Anne Byrne – 04380053CPI – Essay 2acting in a constitutional interpretation capacity), and not a vetoplayer in its own right for two main reasons which apply to the Irishcase. Firstly, the judiciary is typically located inside the unanimitycore of the other existing veto players, primarily because of theappointment process (Tsebelis, 2002). This logic stands in Irelandwhere judicial appointments are a government decision. Secondly,when the court does rule against a government bill it “should notnecessarily be considered an opposition to government action. Itmay be the expression of
” (Tsebelis, 2002,pp. 228). The instances when constitutional courts act as veto players arethus confined to when they are located in extreme policy positions(which is not the case in Ireland), or when new unprecedentedissues come up for consideration (which may be the case in Irelandbut in limited circumstances) (Tsebelis, 2002). As such thepresident/Supreme Court cannot be considered a veto player,except in very specific circumstances. In most instances and policyareas, the government is the sole veto player.
Partisan Veto Players and Agenda Setter
Within the government, there may exist a number of partisan vetoplayers. The current government coalition is a minimum winningcoalition comprised of the dominant partner, Fianna Fáil (FF), theGreens and the Progressive Democrats
, and is supported by fourindependent TDs. In this instance, each of the parties ingovernment can be seen as a veto player (Tsebelis, 2002). Thereare, however, some points to note. Firstly, as a result of the supportfor the coalition (or in reality, FF) by independent TDs, the vetopower of the junior coalition parties is limited. A Dáil majority could
Although the Progressive Democrats are technically no longer a political party(McGee & Collins, 2008), they remain part of the government and shall beconsidered to still be a
political party within this analysis.
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