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The b'dito/'s
EDICION
H1SPANOAMERICANA
,on el numero del
mes de abril de 1945, la
Esruela de Comando y
Estado Mayor ampli"
sus actividades con la
puhlicaci(lll de la MILI
TARY REVIEW en
tres idiomas: e:.-.panol,
portugucs e Ingles.
Los articulos que se
pubhran en las erlicio
neg hlspanoamerirana y
brasilena apareceh,n en
.Ia edicion norteameri
cana del mlsmo mes,
POl' medio de estas
de.seamos hacer
selo saber a nuestros
lectol es y. aseg-urades
a nuestros vecinos de
Hispanoamerica y del
Brasil. que dedicaremos
!Iluestro mas slncero CR
fuerzo a traduclr con
exaetitud la version in
glesa y a presentar, de
acucrdo con los medios
a nuestro alcance, una
revista autontativa, in
fOI mativa. interesante e
instructiva,
La Rcdacci6n
EDICSAO
BRASILEIRA
Com 0 numero do mes
de Abril de I94ii. a
Escola de Comando e
Estado Maior estendeu
seus horizontes com a
publica<,;ao da MILI
TARY REVIEW em
tres idiomas. 0 portu
gues, 0 espanhol e 0 in
gles,
Os artigos publicados
nas edi<,;ues brasileira e
hispano-americana apa
r<'rerao tambem na edi
<;ao em ingles do mesmo
meso
Este aviso tem em
vista dar conhecimento
deste fato aos nossos
Ieitores e assegurar aos
vizinhos bl'asi
leiros e hispano-ameri
canos que serao envida
dos sinceros esfor<,;os na
tradu<;iio do ingles. para
apresentar-Ihes com os
meios ao nosso aJcance,
uma revista fidedigna,
informativa, "interes
sante e instrutiva.
A Redu,iio
J
I"""""""
..
AUGUST 1945 NUMBER 5
Editor-in-Ghief
Colonel Frederick M. Barrows
Editor. Spanish-American Edi tion Editor. Brazilian Edition
Colonel Andres Lopez Major Severino Sombra. Brazilian Army
Assistant Editors
Lt Col C. Montilla, Maj D. E . Gribble. Maj T. D. Price. Maj J. McAdams. Capt C. B. Realey,
Capt D. K. Maissurow. Lt A. D. Bettencourt, Lt L. Galvan. Lt A. Galvan
Production Manager: Maj G. M. Smith. Jr. - Business Manager: CWO C. Williams
CONTENTS
Page
AIR PoWER........... .. ............. .................................................................................................... Brig. Gen. R. C. Candee 3
STRATEGICAL AsPECTS OF THE FINAL CAMPAIGNS AGAINST GERMANY'....................... ........................... CoL Conrad H. Lanza 9
REPEAT YOUR INTELLIGENCE TRAINING........................................................................................ Lt. Col. James F. Miller. GSC 15
KUZUMEl MAKES THE TEAM.... _ ......................................................................................................... Col. Jack W. Rudolph, GSC 17
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES............................................................ .......................................... ................. Lt. Col. David A. Hornby. AC 24
TilE 7TH DIVISION IN LEY'TE...................................................................................................................... Maj. Gen. A. V . Arnold 30
SELL YOUR FIELD ARTILLERY WITH SPARE PARTS AND F REE SERVICING ......................... ..... Lt. Col. E. L. Hoopes, Jr FA 33
A CURE FOR SHIPSIDE CONFUSION................................................................................. ............. Lt . Col. Edmond E. Russell. TC 38
TilE PILLBOX-A TRAP............ _ ................................................................... ........................................ Lt. Col. John E. Kelly. Inf 40
PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH MILITARY LEGISLATION.... ..................... ..................................... .............................. .... I rving M. Gibson 48
THE FALL OF ORMOC ON LEYTE....................... ................... _ ............................................................................ From official reports 51
THE PERSONNEL PROBLEM OF THE
HOSPITAL SHIP COMPLEMENT.... ............................................ Maj . Sidney Robbin. MC. and Capt. Thomas G. Scott. TC 57
T HE UNIT ENGINEER...... .. .............................................. ...................................................................... Maj . Maurice W. Johns. CE 60
ARTILLERY AS AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCy.......... ................... .'................................ ........................ L t. Col. Samuel S. Edson. FA 65
WHY COMMAND INSPECTIONS? ................................................................................ ........................... Lt. Col. Leon C. Jackson.Inf 70
THE PREVENTION OF TRENCH FOOT................................................From The Bulletin of the U. S. Army Medical Department 74
AUXlLIARY PROPELLANTS.. ........................................ .......................... _ ................................................... Capt. Roy G. Tulane. Inf 76
ATTACK THROOGH WOODS ................................................................. _ ............... _......... ..................................................................... 78
MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD................................................................. ...................................................... .............. ........... 79
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS............................................... ............ .................................................................................................. .... . 85
Japanese Morale................................................................. ........................................................................... ........................... ......... 85
Military Doctrine of the Red Army.......................................................... .................... ................................................................... 89
The Air War in Southeast Asia................................... ................................................................................................................... 93
The Value of Permanent Fortificati ons............................................................................................................................................ 97
Attack on a Fortified Zone in East Prussia..............................._ ................................................................................................. 100
The Renaissance of the French Air Force....................................................................................... .................... ............................. 103
Modern Trends in the Development of Armed Forces ................................ .................................................................................... 105
RAF Photographic Reconnaissance UniL............................. ......................................................................................................... 109
Victory in the Pacific ............................................................................... .................. ..... ................................................................ .
113
Smoke Scrl!ens in Tank Operations............................................................... ............ ....................................................................... 115
Tt,rning the Siegfried Line ................................................................................................................................................................ 117
Jungle Fighting in Burma............................................................................................................... ................................................. 120
Artillery Support of I nfantry Attack ................................................................................................................................................ 121
Airships............................................................ ............................................................................................. ..................................... 124
Tactic8....................................................................... ........................................................... _ ............................ ....... 127
COMMAND AND GENERAL
!\fA.JOlt GE1'>:I':ItAL K \Hl. TIU'ESI>I;l.l.
nHII;.\lllElt GEl'>:EIL\I. w. A. (',\\ll'BEI.I.
nR!(;AlJlEH Gl';NEltAL H.. c. CA1'>:llEE
BHl<;AlJlER GI;NER.\L A. \\'. "I;Nn;
CAPTAIN .I. 13. EAHI.E, [',,;1,,1 SIII/" .\'11/,11
COLON!';L ]\;AI.LE, ('II/'fill Y
COLON!;L D. C. SnnL\llL, Fi.ld .1/,111I'/,!1
Class /Jirec/uo;
COLOt\EL J. II. \'AN rLlET, 1"/111111''1
COLON!';L \V..J. BAIRn, III/lll1lry
COLONEL M. F. !\I 0\ EI(, .4 iJ (or/I."
LlI';lIn:NANT CUI.O'<EL .1. W. l'.\OR(;AN, Fi."" :lrtill"I!!
Faculty Chiefs
COLONt:L H. J. SnIROEDr:R, SiU/1I1/ ('lIrw
COLONEL J. S. CHILDERS, Air ('or!"
COLONEL C. L. MARSHALL, In/onlry
COLONEL T. DEI". ROGERS, ('OI'j'S of Rngilln"""
COLONEL L. H, COOK, In/llntrll
COLON!';L N. D, FIWST. Air ('01'/'."
COLONEL H. L. p, KING. Signlll ('or/,s
LIEl'TENANT COLONEL B. F. BOYER, In/llntry
STAFF SCHOOL
Cvmmandanl
A('I ing AssIstant Commandanl
nir"t'lor, Ail' I'nstruction
DirPl'tor, Sprviee Instruetion
Din!'t"r, Naval Instruction
Din'clor, Ground Instruction
Ex('!'utiv('
Ground
Sprvi!'p
Air
Army & Navy Staff CollpW'
P"rsllnnp]
Intplligencp
Opprations
Logistics
Ground
Air
Sprvice
Training
MILITARY REVIB'W -- I'uhh.. hed ml,nthly by the' CommMHI and C('tlC'r.1i Stuli S('hm)] at Fort Lp<lvf'nwurth, Kansa3
Entered as matter .\ugust 31, l!J.lL <Lt til(> Pu.-.t Offke .tt Fort LpJ.vt'll\...'lJrth, under thE' .\ct flf 18i!}.
SubscriptIOn rate..,: $3.00 d'.S. 1 per J,'t'J.r for I:! No) p'i.tra ('harg"f' fur forf'lgn un new or
rt.'nC'wul
$-sa St-eL ueStttQIa 2
-9A.V p.teaPOOfl
01tQn!
UOJ:SlAM te:>l'P<nJ:9d:
Air Power
BRIGADIER GENERAL R. C. CANDEE
nhCl'hH", Air Inall'nt,tilln. Cilmmand Jlllll Staff Schonl
J\ I R power sllmethinp; n<,w tlll,ll'l' the
n sun. The short space of thirty-seV('ll
during which the United Stat('s
hIli! military a brief Ilt'riocl
cOllljlllr\!<! with the fifty 01' l'cntul'ies
of recorde,\ history an<\ till' ntll11hel'les8 ap;es
of ]lrl'hiRtorie life upon earth through
out whil'h I\l(,ll anti natinns have fought each
otlwl'. Alltl in (hi:,; "hort of hut a
singh- human g'l'lleration tllC'rc ha:; al'i:;cn
a n,'w military force whos" hlow,; are meas
un,t! in of of high explosive:;
shattering whole and destroying'
strnng' nlilitul!Y forl't's and \\'hose lltuchin0s,
flyillg' with allllMl lh,' ']leed of Round, find
th"i!' through the ohRl'ul'ity of dOll<\';
and darl<n,'"'' whkh lwretofon' have
redut'l'd 01' enlin'ly haltl'r\ thl' o]ll'l'ations of
\\:-\1'.
\\,p havl' Iivl'd so l'l",,' to the growth uncI
d,'vl,lollmcnt of air power in th,' prt'Sl'llt war
that "',' ha\,<' ('0111<' to take it for gran!<',l. For
thoRe who hay" not bt't'll oil tIl<' cur
lcnt fit'hh; of \)attle the ]In',,, thl' nl<lio, anel
the havt' !'{'pI'odul't'll the Pl'l'ct'ption"
!1l1,1 l'e"ctions of com].at most vividly, But
most persons al't' so l'ngl'o",ed in tht' ,mall
rn,lividual tasks a;;"ignl'r,l them that tht'y
hay" little timt' to air powel' as one of
th(' few dominating ngun', in this vast pan
Gmma of World War II. In th,' hri"f space
of this article an aUl'mpt will he made to
Jll'eHmt some pertilll'nt hut gt'nerul points in
legard to th(' soure,', capahi\itks, ol'ganiza-,
tion, and employment of air power that may
have "scaped the layman,
In discussing any new or important suL
jf'ct it is advisahIe to define the' principal
terms involved, Unfortunately this is not
easy in the case of ail' power. This is Ilue not
to the fact that air power is an abstract
concept but also to the fact that it is con
stantly growing and changing with thl' <Ic
velollmeht of aeronautics and new invt'ntions
in all fields of physical Although the
concept of sea power is much ol,ler than
I! that of air power, the continuing streal11 of
books 'that are still being written on sea
power to the difficulty of defining
that term. Kevertheless, in order to have a
]leg' ol1.whit.'h to hang this discussion, the fol
lowing short definition of air power is of
fl'r"cl: "Ail' ]lower includes everything that
cont dbut"s to a nation's stl'ength in the air
or through the medium of ail'craft." From
this dt'finition it is seen that an almost infi
nite variety of hoth tangible and intangible
factors al'(> include,l in the concept.
In uljclition to organized military air
forces, thl'OUll;h which it is' applied in "time
of war, a nation's air power includes its
industrial capacity for the production of
aer,lI1autic'a.l and equip
nWI1t. It includes the manpower and the
technieal' skill required for this industrial
prodlletion. It includes the air, highway. rail.
and wat"l' shipping that transports the raw
materials and finished prodUct!'. Civil avia
tion, aidinl's, private flying, airports and
haRl's for both, are all a part of ail' power.
Th" l')eatioll of bases, military or civil, from
which air olwrations are conducted, the lo
cation and distrihution of ail'craft and mu
1litiollS faetories, of oil training
estahlishnwnb, an,l depots are also air power
faetOl's. (;eograJlhy, climate, and the polit
ieal, c'conomiC', and jlsychological attributes
of the ]leople contribute to a nation's strength
in the air. EV('n the other organized military
fO!'('t's-armies and fleets-affect and con
tribute to the of a nation in the
"air. Thu", it if; seC'll that military air forces
alone are but a small, though none the less
l'sst'ntial, purt of this larger concept of air
jlO\\'l'r.
But air power cannot as:;ert exclusive
claim to the various national resources and
attributes that I have just mentioned. Many
0f them are also ekments in the land power
and sea power of a nation. What then. one
mig-ht ask, are the gTounds for thinking
th()l'e is such a thing as air power-distinct
from the older forms of military strength?
Why do some people and some nations see in
the'airplane the basis for a new and separate
kind of warfare-coordinate in concept and
l
4
;\llLITAHY HEVIF.W
equal in with the older of
land and sea operations? The reasons are
found in the fundamental difft:renc('s between'
ail', land, and 1<('a forces; betwl'en the air
plane, th.: naval vessel, and the basic equip
ment of combat and l{l(?omotion of the grnund
forces; and in the essential differenc!!s be
tween the ell'n1Pnts or environments in which
they move, It was lwither a('Chlent nor en
price that hroug'ht about through the cen
turies the :wpnrate tlevelopllwnt of fleets Hnd
armies; rather it was the inhlrent physical
differencps in their Rl1ITOUn,lin1!,'s Hn,l the
for using different weapons ami
vehicles and diff('rent and skill.
Men who follow the profession of arms.
ashore and atloat, inl'vitably Cl'{'ate "lwciul
iZl't! materiel, methods, and Ol'1!,'anization,.; to
fit the p('culiar l'l'f)uil'el1ll'nts of their opera
tions and Thi, l'l',ultcti in
funuaDlelltal ditl'.. l'{ne.. " hdwl'l'n land and
sea forc!'s, The ,hordinl' mark" clear a
division lll'!w('en th..,,,l' two fOl'ces as it do('s
hetwet'n the ('klllcnt" on which they fight. In
th" same way. man's new ability to fly pro
vides the ha,:is of a new kiml of military 01'
gallizatiol1-iliffel'l'nt fl'om eillher armies or
flet'tfl. Aircrafts al'e by ail.. naval
craft float in tll(' water, and g'l'Ound unit"
operate firmly upon th.. earth. To this
condition, fllllon1!,' oth('r" i,: tnlc('ai.]P th!' fact
that comoatant air, spa, and land for('t,; are
:.1>< fundal1l('ntally diff('rPllt frolll PHch other
as are the gases, liquids, and which
support them.
Since thp distindive nature of its organ
ized combatant forces is the chief feature
distinguishing air power from lan,1 and sea
power, it is to military air forces that we
must look for an understanding of the capa
bilities, limitations, and organization of air
power, and its adaptation to war. And while
considering what can and cannot be done by
air power in the broad sense, and by the or
ganized combatant air forces through which
air power is made manifest in war, it is well
to bear in mind the distinction' between these
two terms, "air power" and "air forces,"
that are so often confused in popular usage.
The capabilities and limitations of air
powel' have ueen" matters of speCUlation an.l
(:ontrovel\sy since the first flight of the
\'{right ul:others in 1!J03, It was uut natul'al
during the early years of aviation that mIll
have held widely ,Hift>ring views eon
l'e1'l1ing its future. They hall hall no actual
(:,perience with air warfare on which to' ha-i.'
informed or expert Opllllon, Their vicw,
conl,1 hut reflect the 1lll'aSU1'e of their imag
ination or emotion. The World War,
1!l14 to H1l8, was and .,.1
only to conn I'm most people in their previous
beli..r!'l or prdutlices regarlling tlJ(' impor
tance of air power as a factor in war. Nevl'r
our enemies-Germany, Italy, and
,Japan-had th.. fOl'egight to huild, and the
to employ. air powel' un,l air forces ,,0
to uef)uil e trl'mendon;; advantage in tIlt'
,ta1!,'i's of the pl'Psenl conflict.
(it'nnan nil' POWl'l' -l'l!al O}'
\\ a, to rOlllp'!l Britain to try to ap
l'l'a,c Hith'l' at :\[llnieh in ID::H. Gl'l'man :!lr
J)()W('l'- l'{lal OJ' hu:.. a
factor in bring-ing about the Soviet-l;crman
...don in air
1)O\\'ll'-1110rC' apparent than (1'(..ul- an
l'ffeetive thn'ut for 111 the :\ledit('l'
ranean an'a, in hoth diplomatic and military
until its actual ,t!'eng'th !li,
('overed and The failure of eer
many',: Lnftwaff(', F\ comhination with h,,1'
lan,l llnd ,,'a force,. to win decisive victo!'y
{.ver En1!,'lan!l in 1H40 Was till'! not so mnch
to the actual or potcntial llli1!,'ht or
of German air power as it was to Nazi mis
calculation of the defensivl' of the
Royal Air Force and the rugged character
of the British peopk. Japan('se air power
much stronger in fact than in the calcula
tions of our military men prior to December
1941-dealt us a staggering blow in opening
the long-predicted war in the Pacific. Para
doxically, in her shattering air attack at!
Pearl Harbor, Japan sealed her own doom
by awakening the United States from its
twenty-year-Iong self-induced military slu,m
bel'.
The precise capabilities of air power can
not be measured with accuracy_ Too many
and intangible factors are involved,
I
5
\IR l'OWlm
nnd what lil's bt'rvlHI tIl<' hvrizoll of llC'rO
ll:lutical dl'vt'I')jllllt'llt i, al,o. ht'YIllld illHW:
illation, But the conl'ret<' Hl'hil'vl'lllt'nt, of a it,
ha\'\.' hl'Cll viYidly and
Pl'O\'l'l1 c1ul'ing: the' pa.... t livt' It}!}/.!.' \\:\1'
The {:f'l'Blan Ail' Foree dl''''il'\)ycd tht' 'Vl'akl'l'
aviation iUlll1ldiatlly Ht'lPt \vat'
::-tadl'd in I ..... ioll t IOt)p .....
rHI'ril'd to "'''r\\"H.I' and H"llalld I,.\" I h., I.lIf\
watl,!', ,dthin a f,,\\ 11<>lIr, tilt'
of d{f(llbt.' Ill" llllhapp.\' l-tlttll
(;cl'nlall aviation ... :thk
to tIlt' pallZI'I' that
F'l't'neh l'l.lsbtatlt'v in a Blat tt'I' pf day ..... Hnt!
It'd to th(' di",,(<,,' "r 1IIIIIk<'r'lIl", :\azi ail'
f1t'!'t" 1,lm;tpd [o:ngll,h .. il iv, alld lIt! .'all-Ilt'd
Iil'itain's bland (It,f''I1' ... , '" Ih".\" h"d lint
Iwen thr('all'llt'd for a IllI,u,alld .I"'" I',. III It II
1H'1' hopv. if not lit'" alld dt.,tt.'l'lHintl
t 1011. \nq'll all but Itl:-:t. (i{'rnl.ln !o!lt!'-l
ail'l'l'uft "I'ui,,''] Ih" :\olth ,\II,,"lii 1'oul."
a:-. \\'(,,11 a .... tht' rIal !'in\" ..... (.:\ ..... to .... talk thll ,it'
ti1l1:-' of t-Iw :\azi .... ulllllat in' ........1:lPilllt'-..t' ail'
naft t 11<' proud H"il i,h "''1011:11 ,hip'
Pl'il1t't' of and .... t. :llld in {'l'lll
plinj.!' (jUt' pl'l'-\\al :\"V)', I'"d,,'all.l' IlII,dilit'd
olt)' ",h()h: Paeifk plan,
Thc'H' :111" lit IHI!' .... t ;U.!.L!t'l ill;..!" 111(1\\ ....
of :\-..;:i:-:: air furn':-. LI'HlI:!ht aHt.!'lli .... /l to tIlt>
IW'lIb of ,\liil:d lh,l! h"o! failt-o! tn
h('(d tht' warnin.t,!':-' of tht' proplwt .... of ail'
po\vcr. But with prtldll!io!l..... lv:-.\)lutinll.
