Global Governance 17 (2011), 375397

Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy

Gelson Fonseca Jr.
The article describes the evolution of Brazilian multilateralism since the First Pan American Conference in 1889. The impact of the domestic and international spheres are examined to understand the continuities and changes in Brazil multilateral attitudes. In our days, the increasing influence of Brazil international presence, especially in multilateral forums, is evident. The open question is how the emerging countries will influence the new international order. KEYWORDS: Brazil, foreign policy, United Nations, multilateralism.

IT IS EVIDENT THAT, AS A RESULT OF THEIR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL maturation, a number of countries once cast as merely developing have emerged over the past two decades as consequential international actors. Among the most prominent are Brazil, India, China, Turkey, South Africa, and Indonesia. A restored Russia, emerging from the wreckage of the Soviet Union, is generally seen and sees itself as a member of this cohort. Collectively, they promise to play a progressively more important role in determining the shape of global governance. It is equally evident that effective and sustainable responses to the great transnational challenges of our time, including climate change, armed conflict, terrorism, gross violations of human rights, and uneven and unstable economic globalization, have to be universal in breadth and broadly perceived as legitimate. Multilateralism in some form is the natural and necessary means for confronting these challenges. The difficulties and precariousness of extant multilateral institutions are well known. With their newly acquired influence, will the emerging powers move the world order in a better direction? Can we reasonably hope for stronger multilateral institutions? These questions require long and necessarily speculative answers. To the end of throwing some light on present problems and prospects for addressing them, this essay focuses on only one of the moving parts that is shaping the future; namely, Brazil. Specifically, I inquire how the Brazilian attitude toward multilateralism has evolved in the face of its own internal challenges and those that engage the entire world. To cope with todays complex realities, Brazil has participated in the creation of new multilateral forums: Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC); India,
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Brazil, and South Africa Forum (IBSA); and Group of 20 (G-20). But in Brazils view of the world, regional and other limited number forums are not a substitute for the universal forum that is the United Nations. It remains the preeminent multilateral institution. This view of the UN could be called the core of Brazilian multilateral ideology. And while it may not be unique to Brazil, it is nevertheless a key to understanding Brazils multilateral diplomacy.

Seminal Moments in the Making of Brazils Multilateral Principles The multilateral focus was a constant in Brazilian diplomacy even before the creation of the UNs predecessor, the League of Nations. To be precise, that focus first appeared in 1889 when Brazil attended a meeting of Western Hemisphere countries in Washington, DC, convened by President Grover Cleveland. The meeting turned out to be the embryo of the Organization of American States (OAS). By participating in this meeting, Brazil implicitly accepted multilateralism as a useful means for advancing its national interests. At the same time, however, it demonstrated its determination to resist multilateral commitments inconsistent with its perceived self-interest by joining with other Latin American countries in rejecting the US governments proposal of a continental free-trade zone.1 While opposing that particular US initiative, Brazil regarded amiable relations with the United States as very much in the national interest. Consistent with that view, in 1906 it consolidated what both sides perceived to be an unwritten alliance with the United States. The essence of the understanding at the heart of that alliance was that the United States would help Brazil defend itself from European threats and would also support Brazil in the event that it encountered diplomatic problems with its neighbors. In exchange, Brazil would generally support the United States with respect to issues that arose between it and other Latin American states. A case in point was the controversy over the so-called Drago Doctrine, which purported to bar the use of military means by one state to force payment of its debts (normally to foreign bondholders) by another, a doctrine strongly supported by most other Latin states and particularly by Brazils principal neighbors. Overall, while as noted above Brazil was not hostile to multilateral diplomacy, it approached with great caution any proposals of a multilateral character; in particular, proposals that would commit Brazil indefinitely to a system of obligatory arbitration of disputes and proposals for various disarmament schemes. This caution reflected a still relatively weak states sense of risks to its national sovereignty, a sovereignty achieved a little later (in 1822) than in the case of other Latin states after Brazils short period as part of the United Kingdom of Portugal and Algarves (18151822). Throughout the twentieth century, Brazilian diplomacy was informed by a sense that it was not yet one of the major powers that at any given time could

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define the rules constraining state behavior in a way to advance their interests as they saw them, whether or not the rules coincidentally advance the general interest of the international community. Remaining aloof from the norm-making process was seen as a bad option. At the same time, however, Brazils foreign policy elite believed that an optimal diplomacy meant participating actively in the norm-making process while being careful to avoid potentially dangerous constraints. Manifest even trumpeted sensitivity about threats to its sovereign discretion was seen as part of a strategy of participation in multilateral fora. The defense of sovereignty and its consequences for international order, as equality of states, was one of the traits of that balancing act between multilateral commitment and a permanent effort for preserving and strengthening political autonomy. Brazils behavior at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907 illustrates this strategic approach to multilateral diplomacy. Despite the overall alignment of their foreign policies, on certain key issues at the conference the Brazilian and US positions diverged. The latter strongly supported the creation of the International Prize Court and the Court of Arbitral Justice.2 Brazil did not object to the creation of the two institutions, but was concerned about the unbalanced manner by which the major powers intended to define the composition of the courts. The debate ended up going beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to the fundamental question for the international order: how to decide on who decides in international institutions. The choice was clear: the control of the decision process was based either on a countrys power or on international law, which dictates that every country is juridicially equal. According to former foreign minister Celso Lafer, that Hague moment coincided with the beginning of Brazils questioning the exclusive management of the world order by the major powers, an attitude that became even more pronounced during the Versailles Conference of 1919. At the outset of the conference, Brazil successfully opposed a procedural rule that distinguished between countries with general interests (the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan) and countries with limited interests, which would have allowed the latter to participate only in sessions that dealt with their direct interests. Lafer posits, The affirmation that Brazil has general interests, that is, a view of the world and how it should be organized and that this view is important to preserve . . . the specific interests of the country, became a defining trait of the Brazilian identity in the 20th century.3 A third seminal moment of Brazilian multilateralism occurred during the negotiation on the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice established by the League of Nations Covenant. One of the contentious issues was the jurisdictional consequences of becoming a member of the court. Would adhesion imply an obligation for a state to submit all of its judicial disputes to the court? The issue was divisive and some countries rejected peremptorily any possibility of accepting mandatory rulings by the court. Brazils proposed compromise, which in the end enabled the establishment of the new

