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Apparent facticity

Apparent facticity

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The overall purpose of this essay is to affirm the positive nature of schematics in Nietzsche’s attempt to explicate what he means by the Will to Power. The essay will discuss Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s accounts of interpretive schemas with a mind to illuminate their similarities and differences
The overall purpose of this essay is to affirm the positive nature of schematics in Nietzsche’s attempt to explicate what he means by the Will to Power. The essay will discuss Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s accounts of interpretive schemas with a mind to illuminate their similarities and differences

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Published by: Undergraduate Awards on Sep 01, 2012
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We will start by examining Nietzsche’s supposition that Knowledge is the result of itsapplied methodology. If we understand this premise we will come to see someimplications for knowledge claims regarding the Will to Power.Methodologies are those schemas that state the general conditions that enable truthsatisfaction in advance of any particular truth - they are the criterion which makes a trueassertion true. The great methodologists of history were “Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes,Auguste Comte” (Nietzsche: 468, p261)
. That “our objectivity, our method, our silent,cautious, mistrustful ways were considered perfectly contemptible” is not surprising to Nietzsche. Methodologies are invariably expressed in a propositional language, and assuch are inevitably contingent. Methodological statements are implicitly knowledge
(Nietzsche __ p__) (unless explicitly mentioned otherwise will refer to Kaufman’s edition of the Will toPower.
The overall purpose of this essay is to affirm the positive nature of schematics in Nietzsche’s attempt to explicate what he means by the Will to Power. The essay willdiscuss Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s accounts of interpretive schemas with a mind toilluminate their similarities and differences. To understand the central differences between the thought of Nietzsche and Heidegger it is vital that we trace their respective trajectories of thought. In an effort to clarify the focus of each thinker I willexamine the issue of normative schematics primarily in the work in two of their respective works, the
Will to Power 
 Being and Time
. From this it will becomeclear that while they both engage with normative discourse they intend to explicate theneed to surpass the crassly normative. The essay will end on a brief analysis of Heidegger’s “The origin of the work of art” in an attempt to show how suchquestioning is bound within a hermeneutic circle. Art and as such Life is a product of a perspective as being-in–the world.Heidegger’s existential analytics and Nietzsche’s imperative affirmations serve thesame purpose, in that they acknowledge the apparent facticity of man through Art.It is vital that we understand the ‘functional’ positioning of ‘Man’ in the thought of  both thinkers if we are to perceive how each mirrors the thought of the other.My account will focus on what might be called the ‘enworlded’ aspect of their thinking. This is explicit in the thought of Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle whichinevitably affirms some version of world given by language. For Nietzsche, it is lessobvious, but I will attempt to show that there is a rendering of interpretive schemas asnecessarily bound to the condition that is all too human. I will conclude by stating inwhich manner I believe the two thinkers coincide
claims that pretend to be the ground for knowledge claims and yet, their only ‘necessity’is their assumed self evidence.Knowledge claims are the vindication of their method which is nothing more than anassumption about the ground of knowledge itself. This much is clear, it leads us withoutfallacy to say that knowledge is in a certain sense “method”. This is a sinister realisationwhen one considers that our vaunted claims to knowledge are subject to the whims of fashion and that “all the presuppositions of our contemporary science were for millenniaregarded with the profoundest contempt” and may yet be again. (
 Nietzsche: 469
, p261).Methodologies presuppose the form of that which they investigate, so that tautologiesmay eventually stem from the attempt to reconcile the object of investigation withinvestigative principles. It is not surprising when a theologian finds God in the world.Truth for Nietzsche was at all prior points in time a dramatic unveiling with a “powerfuleffect on the imagination” and yet Truth continues to be fashionable. Nietzsche supposesthat it was primarily the self indulgent artistic needs of mankind that delayed our comingto modern levels of efficiency. Our present methods of inquiry were made possible by the“the conscientiousness in small things, the self control of the religious man” and themoral hyperbole that rendered the “picturesque effect of truth” pervasive unto the lowestlevel. Dramatic and dull all in the same move. (
 Nietzsche: 469,
p262). Our microscopicefficiency was made possible by the social veneration of a new methodology. Truth nowseems to pervade the world as an equal opportunity employer - such a thing was simplynot possible when God was “understood as the creator of things”.(Nietzsche: 471, p262)Truth is no longer transcendent, and yet there resides a reverence for the concept thatcould only be described as a religious. The claims of A.J. Ayer and logical positivismhave made a true statement, that which it is possible to humanly verify. Humanity has been exalted to the point of ultimate capacity and our claims are to be synonymous with‘truth’ and knowledge. In other words, despite our ‘capacity’ positivism still appeals toesoteric validation. We are not sufficient.
“Man seeks “the truth”; a world that is not self contradictory , not deceptive, does notchange, a
world – … He does not doubt that a world as it ought to be exists; hewould like to seek out the road to it”(Nietzsche: 585, p316/317)Man would like to seek out the road to what can only be “
The fiction of a world”.(Nietzsche: 585, p317).
There is no doubt that “At bottom, it has been an aesthetic tastethat has hindered mankind most” but this does not mean that we have in any wayovercome our aesthetic taste. The “scientific character” and its empirical search for ‘truth’ merely instantiates a new and flattering aesthetic maxim for moderns to slavishlyfollow. (
 Nietzsche: 469,
p262). The Aesthetic is comparable to logic and ethics in that“both refer to human behaviour and its lawfulness” and it is noted by Heidegger that“The true, the good, and the beautiful are the objects of logic, ethics andaesthetics.”(Heidegger: Vol I p78) These are the laws of convention, schemes amicable toour assumptions. The purpose of this essay will be to show how all knowledge claims arein some sense subject to the whims of the aesthetic valuations because “
Truth is the kind of error 
without which a certain kind of being could not live” (Heidegger: Vol II pp125)
The starting point 
Deleuze explains that for Nietzsche there are two modes of being-in-the-world,characterised by either an active or reactive force. The reactive forces are inferior, butthat does not entail that they “cease to be forces distinct from those which command”.We understand the reactive organism as constituted through a series of “mechanical andutilitarian accommodations”. Evidence of active forces is rarer, because “it is thereaching out for power” (Deleuze_37/8/9) that throws reactive forces into stark relief bycontrast. Napoleon was for Nietzsche an active force. For this reason we cannot followHeidegger who turns the realisation of man’s essence into the wholly active Over-man.This move is strange because “Man’s essence is the becoming-reactive of forces.” it is“determined as human, all too human”(Deleuze pp 159)
The reference ‘Vol II’ will refer to Krell’s second edition of Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures, and ‘Vol I’will refer to the first volume.

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