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And what happened was I had time to think about, finally in 1999, about whathappened in the previous 21 years. I realized that when I looked at what I had done andwhat other entrepreneurs had done that there was a pattern. And it was interestingthinking about what was going on with startups. I realized that traditional ways to thinkabout startups - have an idea, raise some money, do product development, go throughan alpha test, beta test and first customership was the canonical model of howentrepreneurs thought about early stage ventures. In fact, in my class I kind of used toask, "Can anybody draw this model?" And I used to say, "Even the waiters in SanFrancisco could draw this model."So somebody raised their hand and said, "Well, we're waiters in San Franciscobecause we used to be CEO's of dot-com companies." [Laughter] So I no longer makethat joke. But the canonical product development model - idea, raise money, develop,alpha, beta, first customership is the one that the valley grew up in. And when I lookedback at it I realized that it really set me up for a fundamental question. As if you allfollow that model, why is it that some companies are opening bottles of champagne attheir IPO or at their act of rescission and others who almost did the same rules areselling off their furniture? What was the difference here? And is there any way topredict other than you got to work hard and all the war stories you would say? Is thereany way to predict success or failure? And even more importantly, was there any wayto reduce risk in early stage ventures because I had done eight of them?I had sat on a ton of advisory boards and by the end of my career, I was investing.And these patterns kept coming up. And I'll tell you what the biggest pattern was for me.An observation number one was that most entrepreneurs, whether they were engineersor the CEOs or part of the founding team, were focused on one thing. And that wasgetting them to launch and first customership. The board was driving them to that,engineering was driving to that and everybody was focused on "that's the box we'reheading to."Well that's interesting. Product development, concept, develop, alpha, beta, firstcustomership. I started asking a heretical question. Whose diagram was this? What'sthe product development diagram? Well, that's interesting because in the productdevelopment diagram, we seem to be hiring and staffing sales, marketing andbusiness development people based on the timing of events on a product developmentdiagram.
 
Turns out if you look at canonical model, around alpha or beta time you start hiringmarketing people, start getting ready for launch. Start doing positioning and datasheets. Maybe hire an ad agency, start writing blogs, start communicating, all headingto that big launch event. And if you're doing something not on the Web - how many ofyou were doing or will do non-Web products? How many are you going to do Webproducts? Assume that there's a world outside the Web.You start thinking about maybe it's time to hire sales people, start staffing, getting earlycustomers. And if you're thinking about business development, you start thinking aboutdeals. The observation that I had was all heading for a party. What do we do at firstcustomership? Anybody know? What? Party. It's a party. Who's having the party?Anybody know? Anybody ever been to a company that had a first customership party?Anybody?Trust me, the whole company parties, OK? If you really think about it, who should behaving the party? Who's done at the end of product development? Is sales done? No.Marketing done? No. Is dev done? Not really. The only people who are actually done isengineering, yet somehow we end up inviting everybody else to engineering's party.While that might seem a little facetious, it actually drives a lot of company culture -spending, burn rate, etc.I realized that this might actually be a fundamental problem with most startups. Is thatactually startups were burning money by starting sales and marketing and businessdevelopment activities either on the Web or physically in the real world way too early.Because if you think about it, here we are in Silicon Valley, at least those of usphysically here not those watching on TV. But for those of us here in the Valley, wetake technical risks with products all the time. Investors put huge bets on all of you todo innovative things.Anybody have any idea what percentage of startups fail because their technology fails?Any idea? How many think it's over 50 % of startups fail because their technologydidn't work? Over 50 %. Over 25 % How many think it's over 25 % fail becausetechnology doesn't make it? Turns out less than 10 % of startups fail because theengineers were just wrong. Turns out most startups, and I'll leave Life Sciences asidefor a second. Most startups in every other field other than Life Sciences, over 90 % fail
 
because they didn't find a market and customers - full stop. Big idea.Well, if that's the case and go ask your favorite venture capitalist or next guest andyou'll have a lot of them in this class and every other class. Go ask them. If that's thecase, why is it that we have tons of methodologies, some measure and help us gettingthe product right, but no methodologies to help us get the stuff about customers andmarkets right? Anybody ever been in a company with - in product management orknow what product management people do? Some people in the back of the room.There's entire tool sets on how to manage technology risk. Tons. But there are almostno tools to manage customer and market risk. Well, think about this; you're anentrepreneur; I have a great idea, good! Let's go build it. Oh, good, let's go raise money.Oh, let's go sell it. Do you know what the next step it is? Oh, we're out of business.Because most of us grow up reading these wonderful stories about all the people whomade a ton of money at Google and Facebook and other companies that like - theseare great examples. Do you ever notice they don't bring in the people who you didn'thear about? Because you wouldn't have come.How about bringing in the people who said, "You know I cratered my last sevencompanies. Let me tell you why." You'd go, "Well, I don't want to be one of those. I wantto be Google and Facebook. That's whose presentations I want to hear." Any idea whatthe ration is between the Googles and Facebooks and other startups? Know how manycompanies fail every year in Silicon Valley? Anybody want to guess? Do you know whatthe ratio is? I'm sorry? Over a thousand to one. Now, one of the nice things abouthuman nature is every one of you is going to be convinced that you're going to beGoogle and Facebook. You have to be, right? I mean, that's the passion of anentrepreneur. You have to be convinced. You know those other 999 companies? Theywere just idiots. I am much smarter than them because I have better idea and we'recool.Unless some of you have been working in a specific domain for the last 20 years orso, the odds are that anything you're thinking about customers and markets arenothing more than a guess. And you go, "Oh no, the buddies in the dorm. They liked it!And look, you know I put it up and I got 300 hits!" That's not a business. In fact, theheuristic is, if you can't get 10,000 hits like in Silicon Valley, like your server is not
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