HALEY Syllabusbecause the United States denies the occurrence of the incident onwhich the plaintiff centrally relies. Based on §2679(d)(2)’s directionthat certification is “conclusiv[e] . . . for purposes of removal,” theCourt of Appeals instructed the District Court to retain jurisdictionover the case.
1. The Attorney General’s certification is conclusive for purposes of removal,
, once certification and removal are effected, exclusivecompetence to adjudicate the case resides in the federal court, andthat court may not remand the suit to the state court. Pp. 9–17.(a) The Sixth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the order reject-ing the Attorney General’s certification and denying substitution of the United States as defendant. Under the collateral order doctrineof
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
, 337 U. S. 541, the Dis-trict Court’s ruling, which effectively denied Haley Westfall Act pro-tection, qualifies as a reviewable final decision under 28 U. S. C.§1291. Meeting
’s three criteria, the District Court’s denial of certification and substitution conclusively decided a contested issue,the issue decided is important and separate from the merits of the ac-tion, and the District Court’s disposition would be effectively unre-viewable later in the litigation. 337 U. S., at 546. Pp. 9–11.(b) The Sixth Circuit also had jurisdiction to review the DistrictCourt’s remand order. Pp. 11–17.(1) The Sixth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the DistrictCourt’s remand order, notwithstanding 28 U. S. C. §1447(d), whichstates that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court . . . is notreviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . .” This Court held, in
Therm-tron Products, Inc.
, 423 U. S. 336, that §1447(c)confines §1447(d)’s scope. Section §1447(c) provides that a case mustbe remanded “if . . . it appears that the district court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction.” Under
, “only remand orders issuedunder §1447(c) and invoking the [mandatory ground] specifiedtherein . . . are immune from review” under §1447(d).
., at 346. Todetermine whether
’s reasoning controls here, the Westfall Act’s design, particularly its prescriptions regarding the removal andremand of actions filed in state court, must be examined.When the Attorney General certifies that a federal employeenamed defendant in a state-court tort action was acting within thescope of his or her employment at the time in question, the action“shall be removed” to federal court and the United States must besubstituted as the defendant. §2679(d)(2). Of prime importancehere, §2679(d)(2) concludes with the command that the “certificationof the Attorney General shall
conclusively establish scope of office oremployment for purposes of removal
.” (Emphasis added.) This direc-