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court, was the so-called optional clause that allowed each state party to the treaty creating the court to decide whether to accept compulsory jurisdiction to some greater or lesser degree, if at all. That clause is now embodied in the Statute of the Permanent Courts successor, the International Court of Justice. As Lafer explains, the principle of equality of States was preserved and the interests of major or minor powers were safeguarded.4 This episode began to delineate a possible role for Brazil in multilateral forums; namely, mediating and creating bridges between highly contentious positions. Another seminal moment took place in the 1920s, when Brazil tried to obtain a permanent seat on the council of the League of Nations, the UNs predecessor. In 1926, its effort was thwarted by a decision of the European powers to award the seat to Germany as part of the process of reintegrating Germany into the established order. So Brazil decided within the following year to withdraw entirely from the League. This episode evidences a point when Brazil was still a young and relatively weak state with an aspiration to become an important actor in the international arena and a readiness to pay significant diplomatic costs in order to make that aspiration become a reality.5

Brazil in San Francisco The negotiations to create the United Nations were dominated by the victors of World War II. The United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain became the de facto owners of the plans for the new organization since the other participants had only the barest of opportunities to influence the directives drawn up in Yalta. Nevertheless, Brazilian participation was not entirely marginal. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull suggested that Brazil could occupy the sixth permanent seat in the Security Council. That move was a way to compensate Brazil for its early entry into World War II on the Allied side and its substantial contribution of bases and troops. For a moment, it appeared that Brazil would realize its aspiration even while its economy was in a developmental stage. But aspiration remained just that because both Britain and the Soviet Union objected to President Roosevelts proposal, the latter because it viewed Brazil as a likely US ally in the Security Council and the former on the grounds that the expansion of the number of permanent members would dilute the Councils decisionmaking capacity. Following Roosevelts death, the proposal was withdrawn.

The Evolution of Brazilian Attitudes at the United Nations It is possible to distinguish four broad periods in the evolution of Brazilian multilateral positions. The differences from one period to another could be attributed to internal changes in the political system (democracy vs. authoritarian regime and closed vs. open economy) and to the external transformation of

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the international system (decolonization was decisive for the modernization of Brazils foreign policy).
Loyalty to the Western World and Institutional Criticism (19471960)

After fifteen years of authoritarian rule (19301945), Brazil turned to democratic governance following the end of World War II before submitting again to authoritarian control in 1964 when a military coup, backed by the United States, ousted President Joo Goulart. During the democratic interregnum Brazilian foreign policy was strongly influenced by its alliance with the United States, in part because official and unofficial elites perceived the countrys identity as Western and Christian. As a consequence, Brazil generally endorsed US positions in the UN General Assembly and in the Security Council. In doing so it was often at odds, diplomatically, with its Latin neighbors.6 As a member of the Western bloc, Brazil voted for the Uniting for Peace resolution, which sanctioned the UNs institutional participation in the Korean War of 19491953. This position did not amount to reflexive support for US policy. An equal motive behind the vote was Brazilian desire to strengthen the influence of the General Assembly in security matters. Brazil, did not, however, send troops to Korea, despite strong appeals from the United States. To engage Brazilian troops in foreign countries, even under a UN mandate, was deemed politically imprudent particularly for a government that at the time was losing its political support. While seeing itself as an influential actor in the General Assembly and therefore being an advocate, as noted above, of maximizing the Assemblys authority, Brazil was elected to the Security Council three times during this democratic era. One author characterizes Brazilian presence on the Council as prestige multilateralism because it was not linked to concrete and specific national interests that could be secured through Council membership in that era.7 While seeking to avoid antagonizing the United States, Brazil tried, as a rule, to facilitate peaceful settlement by having the UN foster negotiation of inflammatory international issues while upholding the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs, a principle that Brazil construed broadly. The 1956 Middle East crisis stemming from the joint Anglo-FrenchIsraeli attack on Egypt precipitated strong Brazilian support for UN involvement in actively maintaining the peace. Specifically, it became a champion of UN peacekeeping.8 More generally it could be said that, by virtue of being elected multiple times to the Security Council, Brazil felt a greater interest in and responsibility for the success of the UN as the keystone institution of global order. Unlike the UNs authorization for military operations in Korea by the United States and its allies, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) established in the wake of the Middle East war to separate Israeli and Egyptian forces was clearly identified with the office initiative of the Secretary General. It was,

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moreover, an instantiation of the Uniting for Peace resolution and, hence, of the importance of the General Assembly. Moreover, the peacekeeping operation appeared as a new door open to middle powers to contribute to the solution of global security problems. Through that door came Brazil, which assigned a battalion to UNEF that remained in Suez until, on the threshold of a new Middle East war, the Secretary-General ordered the entire peacekeeping force withdrawn. Subsequently Brazil provided troops for the UN Operation in the Congo and United Nations Security Force in West New GuineaWest Irian (UNSF).9 Despite a shared hostility to the Soviet bloc and communism generally, during the years of democratic government, Brazils overall alliance with the United States experienced a process of gradual attrition. This was in part the result of the disappointed expectations of the Brazilian elite about economic assistance from the United States. Aggravating that disappointment was a gradual intensification of Brazilian nationalism and determination to accelerate and deepen economic growth and to be an important actor in world affairs.10 The foundations of the alliance remained, but the Brazilian attitude became more ambiguous and frictions with the United States began to multiply. Emblematic of a certain ambivalence was the coincidence in 1952 of a military assistance treaty with the United States, which practically made the two armed forces partners, and the Brazilian Congresss approval, despite opposition from US oil companies, of the nationalization of the countrys oil industry. The unfulfilled potential from the Brazilian perspective of the alliance with the United States and the need for economic development led to a substantial adjustment of Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil needed greater autonomy and strengthening multilateralism began to be seen clearly as a means to that end. An emphasis on institutional issues became a recurring theme of Brazils speeches in the General Assemblys annual general debate. The reason for this emphasis is simple: except for the Security Council, UN institutions have been based on the equality of nations and, in theory, a middle power can significantly affect their decisions. Brazils speeches were mainly about the need for a more influential General Assembly or a more vigorous Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). They were also quite critical of the way that the permanent members were damaging the Security Councils legitimacy by using the Council as an East-West battleground rather than as an instrument for promoting friendly relations among member states. An independent line also characterized Brazils discourse about the structure of the international economy. Brazil played a major role in the creation of the Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA), which would become, under Raul Prebisch, a source of heterodox theories of international trade. And at an early point in global trade negotiations, Brazil began to support the notion that a countrys underdevelopment should be taken into account in the

