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Kentucky v. Sarah Jones - Motion to Suppress

Kentucky v. Sarah Jones - Motion to Suppress

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Published by David S. Gingras

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Published by: David S. Gingras on Aug 21, 2012
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04/26/2014

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COMMON\ilEALTII
OF
KENTUCKY
KENTON
CIRCUIT
COURT
FOURTH
DTVISIONCASE
No. 12-CR-260-001
COMMONWEALTH
OF
KENTUCKY,
Plaintiff
SARAH
JONES,
Defendant
CASE No.12-CR260-002COMMONWEALTH
OF
KENTUCKY,
Plaintiff
CHERYL
JONES,
Defendant
vs.and
VS
JUN
11
2012
LI
tlt)
KENTONCOURT
MOTION
TO
SUPPRESS
The
Defendants,
Sarah
Jones and
Cheryl
Jones,
move
this
Court
to
suppress
all
text
message
evidence obtained
in
the
abovecaptioned
case.
1
v
 
I.
THEDEFENDANTSHAD
A
REASONABLEEXPECTATION
OF
PRIVACYIN
THE
CONTENT
OFTHE
TEXT
MESSAGES
SENT
TOCY
AND
THEREFORE
HAVESTANDINGTOCHALLENGE
THE
NOVEMBER
23,2OTISEARCH
WARRANTAND
ALL
SEARCH
WARRANTSRELATINGTOCONTENT
OF
TEXT
MESSAGES...........................
3
II.
ALL
EVIDENCEOBTAINEDAS
A
RESULT
OF
THE
SEARCH
WARRANTS
SHOULD
BE
SUPPRESSED
BECAUSESIGNING
JUDGE
WASNOTNEUTRAL
AND
DETACHED,
THE
AFFIDAVIT
DID
NOT
SUPPORT
A
FINDING
OF
PROBABLECAUSE,
OFFICER
INMANWAS
RECKLESS
IN
REGARD
TO
THE
TRUTH
OF THE
STATEMENTS
CONTA]NED
IN
THE
AFFIDAVIT,
AND
THE
DEFENDANT'S
TzuAL
I{AS
BEEN
PREJUDICED
BY
THE
PROSECUTOR'S
MISCONDUCT
...6
A.
Judge
Easterling'sself-initiated
ex-parte
rneeting
with
the
alleged
victim,
his
closeties to
Dixie
Heights
l{igh
School
patents,and
hisprevious
involvment
in
the disposition
of
tickets
for
students
of
Dixie
Heights,
including
twice
fo¡
the
alleged
victim,lend
at
least
an
apPearance
that he
was
not
a
neutral and
detached
magistrate
as
required
by
the
state
and
federal
constitutions.
B.
The
Affidavit
Attached
to
the
November30th
Search
Warrant
is Insufficicntto
Allow
an
Interpretation
of
Probable
Cause because
it
is
Based
Ahnost
Entirelyon
Hearsay,
DoubleHearsay,
and
Rumor
with
AlmostNoCouoborative
Evidence
TZ
C. The
Aiïidavit
with
the
Inclusion
of
HearsayEvidenceis
notSufficient
to
Wa¡rant
a
Finding
of
Probable
Cause
18
D.
TheNumerousDiscrepancies
with
the
Subpoenas and
War¡ants
.............
19
E.
The November
23,2017Affid¿vit
Contained
Little
TruthfulInfo¡mation,
and
the
Affianr
Demonstrated
her
Reckless
Disregard
for
the
Truth by
Portraying the
Information
as Factual
F.
TheCommonwealthAttorney'sDisclosure
of
Sealed
Evidence,
Amounting
toProsecutorial
Misconduct,
hasRendered
theDefendant's Pending
Trial
Fundamentally
Unfair
..................25
In.
ALL
EVIDENCEOBTAINED THROUGH SEARCHWARRANTS
AFTER
THE
NOVEMBER
23,2011
SEARCH WARRANTSSHOULD
BE
SUPPRESSED
AS
FRUIT
OF
THEPOISONOUSTREE.
27
iV.
TI{E
GOOD
FAITH
EXCEPTION
TO
THE
EXCLUSIONARY
RULE
IS
NOT
APPLICABLE
BECAUSE
AIIFIDAVIT
WAS NOTHING
MORE
THAN
A
SUPERFLUOUS
BAREBONES
AFFIDAVIT,THEAFFIANT WAS
RECKLESS
IN
REGARDS
TO
THE
TRUTH
CIF
THE INFORMATTONCONTAINED
IN
THE
AFFIDAVIT,AND
THE
SIGNINGJUDGEWAS
NOT NEUTRAL
OR
DETACHED............
282
VII.
COI\ICLUSION
30
 
I.
THE
DEFENDANTS
IIAD
A
REASONABLEEXPECTATIONOF
PRIVACYINTHE
CONTENTOF
THETEXT
MESSAGESSENT
TO
CY ANDTHEREFOREHAVE
STANDTNG
TO
CHALLENGETHE
NOVEMBER
23,2011
SEARCH
\ryARRANT
ANI)
ALL
SEARCH
WARRANTS
REI.ATING
TOCONTENT
OF
TEXT
MESSAGES
A
defendantthat
rnakes
â
motion
to
suppress
evidencethatthe
govertment
intends
to
use
against
themat
trial
mustshowthat theywere
a
victimof
asearchandseizure
rathe¡
than
one
whoclaimsprejudice
only
throughthe
use
of
evidence gathered
as
aconsequence
of
a
searchor
seizuredirected
at
someone
else.
Jones
v.
Unitetl
States,362
U.S.
257
(1960),overruled
on
otlxer
graunds
by
U.
S.
v.
Salvucci,
448U.S.
83
(1930).
If
the
person
had
a
reaso¡able
expectation
of
privacy
in
theitems
seized,
they
are
a
victim
of
a
search
and
seizure.
The
standard
is
sometimes
broken
down
intotwo
steps:
1) did
that
person
exhibit
subjective
expectation
of
privacy,
and
2)
wasthe
expectation
¡easonable
such
as
to
be
accepted
as
legitimateby
society.
Smith
v.
Maryland,44ZV.S.
735,
739
(1979).
In
Katz
v.
United
States,389U.S. 347 (1967).
the
Supreme
Courr
first
recognized
a
privacy
expectation
in
the
contents
of
atelephoneconversation
in
a closed
public
phone
booth.
Id.
at
353.In
Smith
v,
Maryland,
theSupreme
Court refined
that
privacy
expectation,
noting
the
distinctionbetween
thecontents
of
a telephone
call
(for
which
a
legitimate
privacy
expectation
exists)andtheactual phone
numbers
dialed
(no privacy
expectation).
Id.,44Z
U.S.
at
i43-44
(1979).
However,
when
it
comes
to
new forms
of
communications
such as
email
or
text
messages,
the
Supreme
Court
has
been
reluctant
to
answer questionsabout
whena
reasonable
expectation
of
privacy
exists.
See
City ofOntario v.
Quon,l30
S.Cr.
2619,2629
(2010)
("The
judiciary
riskserror
by
elaborating
too
fully
on
the
FourthAmendmentimplications
of
emerging
technologybeforeitsrole
in
society
has
become
clear." The courtheld
there
wasno
reasonable
expectation
ofprivacy
in
text
messeages
sent and
receivedoncity-ownedwireless
equipment.)
a
J

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