SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

WASHINGTON, DC 20543-0001
August 23, 2012
Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
RE: Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems and Cook, et al.
(FLSC No. SCll-1622)
Dear Mr. Gillespie:
The above-entitled petition for writ of certiorari was sent by commercial carrier
August 20, 2012 and received August 22, 2012. The papers are returned for the
following reason(s):
The petition is ollt-of-time. The date of the lower court judgment or order denying a
timely petition for rehearing was March 12, 2012. Therefore, the petition was due on or
before June 11,2012. Rules 13.1,29.2 and 30.1. When the time to file a petition for a
writ of certiorari in a civil case (habeas action included) has expired, the Court no longer
has the power to review the petition.
The May 22, 2012 order from the Florida Supreme Court does not appear to be a
order denying a timely petition for rehearing.
Enclosures
August 20, 2012
Clerk of Court
Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, NE
Washington, DC 20543
Dear Clerk of Court:
Enclosed is my original Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States, in forma pauperis, with ten copies, for review of the judgment in the Supreme Court of
Florida, case number SC11-1622. Also enclosed is the following:
Rule 39 Motion to proceed in forma pauperis with declaration, original and 10 copies.
Rule 29 Proof of Service with declaration, original.
Appendixes A-F to the Petition. (Rule 14.1 (h)(i)(vi))
Motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem.
On August 13, 2012 I submitted a Rule 13.5 Application to Justice Thomas for the following:
Application to Extend Time To File A Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari, with
Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem, and
Notice of Extraordinary Circumstances; and Appendix.
At the time I submitted the Rule 13.5 Application, I believed the 90-day period to file a petition
for a writ of certiorari ended August 22, 2012. Since then I learned that the 90-day period ends
today, August 20, 2012. I am disabled with physical and mental impairments and was confused.
As of this morning, I do not have a response to my Rule 13.5 Application. Therefore today I
submitted a petition, because the 90-day period is absolutely mandatory and jurisdictional. The
Clerk will not file any petition for a writ of certiorari that is jurisdictionally out of time. See, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. 2101. S. Ct. R. 13.2. My petition today is shorter than planned,just five pages,
because that is all I could do without an extension of time. Thank you.
/,7
//' ./ c,/ V
/./ / ( I ,( .".'"7
/ '>..
Loop ///
R----
Ocala, Florida 34481
Telephone: (352) 854-7807 AUG 22 2012
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net
Enclosures
cc: Ryan Christopher Rodems, counsel for Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., et aI., Respondents
error
No: _______________________
_______________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________
NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER
VS.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS
________________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
The Supreme Court of Florida - Case Number SC11-1622
Decided March 12, 2012 - Rehearing Denied May 22, 2012
____________________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Submitted August 20, 2012
by
Neil J. Gillespie, Petitioner, pro se, non-lawyer,
an adult man disabled with physical and mental impairments.
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Telephone: (352) 854-7807
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Is there a right to mental integrity in civil litigation as a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest, protection from opposing counsel bullying a pro se litigant with abusive phone calls,
insulting letters, harassing behavior in the courthouse, and a false affidavit alleging violence?
2. Is an indigent, mentally ill civil contemnor entitled to counsel when facing arrest and
incarceration for civil contempt on a writ of bodily attachment?
3. Can a judge dismiss at the civil contempt hearing a public defender appointed to
represent an indigent, mentally ill civil contemnor facing arrest on a writ of bodily attachment?
4. What accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a disabled
civil litigant entitled during a full deposition conducted while involuntarily confined in a
municipal detention facility for reasons other than serving a sentence resulting from conviction
for a criminal offense? What ADA accommodations during regular court proceedings can
prevent opposing counsel from bullying and harassing a disabled pro se litigant?
5. Can a lawyer representing a disabled client in civil litigation prevent the client from
testifying in his own case because opposing counsel harasses with intent to upset the client?
6. Do the rules of attorney disqualification as held in McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc.,
890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995, apply to counsel litigating against a former client in the same
or substantially related matter as the prior representation? What duty does counsel have under
bar rules to disclose to the court legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing pro se?
7. What is the fiduciary duty of a lawyer to a client, and a former client? Can a lawyer
pursue vexatious litigation against a former client, a libel counterclaim over a letter written about
a closed bar complaint, in order to obtain sanctions and force a settlement?
8. Can a settlement agreement and release obtained from a disabled and mentally impaired
civil litigant during a coercive confinement be rescinded upon prompt notice to the parties?