{'nl'J'g'Y. and g'ttnitt:-., we ::-l't :i1H!lIt dvv{lnpill}.!'
the potpntial of Ollr aViation and
n']'ltl'(l which thl' :\azb had he
littled as Wl' had ulId.. rJ':ltt'd tllt, dl'j.!'t'l,,, of
their pl'el'al't'dnl'" alld the <'1I01'Illit,\' of tlwil'
('vii plll'pm;l'S, Xot ,oon, \Jut at long tlIP
tide ,,1' \Vat' tUI'l1(,d in tl1l' ..\lIil'" favol' alld
<'Ul' ail' power l'erfnrn1l'd 111 th..
und "ll<'l'at iolt of (llll' Hlt'
Fight"I' ainTaft wel'e "Illpped and flown
fron1 AnH'rie:.t in eVPl'-illert' a:-.ill}1.' l1tllllhel's to
holster the' dwindling' of Eng-Ialld,
Eg-ypt, and Allil'd 110mlieI" IIc'g'an to
strike damaging: 1110\\ S OUl' ellclllh,,:-;
in 1<:urop(", Afril'a, and the l'acilil', Army
I,omhel's joined with Xavy
planes and the RAF to s(,pk and sink till'
V-boats that were starviltg' the British Isles,
:lIu-chant v('sse1s hastily converted, and new
1!iI'('I'aft caniers built with incr('dible speed,
:';'Ilal'ded OUI' vital convoys across'th(' oceans,
,\ ir tl'llnsport Illalll's canied ammunition in
hours from the l:nite<l States to
Egypt tn tip the ,cales in favor of Britain's
d{':-'Jil'l'Hlt' defl'l1Sl
'
again:--t the Xazi'g farth
",t ddvl' towal'(! the vital Suez Canal and
til<' oil lOr the "'("ar East, A,nll tinaIly, in this
t1pl\lU..,iv(' pt'l'iod of OUl' Anlel'ican
,\1'111,\' alld l\avJ' aircraft, land-based and
l :ll'I'i"I'-IIol'lI. I Ul'lll,d haek .1 apan's offensive'
1I,'d, at idwa \' alld tIlt' Sololllon Islands,
,lopping' th., thrust aj.!'ainst our life
LIll' to the !'\outhwC'::-t Pacitic.
l.at'k of 1II','vl'nt, Ibting all thl' kinds
111' at'litllI and a('hh'v(lments of nil' po\ver
<l ftt), \\'(-' thl' :-.tl'uttgic oifenf'ive in
Vllli<'ll" thcakn; of op('rations. It is enough
tn poiltt ollt that we bla,t('d Germany from
th., all' and 0111' far beyond
Ill<' I'anp:c of the weapOllS of our surface
to <lttHt'k the of' 'Xazi mili
llll\\"l'!'-airCl'aft, and vehicle
ra..tori.,,,, and oil. ball hl'aring', stppl, and rub
I,.... it'S, altd ..Jl'etric power and trans
IH'rt'l\loll ,."stI'IllS, Alliell forces pl'<,pareo
the way and .ioillPd in the asoault on Fortress
1':11101''' liy Allil,d ground ana naval forces
III the gTealt"t alllphihious attack of all
tin1<', Our (l',)OP ('alTiers airborne
divisions ,,\,('1' greatcr dIStances and with
11101'C' pl't..'ci::--iun ulld t'tTcl'tivencs:-. than v:ere
('V,'I' achieve,1 IIy the ing'l'niotls GI'rl1lanS, On
the ot h,,1' shle of the wode!, ail'. land, and sea
fOl'ce" c()mbilll,tl to isolate and kill the J aps
in island after island and has(' after base
untIl :llacArthul' once again stands firmly in
tIlt' PhilippilH's, and the relllnants of the
Xav:,' have been' driven back on
t h(' d"uhtfnl jll'otl'ction of its weakpned home
Thl'ouj.!'hout all t}wse offensive
"peration" Allil'II ail' pruvided in
l protection ag'ainst Axis air at
tack on our surface forc,'" Air transport
Ill(}VP.! important staff and (:ombat r,el'sonnel
and ill volllnlE' to the com
hat and has been of incalculable
importancl' in th(, evacuation of sick and
wounded, thus boosting both the morale and
6 MILITARY REVlF.W
tl1<' c"mllal of th,' tkhting- forces,
If emphut'is been placed on till' capa
bilities UlHI dee,ls of aviation, and the g-rent
growth and aC'hicVl'nll'nt, of laud and st'a
force>' in this Wat' hav" h,'pn npg'\t'ctt'd, it
onl)' h<'l'ause the suh,it'd of this if'
air powey. OUI' in the
forct's of tilt' ArlllY and :-\avy hav(' hOln('
tht'ir triab in hatth' with no I"" ,'ourag'p and
tenadty than haYt' tIlt' ail'll1l'n, and lanel and
l'ell fore,',; have fat' ".'\"I'<'Ikd all p",t mili
,p,'rfnrnHlncC',
to tht' liluitntion:-:. of' ail' pn\\"t'I'. WP have
s('en the of air ron'''''''' tl) :ll'l'(Hllpli:-:h
SflnHI of for whil'h hlnd and H'H
are <H'g'aniz,'') 'lllt! "'lUIPP".!'
JU1't a:4 only ail' forep" call opl'ratl' in the
field of air ,'oillhat and at I an)!"" Ilt':;ond till'
reach of pitl1l'r land and ,,'a 1'01<,<'" -0 ail'
units al'(' inf"l'ior to the latt,'r in of
thl' ('olltilat Hnd ;o.PI'\'iet' opl'ratttlH:-- til'
fact.' and are \\ hnp,\' itH.:apablt of cal
j'ying: out ....-otllp of thl' lhual t:l!,}.;: .... of at tnip ....
::nd tll'P!', .-\\thoug'!! all tint'" ("O!'l'P' -land,
:-:ea, and produl'(d }'t::--lIlts dHl'jllg'
this war which. hy old WI'!'l' Ill'
lievl'd the' ntlVl'lty wpH as th,'
important'" of ib opl'l'ations f'l'l'fjul'lltly
tUl'nl',1 th" "potIi)!'ht on ait, I)<I\\'('}', Its fu
pos"ihilitit" are lh lilllitl<" as the sky
which is it, fi .. ld of Hut <lUI' I'X
pel'il'nce ,lul'ilH\' thl' past fiv(, yeat's pl'ovidl's
no sound for a ('oHC'lu:--ion that :-;trong
ef1<!lnit,!-- cun he hl'att'n hy ait, action alol1P.
Thf' vast ruction I)l' (;el'llian indu,trial
eRtahlishllll'nts hy ail' homhing' l'ould not h,'
fully appn'C'iat ..d ul;til the ('ollap>,' of :-\azi
dom permitted of th,' dalllllgc, But
ail' pOW"I' did not alolw eaUl't' th,' ,'olllplett'
stoppag<' (If :-\azi urhan activitil'S no\' tIll'
('ol1lpld,' c"llap,,, of {;"I'lllan nl<>l'HI(', It takes
all availahlP ail' 1>0\\'('1' plus land and ","a
P(lW"}' for vil'lory in llltHlet-ll \\'ar, In union
thel'f' iR alld th... st of each
fprce-Iand, sea, and l1IultipliC'd whpll
joincd with th.. others in til<' fulfilllll'llt of a
common plan,
Having' consid,'rl't! th,p natun' of air power
and tht', t'llpabilitil'" of ail' fol'ct'", Ipt U1' tllrn
to th(' of their ol'j!l\nization, By organ
ization i;;, meant the structure of authot'!ty
and control within an aggl'Pgation of parts,
and tIlt' inlel'l'erntionship of part" Ily
which eOl1lman,1 lIn,l coordination al'(' made
an,\ more throughOllt the
\\ holt> g'roup, Orgnnic strllctui'e determinl'd
the purpose which the organiza
tion exist" and abo by the eguipllwnt and
tvchniqlll'" uvuilahl(' for its liSt':
Bl'I'ore consilJeol'ing' tht' inlt'rnal 01 ganiza
Lon of ail' fon'es, It't us examine their 1'('1,,
tilm to tlw older lund and fore"s, Histol i
ail' forct's dl'vploped first within and ""
Pllt'\>' of tIll' two old"I' sPI'vicps, It has !""'ll
widely m'l'eptl'd in the TJ nited States until
the l't'"",'nt wal' that the g'l'llcral fUllCtit)l'h
of an pertain tu hUHl alld
tht' l:!'l'l1t'ntl fUlletion:.-) of a navy to sea opt.ra
t Tht' rang'p of and thtl doetrint,.'
of of lund 'and ,,'a forces will
alway:-. pl'event tht' ('olnhat opl'rations (If
(,lth"I' flolll ('v('l'lupping far into th,' pal'tien
lal' til'ld of tIl<' "tht'I', Th" of tli"
and "Vel' ait'cI'uft and
air hl't\V('cn our Anny and ::\uvy
\\'a:o: ag:o wht'n tht.'
eapahilitjps of ail'cI'aft limitl'd thl' lattt'r 10
lllinol' . 'UPPOI't of tlwil' parPllt
But ho\\"pv{\l' propel' havt'
I"','n tIl<' pa!'ly ,Ipportioning of aviation b,'
tw,'pn the two traditional tl1<' in
"I'pa'l' in tl1<' rang" atHl the ,It-structive powpi'
of the' airplarw no\\' providl' thl' for a
'-'t'JHll'tHe fol'c{:}. are lal'g'c ail'
radil'all:; diifel'Pllt in l'fjuipm ..nt and Ol'g'aniza
t ion .from land and ,,'a i'm'e,'". hut their ahility
to attack till' ohjectives of both armie1' and
and al"o to targl'ts far,lll'yond
the !'ang" of eitht'r, is sountl atIditionalreason
for ('rpating a stl'ong' national ail' component
di,tinct fl'om both th,' Army and the
The War Departl1ll'llt has t'eeognized thp
distinct nature and capahilities of ail, fOl'cI"
and within tl1<' Arl1lY has as
a element coordinate with the A
(;round Forces and the A t'llly SCl'vice Force"
:-\(1 long-el' b aviation I'egard..a as on" of the
ground arms 01' services, Th" Wal' D('part
Blent has gone even farthl'j' in its appreciation
(If the }ll'",,,ent stalus and future possibilities
\
7
AIR POWER
of ail' IlOWt'1' and l'eeonlllll'nciL,d to the
major and radical reorganization of
. lillI' ttl'nH'd This r('organization would
a Dcpartnll'nt of the Arlllcd
to int'ludL' thl'PC ('ool'<linate comhatant
.. ArlllY, till' Navy, and tIll' Ail'
FClI'ceH-and a [oul'lh l'Ollllltlncnt of (''l llaI
ilHpOl'tallt'(I, namely. a Sl'l'Vil'{i of lOllHllon
Supplip>"
("ool'diuatiol1 of thtl and taetit .... of
!lI'lltip, and !lcvts lig'hting in a colllllllln th('atel'
"I' opl'ration"'ha,, always lll'l'n a dillicult pl'oh
It'Ill, ThiH lll'oblelll has hl'('11 l'olllplicate(1
by the a<lflition of ail' fol'L'C'" \\'hil'h opcl'ate
\\ ith (-'qual eHse OVI'I' hoth land and :-.{.'a arl'as:
\\,hl'1'<.' ('Ollllnand of t h()t'-e ai I' i'O}'l'f.':'>
" div(dc'd lwt \\'L'l'n tit" land and spa ('0111
mand"I''', Snlutitln of tIll' )lrohll'ln in till' titold
h"c I>('l'n found hy pla('ing all fOI'l"',,-lanll,
;--l'H. alld ail'-in one tl1l'.atl'l' undt'l' the
t iolla} ('ont rol of a :-.in,..dt' tlwatl'" eOlltl11
7
11Hh'I'
II It" i, ,u"ordinal<' to Iwith,'r the Will' 01'
Hl'pal'tnl(lnt:-;, hut to a ('Ollllllllll
.. ;h the f'ncitit- to tilt> .)Olllt Chid"
"I' Statr th(' PI'l,,,jdl'llt and in
Europe to tht, COlllhint'<I ('hid, of StatL 1111
llIediate ('outl'Ol of tl1<' Twentkth Ail' POI'tl'
Su}It'l'fort whkh fronl
and within llln}'l' than ont'" theatl'l', is
taim,d I,y the .J"int of Staff th"l1l
",lve,;, TIll' \\'al' ll<>partnwnt'" proposal would
provide tIll' "allle unity of command at the
national lllilital'Y lc-vd during 1'('aCl'
tiJll(, a,:.; h-; now found in ,val', and
tIl<' unity of command in \Yu,hington
a, in the fit'ld,
Although lund, ,;ea, and ail' force,; bhould
he handled ,li,;tinet and cool'dinatt' l'lenH'nt,;
at 'each level of command, it 'l1ot follnw
that {'ueh plan and l'Oll!lnl'l its OPl'l'!I
independently of thl' otl1<'I', Quitc the
('ontrar:) tl'Ut', Thl'ir "cveral
be coordinated thl't)ugh a COllllllOll aim
and a COIlllllon plan, \Ve find in military or
ganization, just as in thllt of the nOll-military
it be commerce, indu"try,
,'ducation, Ol' any otil('1' fil'ld of endeavor
that it is neeessat'y, in order to develop the
greatest technical efficiency in hoth personnel
and equipmCllt, to separate a large mass of
)Hell and nlatel'iel intu diffcl'cRt groupings,
l'uch base,1 on of machines 01' tech
This administrative or technical
,'rganizatlon, 1'11<'n, ff})' the most effective
c'l11ploynll'nt of thi" in one 0)' more
area", all tIll' l'lcments operating
ng'aillt-it g'iVUH ohjeetiv(' in eaeh area rnust
he !>roue;ht undcl' u ,ingle eommandel', This
i" orgunizati,)t1 for a common mi>;sion, 01' task,
Only through the l'xbll'nl'c of a l'otlltllon aim
"'HI lllutual cooperation uIHll'\, a single direct
i}lg' lu . .'nd cun. the gTcatc:-;t effectiveness be
"htained from thc \,U!'ious eomponents of a
large and c0111plex ul'g'anization.
Lt,t us turn OUl' attl'ntion now briefly to
till' intel'nal organization of the ail' forces of
the Army and the t>\uvy. Suffice it to hcre
that lluval ail' and al'e very
,'lo,,,ly illtt'!'\\'OVt'n within tilt' fabric of naval
cd'l.!,anizutioll and l'OIl1111:.tnd. The 1110lnentous
of OUI' naval ('01'('", in the \VL':;tern'
!'aeil;,' in I'('('"nt month" al't' proof of the
of ,;u('h organization, In the
:\avy, airnart have hl'en kept as an integral
pal t of the tll'ets atul until thi, war were
l""d pl'ineipally in ,UppoI't of ,UI fucl' opcra
tiDI", !lO\\'<'\'L'I', naval task built
:ll'onnd tilt' "l1lplnYlllent of aireraft eal'riers,
have incn'a:-.ed g'l'uutly in !-tize and importance
t" compared with task fOI:C('S of other kinds,
In the Army, 011 the othL'l' hand, full scope
for th,' op,'ration>, of ail' fOl'ces would be
jlllpo,,,il>lc' \\'l'l'(' thl'y tied to the ground armies
or gl'Ound task fOj'ces in t'aeh theater, The
of tllt'atL'r air forees include both
til(' "trnt<'gil' operatiuns far beyond the imme
diate operations of ground forces and the
taelical ail' openltion,; dpsigl1l"\ to help the
armies within theil' hattie areas, Hence we
tin,l the bulk of the Army air units organizer!
into two major types of ail' comnH\l1d: stra
tegic and tactical ail' fOl'ces, A nd as long as
the nil' foree is capable of serious
offen,ive bomhing, an ail' defenst' command
c01l1prbing day and nig'ht interccpter fighters
is l'('fjuil'ed ill each theate!'. Two additional
major COlllllHll1ds, whel1 the war
rants, are the troop carrier units fo1' airbol'ne
operutions and coastul 01' antisubmarine
for safeg'ual'ding coasts and shipping.
8
MILITARY REVIEW
The structure of internal organization of, air
forces const.anth' changing to I1W('t til!'
nc\v sit.uations that 111011crn \\Ul'faI'll inc..
Thl' final topic in the Inoa.\ sul',it'd of ail'
powel' jg that of the Ill'illciph's and malllll'r
of it;; "lllploYlIll'nt. It was parlll'I'
that tlw allotnll'llt of nul jonal "HII'l'PS alll"lll!;
land, spa, and ail' fOI'cl" j, a matter of
national policy, So, too, i, the' applkatioll or
the principles of, \\'HI' to the lll'lllll.'l' or
l'lllploying ou)' national a\'lall<lll, (htly 11ll'
nation as a whole, aeting' th1'01H;1I natiollal
legblation suppol'l.,.1 by apPl'opl'iatiollS, "an
decide the objectives of 0111' national ail' PO\\ l'I',
Shall it be usp,1 to CO<'!'t'l' and dl"troy thl'
\veaI,el' (;t'l'lnany tiMid Ilt'I':';'! Or
,hall it hl' uscd only for til<' d"fl'nsp ,of ottl'
national IpI'l'itol'Y and til'l! of Olll' in
this hl'lllbphel'l'? Shall \\'(' build OUI' llll' Corl'l'
enol1gh to 111t'l'l our t'tll'lllil':-- at allY
time'-lll' \\'" l'i,k ddl'at by havine:' too
expan,l a tol(en pl'aedinll' ail'
a hundt'{,dl'o!,1 aftvl' t Ill' ha,
a "rippling' blow'? Shall \\'C' L,' PI'l'P"I''''.! \0
lead with OUl' Ii,( or only wilh Olll' t'lllll'! TIll'
policy b l'xppn,iv(', hut the !allvl' lIlay
be fatal. Shall we "Pnt'l'ntrall' our lilllitl,d ail'
strength ill thl' t'nit ..d Stal,", or
it thl'oug'hout (h .. w(ld'! If Wl' adopt till'
latter Wf' (H.'quil'! ill :-;tnl
tegic un'as, Shall w(> 1'1 ,)vid" fol' lItl>'
foret"'! TIll'1I We' lllU"t maintaill adl''lUa!l'
S(ll'vicc fn]'(.. HncI a ;-;t ronCo ::\Ien'hant :\I a l'inp.
Shall \\'C' give Ilel'd to '" we did
\vhen \v.p huilt ou!" ail'craft fal'tol'ie:-
in the interior of til!' country, 01' \\'('
court hy loeating vital illdu>'t
near the where elilllatic conditions and
the lahol' marl(et are mOl'!, plea,ant? Shall we
simplify our structure and fa
cilitate cooperation hy givIng It'gi,lativl'
J'ecognition to our ail' forces as coordinatl'
with 01;1' lund ancl sea all tt!1,lPl'
a single head, or shall w(' continue to
divide the direction of our ail' power l)(>(\\'e(' II ,
the Army ancl the whose ha"ic l'oillhat
functions arc divided hy the coastline mth'!!'
than being determined by the single purpose
of defeating a common enemy? These are
questions of national policy which may weI!
II" pund('n,d by of our g'l'l'at de,
l11ot'raeV.
Thb' war, the fir,.,t conflict in 'which
"il' Jltl\\l'l' ha, heen " major factor, ha,
\\'l'iclll'd l"t:lhlishcd 11l'inciple8 of tactics,
'll'atl'!.!,, und ol'g'unizatioii and found them
suUII,l, ncpl'alcu 01' successful
"ii' q"'I'ations have abo pI'oduced what ap
i,l"'" to he principles applicahle particularly
10 ail' ",a!'fare, Time and fUl'thC'r test will
l,,,t,lloli,h thc validity of these new principles,
It would l!;1 ,implify the wOl'k of making
military del'isiol1' if we jlossessed fixed 1'ules
1'01' tit" ""lcct iOIl of ail' fot'ce ohjectives and
lal'l!;l't>, !lut in the IOIlg' run such simpJ..
PI',"'(',lut'l' woul,1 ollly play into the hands of
an al"r! pnl'lllY, Each prohlem must be solved
"II it, oWIl fadm's, It i, Olll' thing to stud,'
alld kIIOl\\' tit" pl'inl'iplt,s (If OUI' pl'of('ssiolb
,,1101 a 11I"l'l' dil1il'ul! ta,k lo apply tlll'lll with,
Wi"d(ll11.
.\il' PO\\('.'l' pl'uviclPH a longel' ann for stl'H.
ill", lI11lital'Y hlows than has l'Vcr existed ill
I h,' 1""1. It' hrillg' within rang'e e!1L'my objec.
of a kitHI nl'VCI' \wfol'e attainable, It
.,0 iOllgl'1' necessary to destroy 01' defeat hos
t dl' 'tll'fal'l' forcl's heforE' stl'iking directly at
the 11<'''I,t 01' jugtllal' vein of thl' enemy, Thb
fad, in ttllll, higher headquarters
1"I aill di I'l'I'[ eont 1'01 of IOllg-range ail' forces,
It for this l'l'a,on that not only the specific
ol"'l'ltl iOll' of small ail' fOl'cl's are sometimes
I)ll"(" ih .. d by th,'atl'l' eOml1HlIHlel'S but that
tIll' I'lallnine; of operations and the supervision
and ('"ntl'ol of tIl(' TWl'lltieth Ail' FOl'ce are
l,,'pl in till' hands of our Joint Chiefs of Staff
in \\';),hillglol1, An,1 the, destruction, for
instanl'l', of production of petroleum p)'oducts
in (;l'I'nl<lny, being' a matter which affected at
ib roots the ahility of our Nazi enemy to con
duct all a'pt'rls of his war against us, led i
('V('J1 the hig'hest Allied authorities themselvcs I
to plans for the strategic employment
of AlIil'<l Air Forces in Europe.
The hi"tol'Y of air power is Its
future is ohscure, But Kipling spoke with
the voice of prophesy when he said of air
POW('I', "We arc at thc opening verse of the
opening pagl' of the chapter of endless pos
sibilities,"
Strategical Aspects of the Final Campaigns
Against Germany
COLONEL CONRAD II. LANZA
O
N 1 March 10-15. three major offensives
)I'cn' undcr way ug-ainst Germany. one
('!!eh on thc w(,,,tel'n. southern. ano' eastern
The Wl'stel'll Allie,; conducted the
tit:st two. under the dircetion of the Chief,;
of lloard in Washinc:ton, Hussia con
dueted the third. There was linisoll between
tht' westcl'l\ Allie" and Ru"sin hut there \Va>;
till joint ('OmmalHl. They \\'ol'Jwd
and with somewhat difl'crent strateg'ic points
uf vicw.
