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Epistemology and Experience

Epistemology and Experience

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Published by: transcritique on Jan 15, 2009
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Epistemology and Experience
A. K. Rogers
The Philosophical Review
, Vol. 7, No. 5. (Sep., 1898), pp. 466-484.
The Philosophical Review
is currently published by Cornell University.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/sageschool.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgWed Feb 6 18:54:39 2008
are never sure in philosophy just where we are going to betripped up on our postulates, but, on the whole, it is prob-ably safe to assume that there is such
thing as a knowing ex-perience, and that this experience may be objective in the Kantiansense of the word, that it may present features, namely, whichmark it off clearly from other experiences which we call sub-jective. Knowing is thus a process within experience, and for thepresent we may waive the question whether we ought to go onand ask whose experience this is.We are able to do this forthe reason that each philosopher can philosophize only on thebasis of a single experience, which for him is a unity, and so henaturally comes to speak of experience in general, without speci-fying what experience he means
and he can be intelligible be-cause each of his hearers, too, has his own unity of experience,which for him again is experience pure and simple.Taking, then, experience, which for the philosopher is one, wefind that it breaks up for thought into a great variety of elements.There is, indeed, nothing whatever belonging to experience whichcannot thus be made an object of thought. And we soon findthat there are certain typical forms of thought, certain rubricsunder which the world of experience gets placed, and which, in-deed, constitute its objectivity as a world. But we are still, it isto be noticed, strictly within experience; nothing external ortranscendent has yet been taken into account. Moreover, thesecategories, we find, do not arise in a merely haphazard way, buteach has its place fixed with reference to the whole process ofexperience in which it arises. It ought to be possible, therefore,to introduce order among these forms of thought; and, instead oftaking each isolatedly, and on the credentials with which it firstpresents itself to us, to define it with reference to the one processfrom which it springs, and so with reference to all its fellowcategories. This is the work which Hegel undertook to do.Now, if the problem, as it has just been stated, is the ultimate
one for philosophy, there can hardly be said to be any longer aplace for epistemology in the more common meaning of theterm. When we have assumed the knowing process as a fact-and we can hardly avoid doing this-the question,
How is knowl-edge possible
ceases to possess much interest.
it is actual,why should we concern ourselves about its possibility
The realcenter of interest now lies in its nature and function. If, indeed,knowledge referred to something outside experience, then thequestion as to how such a transcendence could be rendered con-ceivable, would be very much to the point
but the recognitionthat we are dealing with a process entirely within experience,and having its value with reference to experience, puts the wholeproblem out of court.But now
we do examine more closely the function of knowl-edge, we are led, I think, a step beyond Hegel's position, with-out, however, giving up his fundamental presuppositions-to therecognition, namely, that within experience knowledge is not anultimate resting place, but that it has its value with reference tosomething beyond itself, to action. It is this thought which Profes-sor Dewey has worked out in a convincing way, and without goinginto the details of his reasoning, I may briefly state his position
So long as activity is unimpeded, we have what is in itself neithersubjective nor objective, but just a bit of experience. But let ussuppose that there comes a break in activity, and we are broughtto
standstill. Now, in the first place, this brings to consciousnessthe value
the activity
and that value, if it is sufficiently great,is projected as an end. The end or ideal thus grows out of whatwe are already doing. The real, on the other hand, the object,is that which can be utilized as a means to reach this end. Itrepresents past ends, the organization of past experience, whichis real, in that it is there to be utilized, and so can be taken forgranted, but which is yet not sufficiently real to function, toovercome the break, and so has to be made over. Over againstthis, the end, the idea, the concept, is projected as ideal
but thetwo, the real and the ideal, the particular and the universal, areentirely relative to one another, since both grow out of thebreak in experience, and have for their purpose to overcome this

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