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15
TANK PLATOON
FEBRUARY 2007
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only. This publication contains technical or opera tional information that is for official Government use. This deter mination was made on 31 October 2006. Other requests for this document must be referred to Director, Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-G, 204 1st Cavalry Regiment Rd Ste 207, US Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5123. Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
*FM 3-20.15
Field Manual No. 3-20.15 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC, 22 February 2007
Tank Platoon
Contents
Page
PREFACE ...........................................................................................................xiii
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1-1
Section I - Organizations ................................................................................. 1-1
Tank Platoon ...................................................................................................... 1-1
Tank Company ................................................................................................... 1-5
Armored Cavalry Troop ...................................................................................... 1-5
Section II - Capabilities and Limitations ........................................................ 1-6
Capabilities ......................................................................................................... 1-6
Limitations .......................................................................................................... 1-6
Section III - Responsibilities............................................................................ 1-7
Platoon Leader ................................................................................................... 1-7
Platoon Sergeant................................................................................................ 1-7
Tank Commander............................................................................................... 1-7
Gunner................................................................................................................ 1-8
Driver .................................................................................................................. 1-8
Loader ................................................................................................................ 1-8
Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL............................................................................. 2-1
Section I - Command........................................................................................ 2-1
Decision-Making ................................................................................................. 2-1
Leadership........................................................................................................ 2-11
Section II Control......................................................................................... 2-12
Situational Understanding ................................................................................ 2-12
Fire Distribution and Control............................................................................. 2-26
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and their contractors only
to protect technical or operational information that is for official government use. This determination was made on
31 October 2006. Other requests for this document must be referred to Director, Directorate of Training,
Doctrine, and Combat Development, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-G, USAARMC, 204 1st Cavalry Regiment Road Ste 207,
Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-5123.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. *This publication supersedes FM 3-20.15 dated 1 November 2001.
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Contents
Chapter 3
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS...............................................................................3-1
Section I - Fundamentals of the Offense ........................................................3-1
Purposes of the Offense .....................................................................................3-1
Characteristics of the Offense ............................................................................3-1
Forms of Offense ................................................................................................3-2
Role of the Tank Platoon ....................................................................................3-2
War-Fighting Functions.......................................................................................3-2
Section II - Planning..........................................................................................3-3
Movement and Maneuver ...................................................................................3-3
Fire Support ........................................................................................................3-4
Intelligence ..........................................................................................................3-4
Protection ............................................................................................................3-4
Sustainment ........................................................................................................3-5
Command and Control........................................................................................3-5
The Human Aspect .............................................................................................3-5
Section III - Preparation....................................................................................3-5
Movement and Maneuver ...................................................................................3-5
Fire Support ........................................................................................................3-6
Intelligence ..........................................................................................................3-6
Protection ............................................................................................................3-6
Sustainment ........................................................................................................3-6
Command and Control........................................................................................3-6
The Human Aspect .............................................................................................3-7
Section IV - ExecutionTactical Movement ..................................................3-7
Fire Distribution and Control in the Offense........................................................3-7
Use of Terrain for Cover and Concealment ........................................................3-9
Techniques of Movement....................................................................................3-9
Formations ........................................................................................................3-11
Overwatch .........................................................................................................3-16
Section V - ExecutionActions on Contact ................................................3-18
The Four Steps of Actions on Contact..............................................................3-18
Examples of Actions on Contact .......................................................................3-21
Battle Drills ........................................................................................................3-25
Section VI - ExecutionPlatoon Tactical Tasks .........................................3-36
Destroy an Inferior Force ..................................................................................3-36
Attack by Fire ....................................................................................................3-38
Overwatch/Support by Fire ...............................................................................3-39
Assault ..............................................................................................................3-40
Bypass ..............................................................................................................3-42
Reconnaissance by Fire ...................................................................................3-44
Hasty Occupation of a Platoon Battle Position (Hasty Defense) ......................3-45
Breaching Operations .......................................................................................3-45
Section VII - ExecutionConsolidation and Reorganization.....................3-46
Consolidation ....................................................................................................3-46
Reorganization ..................................................................................................3-46
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Chapter 9
Figures
Figure 1-1. Tank platoon.................................................................................................1-2
Figure 1-2. The wingman concept ..................................................................................1-2
Figure 1-3. Tank and Bradley main gun and coax dead space above street level ........1-3
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Figure G-1. Risk levels and impact on mission execution ............................................. G-3
Figure G-2A. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 1 of 2
pages ........................................................................................................... G-4
Figure G-2B. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 2 of 2
pages ........................................................................................................... G-5
Tables
Table 6-1. Characteristics and capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft .................................6-14
Table 8-1. Penetration capabilities of a single 7.62-mm (ball) round .............................8-5
Table 8-2. Number of rounds needed to penetrate a reinforced concrete wall at a 25
degree obliquity ............................................................................................8-5
Table 8-3. Structure penetrating capabilities of 7.62-mm round (NATO ball) against
typical urban targets (range 25 meters) .......................................................8-6
Table 8-4. Structure penetrating capabilities of caliber .50 ball against typical urban
targets (range 35 meters).............................................................................8-6
Table 8-5. Marking methods .........................................................................................8-21
Table A-1. Capabilities and limitations of the digitized tank platoon ............................. A-5
Table G-1. Risk assessment matrix............................................................................... G-3
Table G-2. Instructions for completing DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management
Worksheet ................................................................................................... G-6
Table I-1. Abandon tank procedures ...............................................................................I-1
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Preface
This manual describes how the tank platoon fights. It focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) the platoon uses to exploit its combat power and minimize its vulnerabilities while conducting combat operations. FM 3-20.15 is for leaders and crew members of all M1, M1A1, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP (system enhancement package) tank platoons. Because weapons and equipment vary among units, users should adapt information to fit their specific situations. Where capabilities of the various systems differ significantly, this manual examines alternative considerations and techniques for their use. This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. In addition to FM 3-20.15, two publications are critical reference sources for the tank platoon. ARTEP 17-23710-MTP, the mission training plan for the tank platoon, contains collective platoon tasks and outlines training procedures and exercises. The other resource, ST 3-20.153, contains a detailed example of tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP). Each tank platoon can modify the TACSOP to meet its unique mission requirements. Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. The proponent of this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the preparing agency is the United States Army Armor Center. Users and readers of this manual are invited to submit recommendations that will improve its effectiveness. Send comments and recommendations to Director, Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-G, U.S. Army Armor Center, 204 1st Cavalry Regiment Road Suite 207, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5123. For additional information, call (502) 624-3294/1779 or DSN 464-3294/1779.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The fundamental mission of the tank platoon is to close with and destroy the enemy. The platoons ability to move, shoot, and communicateand do so with armored protectionis a decisive factor on the modern battlefield. It moves, attacks, defends, and performs other essential tasks to support the company or troop mission. In accomplishing its assigned missions, the tank platoon employs firepower, maneuver, and shock effect, synchronizing its capabilities with those of other maneuver elements and warfighting functions. When properly supported, the platoon is capable of conducting sustained operations against any sophisticated threat. The tank platoon can survive and win in battle only if it is well trained, effectively led, and highly motivated. Crews must be aggressive, and their tactics must reflect the tempo and intensity of maneuver warfare. Platoon training must prepare them to operate effectively in hostile territory with the enemy to their front, flanks, and rear.
SECTION I - ORGANIZATIONS
TANK PLATOON
1-1. By itself, any tank can be vulnerable in the face of diverse battlefield hazards (such as enemy forces or unfavorable terrain) and situations; these vulnerabilities are significantly reduced when tanks are employed as units. 1-2. A tank platoon consists of four main battle tanks organized into two sections, with two tanks in each section. Section leaders are the platoon leader, who is the tank commander (TC) of the vehicle designated as Tank 1 and the platoon sergeant (PSG), who is the TC of Tank 4. Tank 2 is the wingman in the platoon leaders section, and Tank 3 is the wingman in the PSGs section (see Figure 1-1).
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Figure 1-1. Tank platoon 1-3. The tank platoon is organic to tank companies, armored cavalry troops, and combined arms battalions. The platoon may be attached to a number of organizations, commonly a mechanized infantry company, to create company teams. It may also be placed under the operational control (OPCON) of light infantry organizations. Note. For information on light infantry organizations and their relationship with the tank platoon, refer to the discussion in Appendix C of this manual and to FM 7-20. Additional information concerning task organized company teams is found in Appendix C of this manual and in FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1). 1-4. Under battlefield conditions, the wingman concept facilitates control of the platoon when it operates in sections. The concept requires that one tank orient on another tank on either its left or right side. In the absence of specific instructions, wingmen move, stop, and shoot when their leaders do. In the tank platoon, Tank 2 orients on the platoon leaders tank, while Tank 3 orients on the PSGs tank. The PSG orients on the platoon leaders tank (see Figure 1-2).
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Figure 1-3. Tank and Bradley main gun and coax dead space above street level 1-7. The platoon leader and platoon sergeant must understand the factors involved with operating in concert with light and mechanized infantry forces. Gaining dismounted infantry significantly changes the need to understand the differences in movement rates and communication challenges. The leaders must have a solid communication plan and conduct rehearsals, including the infantry squad. If the armor section is attached to the infantry or mechanized infantry section, then the infantry/mechanized infantry leaders must understand the supply and maintenance needs of heavy armor forces. This poses the biggest
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challenge for the dismounted infantry, because their need for fuel is far less than that of an armor section. Also, the armor sections ammunition requirements will pose issues in acquisition and distribution. The following checklist is not limited to, but should include, the platoon leaders responsibilities when gaining an infantry section or losing a tank section.
Section (Losing)
z z z z z z
z z
Section leader receives coordination data: linkup time, location, gaining unit designation, frequencies, and point of contact from the platoon leader. Section is refueled and rearmed. Section moves to the linkup point. Section leader enters the gaining units radio net. Section leader reports to the gaining units point of contact and provides a status report. Section leader receives: Mission. Maps. Orders/overlays. TACSOP. Direct fire and control SOP. Digital SOP. Casualty evacuation plan. Section leader submits: Battle roster. CS report. Sensitive items report. Any general issues. Section conducts digital communications check. Section leader confirms linkup with parent unit.
Section (Gaining)
z z z z z
Receiving unit issues coordination data to losing unit: linkup time, location, frequencies. Receiving unit conducts linkup with attaching unit. Receiving unit conducts digital communications check with attaching unit. Receiving unit receives status report from attaching unit. Receiving unit issues: Mission. Maps. Orders/overlays. TACSOP and communications security (COMSEC) information. Unit SOP. Direct fire and control SOP. Digital SOP. Casualty evacuation SOP. Receiving unit receives: Battle roster. CS report. Sensitive items report. Any general issues. Receiving unit conducts battle drill rehearsals for all five forms of contact.
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Introduction
TANK COMPANY
1-8. The tank company is organized, equipped, and trained to fight pure or as a task organized company team. The tank company consists of a headquarters and three tank platoons. The company headquarters consists of the commanding officer (CO), executive officer (XO), first sergeant (1SG), and supply section. The company headquarters is equipped with two tanks, one M113A2/A3 armored personnel carrier (APC), two M1025 or M998 high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), and one cargo truck with a 400-gallon water trailer (see Figure 1-4). A maintenance section from the forward support company (FSC) is normally attached to the tank company. The maintenance section consists of one APC, one heavy recovery vehicle, one cargo truck with trailer carrying spare parts based on the prescribed load list (PLL), and one cargo truck with trailer as a tool truck. A medic team, normally attached from the battalion medical platoon, travels in a medic APC.