The pl'ineipal mi%ion of the wes(CI'II Al
lies was (0 crush Gcrmany, '1'I11il' main fOl'ce
\\as Ill! the w!"tel'n front. As lwar as can
he fron) iit!lIl'c;': far },plen:->cd,
the ,\llil's had, includine: Frcnch (roops.
million::> tlf nll'II, an
,'Jlcmy who h, ..! about two lllilli"Il', Oil (h"
,outhl'l'll front. about :l50,OOO (icl'lllans fa{'ed
at lea,t half a lllillinll Alli""
Ditl'C}('Jlt'llS ill llulllhers dll nllt .... l1tlil'iently
indicate the real difi'ercnce in stl'"ndhf;, In
thc ail', thc Alli(', ha,l ull(li,!,utcll oupcrioritr,
Thcil' plam', could g'" Hnywl1<'re at tilllC,
superio}' was the air fOl'l'e 0\'('1 that of
the cn('my that \lUI' troops could march and
mllneU\'Cr b;.' day, while tlll' Germans WPI e
oblig'l'd til l'l'strict all mO\'pml'nts in the O)lpn,
The Allied \\'ere SllpCl'bly cquippcd
and had abulldHnt mlltol' tl'anspol'tntion, The
Gel'lllanS had motor tran"lllll'tati011, hut most
of it was 1l01l-0}lPI ating, This had l)('en
gnHlually brought about by constnnl ail'
bombing of German plants and utilities, Gel'
had built a c(,l'tain numbcr of under,
g'l'ouno manufactul'in,e: establishmento, Thpi ..
had been based ilpon expede,1 losse's
from night bombing' by the British Royal
Ail' Forcc, Nil allowance had b('en made fOI'
day bombing' which came later f!'Om the
Americall Eiy:hth all, I Fifteenth Ail' FOl:ces,
This was mOl c accurate, and \ more
destructive, than night bombing, Under these
air assaults, German production declined,
and by March it was at a low lev!'1.
Dne to luek of motor transportation, Ger
man nnits hm! but limited manenvering
capacity, Some units appeal" to have
almost none, The Germans wcre prepared
to dcfen,1 positions, On all three fronts" as
soon as their front line was either pierced
, 01' broken, German resistance rapidly van
ished, In no did the Germans have
troops in reservc who had transportation
to ell able them to concentrate against
}lPlleti a tiOl1:4.
In this situation. each of the three fronts
when brokcn through rapidly fell apart, It
was impractienble to establish a new front
in rear, as troops coult! not, on foot or with
animal-drllwn tl'anspol'tation, faJl back as
quickly as hostile forces with motor trans
pOItatinl! ,'ould advance deepct' into German
real' a1'<'as, 1\[ either was it found possible
to hold cities and other likely places as
centers of rcsistallcc or roa,1 blocks, except
in is,llated casc's, And ill lIone of' the isolated
cases whel e German troops Wl're able to hold
did this han' any material effect 'In the
final ,rcoltlt. Motor transportation was al
ways able to avoid particular areas by
dP!ourin!(' aroun(1 them, with only minor
in('onv('ni(,llcc,
On th(' Russian front. the Gerlllan strength
apl)('a1'S to have approache!1 two millions,
The Russian strength is unknown, It was
superiol' and, like the west
ern Allies, had supel'iol' equipment,
On both the westel'll and the eastern
front.", Allied and Russian maneuvering was
facilitated by magnificent I'oads, and in the
northel'l1 half of the f!'Onts, by g-enerally
open and flat tel'l'Uin over which motor
tl'Unsportation ("luld opel'ate. German efforts
to delay advances of thc Allies by destroying
bridgcs had little 8ll{'ceSf;, The increasingly
Iarg-e nut;lbcl' of amphibious vehicles in the
military services make them much less de
pcndent upon bridges than in preceding
wars, Even wide rivers have not been
scrious obstacles,
10
lIIII.ITARY REVIEW
THE PRELDIINARY OPERATIONS ny- THE
\VESTER" A LUES
Dudng- the fil'st half of :\Iareh, opemtions
were on a limited scale, direct,'d
ousting- the German forces west of the Rhine
River, While the made nHmtcr
from time ttl tillie, rontilllled
to fall back sJowly and undeI'look no In l'!.!'('
scale ('ounteI'Ofl'l'nsi\'(':<, Frolll the AII ied
point of view, d(,l'P pcn<'tl'atiOlh \\'('1'(' not
}ll'ilcticabl(' ill viC'w of thl' ((,l'l'aill, whkh
was blocked by widp rivel" "nly a shol't
(listance in rpal' of the (;el'llI:tn fr,m!.
III this fighting' the (;Pl'IIJan< did
well, and \\'Pl'e able to \i'ithdl'aw the g'1'!'ntcl'
part of their troop" to 111 leal'"of (11<' Hhin,'
without ulldel'l!,'uillt!,' t'Xll'!-- .... Itl:-. .... <., ..... There
'vas (InC' (\vt.-'nt U}H",Pt'l'tl'd htlth .... Oil
7 :'.Ial'ch thp Allies t'apillred,:a hdd!.!'l' inlal'l
tht' Rhitw lll'HI' JtC'll1Ht!:t.-'ll. toeal <.'11I11
l1Hlnd(,.'r:-... aPPlt'l'iatillt!, thl' impUI'LIIll"(' Ill' thi:-
llVl'nt, da!->hed and a III l'a...;t
of (he Rhine wa, eotabll"he.I, If thl' C"IIlJaIl,
had had good llIotor tran'pIII'tali'"I, 1"(,,('1 \'e'
might have b(,l'n hl'oll!.!ht lip til I'l'''('"(' tlwil
But thl')? had Ill) lllllhih v" ....
immediatl'ly availabk, \\,<'1 e lInllh!P to
conecntl'nte as mpi<lly '''' th,' Allie:, and
were ullahll' (0 pn'\'"nt thl' hridQ'l'hcad 1'1'0111
being' daily ,'xpan<!l',L
By 1:; :\Ial'l'h th(' ,\ II i<" "Ollliollp<l th"
entil'e west bank of thp Rhitw and wel(' ready
fOl' till' tinul attllck,
TIlE SITUATI(I" TilE EASTER" FRO"T (I"
DVRI",; :\IARCII
.Just as the Allit's on thl' \\es( ,,10",'<1 Oil
the Rhine Rivel', thp Ru,sian annie, elm,pd
on the line of the OdeI' and !\"('bse IlivC!'"
between the Baltic Sea and o,he l\I,llllltains
of Bohl'mia, This \\'a" 11 VPI'Y g'one! line for
an offensive to\\'a I'ds the wpst. But
the westem Allie, were rendy to attack
across the Rhine ll1id-:\Iarl'h, tIl(' Rm,,,ians
were Jlot rc;ady,
South of (he honlel' betweell GerlllallY alld
Bohemia, the Germans had heen ahle to hold
a Russian offensive headed southwest fl'Om
upper Silesia and westward throug'h Slo
vakia, They themselves und"ertook what be
came their final offensive of the war, This
was south and west of the Danube in wcstern
Hung-a!'y, and employed a panzer arl11Y with
eleven al'l11ore(1 divisions, It had initial
sucee"" but failed to reach Budapest," It (lid
draw off Russian from other sectors,
Whether this wafi a matedal reason why thl'
Russians did not attack across the Odel' at
the snme tillle that the western Allies at
tacked acro,:s the Rhine is not yet knowno
(lPERATlO:-;S OF THE \rESTER" ALLIES
FRO,l Hi MARCil TO Hi APRlL
Th() initial operation was the <.:'l'ossing: of
the nOI th from Cologne on :2:) c\1arch,
!lue to the kllown supel'iol' powel' of th,'
Allied artillery and ail' forces, the Germans
(,]P"t('d lIot to defend the riveI' bank, but
IIHld,' (heir til',t stand ,,'vernl miles inland,
An Allit'd inllovation was the u,:e of naval
l'ontin.!..!:ent.;o; to operate lllotnl' lauJ1ehe:-: :1<.'IU:-=: ....
the riVl'1'. Al11jlhibioll>, vehicles ('!'Os,:e(1 by
thl'il 0\\ n POWl'I, and the wh"le operation
aided b) dll>ppin(!" pal'aehut
p
tl'!ll>pS ill
I"par of I h" enemy, By these cOlllhillPd meall'.
hl"id!!:ehends were quickly s('cul'ed, hut thel'('o
a ftel" it took several days to hl'cak thl'OlIl!:h
the Inain Cel'lllHn litlc of 1'l
l
Sisianee. It \\a ....
I'ot ulltil 1 April that (he line waB dl'finitely
pit'l'ep" and Hl'nlOl' had thl'otH.!.'h tn
lIol,th and then east of the Ruhl'.
In the meantime, the Remag'pn hridg'ehead
had heen undel going' daily ('nlar."(,III('nt. At
the end of :\I:1I'<:h, a I'IlW I' there brnke thl'ol!gh
and Oil 1 April linked with that c()lIlin!!
around from th(' north side of the Ruhr b:,
advancing' al!lund the south ,ide, On 2!I
:'Ilarch the AIli"d right attacked at'I''''' tIll'
Rhine neal' the area, anci
it al"" broke through,
By:! April the Allies were 1I0t only aerO"
the Rhine in -trength but al'l1lOl'ed c1i\'isions
in north, center, and south were throug'h
the German fl'ont, and were "not only lthead
of their own troops but in n'ar of the main
Gerlnan
So faJ' as now reported, the Allies had
l!bout twenty arlllored divisions in line abreast
nvel' a 300-mile front. They were neadr
('venly distl'ibuted on a basis of one armored
100 50 0
It , ! ! I , J I , I
0:::
100 50 0
'",.' .. ,,'
r'
.,-/.
)
- ( POLAND
MAGDEBURG TREUENBRlmEN
JUTERBOG .. '" '
DESSAU 1; '\
-' "-",""\
K()NIGSBRUCK 'If. 0",-'.
MANNHEIM
:(1: '!" l...-....
/j,V 'l
o 0'1-\,>0'" <">(.,....'. C.
"'" :" ","; .... \ )
: '::': .PRAGUE ;:" :(
: ....: :;.... !..
'\
,.
_MUNICH
.. BERCHTESGADEN \
.. J>.. \)S\\\!
,; SWITZERLAND':J-.. .. HUNGARY
/\ .f\....,j :-..\-..'-" '".,
(-' ''-''' i i \.. \.. r/, \. ..
' \. v.
" 6'0
: ,,<p(
"I .
12
MII.I'TARY
division to ea('h fift('('n mil's "l' f,'ol1t. The;;
cirded arounu defentle,] ,'enters and
and sep1irated Slll\\'-llJoving-, or nOll-llloving,
German un{tb. Th('s(' \\'e,'e tak('n
care of followinl/: infantry divisions, ea<:h
of which was equipped with ('onsiderable
motor tra'Ilsportation and could make sub
stantial daily nUI,'ehes, III some eases it was
considered advil'able to "uppkment the ill
fantry with tank units t,) reduce defended
cities more The GCl'llllln front Ul1d{'l'
these blows just disinteJ:!'l'ated. Tlwil' l'u}'pliC's
were cut off. They wen' bomhed Illereil('s,l:;.
They were seplll"ated from l'ach <lthel'. They
were unable to maneuve,. No matter what
position they elected to defcnd, the' Allic",
could concC'1l [,'at<' a su perio1' f"1'l'e in k,s
time than the German,. "ot olle position
was able to holtl for Ion!!;, althoulKh many
were b,'avely ,1('[cIl<led,
"'ith not too much fi)!htinc;, AlliC'd al'1ll0"
,eachI'd the hank:; "f the Elbe by 11
April in the vicinity of l\Ingdehul'g'. Thb
wa:; an advance-in an air line- of :200 mihl'
in twenty days, or ten miles a <lay
the breakthroug'h pel'i,)(!. Exclu<lin)! the h"cak
thl'ou/2:h period, in the last eight days 15(1
miles had bcen made, or neady t \\ enty lllilL-,
a day, l\JaXill1Ulll advance on anyone day
was fifty miles.
The we"tel'll Allies h;H] PI'l'ViOllsly aC"Pl'.!
with Russia at the Yalta conferencc not to
go beyond the Elbe in the l\lag'(]ebul'/2: arCH.
Consequentl?, althou)!h therf' was compara
tively little opposition, the advance was
halted in that sector, The Allied flanks to
north and south were yet in l'('ar of the
agreed-upon between the we,tel'll
Allies and Rus"ia. crarlually a,lvHnced
eastwards, but at the same time they /2::l\'e
more attention to explotine; theil' gains with
a view to thost' portions of Ger
many which by the Yalta agreement Wl', {'
to be permanently occupied by British and
Americans. The "n the l1ortlll'l'll flank
turned towards the sea and the approllche"
to Denmark; the Americans un<l French on
the right turned to an advance into Bavaria.
The German armies on the west were split
by the wedge driven to the Elbe, Still having
fiE\, lEW
defl'nsive PO\\'''!', tIl(> German fore",
l'l'sislt'<i, hllt their ultimate destl'ul'tion \Va,
('P!'lain,
TilE lIAIX !{CSSI.\X On'E:-;SIVE
The main ofl"'n"ive launchc'<!
01\ ,j{; /'lll'il am! was dil'ected towards Be,
lin, only >on)e forty miles away from the
line of dl'JHll'itlle the OdeI' River, .\
dirl'l't attack wa" made along the shorte"t
lilll' of apprnaeh; it also sought to envelop
B,'din f,'nm the north, A second, but not
",,'<>ndary, attack \\as launched from th..
Xeb,e Hivl'l', hnvin).'." two pmngs. The north
4..'1 n oJle. l nnlflo:--fld of large arnl0red force:-..
hl'aded 1'",' a breaktlll oug-h, amI then to Hn
attaek on Bl'llin fl'olll the south, The south
ern eolullln hC'a,led towards Dresden,
with the to head otl' German force,
in that al'C'a fron, the rear of their
nfll'tlwl'n column, l'nlike the offensive of the
\\l',tel'll Alli ..s, th,' ]{ll"sian fl'ont was nut
1. Plll iflllOLl'" lint il l:lh't' \\ 11l'11 junctions \VCl'e
('11'(,,'ted. ] 1<><",>, the Russian,
hroke thrullL!;h.
Berlin wa> ,'cneh..d on the 2:2d, and a
liel'l'l' attack was "tar[('<1 illlmediately, Thi,;
dC'\'(lopld illte) a ,ava!.!C' ,treet and
battlc whil'h l'olltinued day and nig-ht until
the fin:l1 battle on :lray when 1:l5,000 re
111Ulllill!.!.' C(,l'lnan:-- :--,ul'lendcl'ed. ThiR See11}"':
like a 1>11 IKe f"I','e to defend one city, but
had no t,
TilE IlISSOLUTlO:-;
CCllll<ln General Headqtl:ll'ters was at Ber
lin. It oJlCl"ate<l in a deep ,lug-out under the
Chancl'll('ry. On 21 April, when the Russian,;
\\ cre at 11w J:!'nte, of lkrlin, fell neal'
the At the daily General Statf
Hweting. therp \\(1 ..... a dive}'gT'nCe of opinion
ttl what to do. Hitler was present, but
\\'n, in a hOjl"les:; condition, and had nothing
tIl SIU!"""t. XOI' woul,l he approve of any plan.
On April, what ,,('ems to have heen the
Jinal lll('eting took place fr0111 3 :00 PM to
N:OO PJE. Hitler was more hopeless, He
li"tl'nC'd to reports and advice and
then announced that the others could do
as they pleased. For himself, he was satisfied
that Berlin would fall within two to seven
STHATgmCAl. Al:WgCTS Of' THI; FINAl. CAMPAIGNS MlAINST GERMANY , 13
d,'Y8; he would and fall with it. The
General Staff thereupon disbanded and went
ofl'
Himmlel' went to Flensllm'g', whel'c by 24
April he had established liaison with Sweden
and had propose,1 surrender to the western
Allies. Gocring' went south to Berchtcsg'a<ien
to orll:anize thcre a eenter of resistance, but
failed to accomplish this. General Jodi joined
tr(lOps outside, a8 the roa,1 to the west was
y<'t open, and made a "e!'ious eflort to relieve
;,Bp}lin. A new Twelfth Army was ol'p:anized
of troopS opposite the American Ninth and
First Armies between Tangcl'munde and
ll('SHII Jodl ha,1 correctly guessed that the
AIlIerican8 would not C}'O:;S the Elbe an,1
'attack hi:; rcaI'. The Twelfth Ar".1Y was
ordered to advullce to the line Potsdam
.fiiteruog.
Between the t\\'o Russian attacks ft'om th('
l'a,l and south of Berlin was a large lake
at ea southeast from Berlin not occupied
the Russians, The German Ninth Army was
ordered to' concentrate aU available troops
III that sector and th('n advance west to
join the Twelfth Army. A third German
arlUY tuken partly from the fronts of the
and Third U.S. Anuie:; in Saxony
was ordered to attack northwards from the
line Dresden-Gorlitz. To enable Berlin to
htlld, reinforcements were sent in, partly
dropped by air.
The southern attack met the Hussian force
specially detailed to watch for a counter
offensive in this direction. The Germans
succeeded in reaching the line Konigsbruck
Kamenz, but hatl insufficient force to go
farther, The Twelfth Army in its attack
the line Potsdam (exclusive) -Treu
pnbl'ietzen, and established a preca rious con
nection with the Berlin garrison. It was
, attacked by the Russians on both flanks. but
on the whole maintained its initial gains.
The Ninth Army completed its aS8embly and
then started west. Its preliminary move
ments had been noted by the Russians, who
thereupon attacked it from all sides. In spite
of this, in a hedgehog formation and prac
tically without motor transportation, it did
west and, not without severe losses,
joined the Twelfth Army by 2 May.
By this date, the western Allies had re
fused to deal with Himmler, but they had
ag'reed to accept surrender of German forces
by separate armies, Thereupon the Ninth
and Twelfth Armies reversed their fronts
and marched back to the Elbe, where on
:3 and 4 May they :mrrendcred to Americans.
The garrison of Berlin, without transpor
tation and practically surrounded, could not
break out, and surrendered on the 2d.
German troops in and south of Saxony
and those facing the Russians in Silesia,
Moravia, and received ol'dcrs to break
contact with the Russian armies and march
west and surrender to the western Allies.
This movement commenced on either 2 or
;J May. The Russians do not appeal' to have
noticed it until 5 May, when they started
a pursuit. The maximum distance for the
Germans to go was 200 miles. The Germans
completed this movement on 11 May, their
real: guards fighting until this day. How
large a llumber of Germans reached British
and American lines is, at date of writing,
a secret,
In the meantime, German forces in all of
north Germany reported their willingness
to surrender to the western Allies on 3 May,
and signed a surrender act effective as of
8:00 AM, 5 May. By what appears to have
been a secret advance agreement, German
General Headquarters issued in:;tructions,
and broadcast them, to allow Allied (British)
troops tf) enter Denmark and Norway with
out delay. First British troops arrived at
Copenhagen by air on 5 May,
A German general Act of Surrender was
negotiated at Reims a!'ld signed at 2 :41 All-f,
7 May. This provided for the surrender of
all German forces to the western Allies and
Russia effective as of 11 :01 PIll, 8 May,
This surrender was broadcast by Germany,
but was held secret by the Allies. pending
a ratification meeting apparently demanded
by Russia. This was signed about midnight,
8-9 May, near Berlin, at the local Russian
command post. It has not been made public
at date of writing.
14
MILITARY REVIEW
German forces-two armies-in Aus;triu
sUl'rendered to American forces on 5 ::'IIay,
OPERATIONS ON 'rIlE SOVl'I[ FnON'l'
On 1 March the Allies hel,I a line across
the neck of the Italian JWllinsula. There were
no important operations until 9 April when
the Allies commenced an otl'en8ive on the east
flank. On 16 April the attack was ma,le gen
eral along the entire front. It had
strong ail' support. By April the Allied
right entl!red Ferrara, >\lui the C;crmlln line
became untenable, On that day the Gl'rllHlI1
commander decided to SUl'l'IHll'r and Sl,nt
word to lIIm;solini to meet him to disc\lSS how
to go about it. The Gernllll1 was late at tIll'
prescribl'li nwC'tillg point in ;,\lilull, On the
way there from his headquartl'ro at Como, Ill'
had bl'en delaYl'd hy a l'OU<i block op('rated by
Partisans. lIIussolini, fearing treachery,
thereupon fled, and also ran into tilt' Partisans
and was murdl,rcd,
When the German <iid'arrive at l\iilan, :'tlus
solini had gonl', Conseqlll'ntly he got
into touch with the Allies carly on April.
An Act of Surr('n,h'r was sigm>d at
20 April, effective at 12 :00 noon, 2 May. It
cannot now be established that this German
was the result of the final Berlin
conference on 22 April. But the dates and
methods employed indicate that it was. The
<il,lay of three days between signing and th"
date fixed for surn,ndel', during which the
sllITen<if>l' was kept Bccrct, enabled the Allied
t l'OOpS to n,ach the northeast boundary of
I taly, with on(' exccption, before troops of
and its Yugoslav ally did. The excep
tion was Tri('ste, where the eastern and west
"I'n Allies aHl'ived at the same time,
So l'n!lcd the war with Germany, A critical
examinatIOn of ,n'cl>nt campaigns is not yet
jloHsiblP. Esscptial information fOI' an'
'll1Uot wait until it is known just
\\'hat forces aIHl otrl'ngths Were involved, what
their o]'(I,'rs werc, all' I their casualties. Most
of this is still sccret.
But to the officers amI mcn who fought and
!Ii"d for OI1l' of thc greatest victories which
the \\'(ll'Id has <,vel' there is due honor,
and the g'l'atitudc and appl'l'eiation of th"
(ntire nation,
Britain's J.\Jaquis
From a British Bource.
IT has lll'cn oflicially rCVl'uled that in 1040
an underground mov,'lllent \\'a,; organizl>,1 in
Britain in preparation fot, a Gcrman invasion
of England.