9. Can a mentally ill attorney, one with health issues, provide effective assistance of
counsel when the disabled attorney failed to obey the clients written and verbal instruction not
to accept a walk-away settlement agreement, made when the client was unable to give consent?
10. Does a disabled, mentally impaired civil litigant have a right to effective counsel while
in coercive custody without disability accommodation to force a settlement in civil litigation?
11. Is a pro se litigant entitled to the same case management as lawyers to avoid discovery
sanctions as described in Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 STETSON L. REV. 323?
Can a pro se litigant be prevented from representing himself, or filing documents? Can a judge
prevent a pro se litigant from attending hearings telephonically, while allowing lawyers to appear
by phone? Can a pro se use JAWS, Judicial Automated Workflow System, to schedule hearings?
12. How can pro se litigants overcome the lawyer-judge bias described by Prof. Benjamin
Barton in his book The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal System?
LIST OF PARTIES
[v'All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.
[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of
all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this
petition is as follows:
1
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner pro se Neil J. Gillespie (Gillespie) respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to
review the judgment below.
I. OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida in case no. SC11-1622 appears at Appendix
3 to the petition and is unpublished.
The opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal, Florida, in case 2D10-5197 appears
at Appendix 1 to the petition and is unpublished.
II. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. 1257(a).
The opinion of The Florida Supreme Court is dated March 12, 2012. A copy of that
decision appears at Appendix 3.
A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied May 22, 2012, and a copy of the
order denying rehearing appears at Appendix 4. The petition for rehearing, and addendum, are
included in Appendix D to show what actually happened. Rule 14.1(h)(i).
A Rule 13.5 Application for an extension of time to file this petition for a writ of
certiorari was submitted August 13, 2012. (Appendix 5). As of this morning there was no
response. The Application included a Motion for Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem, gave
Notice of Extraordinary Circumstances, and argued for consolidation with two other cases in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 12-11213-C and 12-11028-B. Gillespie
incorrectly stated in his Application that Gillespie believes the time in Florida case no. SC11-
4
2
1622 expires August 22, 2012. (Appendix 5, 4). Since then Gillespie learned that the 90-day
period ends today, August 20, 2012. Gillespie is disabled with mental impairments and was
confused. Gillespie calculated the correct 90-day period with a date calculator he found online.
Therefore today Gillespie submitted this petition for a writ of certiorari, because the 90-
day period is absolutely mandatory and jurisdictional. The Clerk will not file any petition for a
writ of certiorari that is jurisdictionally out of time. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 2101. S. Ct. R. 13.2.
This petition today is shorter than Gillespie planned, just five pages, because that is all he could
do without an extension of time. A petition five pages or less does not require a table of contents
or a table of cited authorities. Gillespie will rely on Rule 14.1(h)(i), an Appendix may include
(vi) any other material the petitioner believes essential to understand the petition; and Rule
14.1(h) If the material required by this subparagraph is voluminous, it may be presented in a
separate volume or volumes with appropriate covers.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
First Amendment, Pro se speech, pro se right to petition for a governmental redress of grievances
on equal footing given by courts to lawyers;
Fifth Amendment, protection from abuse of government authority in litigation;
Eighth Amendment, prohibition from excessive fines, $11,550 in sanctions;
Fourteenth Amendment, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, and a right to mental
integrity as a liberty interest.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the
ADAAA; The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et. seq.; Section 825.101(4), Florida
Statutes; Florida Bar Rule 4-8.4(d). Constitutional Challenge to Fla. Statute 57.105, sanctions
for pro se, in conflict with Professionalism and Litigation Ethics, 28 STETSON L. REV. 323.
3
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Gillespie is an indigent, fifty-six (56) year-old single man, law abiding, college educated,
and a former business owner, disabled with physical and mental impairments. (Appendix C, D).
Gillespies litigation against his former lawyers, Barker, Rodems & Cook. PA, is to recover
$7,143 stolen during their prior representation of Gillespie. Ryan Christopher Rodems is
unethically representing his firm against Gillespie, a former client of the small three-partner
firm, contrary to well-established law and ethics rules, see McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc.,
890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. Mr. Rodems strategy has been, since 2006, to inflict severe
emotional distress on Gillespie who he knows to be especially vulnerable, through an abuse of
power in a position of dominance. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted
Gillespie leave to amend his motion for disability accommodation, and it was submitted August
6, 2012. (Appendix D). Gillespie argued for a Right to Mental Integrity as a Fourteenth
Amendment Liberty Interest, see Washington Et Al. v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). Gillespie
has a record of impairment since birth. Gillespie is also regarded by others as being impaired.