Figure 1-4. Tank company Note. As part of continued modernization of equipment, units are receiving the forward repair system (FRS) as a replacement for the maintenance M113.
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Chapter 1
CAPABILITIES
1-12. Tanks offer an impressive array of capabilities on the modern battlefield: excellent cross-country mobility, sophisticated communications, enhanced target acquisition, lethal firepower, and effective armor protection. In combination, these factors produce the shock effect that allows armor units to close with and destroy the enemy in most weather and light conditions. 1-13. Todays tanks can move rapidly under a variety of terrain conditions, negotiating soft ground, trenches, small trees, and limited obstacles. In addition, global positioning systems (GPS) and inertial position navigation (POSNAV) systems allow tanks to move to virtually any designated location with greater speed and accuracy than ever before. Use of visual signals and the single channel ground/airborne radio system (SINCGARS) facilitates rapid and secure communication of orders and instructions. This capability allows tank crews to quickly mass the effects of their weapon systems while remaining dispersed to limit the effects of the enemys weapons. 1-14. On-board optics and sighting systems enable tank crews to acquire and destroy enemy tanks, armored vehicles, and fortifications using the main gun or to use machine guns to suppress enemy positions, personnel, and lightly armored targets. The tanks armor protects crew members from smallarms fire, most artillery, and some antiarmor systems. 1-15. Perhaps the most important technological advance available to the tank platoon is the digital information capability of its vehicles. Some tank crews now employ the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) system, to improve situational understanding, command, control, and navigation. The enhanced capabilities provided by these digitized systems represent a distinct advantage for the platoon leader. They enable him to gain and maintain the initiative on the battlefield by synchronizing his elements with other units through the use of faster, more accurate tactical information. Additional details on the capabilities and operational considerations of FBCB2 are provided in Appendix A and in discussions throughout this manual.
LIMITATIONS
1-16. Tanks require extensive maintenance, proficient operators, and skilled mechanics, as well as daily resupply of large quantities of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) products. They are vulnerable to the weapons effects of other tanks, attack helicopters, mines, antitank guided missiles (ATGM), antitank guns, and close attack aircraft. When tanks operate in built-up areas, dense woods, or other restricted terrain,
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reduced visibility leaves them vulnerable to dismounted infantry attacks. In such situations, they may be restricted to trails, roads, or streets; severely limiting maneuverability and observation. Existing or reinforcing obstacles can also restrict or stop tank movement.
PLATOON LEADER
1-18. The platoon leader is responsible to the commander for the discipline and training of his platoon, the maintenance of its equipment, and its success in combat. He must be a subject matter expert in the tactical employment of his section and the platoon, both by itself and in concert with a company team or troop. He must have a solid understanding of troop-leading procedures and develop his ability to apply them quickly and efficiently on the battlefield. 1-19. The platoon leader must know the capabilities and limitations of the platoons personnel and equipment; at the same time, he must be well versed in enemy organizations, doctrine, and equipment. He must serve as an effective TC. Most importantly, the platoon leader must be flexible and capable of using sound judgment to make correct decisions quickly and at the right times based on his commanders intent and the tactical situation. During decentralized operations, the platoon leader cannot rely on the company commander for guidance and instructions. He must be capable of making decisions based on his units task and purpose and the commanders intent. 1-20. Platoon leaders must know and understand the task force mission and the task force commanders intent. They must be prepared to assume the duties of the company commander in accordance with the succession of command.
PLATOON SERGEANT
1-21. The PSG is second in command of the platoon and is accountable to the platoon leader for the training, discipline, and welfare of the Soldiers in the platoon. He coordinates the platoons maintenance and CS requirements and handles the personal needs of individual Soldiers. The PSG is the most experienced TC in the platoon. His tactical and technical knowledge allow him to serve as mentor to crewmen, other noncommissioned officers (NCO), and the platoon leader. His actions on the battlefield must complement those of the platoon leader. He must be able to fight his section effectively, either in concert with the platoon leaders section or by itself.
TANK COMMANDER
1-22. The TC is responsible to the platoon leader and PSG for the discipline and training of his crew, the maintenance of assigned equipment, the reporting of CS needs, and the tactical employment of his tank. He briefs his crew, directs the movement of the tank, submits all reports, and supervises initial first-aid treatment and evacuation of wounded crewmen. He is an expert in using the tanks weapon systems, requesting indirect fires, and executing land navigation using both digital systems and more traditional methods such as terrain association. 1-23. The TC must know and understand the company mission and company commanders intent. Again with decentralized operations, the TC may operate as a section and must be able to execute independently. He must be prepared to assume the duties and responsibilities of the platoon leader or PSG in accordance with the succession of command. These requirements demand that the TC maintain constant, thorough situational understanding. He does this by using all available optics for observation, eavesdropping on radio transmissions, and monitoring the FBCB2 display.
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GUNNER
1-24. The gunner searches for targets and aims and fires both the main gun and the coaxial machine gun. He is responsible to the TC for the maintenance of the tanks armament and fire control equipment. The gunner serves as the assistant TC and assumes the responsibilities of the TC as required. He also assists other crew members as needed. Several of his duties involve the tanks communications and internal control systems: logging onto and monitoring communications nets, maintaining digital links if the tank is equipped with FBCB2, inputting graphic control measures on digital overlays, and monitoring digital displays during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.
DRIVER
1-25. The driver moves, positions, and stops the tank. While driving, he constantly searches for covered and concealed routes and for covered positions to which he can move if the tank is engaged. He maintains his tanks position in formation and watches for visual signals. If the tank is equipped with a steer-to indicator, the driver monitors the device and selects the best tactical route. During engagements, he assists the gunner and TC by scanning for targets and sensing fired rounds. The driver is responsible to the TC for the automotive maintenance. He assists other crew members as needed.
LOADER
1-26. The loader stows and cares for ammunition, loads the main gun and the coaxial machine gun ready box, and aims and fires the loaders machine gun. He is also responsible to the TC for the maintenance of communications equipment. Before engagement actions are initiated, the loader searches for targets, maintains rear security, and acts as air guard or ATGM guard. He also assists the TC as needed in directing the driver so the tank maintains its position in formation. He assists other crew members as necessary. Because the loader is ideally positioned both to observe around the tank and to monitor the tanks digital displays, platoon leaders and TCs should give strong consideration to assigning their second most experienced crewman as the loader.
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Chapter 2
SECTION I - COMMAND
2-1. Command has two vital components: decision-making and leadership. This section examines in detail how the platoon leader and his subordinate leaders use these elements to develop the flexible, productive command structure that is the catalyst for success on the battlefield.
DECISION-MAKING
2-2. Decision-making is a conscious process for selecting a course of action (COA) from two or more alternatives. At platoon level, many decisions are based on SOPs and standard unit drills. SOPs and drills cover an array of routine and emergency actions, such as evacuation of wounded Soldiers, rearming and resupply procedures, and individual crew responsibilities; they allow the platoon to operate quickly and efficiently without constant guidance from the platoon leader. SOPs and checklists are especially critical in maintaining combat preparedness when leaders are tired or under stress as a result of continuous operations. Because of this, it is absolutely necessary that everyone in the platoon thoroughly understand all applicable SOPs. Refer to ST 3-20.153, Tank Platoon SOP, for a sample SOP that can be adapted for use in various tank platoon organizations. In the modern operational environment, the platoon leader may operate in a decentralized fashion requiring him to make rapid decisions with minimal guidance. Additionally, the platoon leader may conduct missions that will transition from combat operations to stability operations. The enemy will not conform or act in a manner that will fit into the doctrinal named operations. The platoon leader must understand that the enemy is always adapting his tactics to best defeat our forces.
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TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES
2-3. Troop-leading is a dynamic process that begins when the platoon receives a new mission or is notified by a warning order (WARNO) that a new mission is imminent. Most tactical decisions are made by the company or troop commander, who then announces them in the form of orders that include his intent and concept of the operation. Based on these orders, the platoon leader executes troop-leading procedures to organize his time during planning and preparation and to develop his platoons scheme of maneuver. Effective use of troop-leading procedures allows the platoon leader to lead his platoon more effectively in the execution of the mission. 2-4. Whenever possible, the eight steps of troop-leading procedures are integrated and accomplished concurrently rather than sequentially. Time management is the key. The platoon leader maximizes available planning time by starting as soon as he receives the first bit of information about the upcoming operation. He normally uses one-third of the available time to plan, prepare, and issue the order; his TCs then have the remaining two-thirds of the time available to prepare their tanks and crews for the operation. This time allocation, known as the one-third/two-thirds rule, is applicable in planning and preparation at all levels and for virtually all tactical situations and must be enforced. 2-5. The troop-leading process, although discussed here with the eight steps in traditional order, is not rigid, and the steps are not necessarily sequential. The tasks involved in some steps (such as initiate movement, issue the WARNO, and conduct reconnaissance) may recur several times during the process. Although listed as the last step, activities associated with supervising and refining the plan and other preparations occur throughout the troop-leading process. 2-6. The following discussion focuses on the eight steps of troop-leading procedures: z Receive and analyze the mission. z Issue the WARNO. z Make a tentative plan. z Initiate movement. z Conduct reconnaissance and coordination. z Complete the plan. z Issue the order. z Supervise and refine.
Initial Actions 2-8. Upon receipt of the WARNO, FRAGO, or OPORD, the platoon leaders first task is to extract his mission from the commanders overall plan. The key to understanding the platoon mission as part of the company team or troop mission lies in two elements of the plan: the commanders intent and the concept of operations. One platoon will be designated as the company/troop main effort. This platoons task and purpose accomplishes the companys stated mission. The other platoons are supporting efforts; their task and purpose ensures the success of the main effort platoon. The platoon leaders understanding of the commanders intent and his task and purpose allows him to use his initiative, exploit battlefield
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opportunities, and accomplish the commanders plan. If he does not understand the intent or purpose, he must ask the commander for clarification. 2-9. Although mission analysis is continuously refined throughout the troop-leading process, the platoon leaders actions are normally based only on the WARNO from higher. These include an analysis covering the terrain and enemy and friendly situations. The platoon leader may also conduct his time analysis, develop a security plan, and issue his own WARNO to provide guidance and planning focus for his subordinates. At a minimum, the platoon WARNO should cover the enemy and friendly situations, movement instructions, and coordinating instructions such as a time line and security plan. (Note. The analysis is normally conducted as quickly as possible to allow the platoon leader to issue the WARNO in a timely manner. He then conducts a more detailed METT-TC analysis, as outlined in the following discussion, after the WARNO is issued.) Note. The technique of using multiple WARNOs is a valuable tool for the platoon leader during the troop-leading process. He can issue WARNOs for several purposes: to alert subordinates of the upcoming mission, to initiate the parallel planning process, and to put out tactical information incrementally as it is received (ultimately reducing the length of the OPORD). Refer to FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1) for a discussion of how WARNOs are employed at various stages of the troop-leading procedures.