According to unofficial report>, the mov('
ment was so .secretly organized that even
today many mcmbers do not know the names
of others. It was not founded on any continen
tal example, since it was established before
France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and
Norway organized their undergrounds. The
members had radio transmitters and receiv
ers, messengers and code clerkR, and were
organized and supervized by :\00 specially
picked officers of the British Army Special
Dutil" Branch. ::'I!L,mlll'rs were all eivilians
doing ordinary jobs.
Radios hidden in thc countryside in small
l'oncrl'te hideoub werc so well camouflaged
that many people have walked over them
without suspecting that anything was there.
It wa, no amatl'ur f01'ce, but highly skilled,
minutely trained, and kept in training by an
army of intplligencp officers, so that if the
Germans had invaded England a merciless
underground warfare could have been car
ried out against them.
The names of members remain on the files
HUll marked "top secret," and will remain
unknown lest the occasion should ever arise
again for them to be ordered underground.
Repeat Your Intelligence Training
LmUTE:->ANT COLO:->EL JAMES F. MILLER, Gel1c'}"(ti Staff COI'))S
Instructor, Command and Gon.ral, Staff School
"WHAT was your division doing when
you left thllt uetivc thl'nter?" a re
tUl"llin,g G-2 was nsked.
"\Ve \vere training 011 fundalnentuls
t
" l'tune
thl' prompt response.
"Training! But you'll bel'n in ('ombat for
}llIllIth...::.'"
"True, y<'t at every during
, ea('h lull, in faet evcry time we had a ('han('(',
we renewed nUl' training."
"But what can you teach battle-wi""
troops'!"
.. FundanH'ntalg."
('n,dit for angw{'}'s canllot he giv"1J
fai lly to anyone ofllcl'r, [01: the <lllSWl'r has
],"en the same so often. Tntining' is continuou,.
Ever-changing personnel, ,!Ut' to ]1romo
tiong, tl'ansf(ll':;, l'eplael111011tS. cU:-iualtil's,
what not. leavl's G-2 with tlw ""tatl' of intel
lig'cnce trainin/!:" an unknown quantity. The
of fil'e dL\'llop5 wl'aknc:-.:-.es. Chang{'$ in
l'nl'my llwtho,ls and changes in telTain call
for new application of old principll's. .Just as
a championship football t,'am rPlul'ns on
to "skull practic(''' and drill on
fundamentals, so G-2 must rf.'itl'rate basic
intelligE'llcl' principks, eOlTed had practices,
and correet wl'akness.
No unit, it is Bafe to ever left this
country without training and experience in
Fil1lple ll10ssage writing. Those expcrienc'cd in
combat insist, however, that faultily written
rl'pol'is and poorly wl'itten messages nrc a
most general weaknesR. drill (under
combat 01' closely simulated combat condi
tions) in this fundamental is the c{He. Once
pl'oficienc:. is obtained, continuing practice
alone will maintain it.
The estahlishment and operation of ohser
vation posts is a subject iterated and reiter
ated in training. Few units going to the
Southwest Pacific, however, have moved into
the tight without first needing (and getting')
intensive review and practice in this simple
yet important art.
One could go on enumerating the need for
at each opportunity, of every .of
intl'lligence instruction. Some G-2's have felt,
privately,"that this was due to a wealmtss in
the baRic instruction they have given, They
forget that contitant repetition is e8S ntial
fOl' succeRsful teaching. Instead of goin back
over familiar ground, correcting erro eous
impl'essionR and clinchillg the lessons pre
taught, the issue was dodged.
Fortunately, how,'ver, many intelligence
otlicers, throug'h foresight or circumstance,
realiz,' this need for repeating, refreshing,
and reiterating instruction in training. Now
the ohject of all training in time of war is
,UCCeSH ill hattll'-victor)l. Success results
flom ('ach unit and each man doing his small
t but illlpo}'tant) part in a complete and most
proticient manner. Failure by some small part
of till' machine must be prevented.
Recently returned from active combat, an
officer descrihed many an ohservation post at
night as looking like a "crowded, dimly-lit
night club," hecauRe of the many groups con
grl'gated arounrl peering at maps by flash
light. Failur(' to observe blackout discipline
ancl rigid OP ,Ii"ciplin(' could well have caused
the lOBS of such an observation post as just
"e'crihed. Often, want of information which
a good OP could furnish can in turn cause
fuulty decisions to be marie. Repetition of
truining' in rigid OP discipline alone may
not hring victory, hut its failure could con
t rihut(' to enemy SUccess.
G-2's intelligence instruction naturally falls
into two general classes: (1) training of
Military Intelligence personnel, and (2)
t raining of all personnel in intelligence sub
jects. The fOl'lner mUBt be more detailed, of
cOlll'se. TimE' for training each group is al
ways limited. The wi-se G-2, however, is
pl'epared and ready to supplement and refresh
the training of Pither group constantly. To be
ready, he has plans, schedules, and tools at
hand to tak,' advantage of every opportunity.
Experience in,licates that few extended
periods for uninterrupted schools are ,avail
ab.Je to a combat unit. Scattered periods for
16
MILITARY REVIEW
l'efreshing all or part of the intelligence
personnel do occur, If time must be taken
the!! to make preparations, the opportunity
will be wasted. If prior planning leaves G-2
"ready," these scattered periods will pay
dividends.
Intelligence training of different parts of
combat organizations can be had through con
current training (concurrent with other
training) if each unit commander is ready
(by <1-2 having made necesHary preparations
for him) to teach intelligence. G-2 should
give him the means, the reference, the sched
and the aids, and when opportunity
knocks, G-2 should help the- unit commaildel'
respond to her call.
Since fUlHhullentals are 'luite conRtant.
since rep('tition an,l praclicl' develop,; pro
ficiency, plans C(l1I lll' mad{' to inlel
ligence profieiency if G-2 has 1)lan8 l"l'ady for
which "stick to fundal11{'ntals."
Field manual references; notes on your
unit's ('xperience; short, intel'('sting exercis('s
t('sting and improving the senses (of
sedng, snwl!ing, am! feeling); plans for
conducting instruction; and simple aids to
teaching- will give G-2 II start toward h('ing
ready to "hl'ush up" int('llig<:nl"e IWrsol1l1l'1
"during a breathl'l''' on the following suhject":
Map Reading
At'rial Photo Rl'ading'
OLservation
Scouting
Creeping and Crawling
;\Iessage Writing
Countcrintelligenc(' matt('rs
Sketching
Time and Space Estimation
short schedules, com]1]('t(' and
ready to USl', broken down into many small
periods. which G-2 can prl'pal'e. wilI" permit
the> harrierl unit commander to take advantage
of ti)11e when all his troops are not busy and
improve their state of training. A list of
subjects with manual references, like the
following, prepared for a unit commander,
has helped materially wh('1'(, y-2 or his as
are ready to lend a hdnd.
To illustrate, here is a review list for combat
troops:
SECRECY DISCIPI.INE, FM 21-45:
Meaning. Par. 120 and 122,
Talking with strangers. Pal'. 121.
'What can be written home. Par. L
Troop movements. Par.
Censorship of letters. F:'\l 30-25,
Sec. IX.
Diaries and photography. Par. ,
Classified documents. Par. 127. (
Actions prior to going into combat. t
Par. 128. f
Action in case of capture. Par. 129. t
Par. 1:W. I Rights of prisoners of war.
Propaganda. Par. 131. I
CO:\IIlAT INTELLIGENCE, F:'\l 21-45: .1',
I
Estimation of troop strength.
Par. 45 (n) and (h).
Estimation of troop stl"l'ngth.
Par. 45 c and d (1) (a) to (e).
Estimation of trooJl strength.
Par. 45 d (1) (f).
Oml messag('s. Par, 4 .. (a) and
(],).!
:\!essages. Par. 46 (c).
\
PnrSO:\,ERS OF WAR, F:\I :1O-15:
Coercion. Par. 8.
S"gI'0g-ation. Par. fl (a) and (h).
Dispo;,itioll of effects.
Par. !) c.
:;
Proc('dure (front-lin" units),
Par. 9 <I (1), (2), and (:q.
of guards.
Pal'. !) d (4) and (5).
Enemy desel'tel. Pal', 14.
Emmy civilians. Pal'. 15, 23 h.
F:\! :10-2Fi:
Ohject and measures to takt'. Par. 1,'::.
Secrecy disciplinC'. Par...-7.
Concealment. Par. 8-1:!.
Each subject as thus broken down ,'!l11 he
covered in a ten-minute period. Those suh
jects where greater emphasis is desired may
be prolonged, of course.
Plenty of time is available if we take full
advantage of it. Deep, involved studies arc all
right in their place, but until fundamentals
become second nature. their reiteration will
bear greatest dividends. SO )'('[1N,1 YOW' intel.
ligencc training and the results will surprise
you,
Kuzume Makes the Team
COLONEL JACK W. Rl'OOLPH, Geneml Staff Corp8
A ME1UCANS would have called hIm
n Kuzume. But the Japanese.
who a cockeyed angle on a lot of things,
indudinf' their "divine" mission to rule the
world for the glory of Nippon and tilt' Gn-atel'
, EaHt Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, eallld him
I KUZlIllle Naoyukie. Since Naoyukie was a
, Jap and since what follows is told frolll the
t viewpoint of the SOilS 01- -heaven--':"'we'll <'all
I hun that too.
I l\.uzume Naoyukie, latc' Colond in the 11lI
i perlal Japanes" AI"nv, the 222,1
I
Infantry Regiment and the gar
rison of Diak Island when Biak
was an outpost of Nippon",
l'l'lllni>ling "lllph'" of conquest.
with ,;ollle 10,000
,;Iant-ey"d coml'adl's who lived
and died mist'rably on a wild
and hostil,' jungle ihiand they
I Illtht hav,' thoroughly hatl'd,
Kuzullll' b
today in Yasukuni a1' one of his
! count !'y's minor gods. HE.' made
r it the hard way.
, On the morning of 27 May
\ 1 assault tl',oops of the U.S.
I 41st Infantry Division stormed th" south
'beachl's of Kuzume's stronghold, Twenty
s(,Vl'n days later, huddll'd in a miserahle is
lund cave, Kuzullle Naoyukie accepted the
inevitable accordin/! to the code of the Samu
Irai. Cercmoniom,]y his
Icolors, he ordered the fanatIcal banZai charge
'that has heralded the end of so many Nip
hopes. and committed hara,kiri. He
was a long way from sunny, flower-perfumed
Japnn.
I Biak Island, lying athwart the entrance
to Geelvink Bay between the head and
fohoulders of lizard-like New Guinea (Figure
1), is a -triangular-shaped mass of coral and
limestone jutting out of the green sea. Like
its smaller sister island of Soepiori to the
, northwest, Blak is blanketed by a dense and
tang-led jungle wherein an average rainfall
of Il1O}'e than a hundred inches a year spawns
tlw ultimatt: in tropical wilderness.
The hypotenuse' of Biak's triangle faces
northeast (Figure 2). The northern third of
the }sland is a rugged mountain lnass, falling
awny to a centrnl tableland which stretches
(ll a series of relatively flat terraces toward
the south const. Here a border of narrow
!waeh friligcH a rampart of steep coral cliffs,
Luning the way to the terraces behind them.
Thelie cliffs are a series of coral ridges
parallel to the coast, rising precipitously be
tOO 0
FWl HE },
tween onE.' hundred and three hundred yards
from the shore. Captain George Andrew, who
landed \'1ith the first wave and subsequently
fought through the Biak operation, describes
them aR follows:
"lIIany a ridge crest is so sharp and narrow
that it is traversed only with difficulty. Rising
to an elevation of 250 to ;)00 feet above the
beaches, they form an impressive barrier be
tween the coast and the comparatively flat
inland terrain. This elevated coral reef is
evidently the result of several geological up
thrusts; for even in its most perpendicular
places it' consists of a series of terraces now
overgrown with thick rain! forests.
The cliffs and terrace$ are pocked with
caves and potholes, mamy of them large
enough to conceal a battEjry of mortars and
to give shelter to several l\undred men. Many
of these caves are entere4 from the terraces
18
MILITARY REVIEW
through small oPllnings. The potholes have The mission of the Biak garrison was to
been formed by similar caverns into which complete the airstrips and to secure the island
the roofs have collapsed. Their gides are often against an invasion that. after the fall of
pitted with smaller caves and which Hol!andia. appeared inevitable. Kuzume ac
may lead to larger caverns." conlingly formulated his defense plan, the
Midway of the southern coast line. hetween salient featUl'es of which were the of
the villages of l\Iokmer and Sorido, the ridge the vital landing fields and the repulse of
turns away from the beach, runs generally any amphibious attack "at the water's edge'''l
-. The l'<lstem end of the island.,
IpMt particularly the ail'strips, was tOi
____ ? 5 10Km be held at all costs, landing' at-,
templs to be I1Wt and crushed'
''''::0\ .-\ on t I1e I hes. A I I' 1 I' _, ..r leac all< mg e se
v where on the island was to be,
""'C.\ resisted until the arrival of rein
, KORIM-\=::o':::,:;, fOl'Ct'l11l'nts. If a landing in the
"'. , vital al'ea successful, it was
B A K " to he contained by periodic as
from prepare,\ positions. 1
AREA {N(LOSlO IN OOTH.D '.
'SSKOWHO.AI.ARGlR '., 1", All this was orthodox planning,
SCA,E '" '1'"U<' 3 ;;:<r ' ,- lluplementcd by careful dispo-I
I., 't' .1 ffild
,"\ II:J0 0< it J{ , /-: -" Hl lOllS allu constl'uctlOn 0 e,
Ci %] 0.; ; ./ . !
_ 0 ____ _ )0_ '
_ __ ___ _I. The 1st Battalion, 222d In,
____ ___ _ _,_ - - __ _____ __ fantry, was assigned a sector
FtnPRF. 2. east of a line running north,
north for about a mile, then west again before west through the village of Opiaref (Fig'ure
angling back to the coast (see Figure :3). In 2), with the naval unit, 450 strong, on its
the small, comparatively flat and brush- right between Opiaref and Bosnek. The mis
covered pocket thus tucked between the hills sion of these units was to repulse any land.
and sea lay the prizp for which Biak became ing on the eastern part of the island. I
a battlefiE'ld. Here, early in 1944, the Japa- The zone between Bosnek and SOl'ido
l
nese began construction of three airstrips- (Figure :3), which contained the vital landing'
those vital counters in the grim contest for "trips, was the responsibility of the 2d Bat-l
poss('ssion of New Guinea. These airfields. talion, backed by the 3d. The latter, less two
and nothing else, made the jungle-choked companies, constituted Kuzume's reserve and
rockpile called Biak a pearl of price in the assisted in the feverish work to rush the still i
struggle for the South Pacinc. unusable airdromes to completion. I
To rush completion of these fields, whose One reinforced company was ordered to,
importance increased greatly after the loss of construct a road between Mokmer and Korim I
Hollandia (Figure 1) in April, the Japanese Bay on the north coast, detaching a party tOl
garrisoned Biak with approximately 10,000 cover Korim and report any landing on thaq
men under Colonel Kuzume. Besides his own shore. The tanks were assembled in the Saba,
222d Regiment of 3,000 men, he commanded area (Figure 2), some ten miles east of the
a naval guards battalion, a tank detachment airfields, while the engineers began construc-I
(seven tanks), and miscellaneous engineer, tion of roads and fortifications. They were
ack-ack, and service units. About one third of also prepared to carry out demolitions
this force rated combat status, but in an (Kuzume called it "explosive warfare") when
emergency Kuzume could and did arm his called upon.
service elements and fight them as infantry. Automatic weapons and antiaircraft ele
19
KUZUME MAKES THE TEAM
j) ments were charged with the ack-ack defense
d of the ail' fields. Supplies were tQ be dispersed
~ in small dumps, and cave defenses along the
:. tliffs were to be stocked with ammunition,
food, and other necessities to last four months.
,f Kuzume ordered the construction of con
,f crete pillboxes along the coast at key points
"I but left the selection of sites .and the organiza-,
I, i tion of sectors to zone commanders, The
lattc>r were given wide latitude in organizing
and conducting the defense of their sectors,
On the logical assumption that any serious
I landing attempt would strike the southeast
j coast, the defenders constructed a haphazard
P: line of reinforced caves and pillboxes' among
narrow beach defile and block an approach
from Bosnek. Although the'main ridge was
not so precipitous nor so high at this point,
the confusing pattern of cross ridges and
depressions, together with a lack of trails,
made it an area which could only be traversed
with gl'eat difficulty under even the easiest
conditions.' .
This perimeter came to be known as the
Ibdi Pocket (Figure 3). Recognizing it as a
valuable blocking position, thEl Japanese con
tinued, even in the midst of battle, to build
lllore pillboxes and to repair those damaged in
the fight.
North of lI10kmer airstrip a large cavern
en 1 ~ 2 2 2
SUlVEYEOfOA DAOMEC:.f:';:=::2
OUTPOSTS
3. FIGURE
'j' the rocks above high water. Between Opiaref
and Saba the job was exceptionally well done.
) These caves. entered from defiladed ap
.) proaches in rear, were well camouflaged and
:1 fortified by concrete gun ports covering wide
) fields of fire across open water. They were
I backed by mortar positions guarding their
flanks and gaps between them. The wide. open
beach at Bosnek was defended by four large
steer and concrete pillboxes. at least one of
which mounted an al'lillel'Y piece,
The principal defensive works covered the
airdromes and were well designed to deny
, possession of the fields except after costly and
i direct assault. Main defenses consisted of
Ithree pockets in the ridg'es behind and to the
. east of Mokmer airstrip.
Between the coastal villages of lbdi and
Parai, among a series of tumbled. knife-like
cora1 ridges. a strong perimeter of mutually
supporting pillboxes was built to cover the
runs under the terrace overlooking the field.
The cave. about a hundred" yards long, has
two gallery entrances, leading. into the
chamber from the rear at a forty-five degree
angle. At its opposite end a large sump, once
part of the original vault, whose roof has
fallen in, opens into the cave. This pothole,
sixty to eighty feet deep and measuring one
hundred feet across its long axis, has sides
so precipitous that it can be entered only by
the use of scaling ladders.
The Japanese called this the West Cave and
made it the anchor for the final defense of the
airfield, Capable of housing a large force, it
was used as a billeting area and headquarters.
Around it was built a powerful series of pill
boxes and extensive log-and-coral emplace
ments along the ridge.
Midway between the lbdi Pocket and West
Cave another strongpoint was constructed on
the ridge dominating Mokmer village. The
MILITARY REVIEW
position, built around two large sumps and
connecting caverns, was known as the East
Caves. Here again the galleries were used as
living quarters and the sumps as emplace
ments for mortars and machine guns whose
fin' covered the road and beach approaches to
the airstrips.
As long as 'Vest Cave occupied, the
ail'ficl<ls were neutralized. With the Ihdi
Pocket g'ual'ding the eastward entrance to
the littl" valley and the East Cavps covering
the heach detlle, thest' perimeters constituteei
a po\\'t'rful ohstacle to possl'ssion of the
coveted strips.
Xo elL-fenses were prepared along the coast
road from Bosnek to :\Ioknll'r. This road, main
approach from the east. ran along the narrow
corridor between thp cliffs and the sea. At
one point the corridor narroweci to n bottle
Ill'ek only a few Yl\l'(ls wide. Xot until it had
actually been pem-trate,1 and latcr cleared
was any attempt made to block it. nor were
01' mines <'vel' laid to ohstruct
1Il0Vl'lllent to 01' on the heaches.
A rtilll'I'Y installations. while well sited,
Wl'rt' inadequate and incomplete. ;Iolost of the
"uns Wt're concentrated to covel' the air
<lI'ollle, an,1 tlwir direct "ell approaches. These
positions included at least a battery of moun
tain g'uns. three 01' four antiaircraft guns of
thrpe-inch ealib<'r, many mortars and auto
matic w('apons. and foul' 120-llIm dual-purpose
naval guns.
A six-inch rifle was installed south of the
:\lokl1l('I' strip and another in the Bosnek area.
These weapons had fields of fire for at least
six miles up and clown the coa"t, with over
lapping' sectors in the center. One naval
120-mm dual-purpose piece was emplaced on
the Bosnpk beach, while several other navy
six-inchers were being installed but were not
ready for action on D-day,
From the date of the Hollandia landing on
22 Apl'il, Colont'l Kuzume had slightly more
than a month to prepare his defenses. Thel'e
is evidence, too. that if .Japanese intelligence
did not know the exact point of invasion, it
had a pretty good idea of when it would
come. Several days before the assault,
Kuzume apparently received warning to
21
KUZUME MAKES THE TEAM
along the ridge and cut in behind the Yanl,s.
This maneuver isolated t'he' hard-pressed
American battalion. except for one company
which fought its way out of the trap. Kuzume
had his enemy where he wanted him
!!nd laid his plans fo\' a quick annihilation.
During the night, h<.> hrought th<.> 1st Bat
talion into the airdrome urea. morning.
with entire r('gillll'nt concl'ntrat('d. he
thrl'w his 2d and :ld against the
trapPl'd AllJericans in thr(>e .sL'l'arate and
Ill'avy att'H'ks, TIll's<'> failed to over
run the hard-pr(>ssC'd invac!l'rs but intlkted
ht'avy casualties.
The opening attack, launeill'd at 0700 on tIll'
2flth. was pacell hy Kuzume's tanks. The seven
vehicles, a,lvancing in two wave,; half an
hour apart, werl',lll'olllptly wiped out. The
first wave of three was met by nve U.S. me
(limn tanks, which hac! l'ushe;l to the aid of
the beleaguered 'lIlll was quickly de
stroye(l. \Vhen th,' remaining foul' attacked at
07:)0, ov,'r the same ground and in the same
formation, they wen' also wrecked in short
(lrdel',
Although he had not crushed his trapped
Kuzull1e's attacks and his con
tinuous fire from the ;\[okmer rocket had al
most shattered the American force. Before he
could launch the knockout blow. however,
nightfall intervened. Un!ler ('OVl'l' of darkness.
a rescue flotilla move!l in hy water and
evacuated the survivors, who wel'e so badly
mauled that the battalion was unusable for
the rest of the campaign.