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trade negotiations promoted by the United States to produce a progressively more open international trading system. Opposing the liberal orthodoxy championed by the United States, Brazil contended that absolute reciprocity should not be required from poor countries. This position became sharper when, in the mid-1950s, Brazil began to add underdeveloped to its hitherto established identities as Western, Christian, and Latin American. This new status somehow universalized Brazilian identity, broadening the scope of its potential diplomatic linkages. The expansion of identity led to support for the idea of collective economic security and, later, to support for the establishment of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which became in a sense the antiGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the forum for and research arm of third world countries striving for increased economic growth and dubious about Washington, DCs pursuit of free trade. The mid-1950s, the period in which these policy inflections became pronounced, coincided with one of the most innovative moments in Brazilian history. The inauguration of the countrys new capital: Brasilia; the emergence of an extraordinary cultural dynamism (exemplified by the rhythms of bossa nova); and the first stages of modern industrialization all happened in this period. The country became more aware of its potential and acted accordingly. In 1956, President Juscelino Kubitschek launched the Pan-American Operation (OPA). It was the first time that Brazil tried to rally its neighbors to create instruments and goals in order to collectively negotiated economic cooperation with the United States. The core of Kubitscheks position was as follows: without growth, democracy itself would be threatened in the region, so that the anticommunist struggle could not be reduced to its strategic dimension. The United States rejected the transformation of the OPA into an institution that could organize hemispheric cooperation policies but not the idea behind it, which became one of the tenets for the Alliance for Progress. But before that, the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank in 1960 was certainly motivated by the new concepts proposed by Kubitschek. Another important theme that entered Brazilian discourse at the UN was the promotion of tolerance and the condemnation of racial discrimination. But in terms of aligning Brazil with the growing ranks of the third world, there remained through the 1950s and 1960s an omission, an ambiguity with regard to colonialism. This anomaly grew out of the countrys special relationship with Portugal and was not unrelated to the settlement in Brazil of a vocal and wealthy Portuguese community. Brazil would not join in a vote against its mother country until the years of the independent foreign policy. After that intermission, the anomaly endured until Portugals 1973 revolution spelled the end of its colonial vocation and the imminent independence of the so-called ultramarine provinces. During the Cold War, it was difficult for peripheral countries to take unique positions collectively. Peppering the Security Council with vetoes, the

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two superpowers generally constrained UN action in the majority of cases where concerns with peace and security seemed to demand it. They also limited the authority and activity of the General Assembly to the best of their ability. But in the case of decolonization, the developing world tried with some success to make space in UN political discourse and even, occasionally, action for an issue deemed to be isolable from the East-West struggle.
A Universal and Independent Foreign Policy (19601964)

The election of Janio Quadros in 1960 led to deep changes in Brazilian foreign policychanges that were not entirely unexpected, to be sure, since Brazils desire for greater autonomy was already apparent during the Kubitschek administration. The new president wanted to broaden Brazils international scope while maintaining its connection to the Western world. This meant deeper relationships with African and socialist countries, and also a more active role in economic and disarmament negotiations. This heightened global activism was naturally reflected in Brazils positions on issues at the UN. Quadross resignation a mere two-thirds of the way through his first year in office did not halt the effort to mark out an independent foreign policy. His successor, Joo Goulart (19611964), a president with a leftist and labor background, shared Quadross general approach to foreign policy. In retrospect, one can say that this brief era before the coup dtat against the democratic regime augured the long-term course of Brazilian diplomacy. It should be noted that this period was rife with internal problems, starting with Quadross resignation and followed almost immediately by the signs of military resistance to what most senior officers (and the United States) considered Goularts lunge to the left. There followed in rapid and stunning succession of events: first, the political system was changed from a presidential democracy to a parliamentary system; then, after a referendum, it changed back to a presidential system; then came the military coup suspending democracy of any kind. At the same time (and not unrelated to the military coup), relations with the United States became increasingly conflictive once President Goulart announced in 1962 his opposition to the economic blockade of Cuba. Coincidentally, the decolonization process picked up speed and the developing countries created groups to increase their leverage in multilateral forums, groups such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77). In this new world where the rift between the North and the South became structural, the expansion of the Brazilian diplomatic presence and the countrys readiness, according to Quadros, to act as a bridge between the rich and the poor contributed to the sense internally, and also to a considerable degree externally, that Brazil was charting for itself a position that was unique. On the one hand, it refrained from joining the NAM and thus waived an opportunity to become an across-the-board leader of the developing world. But as one of the main proponents of UNCTAD, it did assume a leadership role in the economic sphere. And even in the political sphere, Brazil was far from silent. The su-

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perpower restraints on the UN were sharply criticized; and, at the General Assembly, the Brazilian representatives began to speak against what many saw as an invisible veto on progress toward a more equitable economic order. The Western group, especially the United States, would systematically block the acceptance of international instruments that could promote growth for the underdeveloped countries, as commodity agreements that could guarantee equitable prices for their exports, increase in the levels of financial and technical assistance, nonreciprocal tariff preferences, and so on. Brazilian criticism of the superpower nuclear arms race became more direct and vehement. Araujo Castro, the last of Goularts foreign ministers, summarized the goals of the independent foreign policy era in terms of the prominence of the three Ds: development, disarmament, and decolonization. The disarmament issue provided a convenient vehicle for Brazil to insert itself into global security discussions since it had a record on the issue that was difficult to assail. It had no nuclear weapons, was not involved in an arms race, was at peace with its neighbors, and it was a consistent supporter of an effective UN. Because of these assets and its size and influence in Latin America, Brazil was invited as one of the eighteen neutral nations to serve on the UN Disarmament Committee in Geneva. In that forum, Brazil indicted closed decision processes, such as the one that characterized the treaty on the partial freezing of nuclear testsa treaty directly negotiated by the United States, the USSR, and Great Britainand then presented to the committee as a fait accompli. Years later, Brazil would voice a similar criticism of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). The support for decolonization was stronger and, with respect to Portuguese colonies, a remarkable change occurred. Despite its close relations with Portugal, Brazil changed its vote from negative to abstention on the General Assembly resolutions dealing with Portuguese problems, and, in 1963, voted for two Security Council resolutions (Resolutions 180 and 183) declaring that keeping the colonies in Africa was a threat to peace and demanding that Portugal accept self-determination. This period marked, as mentioned above, the origins of Brazilian modern diplomacy. The ideas of autonomy, universal diplomatic relations, and a strong multilateral presence corresponded to a sort of ideal foreign policy for the country, which continues somehow to serve as a guide for Brazilian foreign policy.
The Military Government: Alliance and Conflict Within the Western Bloc (19641985)

The authoritarian period was not uniform in terms of foreign policy, and even less so in its multilateral positions. Broadly speaking, there were two distinct moments. The first one, from 1964 to 1968, is characterized by the return to close alliance with the United States and a clearly pro-Western position in Cold War matters (the 1964 coup was partly justified by the need to stop a socialist republic from being installed in Brazil). Two examples of this rap-