METT-TC Analysis 2-10. The platoon leader analyzes the mission using the factors of METT-TC: mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops, time available, and civilian considerations. Careful analysis of the company OPORD allows the platoon leader to identify the platoons purpose; the specified, implied, and essential tasks it must perform; and the time line by which the platoon will accomplish those tasks. The following outline of METT-TC factors will assist the platoon leader in analyzing the mission and creating a time line. 2-11. Mission. The platoon leaders analysis includes the following points: z What is the battalion commanders intent? z What are the company or troop commanders intent and purpose? z What tasks did the commander say must be accomplished (specified tasks)? In the OPORD, specified tasks are contained in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5. z What other tasks must be accomplished to ensure mission success (implied tasks)? Implied tasks are those that are not specified in the OPORD, but that must be done to complete the mission. They do not include tasks that are covered in the unit SOP. The platoon leader identifies implied tasks by analyzing the enemy, the terrain, friendly troops available, and the operational graphics. As an example, the commander may direct the platoon to occupy a support-by-fire position near a known enemy observation post (OP). The platoon leader will immediately recognize that he must occupy the designated position (the specified task). Through his analysis, he will probably determine that the platoon must also destroy or neutralize the enemy OP (the implied task) because it can affect the platoon and/or company mission. If time is available, the platoon leader should confirm implied tasks with the commander. 2-12. Enemy. The analysis of the enemy situation includes these considerations: z What have been the enemys recent activities? z What is the composition of the enemys forces? z What are the capabilities of his weapons? z What is the location of current and probable enemy positions? z What is the enemys most probable COA? The platoon leader must apply knowledge of the enemys doctrine and his most recent activities and locations to answer these questions:
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What is the enemys task and purpose? What formations will the enemy use? How will the enemy defend? Where are the enemys kill zones? Where and when will the enemy execute his operations?
2-13. Enemy information is included in paragraph 1 of the OPORD. It is important that the platoon leader analyze this information in terms of the platoons role in the operation. For example, if the company commander only identifies platoon-size center-of-mass locations for a defending enemy, the platoon leader should identify probable enemy locations based on the terrain and the enemys doctrine. 2-14. Platoon leaders need to ensure that they use this evaluation of the enemy, whether it is on the high intensity battlefield (enemy tanks and infantry fighting vehicles [IFV]) or low intensity operations (guerillas, or destabilizing elements). These skills will allow the platoon to disrupt the enemy operations and force the enemy to react to the platoons actions, ensuring the platoon retains the initiative. With changing enemy tactics based on their success, an environment can easily evolve where leaders find themselves reacting to these ever-changing tactics and surrendering the initiative to the enemy. The platoon leader must ensure he sets the conditions for mission success, retaining the initiative at all times. 2-15. Terrain (and weather). The platoon leader analyzes the terrain using the factors of OAKOC (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment). Elements of the OAKOC and weather analysis include the following:
z
Observation and fields of fire. These are influenced by key terrain that dominates avenues of approach. The following factors may apply:
Where can the enemy observe and engage the platoon (danger areas)? Where are the natural firing positions the platoon can use to observe and engage the enemy, including locations for battle positions (BP), support-by-fire and attack-by-fire positions, and overwatch positions?
z z
Avenues of approach. Where are the most favorable avenues of approach (mounted, dismounted, and air) for enemy and friendly forces? Key terrain. These factors may apply: Where is the key terrain? (Any locality or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.) How can key terrain be used to support the mission?
Where are natural and existing obstacles located, and how can they affect maneuver? Where are likely areas for enemy-emplaced obstacles, and how can they affect maneuver? Are there bypasses, or must obstacles be breached?
Weather. The platoon leader can use these questions as he analyzes the impact of weather and other environmental factors on the mission:
What are the light conditions (including percentage of night illumination) and visibility? What are the times for beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT), sunrise, sunset, end of evening nautical twilight (EENT), moonrise, and moonset? How will this effect friendly and enemy use of night vision equipment? What conditions will favor friendly forces, and what will favor the enemy forces.
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How has recent weather affected trafficability in the area of operations? Will weather become better or worse during the mission? How will fog, rain, dust, heat, snow, wind, or blowing sand affect the crew and equipment during the mission?
Note. This analysis should also cover the effects of weather on smoke and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. 2-16. Troops. The analysis of friendly forces and other personnel-related issues includes these considerations: z What is the supply status of ammunition, fuel, and other necessary items? z What is the current physical condition of the Soldiers, as well as of vehicles and equipment? z What is the training status of the platoon? z What is the state of morale? z How much sleep have the Soldiers had? z How much sleep will they be able to get before the operation begins? z Does the platoon need any additional assets to support or accomplish its mission? z What attachments are available to help the platoon accomplish its mission? 2-17. Time available. The platoon leaders analysis includes the following factors: z What times were specified by the commander in the OPORD for such activities as movement, reconnaissance, rehearsals, and logistics package (LOGPAC) operations? z What priorities of work can the platoon accomplish (examples include security, maintenance, resupply, coordination, rehearsals, inspections, and sleep) in the time available? z How much time is available to the enemy for the activities listed in the previous items? z How does the potential enemy time line for planning and preparation compare with that developed for friendly forces? 2-18. As part of this analysis, the platoon leader conducts reverse planning to ensure that all specified, implied, and essential tasks can be accomplished in the time available. He develops a reverse planning schedule (time line) beginning with actions on the objective and working backward through each step of the operation and preparation to the present time. This process also helps the platoon in making efficient use of planning and preparation time. 2-19. Civilian considerations. The platoon leader uses this analysis to identify how the platoon will handle situations involving civilians and/or nonmilitary agencies or organizations. Considerations that may affect the platoon mission include the following: z What are the applicable rules of engagement (ROE) and/or rules of interaction (ROI)? Soldiers must understand when to fire as much as when not to. z What procedures and guidelines will the platoon use in dealing with refugees, prisoners, and other civilians? z Will the platoon be working with civilian organizations, such as governmental agencies, private groups, or the media? z Will the platoon be tasked to conduct stability operations (such as peace operations or noncombatant evacuation) or support operations (such as humanitarian or environmental assistance)? The platoon must be prepared for the operation to change based on the situation. A stability operation could very quickly escalate into a combat mission, as much as a combat mission can change to a stability operation. Leaders need to be prepared for this and make sure the platoon understands how the plan may change.
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Mission Statement 2-20. Once his METT-TC analysis is complete, the platoon leader can then write the platoon mission statement, including the task and purpose of the mission and answering the questions of WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY. This is a clear, concise statement of the purpose of the operation and the essential task(s) that will be crucial to its success. The essential tasks (the WHAT) should be stated in terms that relate to enemy forces, friendly forces, and/or the terrain (for example, SUPPRESS THE ENEMY, OVERWATCH 2D PLATOON, or SEIZE AN OBJECTIVE). The purpose (the WHY) explains how the platoon mission supports the commanders intent. The elements of WHO, WHERE, and WHEN add clarity to the mission statement (for example, 3D PLT, C CO ATTACKS TO SEIZE OBJ RAIDERS NLT 152200OCT2006, TO ALLOW THE COMPANY TO COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY FORCES.). Note. Simultaneous planning and preparation are key factors in effective time management during the troop-leading procedures. The next five steps (issue a WARNO, make a tentative plan, initiate movement, conduct reconnaissance and coordination, and complete the plan) may occur simultaneously and/or in a different order. As noted, the final troop-leading step, supervise and refine, is on-going throughout the process.
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sources of ideas concerning the platoon plan and war-gaming COAs. Refer to Chapters 3 and 4 of this manual for more detailed discussions of planning considerations in offensive and defensive operations.
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Crew Orders 2-33. The platoon leader and PSG make sure all crew members have been briefed by their TCs and understand the platoon mission and concept of the operation through the use of backbriefs. Rehearsals 2-34. A rehearsal is a practice session conducted to prepare units for an upcoming operation or event. The platoon leader should never underestimate the value of rehearsals. They are his most valuable tools in preparing the platoon for the upcoming operation. Effective rehearsals require crewmen to perform required tasks, ideally under conditions that are as close as possible to those expected for the actual operation. Participants maneuver their actual vehicles or use vehicle models or simulations while interactively verbalizing their elements actions. 2-35. In a platoon-level rehearsal, the platoon leader selects the tasks to be practiced and controls execution of the rehearsal. He will usually designate someone to role-play the enemy elements he expects to face during the operation. Refer to FM 5-0 for a detailed discussion of rehearsal types, techniques, and procedures. Note. A rehearsal is different from the process of talking through what is supposed to happen. For example, in a rehearsal, TCs should actually send spot reports (SPOTREP) when reporting enemy contact, rather than simply saying, I would send a SPOTREP now. 2-36. Rehearsal purposes. The platoon leader uses well-planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the following purposes: z Reinforce training and increase proficiency in critical tasks. z Reveal weaknesses or problems in the plan. z Synchronize the actions of subordinate elements. z Confirm coordination requirements between the platoon and adjacent units. z Improve each Soldiers understanding of the concept of the operation, the direct and indirect fire plan, anticipated contingencies, and possible actions and reactions for various situations that may arise during the operation. 2-37. Rehearsal types. The platoon leader can choose among several types of rehearsals, each designed to achieve a specific result and with a specific role in the planning and preparation time line. The primary types of rehearsals available to the tank platoon are the following: z Confirmation brief. The confirmation brief is, in effect, a reverse briefing process routinely performed by subordinate leaders immediately after receiving any instructions, such as an OPORD or FRAGO. They confirm their understanding by repeating and explaining details of the operation for their leader. The platoon leader should conduct confirmation briefs after his TCs have received the OPORD, but before other phases of the platoon rehearsal begin. z Backbrief. The backbrief allows the platoon leader to identify problems in his own concept of the operation and his subordinates understanding of the concept; he also uses the backbrief to learn how subordinates intend to accomplish their missions. z Battle drill or SOP rehearsal. This rehearsal, conducted throughout the planning and preparation time line, is used to ensure that all participants understand a technique or a specific set of procedures. It does not necessarily cover a published drill or SOP, giving the commander or leader flexibility in designing the rehearsal. For example, the platoon leader could rehearse procedures for marking obstacle lanes or establishing local security. This rehearsal is critical when working with new units/forces (such as light units); it allows all elements to understand what each will be doing during a specific action and allows heavy and light forces to better mesh their drills together.