Colonel Kuzume moved down
through :'.10kmer to the nal'l'owing defile and
t'ook up positions from which he effectively
hlocked further attempts to reach the airfields
hy the coastal route, He had lost the first
round, but the second was his by a wide
margin.
Next day he ordered the :ld Battalion into
the Ibdi Pocket, left the 2d ,to hold the defile.
and moved with the 1st Battalion back to the
original bivouac north of Bosnek. Here he
encountered the Amel'ican column which,
after crossing the ridge at Opiaref. was
advancing across the flat inland plain to take
the airdromes in rear. The 1st fought a bitter
l'l'ar-guard action back to the Mokmel' area,
where regimental headquarters returned to
West Cave.
During this withdrawal the 3d Battalion
made no effort to assist its retreating com
rades. It neither withdrew nor attempted to
strike the advancing Americans i;p flank 01'
real', but holed up in its perimeter and was
cut off without a fight. By D plus 7, rein
forcements had arrived for the attackers and
had moved north of the ridge, securing the
American communications and destroying
Kuzume's last chance to attack and crush his
enemies in detail.
On 12 June the 1st Battalion, reinforced by
hastily armed service troops, was driven over
tho ridg'o and onto the 1\10kmer strip. This
defeat required Kuzume to withdraw his
troops to the terrace north of the field, in the
vicinity of. West Cave. A week later his block
ing position on the coastal road was forced,
anll the American columns established
ta('t.
While Kuzume was being squeezed into his
final defensive pockets, two attempts were
made to reinforce him. On 12 June about 200
riflemen landed at Korim, followed a week
latel' by an additional battalion of infantry.
These reinforcements were thrown piecemeal
into action. Attacking a' company at a time,
this previous help was dissipated and de
stroy<.>d without having rendered the slightest
assistance to the sorely pressed Colonel.
By D plus 19. when more Amel'ican rein
forcen.cnts landed. the bulk of the defenders
had been compressed into the area around the
airdromes. The :ld Battalion was still cut off
in the Ibdi Pocket, while the :'.10kmer Pocket
was also manned. Neither garrison offered
more than occasional patrols and slight haras
sing fire that dosed the coastal road for brief
intervals.
A coonlinated American attack on 20 June
cleared the strips and drove Kuzume onto the
ridge north, of the fields. The Colonel, with a
'considerable force of mixed units, barricaded
himself in the West Cave. All next day this
force endured a savage and unremitting at
tack which it resisted bitterly.
One by one the defending pillboxes were
22
lI\lLITARY
.reduced and their savagely fig'hting garrisons
wiped out, Sniper fire, tank guns, and gre
nades drove the des\ll'rate away
from the cave 1l1otlths, hack into the dark
chambel:S, Here any hopes of prolonged sur
vival were sh,)l't-live,1.
Although the winding tunnels were protec
tion against the flame thro\\'ers that now
came into lll'tion ag'ainst tllPlll, tllP harried
fugitives snon discovcn'd that the ing't'nious
Americans had a solution, ])rums of p:asoline
were bl'ought up and poured into the sloping
entrances, Gl'l'nades transforn1e,1 the gasoliIw
into rivers of tlall1l' that ,lI'o\'e the Japanese
deepcr into the caverns, which soon shuddered
with the dl'lonations of TNT blocks lowered
into them.
That was l'nough for 1\ uzume. That nig'ht
he call1'd his and SUI'ViVOl'S around him
'in the hatt('rC'd v:lult. Ill' "I',lL-red all who
cou!'1 still walk to It'av<, tl1<' ,'aVl' and laulleh
their tinal banzai attack. Hand grenades were
issue,1 to the woullde,l with orders for self
destruction, Then Kuzullw :\'aoyukie impres
sively set fire to his regill1l'llta! colors, retire,l
to a far ('01'11('1' of the eave, and, in obedience
to his code as n defeate,I Samurai warrior,
disembowdled himself.
Latel' in the night tht, s\lI'vivors hurled
themselves against SPH">Ill'd jungle fighters
who had such charge's hpfore. The Slllzai
was crushed as furiously as it ha,r heen
launched,
The charge of the night of 21-22 June ende,l
the organized defense of Biak. The troops
isolated at Ihdi and :-'lokmer held on tena
ciously and had to he slowly and completely
eliminated, Tedious as this phase was, it was
of little tactical importance, ,ince the airfields
were clear and Before the last of the
trapped ,Taps w('re liquidated, American
planes were opC'rating from Kuzume's iIl
starred strips. A few survivors escaped into
the rugged northern hills, there to be
hunted down or to succumb to
the l'eveng'e of tht' jungle had defied.
Captain Andrew says that !(uzume's defeat
was inevitahle from the day the Americans
landed on Bial,. Strategically, the statement
is probably true; nevertheless, a study of hb
subsequent tacties confirms the suspicion that
Colonel Kuzume was his own worst enemy,
A more flexible commander could, at thl'
minimum, have made the conquest of Biak a
far more protracted and costly victory.
Kuzume fought stubbornly and with de,
perate courage, as the Japanese do.
From the beginning, however, he made mis
tak,'s which progressively hurt his chancl's
and made his ,lefeat more prompt. These mi,
tak(>s were important, for ther were typical
of NipPoll('se weaknesses which have ghowll
up repeatedly and may he expected to eCClir
again.
orig'inal plan was sound. He made l1i<
,\i"positioIl8 with care, he delegated l'l'sponsi
to hI" and left him';l'lf frc,'
ior th.. overall conduct of the battle, He cor
rpctiy diagnosed the al'l'a of the landing and
11" knew thp approximate tillle it woul,l conw.
Thl'l'e was nothing wrong with the siting nor
quality of his field worb, and although the,'
lacked depth, this was partly due to lack of
time in which to prepare them.
But having formulated a good and careful
plan, Kuzume \vr('cked it by allowing himsl'lf
to be surprised, The landing caught him out
of position and apparpntly rattled him so
balll, that he could think of nothing to P\,l'
\ent consolidation of a beachhead which coul,I
have bl'en a costly if not untenable foothold.
For an entire day the Americans were allowed
to advance without intel'l'uption or loss.
The D plus 1 cncirclement of the advancing
U.S. battalion at Mokmer was extremely well
done. Although he failed to destroy hi,
trapped adversaries, Kuzume',; attacks were
so 'punishing that they effectively neutralized
a good proportion of the landing force. The
badly pummeled unit nl'vC'r again fit for
use in the campaign.
But even in this, the high point of his
defense, Kuzume revealed his weakness in thl'
destruction of his armor. Having lost almost
half his tanks in the first assault, he blindly
threw the remainder into the same trap where
they were likewise destroyed, He simply could
not break away from the Japanese addiction
23
KUZUME MAKES THE TEAM
to :following 'a set plan even in the face of
ohvious failure.
Another mistake was failing to guard the
Im'ach in the ridge at Opiaref, through which
the Americans advanced to outflank him. He
hall the troops to do this; the naval battalion,
which shoUld have done the job, appears nev('l'
to have played a role in the fig'ht. Dispersed
nil ovcr the islanll, it was rounded
up in weak detachments,
The rl'arguard tight of Ow bt Battalion,
while well execute!I, was futile in the face of
twO-tO-Olll' It was an bolatl'!1 action,
foug'ht 'without thl' help which wa" readily at
J.:md, !md acc'omplished little more than a
glig'ht delny. If, instea(1 of di"persing hI,;
l'l'g'iment again after having concentrated it,
I\uzume han held his hlocking positions
lidltly while tjll'owing his main body into an
,'nvl'lopment 01' thL' Allll'rican column behind
tl\l' ridg'", hl' mip!ht have dumgl'!i thl' whole
""IlI'Se of the battle.
With part of their force already out of
netion, a repUlse of the column bL'hind the
ridge would have placed the Americans in
the beachhead in an extremely pl'edl'ioUi;
position. Kuzume had little to lose and much
to g-ain by a swift offensive blow here, but
he lacked the ability to make such a decision.
The arrival of American reinforcements
finally snuffed out the opportunity,
The fate of his own reinforcements was
also typical. Arriving on the battlefield in
,mall increments, they were thrown into futile
counterattacks, a company at a time, and de
stroyed without achieving any worthwhile
results. It was Guadalcanal again on a smaller
scale.
. The arrival of additional Americans com
pletely upset what was left of Kuzume's ptan
rendered futile his subsequen:
HIS plan had revolved around the lnvulnera
bility of the pockets between the Americans
and their objective. These pockets were now
reduced to death traps which wcre little more'
than a nuisance to the invaders.
Having lost the fields, Kuzume did not
recognize these pockets for the tl'aps they'
were, but holed up in thtm in slavish adher
l'nee to his original concept. Once sealed in,
all he could do was defend them to the
inevitable Im;t man. Had he abandoned them
and moved into the hills, he might have car
ried on mohile offen.ive operations long
enoug'h to hold on until substantial help
al'l'ivcd or his troop' Wl're evacuated.
For all hi,; mistakes, Kuzume put up such
a stubborn I'e:;istance that he eventually re
quil'l'd the A ml'I'ican" to double their attack
ing forc..,. Tadically, he had much in his
laval', points which a more daring and
imaginative leader might have put to good
account. But, like hO many of compatriots,
he lacked the flexibility to change his plans
in the heat of battle. Because he could not
improvise and make prompt decisions in the
face of failurl', h(' w('nt to his death a frus
trated man.
Frustration dog'ged him even in death.
. l\lonths later, long' after' Biak had become a
g-<ll'l'ison post with screened barracks and
quintuplicate requisition ffJl'Il1s,' a fever-rid
den, Japalll'se fug'itive walked into
a mess hall and gave himself up.In exchange
for a square meal, he offered the slightly
charred remnant of a Japanese flag he car
ried wrapped about his waist. It was l{uzume
Naoyukie's battle stantlaJ'{1.
A British officer points out the fact that in today's war. responsibility has
been lifted from the shoulders of the individual fa.r ,too often. He says, "The
.tendency must be rather to thrust responsibility 'on to him, and the more' the
better ." Nowhere is this more true than in operation ot: a preventive mainte
nance program, for its success depends almost entirely on performance of
by the individual soldier.
-Maintenance Division, ASF
Strategic Objectives
LllwTENANT COLONEL DAVID A. HORNBY, Air Corps
Int-<l111C'tllr, ('nmnullld anti G(>nernl Staff
J\ L\IOST any morning while rea,ling the
I1 morning' 1>\11)(>1" at you will
undoubtedly find some nlt'ntion of air opera
tions again,;t the industri<11 empire of Japan,
When you l'PlId the headline's an,l karl! thut
large forl1lations of have :\ttacked the
aircraft plants at 01' Tokyo. you arc
prone t(1 ta!;" the attacks for granted. give
the bop, who did thl' ,Iirty work a mental pat
on the back, and then forA'"t ahout tIll' whol('
.th ill g', However, that is not all there is to such
an attack, Wa, this OIll'ration merely an idle
impube on thl' p:lI't of the 'conu1I1ding oftice!'
of the O).'g:lnizatiol1 which pL'rformed it? Tlw
answer is definit<'ly "1\0," In back of the
actual o]H.'l'Htion of nttaeking this target are
long hotll's or l'l'se:ll'ch and l'ollsid,'ratiun on
the part of many 1'l'opl", In vil'\\' of this fact,
it seems fitting to take tinw to consider th,'
1>robll'm of why awl how the", targ'l'ts ar!,!
First of all. let us consider the reason
behind these strategic ail' operations, A vCl'y
Lroad detinition of the reason is the "further
anr (. of the ,tratt'gic plan,;," but this does
not give us a very cOlllpkll' pietul'c, Let us
put it this way: thl' mission is the "prog'l'cs
sive destruction al1(l di,;loealioll of the enemy's
military, industrial, and systl'ms to
a point where his eapacity for armed resist
ance is fatally weakenl'd," Even this definition
does not give a complete l'ictUl'e berllu,e some
times the operations may be carded out
against objl'cti\'('s which do not fall strictly
within the categ,\ril'S of military, iIHlustrial,
or economic sysL'ms, An objective which (Ioes
not fall within these three eatl'gories
best be illustrated by an operation whose sole
purpose is to lower the morale of the civilians,
such as dropping' propaA'anda leaflets,
If this is the case, let us makl' a brief study
of sonw of the possihle objectives for these
operations to see why they are selectc(1 and
of what they consist, First, let us Jist the
various categories of objectives and then
break each one down into the various targets
of which it is compost,d. These ohjectives may
be as follows:
0, Concentrations of forct's, land 01' sea.
b. Em'IllY lines of cOlllmunications,
c, Hostile sourc,'s of materiel.
d. Source" of Jlower,
c. E1llln]),> ai}' f'orce.s.
Xow that \\'l' have listed the general
of objectives. let us bl'l'ak l'aeh one
down into its turg'ets and see why it
he e1as"t'd as a objective,
COnL'entrations of land forct's will be found
to includ.. brlth military and naval establish
!Ill'nts, bases, camps. ot' schools, It b nece,
sal'y at one time 01' another to eoncentrat('
persolll1l'I, eithl'r fol" purposes of t..,lining,
01' education, concentl'ations
take the forlll of training posts,
tions, 01' gl'neral an,l spl'cial ,chools, sUl'h a,
tht' enemy's counterpart of the Infantry
School at Fort Benning. Geot'gia, Ot' the Com
tlIand ami General StatY School at Fort Lea
venworth, KanSlb, \\' e may find thftt they
will consist of technical such as Scott
Field, Illinois, where radio operators are
trailwd for the Ait, Forces, 01' research
instaJIations sl1ch as Wl'Ight Fiel,!. By strik
ing conccntrations we can deprive the
enemy of their use nnd of the personnel who
Wl're being tmine,l in them, It is easy to
visualize the cfft'ds of a possible shortage of
highly trained an(1 skiJIl'd such as
('Iectronic operators, However, it is not quite
so ('asy to visualize a shortage of less special
iZl,d personnel, Staff oftieers may appeal' to
he an inexhaustible itl't11. but the fact
that more is required of an officer than just
battlefield training to make him a qualified
officer, He must have the background of
basic principles and procedure in ol'der prop
erly to a]lply personnel, materiel. and infor
mation to lll'oduce a successful operation. This
background is usually presented at one
specialized school devoted to this subject
alone and to nothing If we can destroy
this school, and along with it some of the po
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
h'utial material in we will deprive
the enemy of the flow of roplace
llwnts which he so badly needs to cany out
present-day combat.
Concentrations of sea forcl's are among the
fOl'cmost of all strategic objcctivl's. The
reason for this is that no nation is completely
solf-sustaining, especially wh<'re the con,luct
of war is COnl'el'llC'l. Evei'y nation fin,I8 it
necessa)'y to import cl'rtain items of eithel'
raw or finished mutl'rials, and the only way
in which tlwy can do this is hy maintaining
tIll' ship]ling-. If it is possihle fOI'
us to deprive him of this shipping hy ,Ie'stroy.
ing it 01' damaging it r('pair, we will
eventually cause him to u"e inf,'riol' mat"riel
or to do without (,(,Itain it,'llls of lllat"ri('1
which aJ'e vital to tIll' l'ondu('t ,)f his
\\' e Will nOl"luully find till' ,'nl'my making
,'Ifol"t to Pl'ot"ct thb ,hi]l]llllg' with
liBval it will he
fol' u:-; to hb naval power :1:-' wt.'ll
nis llH.'r-chant A uothl.'l l'pason for the
destruction qf his naval power is that it is a
]l{)tential threat to tIlt' intelTuptioll of our
,upply linl's.
For example, We' ('an take the elmat ]lens
along the coast of France. Germany was
out an extl'n"ive wal" against our
bhipping which was transporting supplies to
our forces oVeI'Sl'as. The losses incurred by
the U-1:roats were such that action on OUr part
was required. We thl'l"l'fol'c ,l!.'tt'l'l11ined that
the easiest to counteract these opcmtions
was first of al1 to (,est roy the factories whl're
the U-boats w('re heing fabricated, and sec
ondly, to destroy, 01' damage beyond sel'vic('
ability, the pens which were u,:('d for \'efitting
and I ('supplying boats. was in con
junction with the opl'l'ations conrl;lctl'd by
pur navies. The operations were eventually
but it I'cCluil'e,] the diversion of a
large force of our to neutralize this
threat to our supply lin('s. The V-boat b('cal11l'
a strategic tal'g('t bccal1st' it was interfering
with the execution of OU!' strategic plans.
The German battleships Sci1al'nhol"st,
Gneisenall, and Tirpitz were classed in this
same category because of their potential
threat to our lin(>s of supply. In this case we
find that a force of only three sh.ips becljme
a strategic target. The efforts of the Royal
Air Force and part of the British Home
Fleet were l'l'Cluired over a period of five
years before this thr(>at could be satisfactor
ily neutralized,
The next objective we come to is that of
enemy lines of communications. Under this
categor,' we will normally find targets such
as hages, depots, and transportation
systems.
tJy attacking port and harbor installations,
and damaging them, we deny their use to
tho enemy as points at which to unload the
fhipping which we have not pl'eviously de
stroyed. prevent the enemy from being
able to usc the materials that he has imported
from outside sources. In our attacks on St.
Nazaire, Lorient, and the other ports along
the French coa,t we had a second purpose
which was to dl'ny the use of these ports as
refitting" and resupply points to U-boats, as
previously mentioned,
Bases and depots are invariably found to
he Ijoints of concentration for parts and
completed assemblies awaiting further dispo
to the forces in the field. By attacking
and ,Iestroying these hases and depots, we
can the enemy of the use of these
matedals and thereby create a shortage of
critical items at some future time.
Transportation facilities are found to in
..Jude sHeh targC'ts as roads, railroads, and ca
nals. Ie b an undeniahlp fact that once a cer
tain product has bl.'en manufaetured it has to
be transported to another point before it can
be used. This requires an extensive and effi
cient transportation system in order to insure
that materiel arrives at the proper time and
place. By disrupting this system we can pre
vent the enemy fl'om moving. vital materials
from thpir point of manufacture to the points
when' they arp needed. We can accomplish
this by destroying marshalling yards, critical
railrond junctions, and the lines themselves.
We can cl:ater roads and cause vehicles to
take We can destroy bridges crossing
natural obstacles and cause the rhouting of '
both trains and vehicles. By destroying the
26
MILITARY REVIEW
locks in the canal systPI1I we effectively deny
the use Qf the as a of transporta
tion.
One of the most outstanding examples of
the disruption of transportation facilities took
place in Italy just prior to the breakout from
the Garigliano River in l\lay 1\)44. For a
period of approximately two months priolo to
the attack, the Twelfth an,] Fifteenth Air
Forces joint',1 hands to carry out a combincd
opcration against these facilities. The fmal
result of this operation was the complete
denial to the Gcrmans of the transportation
rE-quil'e!1 for lll'eded supplies anti rein force
Just prior to the attack it was found
that the (,erman" troops in the fl'ont lines
wcrc not receiving full rations, Thpy were
being ratione'] ammunition to slIch an
that sOllle of the artillpry piel"'s were able to
fir" onl,' fOUl' or fivc' rounds a day. It was im
possihle for tIll' (,"l'mans to llh)V(' supplies or
troops anywhl'l'l> south of the Arno River by
rail 01' motor tr<ln>'IHlrtation. One rC:ierve divi
sion lllOving up to th,' I'lont found that it had
to nlllr{'h the la,t hundnd mi1c-" The nl<lralc>
facto)' l'lt'atl'd 1):-,- ..'h it not l'Oll
dlH.'IV" to Ih, (,'ndu('\ of war, :\Iuch
the ,ituation ('xi"ted in France at the
tinH' of the of tht> XOll11an
Hostilt, SOlll'('('" of matl'ripl are, logically,
nne of the oh,kctivl" availahle for stra
tl'gil' opl')'ations, Within this catpg'lll'y we find
the following' tal'gl'tt; mi)1l's,
factoril''', and a,,('mhly planb,
One of t 11<' to Ill'l'Vent the
enemy from ohtainiJlg the' materiel which he
needs [01' the <,ondue! of war is to deny him
the source of the raw materials. We can ac
complish this denial hy attacking, and
damaging- or destroying, mines. As these are
smull targets and hard to attack, we
find few exampl('s of typc of operation,
There is one ease on record in which a flight
of bomhprs attacked a coal mine in
Mallchui'ia and succeeded in damaging' it to
the extent of depriving the Japanese of its
use for a period of at least six months, This
"was accomplished by destroying the pumping
system which was used to drain the mine,
thereby flooding it.
As a mine is a fairly difficult target to hit,
the next best way to deprive the enemy of
his mated!'1 is by damaging or destroyinp;
the facilities with which he refines his raw
materials. It is an unfortunate fact for the
enemy th'at practically every type of raw"
material which is taken out of the ground
requi!'es processing of one sort 01' another ill
order to get it into a form which is usable,
This applies whether it be oil, ore, or gas,
The attacks on the Ploesti oil fields C0I110
within this category, They were aimed at the'
source of about twenty percent of the oil
supply for Germany. By attacking and de
stroying these fiL'lds we were able to deny th"
use of this oil or any of its bYPl'oducts to th"
Germans, This was not only felt by the Luft
watt'" hut by the Wehrlllacht as well. By deny
ing this source to the Gernlans we seriously
handicappl'd their mobility.