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prochement include the break of diplomatic relations with Cuba and Brazilian participation in, indeed nominal leadership of, the Inter-American Force, which served as an after-the-fact veil over the US invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965. Replacing Goularts independent foreign policy was a declared commitment to a close alliance with the United States and the shared defense of Western values. In an increasingly interdependent world divided by ideological frontiers, the notion of an independent foreign policy was senseless in the military government view. The military regime also drew back from any hint of criticism of Portuguese colonialism, diminished its presence in multilateral forums, and aligned its votes with those of the United States and the Western countries, except on some economic North-South issues. The inevitable result was isolation from the third world movement and, hence, a reluctance to compete for electoral positions in the UN and termination altogether from the now obviously unattainable pursuit of a seat on the Security Council.11 Brazils twenty-year failure to participate in UN peacekeeping operations after the withdrawal from Sinai in 1967 is another sign of the countrys retrenchment at the very outset of the military regime from any sort of prominent role in global multilateral diplomacy. This attitude began to change by the end of the 1960s, when the country became less dependent on the United States (due to the Brazilian economic miracle). A conceptual alternative to interdependence emerged in elite discourse, especially the military elite, characterized by the traditional aspiration to become a significant power, but with new features as well. Multilateralism was still a relevant option, but its potential was limited by Brazils isolation from third world countries. The course Brazil then took was to begin staking out a place for itself as an autonomous power, a country consequential not for its bloc leadership but for its own capabilities. Some of the governments decisionsfor example, extending Brazils territorial sea to 200 nautical miles and entering into a nuclear energy development pact with West Germanyled to quarrels with the United States. They sharpened when the administration of US president Jimmy Carter criticized human rights practices in Brazil, and the government decided to abrogate the 1952 military cooperation agreement between the two countries. During the same period (specifically in 1969), Brazil refused to sign the NPT, claiming that it unfairly perpetuated a division between nuclear and non-nuclear countries. In multilateral forums, the first and most important objective of the new move in Brazilian foreign policy was limiting the creation of any formal obstacles to the expansion of Brazilian potential. Wayne A. Selcher mentions
the vigor and competitiveness with which the Foreign Ministry led the domestic and international attack against any emerging international consensus spawned by developed states and perceived as a contrived or arbitrary obstacle to full development of national potential, such as criticism of the development

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of the Amazon, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the birth control issue, international pollution standards, an arbitrary twelve-mile limit on coastal sovereignty and potential restrictions on use of water resources shared by many states.12

Autonomy was thus to be maintained by avoiding multilateral restrictive engagement. While unilaterally warding off any perceived restraint on national development and autonomy, the military government was more than ready to use multilateral diplomacy when it served what were perceived to be Brazils interests. The main interests it served were in the economic field where Brazils position coincided with those of other developing states of the Global South. Within UNCTAD the government opted for a very vocal, highprofile style. Relatedly, in 1968 Brazil presided over the G-77, and in 1976 it led the groups meeting in Geneva. Brazils activism in commercial and economic issues is easily explainable. The country, in the view of its elite, needed all of the things that the Global South was demanding, including raw material price floors, nonreciprocity in commercial agreements, tariff concessions from the developed states, and capital investment on favorable terms. Then came the 1973 oil crisis and the related emergence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel as a powerful actor on the international scene. At that point, Brazil concluded that an alliance with third world countries was more than usefulit was necessary. On the political front, however, Brazilian leadership in multilateral forums remained constrained by the governments timidity about Portuguese colonialism and also about Palestinian rights, which were rapidly becoming a major issue on the third world agenda. This timidity became unsustainable when it faced two problems that revealed how vulnerable the Brazilian position was in multilateral forums. The first was a dispute with Argentina over the construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric plant. The issue surfaced in the 1972 Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm, then called Principle 20, but it did not come up for a vote; instead, it was brought up in the General Assembly.13 Brazil found it difficult to contain the pressure from Argentina. Its newly returned president, Juan Peron, had immediately placed Argentina within the NonAligned Movement. Then, Argentina set about using its position in the movement to advance the principle of previous consultation for the construction of dams in rivers that traverse several countries. In the 1973 and 1974 General Assemblies, Brazil failed to defeat resolutions calling for previous consultation. This was arguably the only occasion when Brazil had to adopt a multilateral defensive stand in order to deal with a specific bilateral issue. The 1973 oil crisis induced Brazil, reliant as it was on oil imports, to strengthen its relationship with the Arab countries and to adopt a pro-Palestine position. However, even as it worked a rapprochement with the third world, it sought to maintain close ties with the West primarily through energetic bilateral relations. Though, as noted above, after President Carters election, the

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countrys authoritarianism and its nuclear pact with Germany began to strain the bilateral relationship with the United States. The combination of the two crises (Argentina and energy) clearly effected an adjustment in Brazilian strategy. The government accepted unreservedly the proposition that a good relationship with the third world was essential for the promotion of the countrys global interests. It was evident that any multilateral action could be compromised if it did not have the support particularly of the African countries, which made up more than one-third of the General Assembly.14 The greatest difficulty in executing this plan was conciliating Brazils desire for deeper relationships with Africa and its tacit support for Portuguese colonialism. This contradiction was only resolved in 1975, when Brazil became the first government to recognize the legitimacy of Angolas Movimento Popular de Libertao de Angola (MPLA) government. In the Arab case, there were already signs in 1973 that Brazil was abandoning its neutral stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict and was starting to support Palestinian positions. The dramatic turning point happened when Brazil voted in favor of the resolution that equated Zionism with racism in 1974. It probably was one of the most controversial and internally disputed decisions (as was the recognition of the MPLA government) of Brazilian diplomacy in the 1970s. Ambassador Araujo Castros writings best describe Brazils new aspirations for autonomy.15 Castro, Goularts last chancellor and permanent representative at the UN from 1968 to 1971, detailed the conceptual framework of the independent foreign policy. The starting point was the idea that Brazil is a country condemned to greatness and, to fulfill its destiny, autonomy was crucial. Castro realized that, to achieve it, the international order had to change since it often acted as an obstacle to Brazils efforts. For Castro, the fundamental working concept to understand the international order is the notion of the freezing of global power.16 After analyzing the consequences of dtente and using the NPT as a model, Castro showed how the major powers used the multilateral system to secure an advantaged power position, which constrained Brazils possibilities for ascension and its maneuvering capability. Castro did not propose that Brazil acquire nuclear weapons, but he pointed out how fragile were the disarmament commitments made by nuclear nations, in contrast with the obligations of those states that had no weapons. Another problem mentioned by Castro was the association of power with responsibility in the international order. As chair of the Security Council during the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he made the following remark:
In the precise moment non-nuclear nations are asked to blindly trust the actions or moderation of the nuclear powers, one of them, the USSR, utilizes brute force to achieve its political objective of domination. The curious political assumption that power is synonymous with moderation, prudence, and