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2-38. Rehearsal techniques. The platoon leader can choose among several techniques in conducting rehearsals, which should follow the crawl-walk-run training methodology to prepare the platoon for increasingly difficult conditions. Considerations in selecting a rehearsal technique include the following: z Time. How much will be needed for planning, preparation, and execution? z Multi-echelon. How many echelons will be involved? z Operations security (OPSEC). Will the rehearsal allow the enemy to gain intelligence about upcoming operations? z Terrain. What are the applicable terrain considerations? z Training. Is this a new skill or something they have never done before, either individually or as a platoon? 2-39. As noted in FM 5-0, techniques for conducting rehearsals are limited only by the resourcefulness of the commander or leader; that manual outlines six basic techniques. Listed in descending order in terms of the preparation time and resources required to conduct them, these techniques are the following: z Full dress rehearsal. This rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the mission, but is the most difficult to conduct in terms of preparation and resources. It involves every Soldier and system participating in the operation. If possible, units should conduct the full dress rehearsal under the same conditions (such as weather, time of day, terrain, and use of live ammunition) that they will encounter during the actual operation. The platoon generally will take part in full dress rehearsals as part of a larger unit. z Reduced force rehearsal. This rehearsal normally involves only key leaders of the unit and is thus less extensive than the full dress rehearsal in terms of preparation time and resources. The commander decides the level of leader involvement. The selected leaders then rehearse the plan, if possible on the actual terrain to be used for the actual operation. The reduced force rehearsal is often conducted to prepare leaders for the full dress rehearsal. z Terrain model rehearsal. This is the most popular rehearsal technique, employing an accurately constructed model to help subordinates visualize the battle in accordance with the commanders or leaders intent. When possible, the platoon leader places the terrain model where it overlooks the actual terrain of the area of operations or is within walking distance of such a vantage point. Size of the model can vary, but it should be large enough to depict graphic control measures and important terrain features for reference and orientation. Participants walk or move micro armor around the table or model to practice the actions of their own vehicles in relation to other members of the platoon. z Sketch map rehearsal. Units can use the sketch map technique almost anywhere, day or night. Procedures are similar to those for the terrain model rehearsal. The sketch must be large enough to allow all participants to see as each subordinate walks through an interactive oral presentation of his actions. Platoon elements can use symbols or micro armor to represent their locations and maneuver on the sketch. z Map rehearsal. Procedures are similar to those for the sketch map rehearsal except that the commander or leader uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale as he used to plan and control the operation. This technique is useful in conjunction with a confirmation brief or backbrief involving subordinate leaders and vehicle commanders. The platoon leader uses the map and overlay to guide participants as they brief their role in the operation. z Radio/digital rehearsal. The leader conducts this rehearsal by sending the OPORD and overlay digitally (if equipped). He then may review this information by FM radio. The radio rehearsal may be especially useful when the situation does not allow the platoon to gather at one location. Subordinate elements check their communications systems and rehearse events that are critical to the platoon plan. To be effective, the radio rehearsal requires all participants to have working communications equipment.
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Inspections 2-40. Precombat inspections allow the platoon leader to check the platoons operational readiness. The key goal is to ensure that Soldiers and vehicles are fully prepared to execute the upcoming mission. Inspections also contribute to improved morale. 2-41. It is essential that the entire platoon chain of command know how to conduct PCCs and PCIs in accordance with applicable SOPs (ST 3-20.153 or the platoons own SOP) or based on the procedures outlined in ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. Examples of an inspection include the following: z Perform before-operation maintenance checks, and report or repair deficiencies, if necessary. z Perform communications checks of voice and digital systems. z Inspect and verify maps and graphics. z Ensure that crews understand the plan and are in the correct uniform and mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level. z Review the supply status of rations, water, fuel, oil, all types of ammunition, pyrotechnics, firstaid kits, and batteries (for such items as flashlights, night-vision devices, and CBRN alarms). Direct resupply operations as necessary. 2-42. The platoon leader and/or PSG should observe each crew during preparation for combat. They should conduct the inspection once the TCs report that their crews and vehicles are prepared. It should be understood that the platoon leader will check items he deems critical for the upcoming operations, but the TCs need to check all items based on the platoon SOP. Failure at the TC level to check all systems, and not just the ones the platoon leader is going to check could lead to a critical element or piece of equipment to fail during operations. 2-43. PCCs differ from PCIs in that they are quick combat checks performed at crew level and designed to account for individuals and equipment. PCCs do not require formal notification or conduct. They are designed to be quick and concise in verification that the crew, section, and platoon have all necessary equipment to accomplish the mission. Examples for PCCs include the following: z Perform prepare-to-fire checks for all weapons, and report or repair deficiencies, if necessary. Weapons are boresighted, and all sights are referred. Machine guns are test fired, if possible. Ammunition is checked and stored properly. z Upload vehicles in accordance with the platoon SOP. The standardization of load plans allows the platoon leader and PSG to quickly check accountability of equipment. It also ensures standard locations of equipment in each vehicle; this can be an important advantage if the platoon leader is forced to switch to a different vehicle during an operation. z Account for Soldiers uniforms and equipment necessary to accomplish the tasks.
CONTINGENCY PLANS
2-44. Leaders must use contingency planning to ensure that the platoon knows what actions to do in the absence of the leadership. Less experienced crews, or crews faced with unusual, unexpected circumstances will tend to carry out only their last orders. This tendency could place them in danger as the enemy is developing tactics of rapid hit and run operations which will capitalize on platoons that are not proactive and relay on the platoon leader or platoon sergeant to tell them what to do. The basic six-point contingency plan is used whenever the key leadership is going to be gone from the platoon. Some examples of when this is to be used: leaders reconnaissance, dismounted patrols, or coordinating with other units or local government agencies.
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LEADERSHIP
2-50. Competent, confident leadership inspires Soldiers, instilling in them the will to win and providing them with purpose, direction, and motivation in combat. Leadership involves numerous important personal principles and traits: z Taking responsibility for decisions. z Exemplifying and demanding loyalty.
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z z z
Inspiring and directing the platoon toward mission accomplishment. Fostering a climate of teamwork that will engender success. Demonstrating moral and physical courage in the face of adversity and danger.
2-51. FM 6-22 and FM 3-0 further describe the qualities of effective leadership. The following are the five characteristics of successful combat leaders, as described in the 1984 study titled Leadership in Combat: An Historical Appraisal conducted by the History Department at the United States Military Academy: z Terrain sense. Understand terrain; match tactics and weaponry with the terrain at hand. z Single-minded tenacity. This is the quality that compels the successful platoon leader to harness the combat power necessary to overwhelm the enemy. The platoon leader sees the mission through and never gives up. z Practical, practiced judgment. Common sense and constant practice allow the platoon leader to prioritize effectively, enabling him to separate critical tasks from the non-critical and preventing him from being overwhelmed by the demands of the information-rich battlefield. z Ferocious audacity. Calculated risk-taking is a must if the platoon is to exploit enemy weaknesses as they present themselves. z Physical confidence. Leaders can maintain their ability to meet the demanding requirements of leadership only if they are in top physical condition.
SECTION II CONTROL
SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
2-52. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to the common operational picture to determine the relationship among the factors of METT-TC (FM 3-0). For the platoon leader, this is the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental picture of the tactical situation. This picture includes an understanding of relevant terrain and the relationship between friendly and enemy forces, as well as an awareness of the culture with which you are interacting. It also includes the ability to correlate battlefield events as they develop. For platoon leaders and PSGs, situational understanding is the key to making sound, quick tactical decisions. It allows them to form logical conclusions and to make decisions that anticipate future events and information. A critical benefit of situational understanding on the part of TCs is a reduction in fratricide incidents (see Appendix F, this FM, for information about fratricide prevention). Situational understanding also gives leaders the ability to compress the time necessary to conduct troop-leading procedures; this is especially critical when there is limited time to plan and prepare for an operation. 2-53. The commander structures the battlefield based on his intent and the conditions of METT-TC. How he does this affects the tank platoon leaders mission planning and his ability to maintain situational understanding. The framework of the battlefield can vary from a highly rigid extreme, with obvious front and rear boundaries and closely tied adjacent units, to a dispersed and decentralized structure with few secure areas and unit boundaries and no definable front and/or rear boundary. 2-54. Between these extremes are an unlimited number of possible variations. Maintaining situational understanding becomes more difficult as the battlefield becomes less structured. Modern, highly mobile operations involving small forces lend themselves to a less rigid framework that challenges the platoon leaders ability to maintain an accurate picture of the battlefield.
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REDCON LEVELS
2-56. REDCON levels allow quick responses to changing situations and ensure completion of necessary work and rest plans. The commander uses the REDCON status as a standardized way to adjust the units readiness to move and fight.
REDCON-1. Full alert; the unit is ready to move and fight. CBRN alarms and hot loop equipment are stowed; OPs are pulled in. All personnel are alert and mounted on vehicles; weapons are manned. Engines are started. The platoon is ready to move immediately. Note. A variant of REDCON-1 is REDCON-1(-); the same conditions apply except that the vehicles are not started in REDCON-1(-). REDCON-2. Full alert; the unit is ready to fight. Equipment is stowed (except hot loop and CBRN alarms). Precombat checks are complete. All personnel are alert and mounted in vehicles; weapons are manned. Note. Depending on the tactical situation and orders from the commander, dismounted OPs may remain in place. All (100 percent) digital and FM communications links are operational. Status reports are submitted in accordance with company SOP. The platoon is ready to move within 15 minutes of notification. REDCON-3. Reduced alert. Fifty percent of the platoon executes work and rest plans. Remainder of the platoon executes security plan. Based on the commanders guidance and the enemy situation, some personnel executing the security plan may execute portions of the work plan. The platoon is ready to move within 30 minutes of notification. REDCON-4. Minimum alert. OPs are manned; one man per tank is designated to monitor the radio and man the turret weapons. Digital and FM links with company and other platoons are maintained. The platoon is ready to move within one hour of notification.
WORK PLAN
2-57. The work plan enables TCs and crewmen to focus their efforts in preparing vehicles, equipment, and themselves for operations. Activities designated in the timeline include, but are not limited to, the following: z Reconnaissance, as required and within capabilities. z Orders at crew and platoon level. z Crew- and platoon-level training and rehearsals. z Vehicle maintenance. z Vehicle preparation (camouflage, stowage, boresighting, communications checks).
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z z z z z
Individual soldier preparation (training, orders, rehearsals). Resupply (Classes I, III, and V). Preparation of fighting positions. Obstacle emplacement. Crew- and platoon-level PCCs and PCIs.
REST PLAN
2-58. The rest plan allows some soldiers to sleep while other crewmen conduct priorities of work and maintain security. To be effective in sustained combat, a soldier should get a minimum of 4 to 6 hours of uninterrupted sleep every 24 hours. Less than 4 hours of sleep can significantly degrade combat performance. 2-59. Planning and decision-making are among the skills that suffer most dramatically when soldiers cannot get enough sleep. The platoon SOP must provide for an adequate division of duties to allow leaders to get some sleep. This may require the platoon leader, PSG, and one or both of the other TCs to share duties. When soldiers are tired, confirmation briefings and backbriefs become critical whenever orders are issued, even for the simplest task. 2-60. Whenever possible, the tank platoon leader should coordinate with the commander to use infantrymen to assist with security. This coordination may enable the platoon leader to rest more soldiers for longer periods of time as the infantry mans OPs and conducts dismounted patrols to augment the security of the platoon.
BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION
2-61. To see the battlefield accurately, the platoon leader must have virtually perfect knowledge of the friendly situation one level higher than his own (the company team or troop situation). It is also important that he update the TCs periodically regarding the higher situation. The platoon leader must also have a relatively complete knowledge of the terrain and the enemy situation. He must be able to visualize enemy and friendly elements through time and to picture how the terrain will affect their actions. Note. The requirement to maintain a real-time awareness of the battlefield one level higher does not relieve the platoon leader of his responsibility to understand the situation and commanders intent two levels higher than his own. The difference is that his understanding of the situation two levels higher does not have to be as specific or as timely. 2-62. Most of the information the platoon leader requires comes from what he can observe from his tank and from reports he receives through his communications systems. Although few voice and digital reports are specifically addressed to him, particularly on the company team or troop net, the platoon leader must monitor them by eavesdropping. He then can track enemy and friendly elements and plot all movement on his map and/or his digital display (FBCB2). This allows him to adjust his own movement so the platoon makes contact with the enemy from positions of advantage, which are identified during the map/ground reconnaissance step of the troop-leading procedures. Care must be taken in that inexperienced leaders do not become dependent on digitalization for their situational understanding. The enemy may employ tactics to jam digital systems or overload the leader and cause indecision. 2-63. How effectively the platoon leader can keep track of events on the battlefield depends, to some degree, on experience. No matter what his experience level, the platoon leader is responsible for learning techniques that allow him to relate the information he receives to his map or display and thereby track the tactical situation and increase situational understanding.