Should it prove to be impOSSIble to attack
the refineries or the mines, we must select
the next most vulnerable point in the "hain
of production. This is the factory. l!el'e w('
tind that the raw materials are converted
into the tinal shapes in which they will be
elllployed the militar,' forces. \\' e find
that at this point it is more difficult to hind,,)'
the enemy becausl' his factories are Illon'
widely disperse,l than his mines,
for u" the Germans did not dispen'e theil
before the declarntioll of war, and
we fOllnd that there were certain installa
tions in which a large pcrcentag-e of
g-iven product was produced. A case snch
this is the ball bearing industry. It is im
possible to manufacture machinery of
type at all without the use of ball bearing-s
to protect the rotating parts. It so happened
that about forty percent'of the ball bearing'
inf\ustry was concentrated in Schweinfurt.
Thus, when it was decided by highel' head
quarters that the ball bearing industry was
to take a high place on the priority list
of targ'ets, it was not hard for the Eighth
Air Force to select the factories located in
Schweinfurt in ordel' to deal the most telling
blow in the shortest possible length of time.
Finally, if it is found to be impracticable
or,impossible to attack any of the previously
<--';'-,
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
27'"
nlt'ntioned targets, we will find it necessary
tll turn our attention to tho
wh('l'(, the various parts are gathered ami
a"sc11lble(1 into the cOlllplete article. Again
\\(, find that we are faced with a further
(Ii<persion of thC'se which makes it
1'l'tlportionatl'ly more difHcult for us to pro
dtll'(' the c!"sirt'd (ffect on the industry being
attacked.
The next {'ateg-ory of objective that was
, llll'ntione!1 was that of sources of power sup
ply. llHluRtl'Y must have powei" of one sort
tH' another in order to produce the finished
article. This power will usually take the
form of eleCtricity, sleam, 01' g-as. Ag'ain \\'e
find an objective which, if attacl(ed, and
ti('stroyC'!i or damage!l, will deny the use of
these facilities for at least a shurt period
of time.
;-'Tany of you will remember how the Royal
Ail' Force attal'l'd and destl'oved the l\lo
('llIle, F.der, and Sorpc dams in the Ruhr
valley. The sole objective of this attack was
ttl deny the enemy the use of the power with
\\'hich to operate his factories located in
the Ruhr. It so happens that the Ruhr valley
is one of the most hig-hly electrified areas
ill Europe, and that the source of the ma
jority of this electdcal power was derived
from these three dams, The attacks were
highly successful and resulted in the com
plete drainage on the part of the l\1oehne
and Eder dams and the partial drainage of
the Sorpe dam. This meant that the Germans
would have to rebuild the dams, and then
wait until the reservoirs had filled again
before they would be able to draw on the
electrical power these dams had supplied. A
result was achieved with this at
tark in that many roads and railroads were
washed out, many bridges were destroyed,
crops were damaged recovery, and
many thousands of the workers supplying'
the labor required in the various industries
were made homeless. A further result was
achieved in that the population of the Ruhr
valley was deprived of its source of water
supply. These three dams had provided prac
tically, all the drinking water used by the
natives of this valley.
We finally come to the last, but far from '
the least important, objective, that of the
enemy air forces. Attacks are beillg' con
stantly carried out against this objective,
both in the air and 011 the ground. The
attacks in the air tal{C the form of aerial
combat. Those against the air force on the
ground may take the form of attacks against
airdromes, where the aircraft are gathered
for operations, or uf attacks against the
assembly plants amI factories which ,pro
duce und assemble the various parts that go
into the completed ailcraft.
The requisite ,for any operation, either
land, sea, Or air, is to obtain and maintain
ail' superiority. Without this superiority no
force can operate .. as has been demon
strated in both Europe and the Pacific. At
such times as the Germans utilized the rem
nants of their Luftwaffe in mags they were
able to gain temporary loeal ail' superiority,
thus pel'mitting theil' gl'ound forces to at
tack without hindrance from the ail'. An
example of this uccuned at the time of the
Battle of the Bulr:e. Von Rundstedt was able
to muster a force of about one thousand
aircraft which he uged to gain local air
supel:iority and assist the advance of his
ground forces. Aftel' a day or two, this local
superiority was lost and, through the com
bined efforts of the g'l'uunci and ait forces,
the Wehrmacht was forced to consolidate its
positions and later withdraw because of the
air attacks against its troops, guns, and
supplies.
The success of many of our attacks against
enemy installations has been predicated on
our ability to gain ail' superiority. This was
true in the operations in the Ploesti area.
Due to the large amount of enemy territory
we had to pags over, "it was necessary for
us to neutralize the Luftwaffe to as great
an extent as possible in erder to minimize
our 10,sseg, Likewbe, in our in
the Pacific it will be noted that the enemy
ail' forces. are subjected' to intense attacks
prior to our landings in order to obtain the
air superiority which provides us the neces
sary freedom of action for our forces.
Having briefly cl)vered the various targets
28
MILITARY REVIEW
which are classified as 8trategic and seen
what their destructio;1 will do, let us tak<!
a look';,-nt the process by which the
targets are selected and allotted a priority,
It seem that this would be an almost
task, It does entail a great deal
of work, but it is not quite so ditlicult as
it sound, The process follo\\'('(l in this
selection is somewhat as follows:
A special board, composed of industrial
and military expert,;, will gathcr togethel'
all the information which they can tind rela
tive to the various industries, This is I)OS
sible since very few of' the large industl'ies
were created solely by one nation, Foreign
capital has been im'ested in many of them
and foreign labor has been used in thci I'
design and development. Thercfnl'e, it is
almost possible to fin(l someone who
wiII have a knowledge of what the various
plants are like, how they are laid out, and
what their construetion is, This board will
then proceed to evaluate l'aeh one of these
objectives from the point of view of the
effect their destruction will luwe on the
strategic plans laid down by highel' head
quarters an(l the vulnerability of each in
stallation to air attack. In some cm,(>s the
board will even go so far as to recommend
the type of bomb and the fuze to be
in the attack, As a of these inves
tigations the board will allocate to each
objective a of attack, Finally, after
all angles have been considere(l and studied,
the board will make recommendations in the
form of reports to the ail' fOl'ce commander,
theater commander, 01' the combined and
joint chiefs of staff, Oll the lewl
at which the planning' is beine; done,
\Vhen we commenced operations against
f!'Om England, we were partially
guided by the list of priorities which had
already been set up by the British, As our
operations progressed, we found that we
would have to readjust some of these prior
ities to tit the type of operations which we
were conducting, As most of our attacks
were being made during the hoUl's of day
light, we were subject to severe opposition
, from the Luftwaffe, This meant that the til'st
thing we would have to do was to plal'e
our main effort against the ail' force until
we had reduced it to such a point that it'
coul(l not effectively hinder our
Our next priority on objectives was placed
on gas ancl oil refineries, By destroying' this
source of power we would eventually dl'
mobilize the German Army and Ail' Forel',
1\' ext on the list was the ball bem'ing' in
dustry, and from there on the
varied as the situation demalHled, From time
to time we have had to switch our e/forb
to certain objectives such as the U-boat pens
and factories, When the Germans started
using the V-l, we found it necessaJT to in
terrupt OUI' normal operationR and co-ncen
trate on the launching- for these weapon"
Onte the "perial board has made its rec
ommendations, the staff then proceeds to
e\'aluate them against an estimate of the
which is available at all times, One
of their primary concernR is the logistical
factor, but th(>y will also consider the size
of the force neede(l to out the attack"
recommended, Providing the logistical, intel
ligence, and factors will permit
the attaeks to bl' aecolllplishe(l, the staff \\iIl
w'ually accept the priority alld recommenda
tions of the hoard,
One factor which the picture at
this time is the politieal effect of the opera
tion, It was found in many ca>es that the
Eighth Ail' Force was unable to attack vital
targets in the occupied ('ountdes of Franct:',
Belgium, and Holland because of the pos
sible detrimental effect that would result on
t he native population, The possibility existed
that, if certain tal'g'ets ,vel'C hit, lal'g'e
of the natives mig-ht be injured
or killed, If this were to happen often, it
would 'inevitably turn the natives against
us and hinder our operations on the con
tinent at such a time as we could
fully mount our invasion,
Finally, after the objective has been se
lected and the attack completed, it remains
fo\' the ground and the ail' forces to
exploit the results created by these strategic
operations,
29
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
In the Pacific our rapid progress has
accomplished a large degree ,of neutraliza
tion of the .Japanese sources of raw materi
als, Our bases are now located in such a
way that we press home our attacks
against the industrial empire on the .Japanese
mainland, Our B-:;!!)'s are cal'1'ying out ex
tensive operations against the aircraft and
steel industries, The outside sources of pe
tl'oleum have been cut oft' and are being
neutralized by other units of our armed forces,
Thus, when we pick up a paper and read
in it that Tokyo was attaeked by a large
force of B-2f)'s, we realize that it is not
just an idle impulse or hunch on the part
of some commander which has caused this
attack to be made. It is the culmination of
a long and arduous process of evaluation
and research on the part of hundreds of
people, and was designed to, depriv;e the
enemy of some vital materiel or force 'for
the conduct of war, It is a continuation of
the strategic plan and another step in the
successful and timely conclusion of this plan.
"Dropmasters"
Dig'e!>ted at the Command and General Staff School from an article in
Qual'tcoi1llstcr TrailLii1g Sader .1'lll/nUlI 4 May 1945,
\\' liEN of the dangerous position of
Ba,(og'lle came thlough, supply wheels began
,urllillg, Immediately, qunrtermasters sta
tioned at t,'oop carrier bases from which the
supplies were to be flown began preparing
for the mi,;,ion. They workLd day an,1 night.
HUlldreds of hundll's were wrapped, plnced
ill the special chute containers, and loaded
into the planes,
Plans were made quickly for the dropping.
Fin.t lloillt to h" settle,1 was how the pilots
\\',"'1' to recognize the exact drop areas. Here
was a snag which had caused considerable
trouble in aerial ,uppl,' at Arnhem. There,
Ie"", than ten percent of the supplies dropped
actually reached the Allied troops fighting
below. Chief reasons were bad weather and
intense low-level flak.
RAF nig'ht-bolllber tl'chniques were copied.
A special "pathfinder" force was selected,
consisting of specially trained and highly
skilled pilots and navigators. Theil' job was
to pinpoint the precise drop zones (DZ's), in
(lieated by the garrisons below, in acil'lHICC of
the C-,!7 skytrain,
These "sharpshooters" started out well
ahead, After >;couting, they found the DZ's,
and on' these spots dropped paratroops
equipped with special visual and radio signal
ing aids. The paratroopers set up their appa
ratus, the tense moment came,
As, soon as they sighted the planes, the
paratroopers began operating their signaling
('quipment, The pilots of the didn't
have to bothe,' about landscape identification.
All tlll'Y had to do was watch for the ground
signab an,1 fly to them.
Once over the target, the quartermaster
"dropmasters" on the C-47's went into action.
\Yithin forty-five seconds fro111 the time the
pilot flashed the green light that told the
flying quartermasters they were over their
tal'get, all the heavy packages were out of
th,' planes.
The containers settl0d with high' accuracy.
Less than five percent of all the tonnage
dropped missed the tiny DZ's. In fact, so ac
curate was the timing that some of the
ground SIgnaling apparatus was hit by the
parachuting cargops, One paratroopPl' with
,ix COl1lhat drops behind him said that the
most dangerous job he had ever'done was
standing by the apparatus while 300-pound
f,upply containers fell around him.
Altogether, 878 C-47's flew over the target.
In all, 807 t0118 of ordnance, medical and
food supplies, plus 348 bundles of equipment,
were packed during those vital hours and
parachuted to the men below.
The 7th Division in Leyte
,.\ REPORT MAJOR GENERAL A. V. ARNOLD, United States Army
Commanding 7th I1Ifantry Division
/7'" INf DlV
LANDED
LEYTE ISLAND
CampaIgn for the L,beratIon 01 1M PhlhDPlnes
20 Delobe, 1944 10 febru'", 1945
lEGPtO
THE 7TH DIVISION ON LF;Y1'E
31'
Tactical Operation of the 7th Division in the Battle for
Uberation of the Philippines, Leyte, P. I.
MAP KEY
A. A-DAY. 20 OCTOBER 1944.
Assault landing Dulag.
Formation:
B. A TO. A PLUS 2.
Captured Dulag Airstrip.
C. A PLUS 3 TO A PLCS 4.
Captured Burnuen and Sun Pablo Air
strips One and Two.
Formation:"
121
161
11 ( 3d Bn) Atcl!d 2d lin 184
1
I
l2SJ 184 ( lsI & 2d Bns)
1
D. A PLL'S 5 TO A PLUS 7.
32d Infantry captured Buri Airstrip.
17th Infantry advanced on Dagami.
184th Infantry moved to La Paz.
Abuyog.
E. A PLUS 8 TO A PLUS 9.
17th Infantry captured Dagami, pushed
west from Dagami, Guinarona, and
Burauen.
32d Infantry guarded airfields.
184th Infantry patrolled frQm La Paz.
F. A PLUS 10 TO A PL'WS 12.
17th and 184th Infantry patrolled into
mountains.
32d Infantry (minus one battalion) to
Abuyog en route to Baybay.
One battalion 32d Infantry re
lieved RCT, 24th Division,
Panaon Island.
*The symbo1 fat" the leading ''lement in the center
of the formation indicates the 767th Amphibian Tank
Battalion.-The Editor.
G. A PLUS 13 TO A PLUS 29.
17th Infantry relieved by 96th Division.
In turn, relieved 96th flivision was re
lieved by 11th Airborne Division.
Regiment (minus one battalion).
Burauen.
One battalion. Tanauan.
32d Infantry (less 1st Battalion) with
Reconnaissance Troop patrolled west
coast Caridad to Sogod Bay.
1st Battalion patrolled Panaon, Sogod
Bay. and east coast to Hinunangan.
Infantry reconnoitered east coast
to Hinunangan.
II. A PLUS 30 TO A PLUS 45.
3Zd Infantry (less 1st Battalion) de
fpnded at Palanas River against
elements Japanese 27th Division'j
184th Infantry reinforced 32d Infantry
at Damulaan.
17th Infantry followed 184th Infantry.
I. A PLUS 46 TO A PLUS 53.
Division attacked toward Ormoc.
Formlltion:
32 PROTlCTlD MSR.
A PLL'S 51.
77th Division captured Ormoc.
.J. A PLUS 54 TO A PLUS 59.
17th Infantry held Talisayan River Line.
184th Infantry attached to 77th Division
to defend Ormoc.
32d Infantry attacked east to join 11th
Airborne Division advancing from
Burauen.
K. A PLUS 60 TO A PLUS 64.
17th Infantry protected MSR [main
supply roadl Ormoc-Baybay.
32d attacked north to line east
of Ormoc.
184th Infantry defended Ormoc.
A PLUS 65.
Organized resistance declared ended.
32
1
MILITARY REVIEW
A-DAY TO A PLUS 65.
10,167 Japs killed.
L. A PLUS 65 TO A PLUS 69.
184th Infantry attacked north to
Valencia.
32d Infantry Ormoc.
17th Infantry protpcted MSR.
M. A PLl'S 70 TO A PLUS 110.
Division avpragN! thirty patrols per day.
CovPf('d area south of Valencia-Palom
pon Linp.
N. A PLUS 87 TO A PLUS 108.
3d Battalion, 184th Infantry, rpinfor('(',l,
seized Camotes Islancls.
A PLllS 110, 10 FEBRUARY.
7th DiviRion relieved hy plpments of
Am('rical Division.
A PLUS 66 TO A PLUS 110.
6,392 Japs killed.
A-DAY TO A PLUS 110.
16,559 Japs killed (total;.
A-DAY TO A PLUS 110..
233 Prisoners of war taken (total).
SUMMARY
Total miles covered in coorclinated attacks --34.
Total miles moved-llO.
Total area reconnoitered-l.950 square miles
of Leyte, inducling Panaon and
Camotes Islands.
Total time active fighting-3 months 20 days;
'i
Soviet Underwater Bridges
From an article by Maj,)! Rohert B. Rlgg in The .1Iilitl1/'!I EIIginccl' March 1945.
THE Red Army has pioneered in the con
struct.ion of underwater brirkcs, and, to the
author's knowledge, it was the first model'll
army to achieve in the combat use of
such structures. Actually, some underwater
bridges for tanks and heavy vehicles are, in
effect, artificial fords. OtherR, however, are
actual log' structures built under wate,.
The tl'ue underwater bridges for vehicles
are pile-anchored, prefabricated sections
made either of plain logs or milled timbers.
The sections are assembled upstream a short
way from the place where piles are <.!tiven
into the river. Once the piles are in place.
the sections are floated downstream one or
two at a time, and swung into position where
they are weighted by stones from nearby
rafts to SUbmerge them. The next phase is
to fasten these sections permanently to the
piles, thus securing them to the bottom of the
river, This is a difficult underwater job which
has never been completely perfected. Methods
of fastening vary; clamps, brackets, pegs,
and spikes arl' uxed, but they all have their
drawbacks. This part of the technique needs
improving. It is the Soviet practice to do
e\'ery bit of prefabricating possible un the
in orde,' to eliminate the amount of la
bor and fitting to be done uncleI' water.
Bridges of this type are usually built up in
tiel's, althoug'h the velocity of the river cur
rent will limit the number of tiers. The usual
bridge is from four to five tiers. In order to
prev.ent the prefabricated bridge sections
from floating below the bl'iclge foundation,
guide piles protrude above the water's sur
face; these piles are spaced at regular inter
vals along the downstream edge of the
bridge. Later they are either sawed off or
driven below the waterline. Because of the
effect which the current can have on even
well-anchored sections of a bridge, constant
inspection is necessary. No details are avail
able on the Rubject, but there is some infor.
mation to the effect that the Soviets hav!
used special underwater masks for personne
who must perform the underwater fastenings
Sell Your Field Artillery with Spare Parts and
. Free Servicing <
LIEU CO!'o!\,EI_ E. L. HOOPES, JR., Field Artillery
Illfltl'l1Ctut, ('onunalill un.t (;(>I)('ral BtatT Sehuol
F
"I ELI! Marshal Montgomery recently has
"Succes,; [in hattle1 iR bOUIHI to be
colhlitione<1 hy many of which I con
sid"l! lhe following are the lII'h,l illlportant:
II. TIH' degree of knowledge PO",,{,,{,d by
ell..!l S, I'\'ic{' of the othcl",; taRk, their capac
ant! their IimitationR.
1>. The deg:rce of mutual trust and honesty
of Illotive whid1 is I'<,ached between the two
Sl'l'vil'l'S .. "
This slaten1l'nt was made with particular
ll'g<a I'd to joint air-g'l'ound op('rations. It is
Ilt'lieved applicable in ('qual force to any two
anus 01' services operating together in the
]wl'fol'lnllnce of a {'ommon mission.
TIll' IHlrpOSl' of this article to iIlustrat{'
I,ow a fit'ltl artillcry ('ommander, ('ither per
sonally or throug:h the m(',lium of his staff,
ean do muC'h to insure the most efi'('ctive use
uf antiaircraft artill!'ry, tank-destroyer, and
tank units when employed on the secondary
mission of serving as additional artillery.
The arUd{, will also illustrate what assist
allCP antiai],C'J'llft, tank-destroye,', and tank
unit comllHlIlders or staff offic('rs can render
ttl the al'tilleryman. This exchange of assist
alice betweell repr('sentatives of these sepa
rate arms dematHls the degree of knowledge
and the degree of lllutual trust to whit:h Fi<'ld
:llarshal l\!ontgomery )'('ferrecl.
As :World War II continues, primary mis
,ion5 for antiaircraft, tank-destroyer, and
tank units arc hecoming increasingly scarce.
'The decided decrease in enemy ail' strength
has already' dictated the conversion of cer
tain antiaircraft artillery units; present and
futUl'e reductions in the strength of enemy
armor will decrease the need of tank-de
stroyer employment on antitank missions;
and, as the earth's terrestial battlefield con
tinues to be diminished in size, suitable ter
rain for utilizing ind!'pendently the shock
action of our own tanks will become increas
mg'ly difficult to obtain,
Such an overall picture brings up the
'luestion: "What use can be made of anti
aircraft artillery, tank-destroyer, and tank
weapons where their employment on their
pl'imary mission is imprudent?" One an
!'wer might' be to hold them in reserve until
a favorable situation does occur. Another
solution might be conversion to the most
l'ee<led type of unit, pJ'ohably infantry. A
third possibility is the one to be considered
in thi article, namt'ly, th!'i!' employment as
ndtiitionaI field at'tillery. Such employment is
lint a new idea hy any mNll1R. Our command
el's ill the theaters have already used certain
of thcse units in just such a role,
Lct llS a;;sume for illustrative purposes
that the 11th Infantry Division committed
to a('tion in X Th!'atcr of Operations has
muong' its various' attachments the 701st
Antiaircraft Gun Battalion, Mobile, the 802d
Tank-Dl'stroyt'! Battalion, Self-Propelled,
anti' the 00;1<1 Tank Battalion. The special
on the 11th Division front has
reachet! tht' puint where either the nature of
{'neIllY opposition or the employment of or
gunic and other attached units (augmented
by additional antiaircraft and tank-destroyer
support from corps) has caused the division
commander to attach all three of these units
to th(' division artillery.
To justify its t'mployment on the battle
field, field artillery mllst be able to shoot,
march, and communicate. In order to be
(apahle of performing these three "musts,"
many specific related problems crop up in
the mind of the artilleryman. Of these, let us
consider only the following: materiel, com
munication, observation. gun (howitzer) posi
tions, ammunition, control, and fire direction.