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responsibility was disproved. By invading Czechoslovakia, one of the permanent members of the Security Council ripped, in a single night, several articles of the UN Charter, and shockingly justified this violation by invoking a strange limited sovereignty theory, which, if accepted, would create a doctrine of spheres of influence, perhaps even spheres of domination.17

Following Castros ideas, the possibility that multilateral institutions were an instrument for major powers to advance their own interests became again a constant concern to Brazilian diplomacy. With regard to human rights, Brazils attitude was extremely restrictive and any hypothesis of international cooperation was overruled by sovereignty. There was no dialogue with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), viewed as an instrument of Western powers. In 1977, Brazil was elected to the Human Rights Commission, with a goal of self-defense to avoid, from the inside, any investigations on human rights violations in Brazil. Despite that motivation, Brazil did not adopt an obstructionist stance while in the commission.18 In 1982, for the first time, a Brazilian head of state, General Joo Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo, attended the opening of the general debate of the General Assembly. The decision could be linked to the reshaping of the Brazilian image abroad. The democratic opening was in motion and the country was regaining self-confidence.
Democratization and the New Tendencies of Brazils Multilateral Behavior (19852011)

Brazil once again became a democratic nation in 1985, through the indirect election by Congress of the first civilian president since 1964. President Tancredo Neves, however, became ill and died within a few months. His vice president Jose Sarney assumed the presidency and completed his mandate in 1990, initiating a period of institutional stability that lasts yet today. A new constitution was approved in 1988, and one year later, direct presidential elections were reestablished. Besides the return to institutional democracy (e.g., direct elections, protection of rights and freedoms), there was a simultaneous democratization of Brazilian society, with a growing number of NGOs and social movements becoming participants in the political scene. With democracy, the foundations of Brazils multilateral politics has been clearly altered. It was not a sudden change, but a gradual one. It is curious that, in the first years of democracy, continuity in foreign policy was viewed as positive. President Neves used to say that the Itamaratys foreign policy is an area for consensus, and it should be preserved as such, as Rubens Ricupero observes.19 Not surprisingly, democracy first affected Brazils self-image. Its new and essential objective was to recover its international status and, to achieve this goal, an assertive multilateral attitude would be crucial.20 As early as 1985, Sar-

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neys speech in the general debate delineates the aspiration that will guide Brazilian diplomacy: Im here to say that Brazil does not wish anymore to have a timid voice. We wish to be heard, but we have no desire to be hegemonic.21 From the mid-1980s on, the country faced two distinct challenges. First, it had to transform its negative image, a legacy from the authoritarian years. Brazilians were viewed as enemies of the environment, human rights violators, timid in commitment to multilateralism due to a reluctance to engage in peace missions, and distant from the disarmament struggle because the government did not sign the NPT. The accusers were mostly the NGOs (international and Brazilian), but the way to respond to their concerns passed through multilateral forumsa place where the voice of the social movements was being heard with increasing repercussion. Brazil began to simultaneously change its internal institutions and its international conduct, getting closer to the principles of international legitimacy in environmental matters, human rights, and disarmament. Additionally, with the newly gained margins for maneuvering. Brazilian diplomacy had possibilities to influence the new design in the pattern of international legitimacy, with an active role in the UN global conferences of the 1990s. The second challenge is more complex and remains today: how can Brazil use the political capital it gained from democratizationand later on, from economic stabilityto explore new ways to project the country internationally? The process to recover the international status began in the first phase of democratization, during the Sarney administration (19851990). There was a movement of aggiornamento (updating), notably in the area of human rights. The adhesion to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on Social and Economic Rights, the Convention on Torture (in 1985), and, in the inter-American arena, the signature of the San Jose Pact (in 1986) made Brazil compliant with the new standards of international legitimacy. After the solution of the Itaipu problem (1979), the relationship with Argentina was deepened through the establishment of a gradual process of economic integration in 1988 (the origin of Mercosul), the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) agreement between Brazil, Argentina, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which established a mutual nuclear facility inspection process and, consequently, the dissolution of the two countries strategic rivalry. Brazil gave a concrete and tangible demonstration of a new disposition in disarmament matters. In this context, it was natural that Brazil ran for a Security Council seat after a twenty-year absence and, in 1989, it was elected to a nonpermanent seat. Brazil could again be innovative in the General Assembly, presenting in 1986 a proposal for a South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone. Brazilian officials began to mention democracy in their speeches, unusual as a matter of course for the military. In the general debate of 1985, President Sarney said that war and democracy, war and liberty are incompatible . . .

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when nations have freedom, democracy, permanent institutions, a functioning government, and popular participation, pacific and consensual solutions will prevail.22 Brazilian diplomacy had finally discovered Kant. Another problem was the Brazilian attitude toward environmental issues. The style of development pursued by the military government (e.g., roads in the middle of forests, giant hydroelectric dams) did not jibe with the new environmental consciousness of Brazil and the world. The arguments against international cooperation did not work anymore. Brazil acknowledged this shift and offered to host the UN Earth Summit in 1992. This was a way, on one hand, to reinforce through the UN a national awareness of environmental problems and, on the other, to show that the country was open to international cooperation in this area. It became clear, then, that autonomy could be strengthened by integration in legitimacy mainstream, not by repudiating the social and international pressures to cooperation. An important factor in molding Brazilian foreign policy was the new constitution, promulgated in 1988, which lists in Article 5, the principles that should guide the conduct of foreign policy, including traditional concepts like sovereignty and peaceful conflict resolution as well as new ones such as protection of human rights and regional integration. It also forbids, in Article 21, the production of nuclear weapons. Since 1990, the Brazilian preference for multilateralism became stronger due to internal changes and the subsequent growing importance of the country in the international order. Internally, the institutional democracy was consolidated when the country experienced a constitutional crisis that resulted in the impeachment of the first democratically (directly) elected president. The government followed the constitutional process and the crisis was resolved according to the constitution. In 1992, inflation was reined in and the process of economic opening and privatization continued. Social indicators, though still revealing dramatic social inequalities, started improving when inflation (which penalizes mainly the lower classes) was controlled. During the Sarney administration, the countrys first massive social assistance programs were launched and these were later improved under Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso (19952003) and Luiz Incio Lula da Silva (20032010). Both, in their own ways, had an important international presence. The sum of the consolidation of democracy, economic stability, and social improvement had positive international repercussions. The stature of the country obviously changed. The first sign of a greater international prestige (or soft power) is a more active multilateral presence. Brazil continued shifting its foreign policy closer to the mainstream of international legitimacy, especially in the areas of human rights, disarmament, and the environment. The second was a more significant participation in peace missions and a deeper engagement in international security issues. Brazils participation in the 1990s global