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this environment has always required a broad perspective. Leaders must consider more than the enemys military forces and other combat capabilities. 2-65. The better leaders understand their own forces and capabilities, threats, and the environment, the better they can employ and integrate the platoons actions to create conditions that lead to mission accomplishment. The key to understanding is determining what information is relevant to the mission and making informed decisions based on relevant information. 2-66. The structure for visualizing and analyzing the operational environment is METT-TC. The six factors of METT-TC make up the major subject categories into which relevant information is grouped for tactical operations. Cultural Awareness 2-67. Successful accomplishment of military missions requires that Soldiers and leaders possess an awareness of the cultures with which they interact. To develop this cultural awareness, and subsequently apply this knowledge, Soldiers and leaders must first understand the key elements of a culture. These key elements are the beliefs, values, behaviors, and norms that compose (or are important to) any culture, whether friendly or enemy, local or foreign. Soldiers and leaders must then take into account these considerations: z US culture. They must understand the key elements of the US culture, and how these elements influence their own perceptions of other cultures. In addition, they must realize how US culture can affect other cultures, and that these effects influence other cultures perceptions of the US and its people. z COE culture. They must understand the key elements of the specific cultures within the COE with which they expect to interact during operations. This includes indigenous populations as well as multinational partners. z Impact of culture on military operations. Military personnel must not only know what cultural awareness is, but must also factor specific cultural information into the decisions and actions they take to accomplish their missions. Information that may have a direct impact on military operations includes The influences of religion(s) on how a population behaves. The impact of geography on a population. Actions or speech that might insult or offend the members of certain cultures. The dangers of stereotyping and other biases. Differences in what indigenous populations and multinational partners value. The influences of social structure and relationships. Historical events and how they impact behaviors, beliefs, and relationships. How to communicate effectively with multinational partners and indigenous persons. The impact of cultural awareness on battle command.
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OPORD or briefing the TCs on the plan. During mission execution, the map and overlays play an invaluable role in helping leaders to maintain situational understanding. 2-70. Types of overlays. Overlays can be prepared either in traditional fashion (written out by hand) or digitally. The platoon leader may receive one or more types of overlays from the commander covering such areas as maneuver, enemy forces, obstacles, fire support, and sustainment. All of the information is important; the key for the platoon leader is to combine, augment, and unclutter the overlays so the information needed for a specific situation is readily available to the platoon on one simple, combined overlay. 2-71. Traditional overlays. Copied on acetate, traditional overlays display graphic control measures as illustrated in Figure 2-1. They are prepared even if a platoon is equipped with FBCB2 digital systems in the event the platoon loses digital data or has its digital link broken. Overlays allow the TCs to use the graphic during rehearsals and dismounted operations when they will not have access to digital systems.
Figure 2-1. Traditional overlay 2-72. Digital overlays. FBCB2 allows the platoon leader to receive and transmit graphics virtually on a real-time basis within the platoon and to and from higher headquarters. When these systems are integrated with automatic position/location updates, the platoon leader has a nearly perfect situational understanding link. His display shows the positions of his platoon and adjacent units. These positions and locations are displayed on a menu of overlays using the most recent graphics. The platoon leader can combine, augment, and unclutter the overlays as needed; when appropriate, he can choose not to display any of them on his digital screen. Figure 2-2 illustrates a sample FBCB2-generated overlay.
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2-73. Although fairly accurate, digital systems suffer from minor flaws that detract from their effectiveness as a stand-alone battle command tool. They serve as an enhancement to, not a substitute for, the platoon leaders map with traditional overlays.
Figure 2-3. Boundary (graphic control measure) 2-77. Phase line. Phase lines are used to control and coordinate movement and synchronize tactical actions. Platoons report crossing phase lines, but normally do not halt unless directed to do so. The abbreviation on overlays is PL. (See Figure 2-4.)
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2-78. Assembly area. Abbreviated AA on overlays, this is a location at which the platoon gathers (usually as part of the company or troop) to conduct maintenance and resupply activities and to make other preparations for future operations. The platoon must be able to defend from the assembly area. (See Figure 2-5.)
Figure 2-5. Assembly area (graphic control measure) 2-79. Route. This is the prescribed course of travel from a specific point of origin (the start point [SP]) to a specific destination, usually the release point (RP). The route should be named, and checkpoints should be designated at key locations. The abbreviation on overlays is RTE. (See Figure 2-6.)
Figure 2-6. Route (graphic control measure) 2-80. Checkpoint. Checkpoints are used to control and direct the maneuver of the tank platoon and tank section. They are usually placed on identifiable terrain features, such as hilltops, road intersections, or towers. (See Figure 2-7.)
Figure 2-7. Checkpoint (graphic control measure) 2-81. Attack position. This is the last position the platoon occupies or passes through before crossing the line of departure (LD). The platoon assumes the proper formation and performs last-minute checks of its weapons systems. The abbreviation on overlays is ATK POS. (See Figure 2-8.)
Figure 2-8. Attack position (graphic control measure) 2-82. Contact point. A contact point is a designated location, usually an easily identifiable terrain feature, where two or more units are required to physically meet. The headquarters assigning the contact point must specify what sort of activity is required when the units meet. The platoon leader may be tasked to man or move to a contact point for coordination. (See Figure 2-9.)
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Figure 2-9. Contact point (graphic control measure) 2-83. Passage lane. This is the area or route through which a passing unit moves to avoid stationary units and obstacles. Tank platoons may move on a lane or serve as the overwatch for a passing unit moving through a lane. (See Figure 2-10.)
Figure 2-10. Passage lane (graphic control measure) 2-84. Passage point. This is the place where a unit physically passes through another unit. Tank platoons may move through a passage point or overwatch other units moving through a passage point. The abbreviation for a passage point is PP. (See Figure 2-11.)
Figure 2-11. Passage point (graphic control measure) 2-85. Objective. An objective is a location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort (FM 1-02). The objective is the physical object or area (such as enemy personnel, a man-made object, or a terrain feature) to be seized or held. Tank platoons usually occupy some portion of the company objective. The abbreviation on overlays is OBJ. (See Figure 2-12.)
Figure 2-12. Objective (graphic control measure) 2-86. Axis of advance. This is the general route and direction of advance extending toward the enemy. It graphically portrays the commanders intent, such as envelopment of the enemy. The unit may maneuver and shoot supporting fires to either side of the axis provided it remains oriented on the axis and the objective. For example, platoons may maneuver on or to the side of the axis assigned to their company as long as deviations do not interfere with the maneuver of adjacent units. (See Figure 2-13.)
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Figure 2-13. Axis of advance (graphic control measure) 2-87. Direction of attack. This is the specific direction and route that the main attack or center of mass of the unit will follow. Tank platoons move along directions of attack specified by the commander to take advantage of terrain or to ensure maximum control of the moving unit. The overlay abbreviation is DOA. (See Figure 2-14.)
Figure 2-14. Direction of attack (graphic control measure) 2-88. Assault position. This is the location from which a unit assaults the objective. Ideally, it is the last covered and concealed position before the objective. Tank platoons may occupy an assault position or serve as overwatch for occupation of the position by the assault force. The abbreviation on overlays is ASLT POS. (See Figure 2-15.)
Figure 2-15. Assault position (graphic control measure) 2-89. Attack-by-fire position. This is the location from which a unit employs direct fire to destroy the enemy from a distance. Tank platoons occupy an attack-by-fire position alone or as part of the company or troop. From this position, the platoon can attack the enemy on the objective when occupation of the objective is not advisable; the position can also be used in an attack on a moving enemy force. In addition, this type of position can serve as a counterattack option for a reserve force. The overlay abbreviation is ABF. (See Figure 2-16.)
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Figure 2-16. Attack-by-fire position (graphic control measure) 2-90. Support-by-fire position. This is another type of position from which a maneuver element can engage the enemy by direct fire, with the fires providing support for operations by other units. The tank platoon usually occupies a support-by-fire position when providing supporting fires for an assault or breach force or when serving as the overwatch for a moving force. The overlay abbreviation is SBF. (See Figure 2-17.)
Figure 2-17. Support-by-fire position (graphic control measure) 2-91. Battle position. This is a defensive location, oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach, from which a unit defends. Tank platoon BPs and direct-fire orientations are designated in the OPORD. (See Figure 2-18.)
Figure 2-18. Battle position (graphic control measure) 2-92. Target reference point. This is an easily recognizable point on the ground (either natural or man made) used to locate enemy forces or control fires. TRPs can designate either the center of an area on which the platoon can mass its fires or the left or right limit of such an area. The tank platoon leader controls platoon fires by designating platoon TRPs as necessary to supplement company or troop TRPs issued by the commander. (See Figure 2-19.)
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Navigation
2-93. To protect his platoon, the platoon leader must learn to use terrain to his advantage. Land navigation of armored vehicles requires him to master the technique of terrain association. This entails the ability to identify terrain features on the ground by the contour intervals depicted on the map. The platoon leader analyzes the terrain using the factors of OAKOC and identifies major terrain features, contour changes, and man-made structures along his axis of advance. As the platoon advances, he uses these features to orient the platoon and to associate ground positions with map locations. 2-94. The intellectual concept of the area of operations (AO) is vital to the platoons survival during navigation and movement. The platoon leader must constantly be aware of key terrain and enemy fields of observation and fire that may create danger areas as the platoon advances. This allows him to modify movement techniques, formations, and routes and to maintain cross talk with overwatch elements to make sure the enemy does not surprise the platoon. 2-95. Navigation under limited visibility conditions is especially challenging. Vehicle thermal sights and night-vision devices provide assistance, but leaders nonetheless can easily confuse terrain features and become disoriented. See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 for a discussion of limited visibility operations. 2-96. The platoon can employ a variety of techniques and equipment to assist in navigation. These are summarized in the following discussion. 2-97. Fires. Using field artillery (FA) or mortars to fire smoke (during the day) or ground-burst illumination (day or night) can provide a useful check on estimated locations or preplanned targets. 2-98. Global positioning systems. GPS devices receive signals from satellites or land-based transmitters. They calculate and display the position of the user in military grid coordinates as well as in degrees of latitude and longitude. Most GPS navigation readings are based on waypoints, the known positions entered into the systems memory. The platoon leader identifies points along the route or at the destination and designates them as waypoints. Once waypoints are entered in the GPS, the device can display information such as distance and direction from point to point. Leaders must still know how to employ terrain association while navigating in case satellite or land signals are inoperative or unavailable. 2-99. Inertial navigation systems. Based on an initial calculation of the vehicles location from a known point, inertial navigation systems use the rotation of the track to determine the location of the vehicle. The M1A2s POSNAV system is an example. POSNAV allows the TC to determine his exact location and gives him the ability to plot up to 99 waypoints. Tank drivers can then use the steer-to function on their drivers integrated display (DID) as they move toward the designated waypoints. To compensate for track slippage that could affect the accuracy of the inertial system, TCs should reinitialize their systems often, using a GPS or a known point. Note. In using the GPS or POSNAV, the platoon leader must remember that waypoints are only one of several navigational tools he can use. He must still be prepared to use terrain association and map-reading skills in case of digital system failures. In addition, the platoon leader must not disregard the effects of terrain on the direction of movement. Terrain features that do not show up on the digital display (such as hills, valleys, and cliffs) may cause deviations in the route the platoon must take to reach the next waypoint. 2-100. Terrain/Grid Index Reference System (TIRS/GIRS). TIRS/GIRS are convenient tools for the platoon leader to use as he maneuvers the platoon and disseminates control measures. Known points are usually previously distributed graphic control measures. Referencing a location from a known point is done in kilometers. For example, 500 meters is given as POINT FIVE, 1,000 meters as ONE, and 3,500 meters as THREE POINT FIVE. Cardinal directions are used. Shifts to the east or west are given first, followed by shifts to the north or south. Consider the following transmission: RED SET FROM CHECKPOINT SEVENEAST ONE POINT EIGHTNORTH ONE POINT SEVEN. This means, We (the Red element) are set at a position 1,800 meters east and 1,700 meters north from checkpoint 7. Figure 2-20 illustrates this example.
