15988066As Folk psychology does not cohere with the physical sciences it should be consideredfalse and eliminated.This then is one argument for eliminative materialism. Does it provide us with a goodenough reason to accept eliminative materialism? There are some philosophers whoargue that this particular argument does not necessarily entail that folk psychology isfalse. One counter-argument to Churchland’s points out that simply because Folk Psychology may not reduce to theories such as physics and neuroscience it is not entailedthat “FP is radically false, or that humans do not undergo the intentional events it posits.”
There is one theory for example which agrees with Churchland that folk psychologycannot be reduced to neuroscience, yet does not seek to eliminate mental states. Thistheory, known as anomalous monism
, asserts that mental states are in fact identical toneurological states: “every concrete mental event is identical to some concreteneurological event”.
The existence of anomalous monism offers a way out of eliminativematerialism yet it is pointed out by the philosophers who raised this point thatChurchland has made no attempt to defend eliminative materialism against AnomalousMonism: “Churchland never mentions Davidson’s version of the identity theory”
But even if anomalous monism proved to be false it still does not seem that Churchland’sargument is infallible. Churchland makes the claim that folk psychological concepts do
T. Horgan and J.Woodward, `The Philosophical Review 94 (1985) p 203
“Anomalous Monism is a theory of the relationship between mental and physical events and propertiesdeveloped by Donald Davidson. It holds that every causally interacting mental event is identical to some physical event — particular mental events (tokens) are the very same events as particular physical events(token-identity, or monism). But it also claims that there can be no strict laws on the basis of which anymental event-type can predict, explain, be predicted or explained – therefore, mental properties cannot bereduced to physical properties” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Anomalous Monism)
T. Horgan and J.Woodward, `The Philosophical Review 94 (1985) p 204