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conferences also brought about changes in the way foreign policy was formulated. The Brazilian positions for these global conferences were prepared by commissions composed of representatives from the government and NGOs (and NGO representatives also participated in the conferences as delegates). Foreign policy became more democratic, more linked to the society aspirations. The goal of this article was not to delve into all aspects of the evolution of Brazilian diplomacy in the past few years, nor discuss the differences between President Fernando Henrique and President Lulas diplomacy, which share meaningful similarities in UN issues.23 It should be noted, however, that Lula was able to take advantage of the spaces created by the retreat of the major powers (such as the United States, which had its legitimacy undermined after the use of torture in the war on terror as well as the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan). The space for proposals broadened and, in this connection, Lula promoted several multilateral initiatives: the BRIC grouping, IBAS, G-20, Union of South American Nations (UNASUL), and the South AmericaArab Countries Summit, to mention a few. Yet the continuities are also worth discussing. Take, for example, the case of human rights. According to Jose Augusto Lindgren Alves, there are two distinct periods: the adhesion to international procedures (19901994) and the valorization of the system, which is still going on today, even though after 2006, Brazil manifested some apprehension about the way that the international human rights system was performing. After ratifying the covenants on civil and political rights and economic and social rights, as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, in 1998 Brazil signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Following through with the treaties, Brazil opened its borders to human rights inspectors, sent the reports required by the various covenants, created a national human rights plan, created a reparation mechanism for those who suffered violations, and approved a law dealing with the disappeared. In the Conference of Vienna, in 1993, the head of the Brazilian delegation, Ambassador Gilberto Saboia, presided at the drafting committee and played a significant role in achieving consensus over the final text. In the recent phase, the valorization continues, but to Lindgren Alves, it was approached with a certain grain of caution. Brazilian diplomacy promotes the human rights ideals and is an active participant in UN institutions, being elected for the first composition of the Council of Human Rights. At the same time, the need to improve the UN mechanisms became another aspect of the Brazilian attitude. Brazil is worried about the systems greatest vice, politicization, which weakens its foundation and leads sometimes to inertia when faced with the gross violations by major powers, as in the case of the Iraq War (e.g., illegal imprisonment, and torture). To correct the selectivity problem, the Brazilian reaction has been twofold. First, Brazilian diplomacy defends the idea that selectivity can be neutralized with the universalization of human rights review

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systems and, second, insisting that specific violations be dealt with in a discreet fashion and that enforcement instruments be used only as a last resort.24 A similar movement toward mainstream legitimacy has occurred in disarmament issues. A combination of national and international circumstances ultimately sealed the decision to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998. On one hand, NPT membership was almost universal and Brazilian motivation not to adhere became somehow dysfunctional. There were no political or strategic reasons to remain in the company of the few countries (India, Pakistan, Israel) that rejected the treaty. Brazilian nuclear policies were unreservedly peaceful and so quite different from those of the nonsignatories. Additionally, the 1995 review conference had decided to extend the treatys validity, strengthening its legitimacy. A clear provision in the 1988 constitution prohibiting use of nuclear energy for nonmilitary purposes is another factor to explain the decision taken by Brazil to sign the NPT. In order to complete the reshaping of the disarmament policy, Brazil signed the Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and adhered to informal mechanisms such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Furthermore, Brazil participated actively in the conferences for the revision of the NPT, forming in 1998 a negotiating group dubbed the Coalition for a New Agenda that brought together countries from the North and South (Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden, Egypt, and Slovenia). Perhaps the coalitions most important contribution was the introduction at the revision conference held in 2000 of the thirteen-step proposal offering an alternative to the maximalist disarmament proposals, insisting on the adoption of realistic and practical measures.25 This is a remarkable example of Brazils effort to serve as a bridge in multilateral forums. At any rate, the Brazilian attitude did not come without a good measure of frustration due to the limited relevance of multilateral forums at the helm of a process which, by definition, should be broad and global.26 Progress was achieved, however mostly beyond the boundaries of UN multilateralism. Also worthy of mention are two other developments within the realm of security and peace. The first is with respect to participation in peacekeeping missions and the second has to do with significant interventions as a nonpermanent member in the UN Security Council (Brazil held a seat at the Council several times: 19881989, 19931994, 19981999, 20042005, and 20102011). Even before democratization in the 1990s, Brazil had a long-running tradition in peacekeeping missions that began in 1956 with the Suez. Recently, the most important contributions were in Angola (UN Angola Verification Mission ), East Timor, and, now, Haiti and Lebanon. Brazils role as head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti has a special meaning, not only due to the dimension of this engagement in material and human terms, but also because it signals a willingness to more incisively assume a position of command in the solution of regional crises.

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Brazils participation in the Security Council especially stands out when issues important to it, such as Angola, Mozambique, Haiti, or East Timor, are at stake. Nonetheless, these are not the only ones. In many of its votes, Brazil had explicit concerns with the institutional limits of Councils action. In 1994, Brazil abstained in four of the thirteen resolutions adopted on the Haiti question and in one of them, Resolution 948, it acted alone. In Brazilian diplomacy, the Haitian situation was not characterized at that time as a threat to peace and so it was not deemed to be within the Councils competence. In a similar vein, Brazil did not approve the demarcation of the frontiers between Kuwait and Iraq by the Council or the attempts to extend the Councils jurisdiction to deal with issues such as drug trafficking or the environment.27 Another area for expanding the Councils agenda had to do with the humanitarian agenda, as in the case of the responsibility to protect. As Antonio Patriota indicated,28 Brazilian reactions were cautious for two main reasons: first, the conceptual difficulties involved in defining new areas for the Councils action, which sometimes cannot be characterized as security problems; and, second, the problem of efficaciousness of interventions that tend to deal with domestic matters. It is important to emphasize that, for Brazilian diplomacy, the nonpermanent status does not imply any restriction as to how to act or vote. Brazil is there to represent the international community and, insofar as it has opinions and proposals, it must act with the incisiveness that is called for. Permanent members have the prerogative of the veto, but not necessarily a monopoly over political wisdom. Evidently, opportunities for full-fledged action in the Council, in its current format, are limited but can be useful nonetheless. A noteworthy example took place in the late 1990s when, following US missile strikes, Iraq prohibited the entry of nuclear inspectors. This impasse undermined the Councils prestige and created doubts concerning the possession (or not) of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein. At the time, January 1999, Brazilian permanent representative, Ambassador Celso Amorim, presided the Security Council. He was assigned the task of organizing panels aiming at assessing the manifold dimensions of the Iraqi situation (e.g., disarmament, humanitarian conditions, and indemnities). In addition to the impeccable assessment carried out (none of the contents of the final report were ever refuted), the panel proposed a framework for the return of inspection that guided the negotiations that led to the resolution creating the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inpsection Commission in 1999.29 At that point in time, Brazil fully exercised its ability to build bridges; in this case, bringing together permanent members in a direction that restored the authority of the Security Council in one of the most controversial issues on the international agenda. In 2010, after rotating back into the Council, Brazil, with Celso Amorim now acting as minister of foreign relations, attempted a similar move in view of the impasse holding back nuclear energy negotiations with Iran. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss why the Brazilian and Turkish formula for