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Figure 2-20. Example of TIRS 2-101. TIRS/GIRS are used routinely to control combat operations; they make reporting of current platoon and enemy positions easier. The platoon leader could report his location by referencing a graphic control measure, such as a checkpoint as shown in Figure 2-21, or a grid location. The enemy, however, will quickly figure out the known points if they are continually used in the clear on a nonsecure net. The platoon leader should avoid using the same point more than twice. Instead, he should use a different known point to reference the same location.
COMMUNICATIONS
2-102. During combat operations, dispersion forces the tank platoon to rely on effective communications by means of wire, visual signals, radio, and digital systems. The platoon must understand the proper procedures for using the available systems; the proper application of operational terms; and procedures for constructing and sending effective, concise messages using each type of system. The platoon leader is responsible for planning, training, and employment of the platoons communications systems. He is also responsible for maintaining communications within the company or troop communications system.
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times. On digitally linked vehicles, crews can monitor the commanders integrated display (CID), with its standardized graphics; this significantly reduces the need to send voice updates of friendly vehicle positions. 2-105. Messenger. Use of a messenger is the most secure means of communications available to the tank platoon. When security conditions and time permit, it is the preferred means. It is generally very flexible and reliable. A messenger can be used to deliver platoon fire plans, status reports, or lengthy messages. When possible, lengthy messages sent by messenger should be written to prevent mistakes and confusion. 2-106. Wire. This method of communications is especially effective in static positions. The platoon will frequently employ a hot loop in initial defensive positions, OPs, and assembly areas. Unit SOPs, tailored to counter the enemys electronic warfare capability, prescribe conditions and situations in which the platoon will employ wire. Tank crews can communicate directly with dismounted infantry by routing wire from the vehicle internal communications (VIC)-3 system through the loaders hatch or vision block to a field phone attached to the outside of the tank. 2-107. Visual. Visual communications are used to identify friendly forces or to transmit prearranged messages quickly over short distances. Standard hand-and-arm or flag signals work well during periods of good visibility. Crews can use thermal paper, flashlights, chemical lights, or other devices during periods of limited visibility, but they must exercise extreme care to avoid alerting the enemy to friendly intentions. TCs must clearly understand visual signals as they operate across the battlefield; each TC must be ready to pass on visual signals from the platoon leader to other vehicles in the platoon. See STP 17-19K1-SM (the skill level 1 Soldiers manual for MOS 19K) and FM 21-60 for a description of hand-and-arm signals. 2-108. Pyrotechnics. Pyrotechnic ammunition can be used for visual signaling. The meaning of these signals is identified in paragraph 5 of the OPORD and in the signal operation instructions (SOI). The main advantage of pyrotechnics is the speed with which signals can be transmitted. The main disadvantages are the enemys ability to detect and imitate them and to use them to identify friendly positions. 2-109. Radio. The radio is the platoons most flexible, most frequently used, and least secure means of communications. It can quickly transmit information over long distances with great accuracy. Secure equipment and the ability of the SINCGARS to frequency-hop provide the platoon with communications security against most enemy direction-finding, interception, and jamming capabilities. Sophisticated direction-finding equipment, however, can trace almost any radio signal, allowing the enemy to locate and destroy the transmitter and its operator. Survival of the tank platoon depends on good communications habits, especially when it is using the radio; the platoon leader must strictly enforce radio discipline. The most effective way to use the radio is to follow standard radiotelephone procedures (RTP), including brevity and proper use of approved operational terms; these techniques are covered later in this section. 2-110. Digital. FBCB2 enables the platoon leader to transmit digitally encoded information over the SINCGARS radio to other similarly equipped vehicles. Linkup refers to the ability of the tanks radio to transmit and receive digital information. When properly linked, the platoon leader receives continuously updated position location information for the platoons vehicles, as well as for those of the company or troop commander and executive officer (XO) and of adjacent platoons. Using the digital link with other platoon vehicles and the company/troop commander, the platoon leader can also send and receive preformatted reports and overlays with graphic control measures. ST 3-20.153 provides an example SOP for use of digital systems.
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2-113. Company/troop command. The commander uses this net to maneuver the company or troop as well as to process routine administrative/logistical (A/L) reports. Platoon leaders and PSGs monitor this net to keep abreast of the current tactical situation from the reports of the commander, XO, and other platoon leaders. They transmit on the company net to keep the commander informed and to cross talk with other platoon leaders coordinating the tactical actions of their platoons. Both the platoon leader and PSG must have the ability to monitor and transmit on this net. All TCs must be able to switch to this net to send reports and receive guidance if they are unable to contact their platoon leader or PSG.
Net Control
2-114. Each crewman must be an expert in the technical aspects of his voice and digital communications systems. In particular, he must understand how to maintain each system, how to place it into operation, and how to troubleshoot it whenever he suspects it is not functioning properly. The smooth functioning of the platoon net allows accurate information to be passed quickly to and from the platoon leader. This information flow is critical in maintaining the platoon leaders situational understanding. It becomes especially important when contact is made and the volume of traffic on the platoon and company/troop nets increases drastically. To ensure that information flowing over the net is organized and controlled in a manner that permits the platoon leader to understand it and to issue orders, use the following techniques. 2-115. Radiotelephone procedures. Proper RTP is the cornerstone of effective command and control in the tank platoon. Every platoon member must be an expert in communications procedures. This ensures efficient communications within the platoon and allows members of the platoon to communicate effectively with outside elements such as other platoons or the company or troop headquarters. 2-116. Depending on the enemys electronic warfare capability, the company commander may elect to use standardized call signs to simplify RTP. These call signs allow all users of a net to instantly recognize the calling station. Examples would be the use of RED, WHITE, and BLUE to designate 1st, 2d, and 3d platoons, respectively, and the use of bumper numbers to identity tanks within a platoon. 2-117. Techniques of effective communications. The platoon leader and PSG must ensure that every member of the platoon understands and adheres to the following techniques and guidelines, which can contribute to more effective, more secure tactical communications. 2-118. Minimize duration. All messages sent within or from the tank platoon must be short and informative. The longer the message, the greater the opportunity for enemy elements to use electronic detection to pinpoint the platoons location. Message length can be controlled in several ways: z Write down the message and then eliminate all unnecessary words from the written message before sending it. z Read the message as written when sending it. z Use brevity codes that reduce the need to explain the tactical picture in detail. z Break long messages into several parts and send each part separately. 2-119. Minimize signature. When sending a message, every tanker must be conscious of the size and nature of the electronic signature that he is emitting. To reduce the size of the signature, he can use terrain to mask his transmissions from known or suspected enemy positions. He should set the transmitter to the lowest possible power that will provide sufficient range. 2-120. Know the system. Each crewman must be an expert in the technical aspects of his voice and digital communications systems. In particular, he must understand how to maintain each system, how to place it into operation, and how to troubleshoot it whenever he suspects it is not functioning properly. 2-121. Use an effective format. A thorough knowledge of report formats is critical in ensuring timely reporting of enemy information, especially in fast-moving tactical situations. Every crewman should be familiar with the report formats that are outlined in Appendix B and know how to use them effectively. At the same time, however, they must never delay reports only to assure the correct format. ALWAYS REPORT ACCURATE INFORMATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE!
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2-122. Reporting. In keeping the platoon leader informed, TCs must avoid redundant voice and digital reports. They monitor the platoon net so they can avoid reporting information the platoon leader has already received from other TCs. The PSG pays close attention to the company or troop net while the platoon net is active; he then relays critical information to the platoon. This technique allows the platoon leader to concentrate on fighting the platoon. Once the platoon leader begins to develop the situation, he is responsible for reporting the platoons tactical situation to the commander using SPOTREPs and situation reports (SITREP). Refer to Appendix B for information on report formats. 2-123. As a basic guideline, reports of enemy activity should follow the SALUTE format, which covers these factors: z Size. This includes the number of sighted personnel, vehicles, or other equipment. z Activity. This covers what the enemy is doing. z Location. This is usually reported as the grid coordinates of enemy elements. z Unit. This covers any indications useful in unit identification, such as patches, signs, and vehicle markings. z Time. This item details when enemy activity was observed. z Equipment. This includes description or identification of all equipment associated with the enemy activity. 2-124. Initial contact. Any vehicle can alert the platoon to an enemy. The section leader in contact (platoon leader or PSG) deploys and fights his section according to the platoon leaders intent. The section leader not in contact forwards the report to higher headquarters. If the entire platoon is in contact, the platoon leader fights the platoon while the PSG reports the contact to the commander. 2-125. Routine traffic. The PSG normally receives and consolidates A/L reports and other routine communications from the TCs and passes the reports to the platoon leader or higher headquarters using the procedures prescribed in unit SOPs. 2-126. Digital traffic. Digital traffic may precede, replace, or follow voice transmissions; in many cases, it will reduce the need for and redundancy of voice traffic. Do not duplicate digital traffic with voice messages if digital transmissions precede or can replace voice traffic in a timely manner. Because digital systems are not totally reliable, it may be necessary to verify the receipt of critical digital traffic.
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z z z z z
2-137. In addition to guidance in these general categories, ST 3-20.153 covers specific operational factors that the platoon leader must take into account in fire distribution and control. These additional SOP items include the following: z Vehicle positions (for example, Tank 2 will always be the left flank tank). z TRP marking procedures and materials. z Sectors of fire for each tank. z Engagement bands (based on ammunition capabilities and expected enemy forces). z Procedures for coordination with adjacent units. z Guidelines for identifying and covering dead space. 2-138. The platoon leader should supplement his SOP by developing standardized procedures for offensive and defensive fire planning. These procedures should be detailed enough to allow rapid fire planning after the terrain has been analyzed. This initial planning may be refined and improved as time permits. Note. Visual control measures (and the accompanying SOP actions) may be used to start and stop engagements, shift fires, and signal prearranged actions. On the other hand, an important consideration for the platoon leader in developing the unit SOP is that the dynamics of battle will normally require that fires be controlled using the radio. The radio instructions used to initiate SOPs (as well as issue fire commands) must be brief and precise.