The record shows Gillespie has major depression, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
diabetes type II adult onset, traumatic brain injury (TBI), velopharyngeal incompetence (VPI)(a
speech disorder), craniofacial disorder, and impaired hearing. Gillespie argued in his motion:
8. The right to bodily integrity and security of person includes mental integrity, that is,
freedom from mental and psychological abuse. The right to safely pursue justice is a
fundamental civil right that underscores a litigants right not to be subjected to physical,
sexual, mental or emotional violence inside or outside the court, either by private
attorneys or by judges and people acting on the part of the state. Law already recognizes
the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. Litigants in civil
proceedings must be free from mental or emotional violence, or their Constitutionally
protected rights, including due process, are rendered meaningless.
Gillespies petition to the Supreme Court of Florida in SC11-1622 (Appendix 6)
addressed why the proceedings in the Second District Court of Appeal (2dDCA) should not have
4
been dismissed, and sought to rescind a Settlement Agreement And General Mutual Release
dated June 21, 2011 obtained from Gillespie while he was in coercive custody on a writ of bodily
attachment improperly obtained by Mr. Rodems through ex-parte hearings. The public defender
was appointed to represent Gillespie June 1, 2011 on civil contempt with threat of incarceration
but the judge dismissed the defender and immediately issued an arrest order. (Appendix 7). In
this case Gillespie did not hold the keys to his release; Rodems held the keys, and he planned a
coercive confinement to force Gillespie to sign a settlement in the state and federal cases. The
record shows Gillespie was impaired and could not make a decision to sign the agreement.
Counsel Eugene Castagliuolo made the decision to settle because judges have mud on their
shoes; but he too was impaired with health issues, and had a conflict with the defender.
The state court case commenced August 11, 2005. Gillespie prevailed on Defendants
motion to dismiss February 13, 2006, and established a case for fraud and breach of contract.
Partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible for the fraud or negligence of
another partner when the later acts within the scope of the ordinary business of an attorney.
Smyrna Developers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1965).
There is was actual conflict of interest in Mr. Rodems and Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA
representing themselves. Mr. Rodems strategically disrupted the tribunal on March 6, 2012 with
a false affidavit to the court about an attack. This was later disproved by a police investigation.
Mr. Rodems obtained $11,550 sanctions against Gillespie for a misplaced defense to the
counterclaim, and discovery mistakes. Almost the entire case, from 2006 through 2011, was
spent by Mr. Rodems securing sanctions and executing on the $11,550 judgment, including
garnishment of Gillespies exempt Social Security. In 2007 Gillespie retained out-of-town
counsel Robert W. Bauer for the libel counterclaim. Mr. Bauer reinstated Gillespies dismissed
claims, but unable to overcome the misconduct of Mr. Rodems, he withdrew. Gillespie filed May
2006
5, 2010 Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Appendix B) with leave of court, precluding Final
Summary Judgment September 28, 2010 on the original complaint, where Gillespie was removed
from the hearing. (Appendix 8). Gillespie brought his dispute to court for a lawful adjudication,
but did not find justice, only a pattern of racketeering activity. (Appendix 9).
v. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
Gillespie's experience represents what many, perhaps most, pro se litigants find when they bring
a matter to court: A broken system. Gillespie's experience also shows the torture suffered by the
disabled in court. Under McPartland Mr. Rodems should have been disqualified April 25, 2006.
Rodems' independent professional judgment was materially limited by his own interest and
conflict. This case continued to everyone's detriment. Through my website, people across
America contact me with similar stories. This is not American Exceptionalism. Law Professor
Benjamin H. Barton, author of The Lawyer-Judge Bias in the American Legal System, says that
virtually all American judges are former lawyers, a shared background that results in the lawyer-
judge bias. Barton argues that these lawyer-judges instinctively favor the legal profession in their
decisions and that this bias has far-reaching and deleterious effects on American law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Please grant this petition for writ of certiorari, together with such other and further relief as this
Court deems just and equitable, and rescind the "Settlement Agreement And General Mutual
Release" dated June 21, 2011. (Appendix 4). Respectfully submitted August 20,2012.