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enrichment of Iranian uranium in a third world country was not even brought up in the Security Council, which days later imposed a new round of sanctions on Iran. Brazil and Turkey voted against that resolution. Differently than what occurred in 1999, there was no mandate to act on behalf of the Council and, hence, the initiative was ignored by the permanent members. On the other hand, the Brazilian attitude was broadly discussed internally. The criticism concentrated on the idea that Brazil does not have specific strategic interests in Iran and so its capacity to influence events in the region is modest. Another revealing sign of Brazils multilateral stance was the Initiative Against Hunger proposal, launched in 2004 by the presidents of Brazil, Spain, France, and Chile. The stated goal consists of reducing in half the number of people in the world suffering and dying as a result of poverty and hunger by the year 2015. A mention of Brazils aspiration to become a permanent member of the Security Council is in order. The Brazilian credentials are indisputable given, for instance, its commitment to the values and practices of the United Nations. Brazil has cultivated excellent relations in its region and a good reputation at the global level. Its candidacy thus seems natural and, domestically, the effort to become a permanent member of the Security Councial has achieved a reasonable consensus. But some controversy remains regarding the costs of the candidacy and the strategy adopted in its pursuance. Is the hypothesis one of causing harm to or enhancing Brazils regional presence? What is the effective cost of garnering more votes? Is Brazil prepared for global diplomacy? Answers have been varied. But during President Lulas term in office, the disposition to pursue alongside Germany, India, and Japan, the Group of 4 (G4), a reform proposal establishing new permanent members, gained momentum. Two important issues in which Brazils profile has been increasing must be summarily mentioned: trade and the environment. As I indicated above, the traditional attitude in matters related to the environment was that sovereignty was the sole factor defining Brazils choices. After the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio 92), this attitude evolved to admit international cooperation. Brazil was a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol. Nowadays, one of the emblematic concerns consists of defining shares of responsibility for global warming.30 This item is crucial since curbing global warming implies costs that affect economic potential. The ensuing clash between rich countries (traditional polluters) and emerging countries (recent polluters) was more than expected. The Brazilian emphasisand that of many other developing countrieson differentiated responsibilities was germane to the idea of sharing costs. They go hand in hand. The negotiating processes must strike a balance between a careful (and painful) sharing of costs incurring on the short run and the need for a global environmental solidarity. The greatest risk is mutual demonizing of negotiating positions, which is always a possibility when issues that are at the same time highly technical and emo-

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tional are at stake. The Brazilian attitude, if we look back at the United Nations Climate Change Conference meetings, have evolved to a willingness to accept greater responsibilities for the costs of attenuating the effects of climate change, without abandoning the need to find a balanced and just solution for developing countries. The Doha Round negotiations are advancing slowly; many believe that they are entering a terminal stage. This is not how Brazil sees it because the country is always motivated by a belief in universal solutions for trade, not least because several issues in this realm (e.g., subsidies) are intrinsically global. The complexity of the Brazilian economy is crucial in understanding Brazils stance. In a nutshell, the demands of the developed countries are concentrated in modernized sectors (e.g., greater access to industrialized products and services markets) in which the developing countries are not always internationally competitive and little is offered in sectors where they are competitive like agriculture. Often, developed countries are the ones with an illiberal attitude only to protect the more traditional sectors of their economies. They have the economic and financial conditions to subsidize their agricultural sectors, but Brazil does not. The road ahead is not yet clear. But again, Brazil is a fair partner in the game. It has legitimate interests to protect, and its view of the future conforms to the tenets of its multilateral vision.

Conclusion My examination of the evolution of Brazils multilateral attitude was naturally quite selective. But I think it may be sufficient to demonstrate one simple point: Brazil has had a consistent and clear multilateral vocation, characterized by a balanced view of the possibilities and limitations of the United Nations. A sort of utopian realism marks Brazils attitude. We need a stronger multilateralism because the multilateral forums are the ideal stage for the middle powers to influence global questions. On the other hand, multilateralism is seldom a clear path. Ideals and principles define the goals of the institutions, but the hard game of politics is the necessary means to realize those goals. Vocation and caution go together. Brazil has expended a large amount of political capital in the United Nations. This capital is translated, physically, into missions with considerable staffs and, morally, into the acceptance of the legitimacy of the decisions made by the organization. This constitutes a natural path for Brazils projection into the decisionmaking arena of the international order. If it is to accept the notion that universal forums, especially the UN, are ultimately becoming irrelevant, would it be worthwhile to maintain its engagement or would it be preferable to pursue partial solutions according to specific interests and selected partners; for example as in the Group of 8 (G8) model?31 Thus far, the diagnosis made by Brazilian diplomacy is that partial movements are quite distant to under-

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mine the need for a strong, legitimate, and universal forum. Brazilian diplomacy firmly sustains the belief that the solutions to the problems Brazil faces in several fields, from disarmament to the environment, must be universal. The challenge is not to abandon the UN, but rather to strengthen it and to ensure that partial movements converge toward the universal forum. More than ever, there is a need for countries that know how to build bridges in a world in which clear consensus and easily convergent interests are difficult to find. Indeed, Brazils presence in the world is essentially diplomatic. It does not aspire to be a military power; it is not promoting an ideological agenda; and it is still a developing country. So Brazil has, perforce, been relating to the world primarily through diplomacy. And diplomacy should be the domain of toleranceof the ability to deal with differenceswhich is a product that the world needs with urgency. So, if Brazil were to become a member of the Security Council, its multilateral orientation would be an asset that could help to generate more diverse ways of facing conflict resolution and the issues of security than those that have tended to resonate with the present permanent members. Brazilian diplomats believe that the countrys settled commitment to multilateralism is the trump card in its bid for a permanent seat.