Distribution
2-139. The platoon leader employs two primary methods to ensure effective distribution of direct fires: fire patterns and firing techniques. Fire Patterns 2-140. The entire platoon must thoroughly understand the three basic fire patterns: frontal, cross, and depth. In addition, each tank crew must understand its responsibilities, by SOP, in using the fire patterns for target engagement. The basic fire patterns cover most situations and promote rapid, effective platoon fire distribution. They are normally used in the defense, but may be modified for employment with techniques of movement. They may be used at both platoon and section level. 2-141. Regardless of the fire pattern used, the goal is to engage near targets first, and then shift fires to far targets. Tanks should engage targets near to far and most dangerous to least dangerous in their sector. A most dangerous enemy is any enemy antitank system preparing to engage the platoon. The platoon sector is defined by TRPs, which are used to mass platoon fires at specific locations and to mark the left and right planning limits for platoon fires. As directed or when he determines it is necessary, the section or platoon leader may make exceptions to the most dangerous to least dangerous guideline; an example would be engagement of designated priority targets (such as command and control vehicles). 2-142. Frontal fire pattern. The frontal pattern is used when all tanks within the platoon can fire to their front (see Figure 2-22). Flank tanks engage targets to their front (right tank shoots right target, left tank shoots left target) and shift fires toward the center as targets are destroyed. Leader tanks engage targets to their front and shift fire to the outside as targets are destroyed. The frontal fire engagement rule is near to far, flank to center, and center to flank.
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Figure 2-22. Frontal fire pattern 2-143. Cross fire pattern. The cross fire pattern is used when obstructions prevent some or all tanks within the platoon from firing to the front or when the enemys frontal armor protection requires use of flank shots to achieve penetration. In this pattern, each tank engages targets on the flank of its position. The right flank tank engages the left portion of the target area while the left flank tank engages the right portion. As targets are destroyed, tanks shift fires inward. The leader tanks engage the center targets and shift fire to the outside as targets are destroyed. The cross fire engagement rule is outside in, near to far. An example of the cross pattern is shown in Figure 2-23.
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Figure 2-23. Cross fire pattern 2-144. Depth fire pattern. The depth fire pattern is used when targets are exposed in depth. Employment of depth fire is dependent on the position and formation of both the engaging platoon and the target. For example, the entire platoon may be required to fire on a column formation in depth; in other cases, individual tanks engaging in their sector may have to fire in depth. If the whole platoon is firing, it may be possible for each tank to fire in depth on a portion of the enemy formation (see Figure 2-24). The far left tank engages the far target and shifts fire toward the center of the formation as targets are destroyed; the left center tank engages the center target and shifts fire toward the rear as targets are destroyed. The right center tank engages the closest (front) target and shifts fire to the rear as targets are destroyed; the far right tank engages the center target and shifts fire to the front as targets are destroyed.
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Figure 2-24. Depth fire pattern Firing Techniques 2-145. In addition to employing fire patterns, the platoon leader may choose one of three firing techniques to distribute and control the direct fires of the platoon: simultaneous, alternating, and observed. Figures 2-25 through 2-30 illustrate a variety of situations in which the firing techniques are employed; the illustrations include the applicable fire commands. (Note. Refer to the discussion of fire commands later in this section.) 2-146. Simultaneous fire. This is the primary firing technique used by the platoon. It is employed during most offensive engagements when the unit encounters surprise targets. It is also used in most defensive engagements when the enemy array is numerous enough to require multiple engagements by each tank in the unit. In that case, all tanks engage simultaneously in their assigned sectors. Figures 2-25 through 2-28 illustrate various simultaneous fire situations. 2-147. Alternating fire. Alternating fire is normally used when the platoon is in a defensive position or is undetected. Each tank alternates firing and observing in conjunction with the other tank in the section until both are satisfied that they are hitting the target consistently. Subsequent fire, by command, is then simultaneous. During alternating fire, Tanks 2 and 3 (the wingmen in each section) are normally the first to fire at their outside targets. The section leaders (the platoon leader and PSG) provide observation before firing at their targets. The process continues until all targets are destroyed or the leader switches to simultaneous fire. Refer to Figure 2-29 for an illustration of how alternating fire is employed. 2-148. Observed fire. Observed fire is normally used when the platoon is in protected defensive positions and engagement ranges are in excess of 2,500 meters. The first tank to fire in each section engages designated targets while the second tank observes. The second tank prepares to engage targets in the event the first tank misses consistently, experiences a malfunction, or runs low on ammunition. This technique maximizes observation and assistance capabilities for the observing tank while protecting its location. See Figure 2-30 for an example of observed fire.
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Figure 2-25. Use of cross fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage enemy PCs (with platoon leaders fire command)
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Figure 2-26. Use of frontal fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique to engage multiple enemy tanks (with platoon leaders fire command)
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Figure 2-27. Use of different fire patterns in each section (with simultaneous fire technique) to engage enemy targets (with platoon leaders fire command)
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Figure 2-28. Use of depth fire pattern and simultaneous fire technique (with section fire command)
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Figure 2-29. Use of cross fire pattern and alternating fire technique (with section fire command)
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Figure 2-30. Use of observed fire technique (with section fire command)
Control
2-149. The platoon leader uses two processes to control fires: fire planning and fire commands. He decides how to control fires based on the factors of METT-TC, especially the specific tactical situation and the time available to plan and prepare. Fire Planning 2-150. The more thoroughly the platoon leader can plan an operation, the more effective the platoons fires are likely to be. The amount of time available for fire planning, however, depends almost entirely on the collective factors of METT-TC. There are also important considerations based on whether the operation is offensive or defensive in nature. 2-151. For example, some defensive operations may allow the platoon leader hours or days to conduct fire planning. Intelligence assets may be able to acquire, track, and report enemy elements as they move toward the platoon. The platoon leader can then initiate fires with a platoon fire command or a predetermined event (such as the enemy crossing a trigger line). He can also rely on detailed planning and preparation to assist him in distributing fires effectively during the fight. Further fire commands may be required, but the object of the planning phase is to anticipate events and coordinate fires before the fight starts. A well-planned defense requires minimum radio traffic over the platoon net during execution; trigger points, priority of engagements, and targets are established in advance. 2-152. In other situations, especially during offensive operations (such as a meeting engagement or in a movement to contact), the platoon will have only limited time to plan and prepare. At best, the platoon leader may have time to issue a full platoon fire command; on the other hand, a member of the platoon may
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acquire and engage a most dangerous target before the platoon leader has an opportunity to initiate his fire command. In the absence of adequate planning time, the platoon leader must initially rely on preestablished, well-rehearsed SOPs to distribute and control fires and ensure fast, predictable engagement by all tanks. Note. Fire planning for offensive and defensive situations is covered in detail in a discussion later in this section and in Chapters 3 and 4 of this manual. 2-153. No matter what kind of situation it expects to face, the platoon must learn and rehearse target acquisition responsibilities; use of TRPs and fire patterns; and procedures for initiating, shifting, and stopping fires. Its survival depends on it. Fire Commands 2-154. The effective use of fire commands is a function of the leaders knowledge of the enemy and the fire control process and of the time available to plan, prepare, and rehearse. Using a standard format for a platoon or section fire command ensures that all essential information and control measures are given in a minimum amount of time. It enables the unit to react instantly and effectively, even under the most adverse conditions. Standardized platoon and section fire command formats must be established by unit SOP and then practiced by platoon leaders and PSGs (the section leaders) for optimum proficiency. Brevity and clarity are essential. Abbreviated methods for identifying target locations are encouraged; however, these methods must be familiar and understandable. 2-155. The platoon leader may provide coordinating instructions or additional information to individual TCs; this information is not part of the platoon fire command. When one tank sends a contact or spot report and it is reasonable to believe all other tanks in the section or platoon have received it, the section or platoon leader issues only the elements needed to complete the fire command. In all cases, a TC has the freedom to engage a target without a section or platoon fire command if he is under immediate enemy contact. 2-156. The battlefield situation and/or platoon SOP dictate the number of elements used in a fire command. The standard platoon fire command includes up to six elements, transmitted in the following order: z Alert. z Weapon or ammunition (optional). z Target description. z Orientation. z Control (optional). z Execution. 2-157. Alert. The alert element addresses the tanks that are being directed to fire; it does not require the individual initiating the fire command to identify himself. (Note. Wingman tanks or sections not designated to engage should sense the target effects and be prepared to engage targets as necessary.) 2-158. The platoon or company/troop SOP may specify code words to be used to standardize the alert element, as in the following example: z RED. Entire platoon prepare to fire. z ALPHA. Platoon leader and his wingman prepare to fire. z BRAVO. PSG and his wingman prepare to fire. 2-159. Weapon or ammunition (optional). The weapon is not announced unless specific control measures are required. Ammunition is not announced unless a specific type is dictated by the situation. The TC selects ammunition based on the platoon SOP, the number and type of enemy targets, and the supply status of ammunition (how much of each type is on hand).
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2-160. Target description. This element briefly describes the target in terms of number, type, and activity (THREE TANKS MOVING EAST TO WEST). If the target is stationary, the activity may be omitted. 2-161. Orientation. Target location is described using one of two methods: z Reference point or terrain feature. This method is used for most defensive engagements and can also be applied to offensive situations. If the platoon leader designates separate targets for each section, he assigns responsibility and clarifies target location in the orientation element. For example: ALPHATWO TANKSTRP 3126BRAVOBMPs AND TROOPS ROAD JUNCTION. z Direction of target. This method is used most often in the offense when no TRP or definitive terrain feature is near the target. Direction is indicated from the projected line of movement (LOM) of the platoon in the offense or from the center of sector (COS) in the defense (for example, LEFT FRONT or RIGHT FLANK). The clock option indicates direction starting with the LOM or COS at 12 oclock (for example: TWO OCLOCK; NINE OCLOCK). The cardinal direction may also be used (for example: NORTHWEST or SOUTHWEST). When using the direction method, the platoon leader will announce a range to help his TCs locate the targets. Examples of this method: RIGHT FRONTONE EIGHT HUNDRED or TEN OCLOCKTWO FOUR HUNDRED. 2-162. Control (optional). The platoon leader can use the control element to provide the platoon with critical firing information in several areas, including the following: z Fire pattern. The platoon leader may specify which pattern (frontal, cross, or depth) he has selected based on his plan for fire distribution. As noted, if the control element is omitted, the platoon engages targets using frontal fire. Refer to the discussion of fire patterns earlier in this section. z Firing technique. The platoon leader may designate which of the three firing techniques (simultaneous, alternating, or observed) he wants to employ. If no technique is specified, all tanks engage simultaneously. If the platoon leader wishes to designate a firing tank or section, he specifies which tanks will fire in the alert element of the fire command. Refer to the discussion of firing techniques earlier in this section. z Ammunition or weapon. The platoon leader may designate the amount or type of ammunition or weapons to be fired. For example, he might direct four bursts from the coax machine gun for every two main gun rounds fired. (Note. This information may also be provided in the weapon or ammunition element of the fire command. Refer to the discussion of that element.) 2-163. Execution. The execution element indicates when firing will begin. Normally, this is simply the command FIRE. If simultaneous fire is desired or if the platoons fire is to be coordinated with other direct or indirect fires, the execution element AT MY COMMAND is given first. The resulting delay allows the coordination of all fires to be completed while the individual crews select their targets, issue their own fire commands, and prepare to engage. If for any reason a tank is not prepared to fire (for example, because it is conducting ammunition transfer or has experienced an equipment malfunction), the TC informs the platoon leader or PSG immediately. The TC estimates and reports the time required for the tank to become ready to fight. 2-164. As he prepares and issues the fire command, the platoon leader must remember that tanks have to occupy hull-down positions before firing. A pro-word (for example, TOP HAT) can be used in the execution element to signal this move.
