3The third theory relates to gender. It postulates that every person has their own expectations and
preferences as formed by socialisation. What has been found is that the man’s gender ideology is farmore influential than the woman’s when it comes to predicting who does the housework
(Bianchi etal 2000). If the man is what Breen and Cooke (2005) term a
preferring to dohousework rather than remain single or divorce
then the housework is more likely to be evenly
divided, regardless of the woman’s opinion. The same situation arises with ‘hardliner’ men who
refuse to do any housework. Women are often less well equipped to leave the marriage
and sotheir values matter less. This also feeds into the relative resource bargaining theory. The next sectionwill address how states choose to respond (or not respond) to the issue of housework being
To allow for a more revealing analysis of how different welfare states utilise family-friendly policy,some kind of typology is required. The best-known and most widely-used is Esping-
(1990) which identifies a Social Democratic, a Conservative and a Liberal form of the welfare state.This corresponds to the triumvirate of family policy models elaborated by Korpi (2000; cited by Boye2009) aligning Esping-
Andersen’s three groups
with the Dual-Earner, Traditional and Market-Oriented family policy models, respectively.The Dual-Earner family policy model, as typified by Sweden, Norway and Denmark, allows forreproduction work to be allocated to the state and supports female labour market participation andmale unpaid labour. There is less focus and assistance to women as homemakers. The Traditionalfamily policy model offers a strong reinforcement of the male breadwinner family, with low levels of dual-earner encouragement. The responsibility for reproductive work rests with the family unit.
Breen and Cooke frame this in terms of divorce law and economic autonomy though perhaps a more
‘emotional’ evaluation is required.