Notes
Gelson Fonseca Jr. served as permanent representative to the United Nations from 1999 to 2003, as ambassador to Santiago from 2003 to 2006, and as consul general (Madrid) from 2006 to 2009. Presently, he is inspector general of the Foreign Service (since 2009) and professor at Instituto Rio Branco, Brasilia, Brazil. This article was translated by Jose Pedro Londres Fonseca. The author wishes to thank Tom Farer for his perceptive observations and his careful, intelligent, and sensitive editing of the text. He also thanks Celso Lafer, Rubens Ricupero, Breno Hermann, Benoni Belli, Luiz Felipe Seixas Correa, and Gisela Padovan for their rich comments. Alexandra Barahona reviewed the text with care and intelligence. While the author is a member of the Brazilian diplomatic service, this article reflects only his personal views. 1. The motives behind Brazils approving the bureau can be found in the report on the US invitation issued by the State Council on 7 November 1888, O Conselho de Estado e a poltica externa do Imprio, 19751889 (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2000). 2. Luiz Felipe Seixas Correa, O Brasil nas Naes Unidas (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2007). 3. Celso Lafer, A Identidade Nacional do Brasil e a Poltica Externa Brasileira (So Paulo: Perspectiva, 2009), p. 73. 4. Ibid., p. 78. 5. E. V. Garcia, O Brasil na Liga das Naes: Vencer ou No Perder, 19191926 (Porto Alegre: Editora da UFRGS, 2000). 6. See Wayne A. Selcher, Brazils Multilateral Relations (Boulder: Westview, 1978), p. 38. 7. Eduardo Uziel, O Conselho de Segurana e a Insero do Brasil no Mecanismo de Segurana Coletiva das Naes Unidas (Braslia: FUNAG, 2010), p. 82. 8. Ibid.

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9. Ibid., p. 84. 10. As Selcher (Brazils Multilateral Relations) explains, starting with Kubistchek, the chief national goal became industrialization. Foreign policy ceased being merely expressive (declarative of what Brazil represents in the world) and became instrumental to concrete national programs, p. 39. 11. Selcher (Brazils Multilateral Relations) correctly states that Brazil has kept a low profile in not showing great interest in election to a Security Council seat at the present time, because that would tend to over-accentuate some political vulnerabilities in areas not immediately tied to the national interest, p. 45. 12. Selcher, Brazils Multilateral Relations, p. 23. 13. Andre A. Correa do Lago, Estocolmo, Rio, Joanesburgo: o Brasisl e as trs conferncias ambientais das Naes Unidas (Braslia: FUNAG, 2007), p. 138. 14. In a 1968 telegram, Ambassador Araujo Castro, permanent representative to the UN, was explicit: I see great difficulty ahead for any Brazilian aspiration to higher positions in the UN, given how irritated and disappointed a number of African nations, who do not hide their hostility. The telegram can be found in J. A. Costa Vargas, Uma Esplndida Tradio: Joo Augusto Araujo Castro e a Poltica Exterior do Brasil (Brasilia: Instituto Rio Branco, 2008), p. 50 15. Rodrigo Amado, Araujo Castro (Brasilia: Editora Universidade de Brasilia, 1982). 16. Ibid., p. 219. 17. Vargas, Uma Esplndida Tradio, p. 80. 18. See J. A. Lindgren Alves, Human Rights and the Role of Brazil, in Alexandre de Gusmo, ed., O Brasil e a ONU (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2008), p. 190. 19. Rubens Ricupero, Dirio de Bordo (So Paulo: Imprensa Oficial), p. 38. 20. Seixas Correa, O Brasil nas Naes Unidas, p. 441. 21. Ibid., p. 447. 22. Ibid., p. 457. 23. Some differences are meaningful. For instance, despite the same goals, the campaign to obtain a permanent seat in the Security Council led to very different diplomatic mobilization efforts, much more forceful during Lulas government. 24. Brazilian president Dilma Roussef, whose mandate began 1 January 2011, signaled that some changes will be introduced in human rights policies. A different attitude in regard to the Iranian problems was the first movement, and Brazil voted in favor of a Council of Human Rights resolution that designated a special rapporteur for Iran. 25. See Carlos S. Duarte, Por um mundo livre de armas de destruio em massa: desarmamento e no proliferao, in O Brasil e a ONU (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2008), p. 75. 26. Ibid., p. 81. 27. See Uziel, O Conselho de Segurana e a Insero do Brasil no Mecanismo de Segurana Coletiva das Naes Unidas, p. 164. The author mentions that, during his 20042005 mandate, Brazil abstained only in three votes in the Security Council: Resolution 1559 (Lebanon), because it disagreed with the characterization of the situation as a threat to peace; Resolution 1593 (Sudan), because it defended the notion that the Security Council could impose restrictions on the International Criminal Court; and Resolution 1646 (Human Rights Council), because it opposed the existence of permanent seats for the P5 on the Council. 28. Ver Antonio Patriota, O Conselho de Segurana aps a Guerra do Golfo, 2nd ed. (Braslia: FUNAG, 2010). Patriota is now the Brazilian foreign minister and, as many of his predecessors, has a strong multilateral background. 29. See A. Patriota, G. Padovan, and L. Gorgulho, Os Trs Painis sobre o Iraque nas Naes Unidas, in Alexandre de Gusmo, ed., O Brasil na ONU (Brasilia: FUNAG, 2008), pp. 231249.

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30. There are several other issues, but global warming is perhaps the most revealing of the interests being negotiated. 31. In trade matters, a similar criticism is also raised. It is said that Brazil should have engaged more consistently in bilateral free-trade agreements instead of waiting for the dubious possibility of success of the Doha Round. The government defense says that there are areas, such as intellectual property, agricultural subsidies, and others, that necessarily require a universal treatment or the results will be meaningless. Moreover, the diversified (in terms of products and international partners) Brazilian economy tends to gain in absolute terms only with global negotiations. For a summary of the discussion on trade policies, see Lia Valls Pereira, A pauta do comrcio exterior brasileiro e os acordos comerciais, Conjuntura Econmica (June 2010); Pedro Motta Veiga and Sandra Polonio Rios, A Poltica Externa do Governo Lula: o fim do consenso de Braslia, Breves Cindes (August 2010).