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PO14 Paper

PO14 Paper

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Published by: iiliut on Sep 10, 2012
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09/10/2012

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Tsunami Countermeasures at Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS based on theExperience of Fukushima Accident
Kazuyuki Nagasawa*, Hideaki Kiyoura* and Masashi Fukushima** Tokyo Electric Power Company INC.The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, which had its origin in the inundation caused bythe large tsunami, occurred due to the loss of multiple safety functions simultaneously. Themost serious problems were the “simultaneous loss of all AC and DC power sourcesextending over a long period of time” and the “loss of heat removal function employingemergency seawater systems extending over a long period of time.” Therefore, we learnedthat adequate preparation is important to be able to reliably initiate success paths which willsuccessfully remove heat and cool the spent fuel pool and reactor in order to prevent coredamage even if all power sources are lost.On the Japan Sea side, there are no boundaries where large plates subduct as happens on thePacific side and it is believed that there will be little likelihood of a large tsunami strikes onthe Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS, but it was decided to adopt thorough tsunami countermeasuresagainst the design basis tsunami in order to fully ensure the safety of the station. On adoptingcountermeasures, it was independently set that the potential tsunami height was 15m asadequately large tsunami. Though the design basis tsunami was not defined at theKashiwazaki Kariwa NPS, the design basis tsunami would be expected to be lower than 15m.The following countermeasures have been adopted.(1) Measures for preventing inundation of the site and avoiding impact of the tsunami(Units 1~4) An seawall of reinforced concrete and a solid basic structure sufficientlycapable of withstanding the wave force of a tsunami and seismic motion will be constructedto a height of approximately 10m (approximately 15m above sea level). (ref. Fig.1,2)(Units 5~7) An elevated ground seawall, which is able to sufficiently withstand evenseismic motion and the force of a tsunami, was constructed using amended soil-cement to aheight of approximately 3m (approximately 15m above sea level) and connected to elevatedground at both ends of the site so as to function as a solid seawall.(2) Measures for preventing inundation of buildingsTide barriers and panels are mounted on penetrations and other openings in the reactorbuilding outer walls so as to reliably prevent seawater from inundating the building. (Thiswork will be carried out on Units 1~4 where there are openings at a height of up to 15mabove sea level.) (ref. Fig.1)(3) Measures for preventing inundation of important equipment rooms inside buildingBy making the doors to important equipment rooms watertight, inundation of suchequipment is reliably prevented even if seawater flows into the building. (ref. Fig.1,3)As mentioned above, various inundation prevention measures have been adopted, but powersources, coolant injection and heat removal functions have also been redundant anddiversified so that the power station’s safety functions will reliably operate even if powersources in operation are lost.(4) Maneuverable emergency safety measures

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