In a situation involving only field artillery
personnel and equipment, the solution t;>f
these prol;>lems requires thought, time, and
cooperation among artillerymen. In a situa
tion such as we have assumed for the 11th
Infantry Division artillery and its three at
tachments, certainly no less thought, no less
'
34
MILITARY REVIEW
time, and much more cooperation between the
supported unit and it:> will he
required,
Ll't heg-in our of thi, ('x
change of by tHatlriel.
How much a(hlitional artillcry i, tl1(' 11 th
Division artillery rcceiving from ('neh of
these Onc nll'lhod of' ohtaining'
the answcr to lhb qU('stion would he n'fcr
('ne(' to the appropriate Tables of Organiza
tion and Equipment. A hettel' lllethod, in
view of pos"ihl l, hattll' easualties in matL'l'iL'1
and also in view of frcquenth' chan"'in'"
Tables of Organization and I':quip;nent. w';;ulJ
be by l11ean$ of a statf ('onfcl'pn{'c. B\' either
method, thc artillcl'\' con;lllandcr
could obtain the folltl\\'ing' inf:,rmatioll: (1)
The 7,01st Antiail'craft Gun Battalioll, :\[obile,
is equippe(1 with (lO-lllll1 antiaireraft
dividc(l equall,' among foul'
(2) The Tallk-De.,tl'o,wl Battalion,
Self-Propcl\L'd, has thill\'-,ix lllotO!' car
riage'S, I\T::I;, ('aeh C'qliipp;'<! with a HO-lllm
gun; t\vl,lvp of thp:->t ,,'capon::.; are IH't.';.;ent
in each of three tank-destroYl'r
and within eaeh cOlllpany thl're al'C' threl'
fOUl'-gun platoons, (:l) Thl' !1O:ld Tank Bat
talion has fifty-foUl' :'.1-4 llledium tanks each
arlllcd with a 'j'5-ll1111 gun; of this nUlllber,
fort)'-fivL' is prohahly tIll' maxilllull1 numbl.'r
which would be available to i1r{' I!S ti{'ld a!'
tillery, the rClllaindn heing' conlllland tanks;
these forty-five avnilable are divi<IL'<I among
three cOlllpanil's, jjJ'tl't'n in L'ach comJlany;
each company is further capable of subdivi
sion into three platoons of five tanks each,
In adJition to these 'j'5-ll1ll1 guns, it is also
possible'to form frolll tank-battalion weapons
a six-howitzCl' battery of 105-111111 howitzers,
This can be done hy tnking one such tank
from C'ach of the three mediullI tank com
panies and combining them with three simi
lar tanks found organically in the tank
battalion hea(lqual'ters company, Summariz
ing the available arl1lanent in thl."c three at
tached units, the divi"ion artillery could
obtain from the antiaircraft gun battalion,
foul' batteries, each consisting of four !lO-mm
guns; from the tank-destroyer battalion, nine
batteries, each consisting of four !lO-mm
guns; and from the tank battalion, nine bat
tpl'ips, each consisting of five 75-mm guns
<)Ilt' hattery of HIx 105-Hlm howitzers, It
j, {'viclt'nt that anyone of these ol'gapiza
would nott'wol'thy assistance
to any al'tilkry organization. The assump
tion ]ll't'viously stat('ri of having all three
battalions attltched to our division artillery is
not meant to be indicative of any specific bat
tle situation, It is maLip only fol' purposes of
pxplanation nnd comparison, Actually, a di
vbion :50 far in this war would have been
l110re likely to have leceivct! the attachment
oj' ju,t one 01' two of these battalions and
tlwn havl' bL-en able to make only one or two
01' hatterh,s available as addi
t ional field artillery,
The subject for consideration is
('{Illllllllllication<;, The primary means of com
l11unil'ation of an antiaircl'tlft gun battalion
wjJ'('; of a tank-dl'stroyer battalion ancl
tank hattalion. it is radio; and of artiJIer,'
in an infantry divbion, it is also wire. Thl'
nwans of t'xchanging this informa
tion would also be a conference of C0111
nland,'r:-< 01' staff officers, At the same confer
('nc(', our fiL'ld aJ'tillery representativc coult!
ill forlll th(> of each of these
units that wire ('omlllunieation between the
divbion artillery "witchboal'd and the at
tach(,d unit will be il4stalled and maintained
Ly the divj,;ion artillery, Also, wire communi
cation l'equired between the attached unit's
Lattalion switchhoa}'(l and each of its firing
I'attl.'ries (companies) is normally a unit re
sponsibility, In the of the tank destroy
ers ane! tank:;, this will also usually include
at least one and preferably two circuits be
tween each company fire-direction center and
each firing platoon, In the event> one unit
commander or officer states that he does
not havL' that much wire on hant! in his bat
talion, once again the field artillery repre
sentative can af'sist by stating that the
artillery communications officer and
8-4 will make excess artillery wire avail
!J hIe, Should even this be insufficient, the di
dsion artillery commander will request ad
ditional wire from the division signal officer,
Now what about observation? Here again
SF-LL YOUR FIEI,P ARTILLERY WITH SPARE PARTS AND FREE SERVICING '
til<' field artillery must The
tank and battalion!; both
"'," reconnaissance persOlllll'l who can sprve
as ground obs(,I'v('r,;, ",l]('n their unit iH func
tinning in this secondary role, However', in
"!'Iler to coordinate the location and obs,'rvn
tion of all field artillery observers, our fil'ld
artillery commander or staff officer must tel!
thelll in what sector to observe a11<1 possibly
"ith what other field artillel'Y unit to es
tahlish one or more joint' ohscrvation
This joint ohservation ]lost Sl'tUP would have
lhl' advantage of giving the uttnchC'l1 unit a
field artillery adviser to aHsist its own ob
server in the attack of targets using indirect
fire. The antiaircraft gun battalion is an en
tirely dift'erent arrangement hC'cnuse the
hnttulion has no ground, observel'8, Conse
fluently, some field artillery ohsern'r will be
l'!,fluired to hamIll' all flre missions
of tl10 antiaircraft hattali"n. The l'xtensive
flel(\ artilll'ry communication system will
I'eadily permit such an arranl!;cmpnt. The
hlltiuircl'aft battalion must he RO informed.
:\'ext let us consider position areas. The
Rtaff officer (command('r) of each of our at
taehed hattalions familiar with the type
of position normally occliPied by his unit
when performing its primary mission. Ho\\,
e\,er. he is no doubt somewhat less familiar
with the characteristics desirable in a field
artillery position. Consequently, here again a
mutual ('xchange of information between
commanders or staff officers is r<'quired. The
fleld artilleryman knows where the bulk of
the fire from these attached units will be de
sired, The specialist (antiaircraft artillery,
destroyer, or tank) knows the trajec
tory of his weapons. With range and tra
jectory being so interrelated, the most
desirable result is gcnaal ilt'"igllation of po
sition areas of attached units by the field
artillery commander. Ddailed selectioll of
actual battery (company) (platoon) firing
position's is left to the attached unit com
mander.
A firing weapon without ammunition is of
no value. Such a concluRion causes an artil
lery commander to take action to ensure the
value of both his- organic and attached 'units,
111 situation. the commanding genel'al .
of the 11 th Division artillery would have I
three consicil'rations concerning ammunition I
for the attached antiaircraft artillery, tank
({""tl'oyel', and hmk battalions, First. he
must ""tima!e what quantity of ammunition
will],,, expclHlt,,] by thes" attachments dur
in!): till' cOllling' action. Second, he must as
(l'rtaill whether ammunition for these
will be made available by corps in suffi
cient quantity to the estimated ex
pC'nditl11'l' m!l'; If !lot, he llIay have to revise
his e5timate, And, finally, he must consider
whethcr 01' not the attached units can trans
port in their own transportation the quantity
of ammunition allocated an(l If the
amount is bCY"llIl their capabilities, he must
l'itl1l'r reduce tlH' expl'nditure rate to a figure
COllllnensurate with their hauling capacity,
allot them some of the organic flcld artillery
ammunition sUPllly vehicles, or ohtain the
additional transportation else
where, This alllmunition supply problem is an
oth<'r example of the need for knowledge of
the capacities anti limitations of a cooperat
ing branch of the s<'rvice. Exaggeration of
either capabilities or limitations would vio
late the mutual trust and honesty of motive
described hy Field Marshal :\lontgomery as
e,sential to success, .
The next major point of concern to the
"gunner" was that of "control." Until re
cently, this subject would probably have
given an antiaircraft artillery, tank-destroy
er, or tank unit more difficulty thlln any
other phase of serving as additional field ar
tillel'Y. Actually, with the proper fire control
and survey equipment, with which all such
units are now being equipped, it is very
simple. What is the artilleryman trying to
obtain when he seeks "control"? Nothing
more than the l'l'lative location on a firing
chart of at least one gun (howitzer) in each'
of his batteries with regpect to a point or
points in target area. It may be obtained
in sev('rai ways, such as by inspection, by
by survey. In every situation,
regardless of its speed. the artilleryman con
stantly se\'ks to improve his "control." This
means that the goal for which he strives is
36
REVIEW
either a complete grin Rurvey of both
position and target areas or at 80111('
type of map, showing both tIw.-e al'ea", whi"h
has been cill'l'CCted by "tlI'Vt'y, Who doe,; the
SUl'vl'ying'! Personnel in ('vel'Y tiel,! artillery
organization from COl'PS tll,tillel'Y l1l'ac!qutlr
tel'S clown to at least each hattalion, very
often to each battery, Th(' desirahility of
accUl'ate Hrtilll'ry tin' requiI'es that
sooner 01' later all survey Ill' ('oonlinatc,l,
How is this ('oordination l'Ifcded'! By having
a hight'r "ueh as corps artillery
give a 10Wl'1' headquarter,; as division
artillery a point of known hJt'atl<ln ancl eleva
tIOn (and 1'1'0111 that point a 1000\\'n direction)
from which to start its (the sllhordinutt'
unit's) SUrVl'Y, At lem;t two points. one in
the target ar('a an,l onl' in tilt' position area,
are more desiru1>I(', In tIlt' of attacht'd
unib, how('ver. sueh as 0111' antiaircraft :tr
nnd tanl,
no tal'get al'ea is 1'e'lui1'l',1 01' ,',,
pected, Tlw parpnt tield (in thb
the 11th
sible for all tnrg<'l al'('a control. In thl' l""i
tion U)"(IH., lIt, IH'e
pareel to survl'y lll'tilll'l'ynwn, Spl'citicall,'.
if anel when 11 th Division artillery g;ives any
one of these units a point and a direction
with which to that unit must
be able to locate its ba[tc'ry (company) (pla
tOOIl) position:; nccll1'ately both horizontally
ancl with to that point.
Eventually, that "lllust" will Ilt' une with
which compliance b easy, HO\\'('vcr, it may
remain in our th,'aters until the state
of training and issue of ,'quipment is more
complete, Until such occurs, the artilleryman
can once again a:;sist the sllpporting' tlnit to
accomplish its mission. The voluntary loan of
both survey personnel ami equipment will
do much to solve the problem,
Since the development of the public;ized
massed-fire field artillery technique, many
artillerymen think in terms of fire-direction
centers, Fire-direction center computation is
an application of simple mathematics capable
of improvement with practice. In this re
spect, also, training and receipt of fire-direc
tion equipment will have a definite bearing on
how much assistance a Iloll-field artillery.
nrgnnization will require. An antiaircrai't
gun hattalion, such as our 701st Antiaircraft
(iun Battalion will have to furnish the per
sonnel and equipment to operate a battalion
fire-direction center, A tank.destroyer bat
talion or a tank battalion such as our 80:2d
Tank-Destroyer Battalion and our !lO:3(1 Tank
Battalion, will each have to provide a bnt
talion fire-control ccnter in additinn to a
company tire-direction ccnter, This is
sal'y becaw,e each company with its thrc,'
platoons of either six (tank-de;;troyet) or
five (tank) g'uns is comparahle to the fipld
artill,'ry battalion organizatioll, E"pcriencl'
has dl'nllHlst]'atl'd thnt a fire-dir('ction cpntl']'
b c1esit'able for each field al'tillel'Y hattalion,
Purticularly in the cuse of tank destroyers
and tanl,s, this fire tli rcdion St'tllJl r('quires
a of tl'ained fire-direction pPI'sllnllel.
In the evcnt training' 01' equipment has heen
laeking', once ag'ain the field artillery should
"Ifer all pnssihle as,istancc by
loan", Aside from the training' an,l equip
nll'nt angIPs, it will be normal for the sup
ported /icld artillery organization (in thi,
case, 11 th Divisinn artillery) to relieve th"
;.uppol'ting unit of much of the command 1'('
of fire direction, The field <lrtil
!t'ry commtlndel 01' his representative in hb
lire-direction l'enter will u;.ually dcsignat('
targets to be altack"d, time the fin' is to h('
delivt'rl"l, and tht, Humber nf rounds to be
fired,
Tn condusioll, it is po"sibl" that th(' day
lllay cnme when tank-destt'oyer" battalions,
antiaircraft-gun hattalions, and tanl, hat
talions may be capable of superior, unas
sisted performance of the field artillery role,
This, of course, will depend on the training
and equipment of these organizations. Until
such training; and issue of equipment is ac
complished, the field artillery organization
supported by either the attachment or rein
forcement of these units can do much to
bridge the training and equipment gap. Much
has been written about the salesmanship
necessary to make the arms supported by
field artillery "artillery-minded." In the case
of antiaircraft artillery, tank-destroyer, and
SELL 1.'OUR FIELD ARTILLERY WITH SPARE PARTS AND FREE SERVICING
tallk such cducl\tion iH not neces
in the lwcause the vcry na
tun' of wcapons callS(,S them to be
"sl'l'eialist" 01' "dircctfire" artilielTmen, In
stead .If the infantry type salesmanship, this
tl'llllsaction is similal' to one asp('ct of the
prewar sale of an automobile, Included in
lOllY such wOllI.1 have hN'n' a frce 1,000
mile inspection, a set of tools, a spare wheel
aIHI tire, and a grease and oil change. In,
other words, when your customer is a mem
her of an antiaircraft artillery, tank-de
stl'(lyer, or tank organization, sell your field
artillery with spare parts and free servicing,
Such a sale would subscribc to Fiela ;:\Iarshal
;:\lontgomery's formula for success,
Bearing a Burden
by tht' Oir.:.:tol', Maintcnance Division, Army Service Forces.
B \Ll. anti rollvl' b0<lI'inc::-. Hl'(.l currying the
war tn th(l ()ll tl'lltl\:-;, tank:-;.
tl'ain" plan<"', alltl .\nd bC'arings are
ju,.,t H1HHlt 11 tlllll 11,'1' 111le' Wlll'll it to ('l'iti
en} Itt'lll .... 11:-'l'<1 in thl' A 1'l1lY.
Th",'" Illaill point, in tilt' CHn' and handling
"f 11\'aring'< should hl' I,cpt in nliJlIl at all
lillh ..... l\ll!,p dean! Ht'1111'111
hpl' that nl' g:nt will :--l'pre a hearing in
,h"l't Ol'dl'1 a ('PlY d 1'0p' of 1'(> will
1u-..t it 11:-- quiekly. So h()PP
1\T;tppC'd at all tilll\" wlH'11 arp not ItI
P"'{', Hnd \\ llllll 01" l't.'lll()ving thl'111
::Iwa,'< placv tlWlll on "/f'IIlI ThC'
dl'y-eh'Hninc: :--nivPllt .... you U;--t' tn cll'an thenl
and thl' 11Ihl'll'anl< 1I,<, tn l,l'C']> them run
ning' ,mo"thly nll"t Ill' ..!van too, 1-'01' this
",'a"lIl it i, important t hat containers he
1,(lpt l'OVl'rt..'d nlueh a .... to prC'vent
tlust alld grit from 'l'((ling' and !>Iowing into
th\'m, Hands, hC'nclll's, I'ag'';,
that tout'h(lf, he elean.
S,'cond, kC'el' \JC'aril\g" adjusted properly.
Thi, is lI1l}mrtant in operation of
IIItitol' \'t'hicll's wlll'l', I'PI\\Oval. of front
\\'hl'('ls for luhril'atjoll i, a fl'Pf}uent occnr
Il'nC', Hpinstallution of hearings at time:;
likl' thpsl', or installation of new h('urings
II hen nece",,,'y, must he pel'formed carefully
,(I that h('aring's are Iwitht'l' too tight nor
too Ie)!)SI'. A hearing that is too tight will
o\erheat qlliekly an,1 a hparing that is too
loose will he slIhj(>ct(>d to jolting and jarring
far in excess of its ahility to withstand,
Bearings are shock breakers, not shock
takers.
Luhrication is the third important main
\pnancl' service in the cal'e of bearings. \Val'
Departl1ll'nt Lubrication Orders for specific
items of ef}uipment should be followed so
that the right lubricant in the right amount
is ap}llied. Here, again, the cleanli
ness of lubl'icants must be emphasized and
the practice of keeping lubricant containers
lovpred whenever they are not actually in
\1'\' must be stresseel,
In conneetinn with s{'cond, third, and
fourth l't'helon handling anel reclamation of
\J(,HI'ings, a new technical manual, TM2856,
""'Iaint'nance of Ball and Roller Bearings,"
IS no\\' in the process of pl'eparation for dis
tl'ihution in the neal' future, This manual
gives special attention to inspection pro
(e<lures in' connection with determining
whether hearings are serviceahle or unsel'v
iceable: It would be well for personnel re
sJlonsible for this phase of bearing mainte
nance, especially, to watch for the appear
ance 0\ this manual, th01,lgh of course, every
one who handles bearings will finel the man
tlal of interest and help.
It takes just as mtlch, if not m:>re, equip
ment to win a war as it does to lose one. So
the fact that we are winning many victories
as the days pass does not mean that we can
let up on our efforts to make our ef}uipment
last as long as possible and give the utmost
in efficient 'lervice. Bearings are small in
size, but they are big in importance. Give
lhem the attention they geserve-keep them
clean. keep them adjusted properly, and keep
them lubricated-to keep them rolling. '
A Cure for Shipside Confusion
LIEUTENANT COLONEL E. RUSSELL, TJ'QII8po)'tation Cor/l8
('omnHlIlrl n11el
D
URI1\G tlw d,\Y8 of this war a
c('\'tain transport nrnvcl\ at onc of our
major with some :100 on
roard illlllati,'ntly awaiting- the ll!-ollping of
the gang-plank. On tllP dock an "<lunl numl)('r
of pl'rsol1lll'1 ('alrcrl,' awltit,'d an opportunity
to board ship to welt-oml' th"lll. or to assist in
the debarkation. It might Ill' eXI'Cdel\ that
such n 'situation. e1os"ly reglllat,'d,
would I('a<l to confusion. It did. As a rl'sllit.
it was <lecidl'<I to <,liminal" the cro\\,ll on the
pier by admitting only llL'rsons as w,'re
<'l"scntial to thc opcl'ation and tlwn only wlll'n
called for hy til(' Troop 7IIov(,Il1,!lt Ollicl'r.
The latlcr was diJ'('ctl'd to ctlnduet the' <1<,
uarkation in acelll'dance with tIlt' pl'ocedul'('
outlilH'd in tIl<' lllPllllll'undlllll ht'I,,\\'. Th" pl'O'
('"dul'" olltlilll'd th"I'pin has h(>('n in operation
CPlleral Staff 8l'hool
for sevC'l'ul years nnd has prove',l a most d
f"ctiv(' l'en1l'dy for the situation cited.
The I'eatll'r will no doubt be uy
the heading of the procedure, which lin><
.lnll'Jllll',l slig'htly to COnfOIl\! with a 1('('<'111
\Val' Dl'panllll'nt dirt'ctive. Dccause port "p
between ptlrts as wpH as from
tUlll' ttl time within ports, we h,'re at the
school have allopte<1 for instructiollal Plll"
HOg"" a hypothetical port known as the
Port of and 11,,\'o
located it on Chcsap.:ake Bay below Ralti
Ill'll','. so doing, we have been ahle to
!('ach the prineipl('s of port operation at a
typi"al POl't without harassment tIll' !
variatiolls ('xisting in tIll' flcld. The pl'nt'('du}'('
:I" usc,1 in school
SERVICE FORCES
!.eav,'nworth Port of Embarlwtion
Chesapeak(', :\Id.
DEBARKATIO:-1 11 l'\ovemlwr If)
Ko. :!:1 (
DEHARKATW:-1 PROCEDCRE
1. The following will s('\'ve ag a general guid,' to goverll debarkationg.
a. BOUl'dillf/l'u/'ly (Boards ship as soon as possible).
Troop Movement Offic,,!'
Port Surgeon
E:-'T Medical
:\aval Boarding Officer
Naval Logistical Officer
(1) Contacts Transport CommalHler and
obtaills passenger list; advis('s Trans
port Commandl'r lllethod anti or<1er of
debarl{ation. Gives welcoming address
to RO & TD Group".
(1) Clcars ship per AR 30-1245; notifles
TMO to proceed; a1'1'angcs ,Ietails for
debarking sick and wounded.
(l) Clerk .
(1) Interviews survivors.
(1) Arranges interrogation of civilians.
Total 5
b. Following clrlrdls board ship 1I"hcn dacked, ill orr/er ltftmed:
(1) Customs Inspector
Immigration
Inspector
Baggage 11aster
Debarkation
Officer
Total
(1) Secures declarations on haggagf'.
(1) Arrl).nges to inspect civilians.
( 1 ) Effects transfer baggage from ship to
clock.
(1) Reports to TMO; issues such instruc
tions as may be necessary to accomplish
orderly debarkation ancl control of pas
sengers,
4
A CURE FOR SHIPSIDE CONFUSION
(2) MP Detail:
NCO (1) ReportH to TMO for instructions.
