantenna communication process (
 p
) will be zero. With thiscriteria, we observed that the unauthorized use of cardvulnerability in the RFID Card can be mitigated using thecombination of digitally clippable tag-antenna-joint, and a biometric authentication system, preferably, fingerprint, asanalyzed in [31]. Furthermore, we observed that a strategic placement of a digitally controllable hinge between the antennaand the tag in such as way that the antenna forms a shieldaround the tag, when totally disconnected from the tag, will prevent privacy disclosure, tracking and all radio wave relatedattacks. When this clippable joint is then strictly controlled byan authentic subject, the single point of failure of the RFIDCard can thus be mitigated. We termed this concept Bio-Thentic Card (BTC), which is the integration of biometriccomponent into the RFID tag
i
=0
 j
=0
ni
=0
 j
=0
n
Table 1: Countermeasure to physical layer AuthenticationChallenges
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,Vol. 10, No. 7, July 201264http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ISSN 1947-5500
 
IV.
 
RESEARCH METHODOur research aimed at conceptualizing an RFID Card (whichwe called BTC) which can mitigate the unauthorized Card usevulnerability. In order to achieve our aim, we designed our methodology into three distinct stages.
Stage1
: this stage comprises the design, calibration, simulationand fabrication of the card antenna unit. In this stage, weanalyzed thoroughly; the suitable positioning, and control of theclippable joint, such that the Card will respond to interrogationonly through the contact from the clip joint.
Stage2
: this stage involves the acquiring, authenticating,securing and storage of the biometric authentication process,fingerprint in this case. We carefully considered the choice of the fingerprint module to use in line with information security practices such as security of the fingerprint module (livefingerprint detection, and false error rate) and secure codedevelopment practice.
Stage3
: this stage involves the integration of the variousmodules, and the control module. The result and testing processis detailed in the next session. The control unit integrates the biometric fingerprint and the fabricated antenna unit into asingle module controlled by a microcontroller. Figure 1 gives adetailed description of the our designed methodologyThe Output from the clip joint and the Faraday cage must be‘Yes’ before stage1 can be passed to stage2 as shown in Figure1. The communication between stages 1, 2 and 3 is illustrated inFigure 2. We designed a rectangular loop antenna consisting of stripped copper lines, with external dimension of 54x33mm,0.5mm width, 7 turns, 1mm spacing and 0.035mm thicknessusing a computer simulation technology (CST) studio as shownin Figure 3 and 4. The design comprises a PCB made of FR4-lossy dielectric material with thickness of 1.6mm, dimension of 60x40mm, relative permeability of 1, and relative electric permittivity of 4.55.We integrated the clipped joint as shown in Figure 3 throughthe fabrication process of the card antenna unit with a13.56MHz RFID tag (see Figure 5). The digitalized controllablehinge was introduced through a miniature relay of 1A, 5Vdirect current, and internal coil resistance of 166ohms. Uponsimulation, we arrived at an S-parameter value of -2.730712,which we considered as suitable for our experimental purposeas illustrated in Figure 4.
STAGE 1STAGE 2
   S   T   A   G   E   3
Figure 1: Design Flow Process
Match
   F  a   b  r   i  c  a   t   i  o  n  a  n   d  r  e  a   l   t   i  m  e  v  e  r   i   f   i  c  a   t   i  o  n   U  n   i   t
CONTROL UNITMatching unit
Feature extraction unitAcquire thefinerrintTemlate
 S   e n s 
Study of antenna design systemDetermine the number of turns, dimension and positioning of the coil,Determine the antenna orientationand the height of the dielectricsubstrateSimulation (using CSTsoftware
)
   N  o   t  s  u   i   t  a   b   l  e   f  o  r  a   1   3 .
Design clip joint andsimulateDesign a digitalcontrollable Faraday cage No
Yes
 No
Yes
Yes
(IJCSIS) International Journal of Computer Science and Information Security,Vol. 10, No. 7, July 201265http://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/ISSN 1947-5500

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