Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
2Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
A case study analysis of veto player theory

A case study analysis of veto player theory

Ratings: (0)|Views: 75 |Likes:
This essay introduces the main tenets of Veto Players Theory (VPT) in order to apply the theory to analyse the German and Irish systems. VPT is used to deduce predictions regarding legislative output and the independence of the judiciary and bureaucrats. These predications are compared to observed behaviour in order to determine whether VPT serves as accurate predictive theory.
This essay introduces the main tenets of Veto Players Theory (VPT) in order to apply the theory to analyse the German and Irish systems. VPT is used to deduce predictions regarding legislative output and the independence of the judiciary and bureaucrats. These predications are compared to observed behaviour in order to determine whether VPT serves as accurate predictive theory.

More info:

Published by: Undergraduate Awards on Sep 01, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
See more
See less

10/27/2013

 
Anne Byrne 04380053CPI Essay 2
A Case Study Analysis of Veto Player Theory
Select two advanced industrialized democracies. Analyze andcompare their political systems in terms of Veto Players Theory.How many veto players does each country have? What types of veto players are present in each system? What does Veto PlayersTheory predict in terms of legislative output, the independence of the judiciary and the independence of bureaucrats in each country?
Introduction
 This essay will introduce the main tenets of Veto Players Theory(VPT) in order to apply the theory to comparatively analyse thecharacteristics of veto players present in the German and Irishsystems. VPT will be used to deduce predictions regardinglegislative output, the independence of the judiciary and theindependence of bureaucrats in each country. These will becompared to observed behaviour in those countries, in order todetermine whether VPT serves as accurate or appropriate predictivetheory in these instances. The essay will conclude by examining theimplications the preceding case study analysis has for VPT.
Veto Players Theory
1
and definitions
Veto Players Theory (VPT) defines as veto players any actors(individual or collective) who must agree in order to change policyfrom the status quo. Veto players can be institutional (specified bythe constitution) and partisan (products of the political system). Inaddition, agenda setters are veto players who have the capacity tomake a “take it or leave it” proposal to other veto players. Thenumber and characteristics of these veto players in a system willaffect policy stability (Tsebelis, 2002). Additional points relating to
1
For a fuller explanation see Tsebelis (2002)
Page 1 of 1412/03/2009
 
Anne Byrne 04380053CPI Essay 2specific predictive propositions of the theory will be mentionedthroughout this essay.
Veto Players in Ireland
Institutional Veto Players
In Ireland, the government, Seanad and president couldtheoretically be considered institutional veto players. In reality, thegovernment is an effective solitary institutional veto player. The Seanad can be immediately dismissed from a discussion of vetoplayers. Firstly, the limited powers
2
of the Seanad make itineffectual. In addition, due to selection procedures
3
the partisancomposition of the Seanad inevitably is supportive of thegovernment. Thus the preferences of the majority in the Seanadand government are aligned and it does not operate as a veto-player.In noting the potential of the president to act as a veto player inIreland, it is essential to note one salient point – the president in thisinstance is not an independent veto player with policy preferencesbut rather acts through the judiciary. The president may “veto” byreferring a bill to the Supreme Court “to test its constitutionalvalidity” (Elgie & Fitzgerald, 2005, pp. 308). If the Court deems thebill to be unconstitutional, then a veto is effectively operated. Tsebelis views the judiciary as a dependent variable (even when
2
The only real power the Seanad has with regards to legislation is to merely delaylegislation for up to 90 days. Rejections of bills can be overruled and, in addition,there are limitations on the type of bills the Seanad can reject. (Gallagher,2005a) Furthermore, rejection of bills (i.e. exercising of an actual veto) occurs sorarely as to be insignificant: “the Seanad has not rejected a government bill since July 1964” (Gallagher, 2005a, pp. 233).
3
Eleven senators are appointed by an Taoiseach and are “usually chosen so as toensure that the government has a secure majority in the Seanad” (Gallagher,2005a).
Page 2 of 1412/03/2009
 
Anne Byrne 04380053CPI Essay 2acting in a constitutional interpretation capacity), and not a vetoplayer in its own right for two main reasons which apply to the Irishcase. Firstly, the judiciary is typically located inside the unanimitycore of the other existing veto players, primarily because of theappointment process (Tsebelis, 2002). This logic stands in Irelandwhere judicial appointments are a government decision. Secondly,when the court does rule against a government bill it “should notnecessarily be considered an opposition to government action. Itmay be the expression of 
 procedural preferences
” (Tsebelis, 2002,pp. 228). The instances when constitutional courts act as veto players arethus confined to when they are located in extreme policy positions(which is not the case in Ireland), or when new unprecedentedissues come up for consideration (which may be the case in Irelandbut in limited circumstances) (Tsebelis, 2002). As such thepresident/Supreme Court cannot be considered a veto player,except in very specific circumstances. In most instances and policyareas, the government is the sole veto player.
Partisan Veto Players and Agenda Setter 
Within the government, there may exist a number of partisan vetoplayers. The current government coalition is a minimum winningcoalition comprised of the dominant partner, Fianna Fáil (FF), theGreens and the Progressive Democrats
4
, and is supported by fourindependent TDs. In this instance, each of the parties ingovernment can be seen as a veto player (Tsebelis, 2002). Thereare, however, some points to note. Firstly, as a result of the supportfor the coalition (or in reality, FF) by independent TDs, the vetopower of the junior coalition parties is limited. A Dáil majority could
4
Although the Progressive Democrats are technically no longer a political party(McGee & Collins, 2008), they remain part of the government and shall beconsidered to still be a
de facto
political party within this analysis.
Page 3 of 1412/03/2009

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->