E!\Is (as directed
by TMO)
,
1 (3) Medical attendants
(As required) Relieve attendants provided by CO of Trans
port. (Report to Port Surgeon.)
(.1) Balance Navy Logistical Party:
Control OfficN' (1) Sets up panels for interviewing civil
ians.
Opcrations Officer (1) Sets up palwls for intcrvi('wing civil
ians.
EM Xavy (1) Clerk.
Total 3
e. I'I'iSOtlCl'S of iraI' first to be dcbatked.
d. SCI'victJ PCI'SOlll1('/ debarks in the following on/a:
(1) For duty,
(2) Ambulant sick.
(3) Mental caseR.
(4) Litter cases.
Notp: EMEmiE:-ICY HUSPITAL CASES '1'0 m: EVACUATBD AS DIRECTED BY 1';\10
(Troop 1I10venll'Ilt Officer).
,'. [<,,,lIoU'illg board ship UI! c<wqlldion of deu(lrkatiull "r servIce pcrsvlllld, 011 cull vI' TJIO:
(1) Intellig'('nce Pa!lLls:
Army
Navy Panels for interviewing and clearing' civil
FBI ians for debarkation.
Immigration
(2) W. S. A. Representative Arranges transportation details for mer
chant seamen. _
(:l) Red Cross Repl'l'sentative Handles Red Cross personnel. Arranges
transportation details for other civilians
when called upon by TMO.
f. Civilians debal'!. in fullowing Ul'd!!l':
( 1) Hospital casps Xames and place of to Intelli
(2) Other
gence.
Director Troop l\Iovement Division.
DISTRIBUTION:
Special.
I say, then, that when you have gained a victory, you ought by all means to
pursue it, and to imitate Julius Caesar rather than Hannibal in that respect;
the latter of whom lost the empire of the world by trilling away his time at
Capna, after he had routed the Homans at the battle of Cannae. Caesar, on the
other hand, nevcr rested after the victory. but always pursued and harassed the
enemy after they were broked and flying. with vigor and fury than he
lIttacked them at first.
, -Machiavelli, The Art of Wa,'
The Pillbox--A Trap
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN E, KELLY, Inlantry
('ommnnding omeN', 3,1 HnUnhnn, lnfntltl').
Major Gelleral Han'y L. Tlcadd{."
Commalldilly Gelleml, 95th III/It/dry Di
l'i8iol1, ill {dtN of translllittal of this
article to the editol', stated: "Cololle[
Kel/y is all authority 011 thr subject 0/
pillbo.1' pyhting, hlll'ing had sepent!
1I'eek8' e,"jlcricnc{' ill reduction of the de
fensl's of thc Sie[J/rier/ Linc ill the /Jritl[Je
head /chi('11 th" Il,ith ])i,'isio/! [J({illcd al
SWII'lauicrll, (1('/ JIIIIIIY, Throlluhollt tltis
Division, we pllt into practice the meth
ods which he lias l'eI'Y ably c,1'plail1etl ill
his altiele, Pillbox fiUliting is a special/y;
therc is 110 doubt abollt that."
,-,THl!: ImlTOU,
P
ILLBOXES are traps, tombs frolll which
there is no cseape for thOSl' who clect to
I'emain and tig'ht from within the rabe ,eeu I'
ity of their walls, Perhaps this reads a bit
differently from the usual remarks on German
bunkers, but havin\!; successfully r!'duced
every pillbox we have assaulted, we would
much prefer to attack thcl11 than to defcnd
Olle,
True, th,,\' offer morc protection than the
foxhole aml'are strongly manned and
arme(l, yet from the viewpoint of the attacker,
there are some advantag'es in fighting them,
For example: All pillboxes havc certain
characteristics in common, Thcy all have an
entrance and usually VIII!! oJ/e, This, in itself,
means there is but one route of escape for
JeITY. Cover it and hc is trapped, Anothc)'
gene'ral feature of all pillboxes the tiring
embrasurc or port. On the whole, thcse are
points of weakness, as I shall show later,
Moreover, Sieg-fric<i bunkers are made of
concrete, This gives the occupants a false
sense of security, which in allY military opcra
tion facilitates the attack,
Considering the above-mentioned similar
ities among pillboxes, one might believe that
they are aJl alike, This i,; not true! In thc
Siegfried Line we encountered two general
classes of bunkers, The "embrasure" type
(Figure 1) whose fire power is delivered
from one 01' more opellllll\S in the wails, "nd
the ste<.>1 cupola ]lillbox (Figures 2 and 3)
which has only the tU1'l'et cxpo,ed, the re,1 of
the ]liJIbox b('ing- coverecl by a Ian!;e 1l10lHld of
earth, TIll' former more readily lends it'clf
to CHtl1ouflap:e in a .e:a l'ag'p, :--ht:d.
small house, 01' bnnd and in the
as a ha,'stal'k 01' dirt n]olInc!. The
lattel', ho\\'('ver, is the sl I 011,,1'1', \\,ith ,"'''ItI
liel<ls of tin; in all dirl'l'tions, It h,,, nn Llllld
>,pots and pI'e"ents a Hlost ditlil'ult problem to
the attack"I',
"'hat al'E' the means of .Iefellse "pel1 to the
(icrlll!lns fOl' protectinl!,' these pillb"xcs, alld
how can wc overcome them?
First, riflelllen usually f1n:uJlY trem:he,
around the bunker to kl)ep 0\11' a:-. .... ault pallll''';
fl'llll1 infiltrating' Hlld utllllOle:-;'tcd. OUI
conccntratcd artillcl'Y and mortal' tlre ,,-PIIPI"
ally <leals with thl' problem slH'ce,sfllll>',
ddvillg this sccunty \!;I'OUp illto the I'elathe
,afety of ib hox, }lllrl'over, with hi, own Inell
under l'O\'{}l' now, to (1i!"WOHI'<lQ'(l us fronl at
tacking, the (lefendpI' will !ll'obahly plal'l'
artillery tire on the pillbllx, This {'all he,;t be
combate(1 by (a) feints on othl'l' bUl)k"I",
which will ('allse the tll divi<it' hb
support t1re:-. Inuny uIl11 by (u)
clluntel'battt'ry tirE' on ]lI'edo\1sly <letel'luilll'd
01' Su"pccted .1 CITY artillE'ry and morbI'
positions.
the (;"I'n1'lI1s lay mine Del,]"
m'oulI(1 their bunkel's, Ret'OnlIab,alll'e should
determine the prescnce Ill' ab"enl'e of such a
field, Eng'ineers probing' or a e tOl"
pedo crew with the tcam ('an usually
breach a path' through thc lield, A dillel'Y
tire usually disrupts any casual mines in the
area, though this is not a sure method to clcal'
a fiE'ld,
The principal difficulty in redut'ing pillboxes
lies, however, not in the bunker itself, but in '
the supporting tires which protect it again"t
assault. The neutralization of tl1('se weapons
is the toughest problem confl'onting the at
tacker, The best solution is to fight tire with
tire. With this in mind, all possible fire power
I
.oPlRA1[O FR:l5H WATER PuMP.
t
THE PILLBOX - A TRAP 41;
NOH. S'1MBOL 1D1I".. OICAHS
HAND OPrRATlO V[f1TllATOR.
')v.-1S0l III Ik{)I(AT(') HAND
NOll AlL 51\OWtl
t
S'O"XZ'E,'X 'h,' 5T(L,
.If HltiGES
A A
Fua HE t.
PlIllln\
if available, {';l11 be effectively employ('(\, pin- been discussed. However, the isolation of the
, pointing- the strongest pillboxes. The fll'e f!'Om objective is not its reduction. The attacl-er
these guns U'<ually cncourag'es the occupants must force ,the defenders to surrender. This
tn leave the firing chambers and ,J@scenti to will probably ca!! for a dose-in assault,
the bott()m ()f their sheltet where they at'e though sometimes fire power alone will suffice.
impotent. Ho\\,('\,er, don't on 01' In any case, \ve always try to place a 90-mm,.
mediulll artillery to a steel tUlTeted 75-ml11, or even a 57-111111 gun in position to
pillbox. On one occasion at Ensdol'f, Germany, fire on the bunker from close range, When we
we rolled a 155-mm "Long Tom" to within obtain penetration and put smoke shells into
800 yards of a menacing steel cupola., The the bunker, the occupants often come
is placed on the known and localities
{If ('nemy I'csistanc:e. None of the weapons at
the disllOHal of the attackel' be over
looked. Tl\l1k ,lest and antitank fire
should he plneer! on the 1ll0l'e formidable
bunker:.; the Dbjective, while mu
rhine guns UIlI.! lire or all in
u(j,lition to mortar aile! lig-ht al til1c.>IY, shoul<1
be .Iir,cted on "II targ'pt areas. Hc.>avy artil
lei)'. Slll'h as the R-inch and 240-mnl howitzcrs,
target absorbed five direct hits and hardly
showed the effects at all. Against this same
box, some fifty rounds of 90-mm TD fire was
directed without registering a dent in it, In
the same area we registered hits with 8-inch
howitzers on another box of this type without
visible results. They are really toug-h nuts to
nack.
Thus fal' the means at hand to isolate the
small b(lttlefield around the objective have
42
MILITARY REVIEW
Halide 11';,,11. If don't sunenrler of their
own accord, we broa<lcast to them throup;h a
public adrlress systelll to tell the'llI to give up.
has saved us lives,
often perl'ua<1ing to sUl't'en<1et' without
our l1H:'l1 l1ulldnp:
Frequentl,', howeyer, the above means do
not Rain the and so the assault
whatever adrlitional strength the commander
of the assault group ,Ieems necessary to pi o
teet the operation from small counterattaeh
and other developments, The demolition el'l'\\'
should be large enough to carry the necessary
explosiYes to destroy the box, once it has bpen
captured, '
In order to neutralize any fire that may
-.----------------------------------------------------
Sleno" OF lNTRANCL
II
---.J,
Flr,I'RJo: 2.
SKETCH OF PILLBoX
is in or<1el', The groups will YUl'Y in
,ize, dependinR on the situation. It will p;en
erally consist of the a,,,ault teams, the sup
port and group, and the demolition
crew. The a:;;sault teams should contain H
leader, some riflemen, and at lea"t one man
cal'l'ying- thp chal;g'e III hreach the bunker.
The minimum number that can accomplish the
mitision should be employed. Don't expose u
platoon where half a squad will succeed. The
support and security group should consist of
come from the bllllkpr or frolll fil'e trenche,
protecting it, the assault team l11ust carry a
lal'P;e proportion of automatic weapons, 'Ye
have found that BAR's, Rubmachine gunR, and
automatic carbines aJ'e particularly yuhwblp
for work. We haye also USE',] flame
throwel's in this capacity. All the membels
of the party should carry smoke and frap;mcn
tation grenades for use against enemy re
sistance, both inside and outside of the box.
Moreover, there should be at least two such
THE PILLBOX - A TRAP"
'43
teams-one <l fOl' the other,
"should the unavoidable and ('""pceted nee,1
il(fore the on the hunker is made,
plans must be laid and ea rried out to "button
up" the alHl iil'ing ports from
which it may itself, Usually this t(lsk
i, the 'sullpol't group which, from
its dose pusi lion to the hox, may be able to
POUI' withering' ilre into thes!' opening's, forc
ing' the occupants to close up the trap com
pll'tdy in unlel' to save themselves: This lire
is lifte,1 when the assault team masks it, at
which time the latter takes up the neutraliza
tIOn of these defenses, When the engineor with
the charge sig'mlls for the til'e to be raised, he
rushL's in lind places the explosive at the point
,elected 1'01' hreaching',
Which "hould hl' in sueh an action-a
,at,.:ht.'l dUll"}'!"(,.' 0)' a 'ht'l'hiVt'.u,? \Ve have ('111
pIIlY,',] both With success. The main difficulty
in tlsing a "beehiye" it; thut it must" he placed
lllore carefully than a satchel charge or it will
be of little value, JIowevcl', when it call. be
positioned, as in an embrasure, it is
I!"l'nt'l'ally mOl'!, effpcti\-e than a ehat'ge
of the sallie wcig'ht. On one of OUI' nig'ht op
erations pillboxes \\"e placed a thirt;)
five potlnd "beehive" on the top of a stee)
cupola, A satchel charge woul.d have been
ineffective, but the "beehive" droye a hole
into the turret, spiattcl'ing m'1Jtcn steel in
the inside, On the other hand, have as
saulted pillboxes where it was impossible to
place a "beehive" properly, In these instances,
satchel charges were effectively ,Ye
have pushed them,. attached to poles, into
otherwise inaccessible positions. Standing on
the top of turreted pillboxes, we have swung
g,itchel charges attached to the end of gOllle
tel<'phOlle wire into the entrances of the pill
boxes, hlowing in the doors. However, I believe
that, where ther can be placed correctly, "bee
hives" should be used.
The bunker should be bl'eached where it is
.. Thp satchel charJ((' del'hes itl' from the fact
that it is t'nrried in a cloth halo{ with a carrying str.ap.
The "bcehl\ e" charge I't'hembles a beehive in shape.
The dTec>t of a satchel cral'ge is that of an ordinnry
(i,\ plo!Sj\'e charge. while the "bechi\'e" charge is a
'lliHnt 1 I"h;ll''.!' rrivinl! mnl'e npnetl,ation in the direction
in which the b"se points,-THE EDITOR.
most vulnerable-where the concrete walls are"
not so thick. There are two weak points to
all pillboxes, the entnlllce and the
or firing port. Where there are embrasures
(there alie 1I0ne in the steel turret-type box),
we believe that the charges should be placed
ng'ainst them rather than against the door,
for these reasons: (1) The door is usually
covered by fire that is "zeroed" in on it from
boxes to the rear. (2) Aftel' hreaching the
<1001', one lUu,t hreak down othel' doors dosing
of!' the narrow conidors inside the box to get
to the defenders in the firing' chambers. These
doors usually are covel'ed by fire from small
ports facing' them. (3) And of course most of
the defenders are in the firing' compartment,
and so, when a charge placed at the embra
explodes, it kills or stuns most of the
occupants,
After the box has been breached, the assault
team should toss in smoke and fragmentation
g'renades to inflict furthC'I' casualties on the
defender,.
At this time, it is necessary to wait some
five or ten minutes for the slIIoke and dust
to clear before attempting to enter the box
through the blown opening'.
Whenever possible during this period we
elllploy a public address system to inform the
occupants of their positioll and to warn them
to leave the box or die, When a public address
system is not available, "a German-speaking
soldier can call out the pertinent illstructions.
If a prisoner is available, we usually send him
to influence the defenders to sunender. 'Ve
take all these steps, not from any heartfelt
sympathy for the JelTies in the pillbox, but
to save possible casualties among our own
men. Generally, the "supermen" quit at about
this time-those that can still walk coming
out of the bunker with great alacrity,
Howe:ver, the few times we have had to
assault the interior of the box, we haye been
successful, adhering to the tried and true
principle of fire power, We pOUl' all the fire we
can into the box and sweep from rooin to room,
killing' all the "diehards."
This entire operation, when properly
planned and executed under the best condi
tions, will take from ten to twenty minutes.
44
MILITARY REVIEW
The best condjtions, however, rarely prevail
and the inevitable and c,l'perted difficulties
arise. it' will take longer than
twenty minutes when charges do not blow,
communications "go ont," key Illen are hit, 01'
Gcrm!\n suppol,ting fire has not been com
The best solution to these
and other contingencies is to e,l:pect them and
be prepared with alternate plans, teams,
leaders, and explosives.
The job has not been completed, however,
until the bunker has been made unserviceable
for future use. There are a numbcr of ways to
accomplish this. \Ve can seal off the
by melting the doom to the box with thel'l1lite
grenades, This is not the best solution. ft)I' if
we abandon the boxcs anu Jel'l'Y can get thelll.
all he need do to re-enter thenl is to melt th"
welding alHI remove the doors, Another way ttl
seal the entrances is by shoveling' dirt oV('r
them, Tankdozel's can oftcn accomplish this
quite effectively, but here too. if the 0PPOI'
tunity presents itself, the can dig' his
way in and once mol'l' defend the box, \\'e
believe the best method for denying' t'alltut'ed
boxes to future use by thE' E'nE'llIY is to d,,
molish them, It normally requires SOIlIC 700
to 1,000 pounds of T"-IT to destroy a German
bunker completely, It does no g'ood merely to
crack them. they be converted into a pile
of rubble, This we do!
The German ArillY believed that pillboxes
were the answer to the that to at
tempt to crush them would prove too
for the attacker. Instead. they have been
crushed. anu each one that defended
proved to be a trap for the Germans inside, I
do not mean to imply that it is easy to capture
and destroy a pillbox, On the contrary. it
a most difficult operation refluiring cal'efnl
reconnaissance. planning. and execution,
In Fraulautel'l1 and Ensdot'f. Get'many,
fortified towns in the industrial Saar Valley.
we had many experiences attacking' pilboxes
of all ty.pes in the Siegfried Line, There is no
one way to prescribe for the reduction of
enemy bllnkers. However, the following de
tailed account of the actual reduction of a
pillbox underlines the application of the gen
eral principles discussed above:
During the first part of January 1945, my
battalion \vas protecting' a bl'idgehead over
the Saar mver near Saal'Iautern. Germany,
Our mission was to maintain an active defl'nse
and knock out any German pillboxes that
menaced the bl'idg'eheacl. One of tlH'se buukPrs,
No, 337. continued to be a thom in our "ide,
So on about 5 January we decided to capture
anu uestroy it. The opCl'ation was set fur 7
January, Reconnaissance was immediately
initiated to determine the shape. size. and de
fenses of the objective. All this information
\YUS obtained priOlO to the ope1'ation
the box a couple of days later,
Not controlling; the buildillg's (Row "A")
pamlleling' the riVt'I' IIOt' the IJillLox('s protl't't
iug its bank (see Fie;ul'l' 4). we decided to
neutralize both hy the houses. and
from there. covering' the leal' of th" bunlwrs,
Hence. \\e pushed out thl' next day against
the Llol'k of buildings and by 1700. aftl'l'
srattered resistance. o('cupic,1 the Piltire I'o\\',
From positions in these houses we also
planned to direct fire on aI'eas not under oUI'
control to the north and ea,t of our "bjl'ctive,
In addition. the nig'ht bl'fol'e the as"ault. we
occupied the hou,es ;,f
the objedive to s(,('UI'e the elo-!'-t
point'from which to "jullIP off,"
The fire plan fOl' neutralizing' t;el'lIIan "up
porting' positions callcd for Ikht and lII('diulII
artillery at H-houl' to drive to eovel' all G('I
mans in fire trenches, The kept ('on
tinuous hamssing fin' on trenches in the area
during the assault. and in addition. the larg't'st
,uPllorting pillb,)x on the ridge to tllC' east m1>; i
taken under fire by an 8-inch howitzer, At i
the sante time. a sneen of smokc blankett<J ;
the entire al'ea. concealine; from ob- l
sen'el', the exad location of OUI' operations i
ami preventing aimed fire fl'Om being' directed J
on the assault team aftel' its disco\'CI'Y, It was I
planned that smoke ]lilts anll mort:11'5 ,i
would be used for thi>; but tlw ,\inll ;
were unfavorabll! with tht result that foul' Ilf
our .gl-mm mortars had to he employed to !
complete the screening', The othel' two 81-mlll
mortars and all 'the GO-mm mOI'laI'S in the
battalion were used to thieken the artillery
fires. At thi" time too, riflemen and a platoon
THE PILLBOX -' A TRAP
RETRACT PERISCOPE ---.......
EA'RTH rill ------....
lZ"STEtL TURRET
2 MOUNT M.G
(rJRE FROM ANY PORT)
Sedion"AA"
F,GURE 3.
..
OnSERVATION TYPE PILLBQX
46
MILITARY REVIEW
of machine gunners ill thebuildinQ'" liMth' of
the objective fired on knowl1 Hnt!
enemy locations to the south and (''1st. T\\,tl
other pllltoons of riflemen aJ1(1 machine ll;un
ners in the newly occupied rin'l' block fil'l'd
on housef< and pillboxes to the north and east.
A plutoon of tank plueed din>et
fire 011 the pillboxe. to the and en"t of
Yet in spite of the fact that for eonmlUnica
(iOll between the M'salllt g'1'OUP'S position and
the hattalion nbsen'ation 110:;t we used two
SCR 53!l's, two wil'c lines, and an SCR 300,
we hu,l to rely O'n rUllners at one time in the
operation becnllse we hnd no other contact.
At H-hour one tank destroyer (90-mm)
tirl,,1 on the obj('etive ane! piel'ced the wall
r- TURRET TYPE. PILLBOXE.S----.,
aJ' a' J "'a
z ...
,1,- TO. POSITIONS
5,0 190VARDS
(APPROX)
our objective. Thus all the supporting posi
tions were neutralized by laru;e :In,1 small
caliber, direct and indir('ct tires.
The assault platoon was orQanir.c,j at the
"jump-off" point into a secul'ity and support
group, a demolition crew, and two assault
teams. We tried to foresee all conting-encies.
preparing more charg'e:;, fuzes, personnel, and
equipment than we thought we woul,1 need.
with five rounds. Then, using a public address
sYbtelll, we called on the defenders to come
out, Heeeiving no response, the assault team,
consisting of two men with BAR's, two men
with submachine guns. and one eng'ineel' with
a beehive, under the covel' of supporting fin>s.
attacked the box, placed the charge, lit the
fuze, and withdrew. But at this time the op
eration ceased to proceed accol',ling to plan.
.
THE PILLBOX - A TRAl>
The charge did not explo,le ancl a. chance centration. Jerry- as all of his boxes regis- :,
"round" killed the aSRault engineer. The as tercd and RO, thou