SRCSB Motion to Dismiss Complaint

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTNORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDAPENSACOLA DIVISIONMINOR I. DOE, through parentPARENT I. DOE; MINOR II. DOE,through parent PARENT II. DOE

,Plaintiffs,Case No.: 3:08-cv-361-MCR-EMTv.

SCHOOL BOARD FOR SANTAROSA COUNTY, FLORIDA; JOHNROGERS, in his official capacity asSuperintendent of the School District of Santa Rosa County, Florida; H. FRANKLAY, in his official capacity asPrincipal of Pace High School

,Defendants. /

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINTAND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Defendants,

SCHOOL BOARD FOR SANTA ROSA COUNTY, FLORIDA

and

JOHN ROGERS, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the School District of Santa Rosa County, Florida,

(“Defendants”), by and through the undersigned counsel, andpursuant to

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Civ

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P

. 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), and

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Fla

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. 7.1, move to dismissthe Complaint filed by Plaintiffs, and in support of the relief requested, state as follows:1. On or about August 27, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a two-count Complaint in thisCourt alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Establishment Clause violation) (Count I) andthe Florida Constitution (“No Aid” violation) (Count II).

(Doc. 1)

. The Complaint wasserved upon Defendants on or about August 29, 2008.

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2. Defendants requested, and were granted, a 30 day extension of time withinwhich to respond to the Complaint.

(Doc. 9)

.3. The Complaint should be dismissed for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs MinorI. Doe (“Doe I”) and Minor II. Doe (“Doe II”) have failed to meet their burden to pleadsufficient facts to establish the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” for thealleged United States constitutional violations occurring at District Schools other than PaceHigh School, the school which they attend.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

, 504 U.S. 555,560 (1992). More specifically, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they suffered a concreteand particularized “injury in fact,” much less one that was sufficiently personal andindividual to satisfy the standing requirements of Article III of the United StatesConstitution.

See

,

Lujan

504 U.S. at 561 n1. Moreover, because neither Plaintiffs Doe I norDoe II has established their standing to bring claims alleging constitutional violations atSanta Rosa County Schools other than Pace High School, they may not seek relief on theirown behalf or for any other member of the class who may have suffered constitutionalinfringement at these other schools.

See

,

O’Shea v. Littleton

, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974).Because Plaintiffs have failed to establish this threshold jurisdictional prerequisite, there isno active case or controversy, and therefore this Court lacks standing to hear these claims.

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons

, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983);

see also

,

Doe v. Duncanville Ind.School Dist

., 70 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 1995).4. Basic standing principles under Florida law also require that Plaintiffs’ claimsunder the “No Aid” provision of the Florida Constitution be dismissed. Like their claims

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under the Establishment Clause, Plaintiffs cannot establish standing to assert their claimsunder the “No Aid” provision. As with principles of standing applicable under Federal law,under Florida law, a litigant must demonstrate that he has standing to invoke the power of acourt to determine the merits of an issue.

E.g.

,

Keehn v. Joseph C. Mackey and Co.

, 420 So.2d 398, 399 n.1 (Fla. 4

th

DCA 1982). “Standing depends on whether a party has a sufficientstake in a justiciable controversy, with a legally cognizable interest which would be affectedby the outcome of the litigation.”

Nedeau v. Gallagher

, 851 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1

st

DCA2003) (citations omitted).5. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs Doe I and Doe II do not have standing toassert claims for alleged violations of the United States and Florida Constitutions, anabsolute predicate to the establishment of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court lacks theauthority to hear these claims, and therefore the Complaint should be dismissed.6. Additionally, this Court should exercise its discretion and dismiss Plaintiffs’Count II claim brought under the “No Aid” provision of the Florida Constitution. This claimraises novel and unsettled issues of state law on which Florida courts have not passed. 28U.S.C. §1367(c)(1). Further, under the “exceptional circumstances” prong of 28 U.S.C.§1367(c)(4), and based upon principles of comity and deference to Florida courts, this issueshould be decided in state court rather than in the case

sub judice

.

MEMORANDUM OF LAWI. Applicable Standards of Review

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court “must accept the allegations set forth in

of 00

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