,eil J. G ~ p i e , Petiti er pro se
5
No: _______________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________
NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER
VS.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS
________________________
APPENDIX VOLUME A
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
______________________
Appendix 1 Decision of Second District Court of Appeals, Florida, 2D10-5197
Appendix 2 Decision of State Trial Court, Hillsborough County, Florida, 05-CA-7205
Appendix 3 Decision of The Supreme Court of Florida, SC11-1622
Appendix 4 Order of The Supreme Court of Florida Denying Rehearing, SC11-1622
Appendix 5 Rule 13.5 Application, Extend Time To File, Guardian Ad Litem, etc.
Appendix 6 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Supreme Court of Florida, SC11-1622
Appendix 7 Public Defender appointed, relieved, order for Gillespies arrest.
Appendix 8 Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie, removed from Summary Judgment hearing.
Appendix 9 Motion to Reconsider, RICO, C.A.11, 12-11028-B May-30-2012
No: _______________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________
NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER
VS.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS
________________________
APPENDIX VOLUME B
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
______________________
Appendix B Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, May 5, 2010, with motion.
Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, et al., 05-CA-7205
Rule 1.190(a), Fla.R.Civ.P. A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of
course. Leave of court shall be given freely when justice so requires.
A court should not dismiss a complaint without leave to amend unless the privilege
of amendment has been abused or it is clear that the complaint cannot be amended
to state a cause of action. Trotter v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. 868 So.2d 593.
Procedural rule allowing amended pleadings to relate back to the date of the
original pleading is to be construed liberally. Rule 1.190(c). Stirman v. Michael
Graves 983 So.2d 626.
No: _______________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________
NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER
VS.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS
________________________
APPENDIX VOLUME C
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
______________________
Appendix C Verified Notice of Filing Disability Information of Neil J. Gillespie, May 27, 2011.
Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, et al., 05-CA-7205
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.
Under Title II of the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C.
12132. "A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures
when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the
public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature
of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. 35.130(7). "Public entity" includes "any State or
local government" and "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality
of a State or States or local government ...." 42 U.S.C. 12131(1).
Under Title II of the ADA, "[d]isability means, with respect to an individual, a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a
record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment." 28 C.F.R.
35.104. "The phrase physical or mental impairment" includes "[a]ny mental or psychological
disorder such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities." 28 C.F.R. 35.104. "The phrase major life activities means
functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 28 C.F.R. 35.104. A "qualified individual with a
disability" is "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to
rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a
public entity." 42 U.S.C. 12131(2).
No: _______________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________
NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER
VS.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS
________________________
APPENDIX VOLUME D
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
______________________
Appendix D Consolidated Amended Motion for Disability Accommodation, August 6, 2012
With Appendixes 1-3, Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, et al., 12-11213-C
The Right to Mental Integrity as a Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest
Washington Et Al. v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)
Supreme Court of United States, No. 88-599
Argued October 11, 1989 - Decided February 27, 1990
As relevant to Gillespie and this motion: (footnotes omitted)
The Court acknowledges that under the Fourteenth Amendment "respondent possesses a
significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs," ante,
at 221, but then virtually ignores the several dimensions of that liberty. They are both physical
and intellectual. Every violation of a person's bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty.
The invasion is particularly intrusive if it creates a substantial risk of permanent injury and
premature death.[1] Moreover, any such action is degrading if it overrides a competent person's
choice to reject a specific form of medical treatment.[2] And when the purpose 238*238 or effect
of forced drugging is to alter the will and the mind of the subject, it constitutes a deprivation of
liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense.
"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
No: _______________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________
NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER
VS.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS
________________________
APPENDIX VOLUME E
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
______________________
Appendix E Consolidated Notice of Pro Se Electronic Case Filing Prohibition by District Court
In Support Of:
Consolidated Amended Motion for Disability Accommodation, August 6, 2012
Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, et al., 12-11213-C
The Right to Mental Integrity as a Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest

No: _______________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________
NEIL J. GILLESPIE - PETITIONER
VS.
BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, PA, and WILLIAM J. COOK - RESPONDENTS
________________________
APPENDIX VOLUME F
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
______________________
Appendix F Affidavit of Neil J. Gillespie, Conflict of Interest and ADA denial by Florida Judge
Claudia R. Isom, in case 05-CA-7205, Hillsborough Co.
In Support Of:
Consolidated Amended Motion for Disability Accommodation, August 6, 2012
Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, et al., 12-11213-C
The Right to Mental Integrity as a Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest