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East vs West Air Power

East vs West Air Power

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Published by draculavanhelsing
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Categories:Types, Research, History
Published by: draculavanhelsing on Sep 13, 2012
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 Air power seems less important in most Westerndefence departments, reflected by deliberatepolicy decisions and funding choices, perhaps bestencapsulated in public statements by US Secretaryof Defence Robert M Gates who observed in May2008: “I have noticed too much of a tendencytowards what might be called Next-War-itis — thepropensity of much of the defense establishmentto be in favor of what might be needed in a futureconflict.”Military professionals found Secretary Gates’statements offensive, as centuries of defenceplanning practices were being arbitrarily overturned.The objections could be best summarised as, “doyou want to go into a gunfight armed with a bowand arrow?”Secretary Gates’ comments were serious, as hesacked the Chief of Staff Air Force and theSecretary of the Air Force. This action wasunprecedented, and in the assessment of many American observers, a result of their objectionsto Gates’ intent to cease further funding for theF-22A Raptor, the only upper tier combat aircraft inproduction in the United States inventory.Since then, a good many high achieving US AirForce generals have been denied promotions, andquietly pushed into early retirement. What is beingdone to the US Air Force now differs little fromthat observed in other Western nations over thepast decade: to be employed military professionalswho put the profession and national interest aheadof bureaucratic agendas cease to be militaryprofessionals thereafter.This broad and deep attack on the militaryprofession itself is not isolated, and reflects a widerpattern in Western nations of actively denyingthe need for advanced high technology militarysystems with competitive upper tier capabilities,and actively making an effort not to fund them.While the West is pursuing a deliberate policy ofunilateral disarmament in upper tier capabilities,
East versus West:Divergent paths in air power
Dr Carlo Kopp
OVER the past decade, increasingdivergence in the direction of airpower planning in Western nationsand their counterparts in Asia andRussia is changing the balance intraditional East versus West globalair power. China, India, Russia andlesser nations in Asia have investedincreasingly in top tier air powerand the full spectrum of supportingcapabilities, while the United Statesand its allies have been downsizingtheir air forces – replacing top tiercapabilities with lesser assets.The Chinese proverb“May you live ininteresting times”will be fulfilled.
F-22A Raptor.Right: PAK-FA Prototype.Far right: J-20 Prototype.
the very opposite is true on the Asian continent, andWestern Pacific Rim. China, India and Russia arerecapitalising their Cold War aircraft fleets, radarinventories and air defence missile inventorieswith modern high technology systems. Russianand Chinese industry have exploited the stagnationin the West and closed the gap in most keytechnologies that matter in modern air wars. TheWest now holds only incremental advantages insome stealth and radar technologies; in most othercategories Russian and Chinese analogues are nowavailable, which are equally good and often betterthan the products made by the US/EU industries. American analysts Blumenthal and Mazza thisJanuary labelled the effect as “A One-Sided ArmsRace”, referring to China’s large scale restructuringand recapitalisation of its military capabilities.While the United States Air Force combat fleet agesinto oblivion, shrinking progressively in numbers,China has deployed over 300 Flankers, is buildinghundreds of J-10 Sinocanards, developing thevery good J-20 stealth fighter to rival the F-22,and modernising its weapons inventory withdomestically manufactured analogues to the US AMRAAM, JDAM, and Small Diameter Bomb.China now operates the largest modern Integrated Air Defence System globally, with over 200airfields, of which at least 40 have undergroundsuperhardened hangars to resist air and nuclearattacks, and more surface-to-air Missile batteriesof the modern SA-20 and HQ-9 systems thanRussia operated in numbers of older, less capableSA-10 and SA-12 batteries.While China pursues its military capabilityexpansion, Russia is exploiting this by sellingadvanced weapons across Asia to China’sincreasingly uncomfortable neighbours, whilecontinuing to sell advanced systems to China.The policy in Western senior bureaucratic andpolitical circles of putting domestic politicalporkbarrel and bureaucratic ideological agendasahead of real military capabilities, and of ruthlesslysacking generals (and analysts) who object orfail to enthusiastically endorse the bureaucraticagenda, will result over the coming decade inthe single greatest shift in the balance of globalmilitary power observed since the late 1930s,when Germany and Japan were ascendant.The Western world has a few years left to reversedirection in its air power planning, but this willnot happen until there is political acceptanceof the need for change, which senior defencebureaucrats in the West have resisted stronglyover the past half decade. Having behaved similarlyto their predecessors during the late 1930s, theexpectation that Western bureaucracies willchange their behaviour without decisive politicalintervention is not realistic.The Chinese proverb “May you live in interestingtimes” will be fulfilled.
Russia’s PAK-FA and China’s J-20 are highperformance aircraft, developed specifically tocompete against the F-22A Raptor. Both are likelyto outperform the F-22 in aerodynamic performanceand agility once fitted with the intended engines,and both will have sufficient stealth performance toseriously degrade the effectiveness of all Westernradar systems.In Washington, and most other Western capitals,both aircraft have been almost uniformlydismissed and labelled irrelevant by senior defencebureaucrats. The arguments put forth are mostcommonly along the lines of neither the Russiansnor Chinese being intellectually competent toengineer the stealth capabilities, or to produce theaircraft at a viable unit procurement cost.In the simplest of terms, Western bureaucratsare mirroring Western experiences onto nationsthat have completely different military equipmentdefinition and development cycles, very differentfunding models, and no shortage of engineeringand scientific talent to place into defence industry jobs. In the West, a high achieving engineeringor science graduate with qualifications up to PhDlevel is unlikely to consider a career in the defencesector, be it industry or government, but in Russiaand China such employment has high social statusand is most often much better rewarded relativeto other sectors, and highly secure. Funding fortop end military programs, especially in China orin Russia for export products is usually generous.Prototyping and experimentation is activelyencouraged.No less importantly, the United States as the leaderin these technologies for four decades now hascarried the heavy cost burden of doing the basicresearch required to learn how to best build suchequipment. Russian and Chinese engineers exploitknowledge of United States designs to take smartshortcuts in their design cycles, saving many yearsof development and many billions of dollars infunding programs. As a result, the PAK-FA and J-20 are now indevelopment, and both will be operational wellbefore 2020, notwithstanding claims otherwiseby technologically illiterate bureaucrats in theWest. While their stealth performance will not bequite as good as the F-22, it does not need to besuch to produce strategic effect, especially if largenumbers are built.The strategic impact of non-Western stealthfighters will be profound. Western built Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) rely primarily onS-band, and to a lesser extent L-band and UHF-band acquisition radars for land based andshipboard use. Airborne Early Warning capabilitiesare similarly constrained, with the E-3/E-767/  APY-2 AWACS operating in the S-band, the E-737Wedgetail/MESA and G.550 CAEW / EL/M-2075 theL-band, and the E-2C/APS-145 and E-2D/APY-9(US Navy) in the UHF-band.While the L-band MESA and EL/M-2075, and UHF-band APY-9 will have significantly better detectionperformance against a PAK-FA or J-20, comparedto an S-band radar such as the APY-2 or SPY-1 Aegis, it will be much lower than that achievableagainst a non-stealthy conventional aerial target. As a result of the introduction of robust stealthcapability, the coverage footprint of United Statesand allied IADS globally will be severely reduced,
Top: Russian KAB-1500L 3,000 lb LGB. Above: Chinese Luoyang LT-3 “Sino-Laser-JDAM”.Left: Chinese CETC DLW002 three dimensional Emitter Locating System.Below: Russian NNIIRT 55Zh6M Nebo M counter-stealth  AESA radar.

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