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NEA Mission
The mission of the NEA is to assist its Member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international co-operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for the safe, environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
To achieve this, the NEA works as:
A forum for sharing information and experience and promoting international co-operation; A centre of excellence which helps Member countries to pool and maintain their technical expertise; A vehicle for facilitating policy analyses and developing consensus based on its technical work.
OECD/NEA Membership
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary
Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic
Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States Not member of NEA
NEA Strengths
Small size and budget (80 staff members; budget of 14 million euros, + voluntary contributions and projects) Large representation (85% of the worlds nuclear power capacity) Non-political forum; climate of mutual trust Tries to pool worlds best nuclear expertise among developed countries Narrow focus: in-depth scientific, technical, legal work
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are operated in a safe manner and in accordance with regulation. A strong regulatory body possesses technical ability and independence in decision making; works transparently; strives for continuous learning and improvement; and utilises international networks.
CSNI, CNRA and CRPPH discussed appropriate strategies and priorities in response to Fukushima Daiichi beginning in late spring 2011 December 2011 Tri-bureau meeting of the CNRA, CRPPH, and CSNI to discuss coordination and integration of NEA response Enhanced cooperation and coordination among involved committees for efficiency Cross-Committee activities identified and prioritized Strategic alignment on new work scope of NEA Agreement on approach to coordinate cross committee activities Cross-committee process defined
STG-FUKU & PRG STCs Working Groups and Parties STG-FUKU & EPRG - recommendations STCs - decisions
Prioritization
Task allocation
STCs
Existing Group
New Group
Continue Longterm?
Continue Longterm?
STCs
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Cross-committee Follow-up
Integrated list of 3 Committees ideas and proposals for new Fukushimarelated work shared with all 3 STCs CNRA STG-FUKU coordinates new cross-committee Fukushima related work
Supports information exchange between NEA Members and between Working Groups, Parties, and Task Groups of the 3 STCs Coordinates activities between STC subgroups as needed
CSNI PRG (expanded) reviews and makes recommendations on crosscommittee Fukushima related work products Joint and Tri-Bureau Meetings
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Accident management including human factors and organisational issues related to the response to the accident. Reassessment of Defence-in-Depth. Evaluating the methodologies for defining and assessing initiating internal and external events, including coupled events, as well as methodologies defining the design basis criteria. Evaluation of operating experience for events that may be precursors to events that could challenge the safety of nuclear power plants given the insights from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. Communication with the public, media and other stakeholders. (See www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/fukushima)
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S S S
S S L
L L S
2. Crisis or Emergency Communications (primary information exchange between CNRA and CRPPH)
a. PUBLIC: Communication with the public, media and other stakeholders including Japanese organisations. b. REGULATORS: Communication with the regulators in other countries and with international organisations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE). L L L S S S L L L L
c. ONSITE OFFSITE: Crisis communications between onsite and offsite emergency response organisations.
3. Reassessment of Defence-in-Depth 4. Evaluating the methodologies for defining and assessing initiating internal and external events, including
Reassessment of Operating Experience and prior opportunities to identify or address conditions that could challenge nuclear safety.
a. OP E: Evaluation of operating experience for events that may be precursors to future events that could challenge the safety of nuclear power plants given the insights from Fukushima. b. RESEARCH: Review and gap analysis of safety research relevant to the analysis of the accident. L S L L L L S L S
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7. Regulatory 8. 9.
Radiological Protection and Health Physics Decontamination and recovery (onsite and offsite)
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The importance of future safety research has been highlighted New safety research will be identified using a phased approach within NEA: Comprehensive review of past safety research - done Gap analysis based on research issues from Fukushima - ongoing
Discuss possible expansion of existing projects and/or New R&D project proposals
HEAF
H2
HYMERES
PKL-3
LOFC
LOFT
SERENA
MCCI MCCI-2
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CNRA Senior Task Group on Impacts of Fukushima Daiichi Accident (STG-FUKU) established to coordinate CNRA and ultimately cross-committee response to Fukushima Daiichi accident New Task Group on Accident Management established Enhancements of on-site accident management procedures Decision-making and guiding principles in emergency situations Guidance for instrumentation, equipment and supplies for addressing long-term aspects of accident management Guidance when taking extreme measures for AM
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Experience (WGOE) Task on pre-cursor events evaluation of various initiators and situations for new lessons in light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and improvements in implementing lessons learnt. WGRISK to cooperate in a risk analysis of precursor events exercise
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Multi- unit sites Site layout considerations Consideration of external events or combinations of hazards a the siting stage Land use/population density Emergency preparedness arrangements/feasibility Social acceptability NPP design parameters are enveloped or suitable for a given site
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Safety of Research Reactors Task Group (SORRTG) Task on peer review workshop of country comprehensive safety assessments (stress tests) of high risk RR facilities.
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Established Expert Group on Radiological Protection Aspects of the Fukushima NPP Accident (EG-RPF) Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matters (WPNEM) INEX 4 evaluation report and workshop planning EGIRES report on optimization in emergency preparedness and response with special focus on reference levels Update of report on Short-term Countermeasures in Case of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2003) Survey on emergency management lessons learned
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Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE) Expert Group on Severe Accident Management (EGSAM)
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Conclusions
The Fukushima Daiichi accident is very important and it is going to influence the future of nuclear power. It was caused by highly unexpected external natural events, and not as TMI or Chernobyl by failure of equipment or maloperation. The accident caused the evacuation of more than 80,000 people and contaminated a large area; there has been no radiation-related fatalities, while the earthquake and the tsunami caused 20,000 deaths. All plants in operation are being reviewed by independent safety regulators.
NPPs are safe to operate according to the very demanding standards in place today Enhancements to further improve safety continue to be identified and implemented
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Conclusions (contd)
For many countries, the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident does not question nuclear power as such, but it does question the choice of specific locations and designs at these locations.
Better understanding of external hazards and their consequences Broader application of defence-in-depth A more balanced use of deterministic and probabilistic approaches
Policies may evolve in radiological protection, emergency and post-accident management in areas such as:
Societal impacts beyond radiation hazards Enhancements to crisis (emergency) communications Enhanced offsite capabilities to respond to severe accidents
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