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Note. Once engagement of the enemy begins, the platoon leader controls fires by issuing subsequent fire commands or individual elements of the fire command; this serves to focus and distribute the fires of individual tanks, a section, or the entire platoon. Figure 2-31 illustrates an example of a platoon fire command; note that the optional element specifying the weapon or ammunition has been omitted. Refer to Figures 2-25 through 2-30 on pages 2-29 through 2-34 for examples of how fire commands are used to control and distribute fires in a number of tactical situations. The engagement is terminated when all targets are destroyed or when the platoon leader announces CEASE FIRE. Alert Target description Orientation Control (optional) Execution RED THREE TANKS VICINITY TRP ZERO ZERO SIX CROSS AT MY COMMANDFIRE
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2-170. If possible, the platoon leader, along with his TCs, physically inspects the ground where the company team commander has directed him to orient his platoon to engage the enemy. Looking back toward the BP, the platoon leader selects the platoons primary firing positions, alternate positions (50 to 100 meters from each tanks primary position), and supplementary positions (to orient platoon fires into another engagement area or TRP). 2-171. As the platoon leader walks the engagement area, he identifies dead space based on how the enemy is expected to move through the area. He either adjusts the firing positions or plans indirect fires to cover the dead space. He verifies grids using the GPS. Firing Positions and Target Reference Points 2-172. The platoon leader then moves to the selected firing positions. He checks the positions for correct orientation toward the engagement area and determines whether suitable TRPs are available. TRPs must be visible through both daylight and thermal channels and should be visible to friendly elements only. If existing terrain or man-made objects are inadequate, a field-expedient TRP must be constructed. Note. Materials that can be used in constructing TRPs include target panels, heated with Class VIII heating pads, and caliber .50 or 7.62-mm ammunition cans filled with charcoal or a mixture of sand and diesel fuel. 2-173. The two main types of firing positions are defilade and keyhole. In defilade positions, tanks are vulnerable from the flanks and to enemy overwatch fire. Keyhole positions (also called window positions) provide greater protection by taking advantage of terrain features that create a keyhole around the position. Ideally, the platoon should employ a combination of defilade and keyhole positions whenever possible to take advantage of their respective advantages and negate their weaknesses. 2-174. Defilade positions. There are three types of defilade positions: z Turret-down. A turret-down position uses terrain to mask most of the tank, with only the highest parts of the vehicle (such as the GPS and CITV) exposed to the enemy. Targets cannot be engaged with the main gun from this position, but can use the turret top mounted machine guns. z Hull-down. A hull-down position exposes only as much of the tank as needed to engage targets with the main gun. z Hide. The platoon leader may assign a hide position to the rear of the BP for each tank to occupy after the initial preparation of its firing positions. The hide position serves two purposes: A well-constructed, effectively camouflaged hide position may delay enemy acquisition of the platoon; a hide position located away from the prepared position may protect the platoon from the full effects of enemy artillery fires. (Locations of hide positions are terraindependent, but they should offer cover and concealment.) 2-175. Keyhole positions. Keyhole positions afford the firing tank a measure of protection from enemy overwatching fires (see Figure 2-33). They restrict observation, and thus limit vulnerability to only one segment of the platoons engagement; therefore, only those targets that can be seen (and engaged) by the tank can return fire on it. The platoon leader must select each keyhole position carefully so the ability to interlock fires with other tanks in the platoon is not degraded. Moving into or away from the opening to the position can vary the width of the field of fire. Weaknesses of keyhole positions are limited sectors of fire and excessive dead space. In built-up areas, dismounted infantry should be used to provide protection from infiltration.
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Figure 2-33. Keyhole firing positions Weapon Planning Range 2-176. The weapon planning range for a tank is the distance at which the platoon leader intends to begin engaging enemy targets. In determining this range, he must know the lethality of the kinetic energy rounds his crews will be firing versus the specific vulnerabilities of the enemy armor he expects to face. Lethality, and as a result the weapon planning range, is based on the two factors known as probability of hit (PH) and probability of kill (PK). While actual values of PH and PK are classified, it is obvious that PH decreases as range increases, as does PK for kinetic energy penetrators. This is because velocity decreases with range; penetration is largely dependent on velocity. 2-177. Evaluating and determining the planning range. With limited rounds available on board each vehicle, the platoon leader must weigh the tactical alternatives and try to make every round count. A key factor in determining the weapon planning range is METT-TC. The commander must consider the capabilities and limitations of friendly forces as well as those of enemy troops. In addition, the planning range for a tank cannot be separated from the number of rounds the platoon leader is prepared to expend. While it is possible to hit an enemy tank at 3,000 meters, the probability of doing so on the first round is low. Further, even when a hit is made, PK will be very low against turret frontal armor. 2-178. Taking into account these factors, the platoon leader will usually direct his TCs to engage targets from closer ranges, especially in frontal engagements. Considering only PK, frontal tank engagements should begin at less than 2,500 meters. Several factors combine to make frontal engagements of enemy tanks beyond 2,500 meters only marginally effective. If the tactical situation permits, the optimum weapon planning range against tanks in the frontal 60-degree arc is 1,500 meters. This can be extended with recognition of degraded PH, of degraded PK against turret frontal armor, and of reduced kills per on-tank load of ammunition. The planning range can also be reduced based on terrain, weather, and obscuration. As noted, engagement of enemy fighting vehicles with lighter armor can begin at longer ranges based on
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the increased PK; however, due to their smaller size, the PH for these vehicles will normally be lower than that for tanks. Note. Frontal engagements of enemy fighting vehicles with lighter armor can begin at longer ranges; the PK is higher due to the difference in protection levels. 2-179. Further consideration on engagement range will be based on enemy capabilities and type of equipment. Platoons may be faced with a full spectrum of equipment from converted civilian trucks, older equipment upgrade with new sensors and capabilities, to high level state of the art equipment. Now the platoon leader must not only understand how far his forces can see and shoot, but how far the enemy can see and shot. The tank platoon is no longer in an environment where it can see or fire farther than the enemy: it may even be faced with an enemy with superior equipment. 2-180. Long-range engagement considerations. When the decision is made to engage the enemy at longer ranges, several additional planning factors must be considered. In choosing long-range engagement, the platoon leader is almost certain to compromise his positions and loses the element of surprise. At the same time, however, the forward placement of a platoon may deceive the enemy as to the location of the main defensive position and cause the enemy to deploy sooner than he had planned. Longrange engagements require the use of sensing tanks and observed fire techniques; as a result, the platoon leader should always attempt to conduct them from an elevated firing position. He should task only his most proficient firing crews and most accurate tanks to execute the long-range gunnery mission. Note. Refer to FM 3-20.12 for an in-depth discussion of the training issues involved in preparing crews for long-range engagements.
Final Planning Considerations 2-181. As he conducts his troop-leading procedures, the platoon leader mentally rehearses the battle. After reconnaissance of the engagement area or sector, he gathers all the TCs (and gunners, if possible) where they can view the area. He ensures that everyone can identify the assigned TRPs, obstacles, avenues of approach, prominent terrain features, and dead space. 2-182. Using TRPs, terrain features, or man-made obstacles, the platoon leader ensures that each tank has a well-defined and well-understood sector of fire. An individual tank sector should be wide enough to allow some overlap with adjacent vehicles, but narrow enough to prevent overkill of targets. This reduces the scanning requirements for the gunner and the potential for overkill; it also ensures that the entire engagement area or platoon sector is covered by main gun fire. Based on the commanders guidance, the platoon leader also establishes the trigger line for initiation of the direct-fire fight and takes other actions that are time- or space-dependent. 2-183. The platoon leader will decide whether to have all his tanks orient on the TRPs assigned by the company team commander or to have sections or individual tanks orient in slightly different areas (platoonlevel targets). For example, if the platoon leader is tasked to orient on TRP 006, he might decide on one of the following missions for his subordinates, based on the enemy and terrain: z All tanks orient on TRP 006. z Alpha section orients to the left of TRP 006 while Bravo section orients to the right. 2-184. When the platoon leader decides how to use his tanks to best execute the company team commanders intent, he checks each firing position he has selected, identifying and confirming sectors of fire to ensure he has mutual support between tanks. The platoon leader must know where friendly infantry and combat support elements (such as air defense artillery [ADA]), if any, will be positioned. He must then plan machine gun fires for each tank to protect itself as well as other tanks in the platoon and adjacent friendly elements. He does this by assigning final protective fires (FPF), with the platoon using its coax machine guns to fire on dismounted enemy infantry, and by planning for additional indirect fire support.
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Preparation Summary 2-192. The platoon leader must be resourceful and thorough in making sure all crews understand and can execute the plan under all conceivable conditions. This includes planning, preparing, and conducting rehearsals for supplementary and successive BPs that he has been directed to prepare. If time does not permit all of these steps, he must prioritize his preparation activities. 2-193. The end product of the platoon leaders fire planning and preparation is not merely a thorough, accurate fire plan, although this is an indispensable component of the defense. To be successful in battle, he must complete these phases of the defensive operation with tank crews that understand in detail what they are supposed to do and a platoon that, as a package, is completely prepared to fight.
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TC adjusts fire and switches targets in accordance with the platoon fire command or platoon SOP. The commander and/or platoon leader will already have assigned engagement priorities according to the mission and other factors. As an example, defensive engagement priorities might be the following: z Priority 1. Most dangerous targets (tanks, ATGMs). z Priority 2. Dangerous targets. z Priority 3. Command and control assets (vehicles with the most antennas). z Priority 4. Air defense assets. z Priority 5. Engineer assets. z Priority 6. Least dangerous targets (supply vehicles). 2-200. How long each tank can safely remain in a hull-down position will depend on the enemy situation. Whenever possible, a tank should remain in position to kill enemy targets. Taking the time to move between a turret-down position and a hull-down position, however, increases the enemys probability of a hit because he will be closing on the tanks position. If the enemy is within 2,000 meters, relatively numerous, closing rapidly, and the mission requires a defense (as opposed to delay), a defending tank will normally be more successful continuing to fire and not moving to his turret-down position. On the other hand, if the enemy is stationary and/or has tanks or ATGMs in overwatch, the crew should fire no more than two rounds before returning to a turret-down position. When the crew is not engaging enemy targets, the tank should return to a turret-down position and provide observation or assistance to other tank crews. Note. Similar considerations, problems, and criteria also apply to movement between primary and alternate positions.
Contingencies 2-201. After direct fire has been initiated, platoon fire commands will be used only to cover previously unanticipated contingencies. For example, the platoon leader might have one section engaging to the left side of the sector and the other to the right after anticipating an enemy company deployed on line across the platoons sector. If the entire enemy force arrives along the right side, use of a fire command gives the platoon leader the flexibility to adapt his distribution of fires rapidly and economically to the new situation. He issues the appropriate fire command to initiate the direct-fire fight. Ammunition Transfer 2-202. Important considerations as the engagement continues are each tanks supply of ready ammunition and the related requirement for ammunition transfer. No tank should totally deplete its ready ammunition before initiating the transfer of rounds from its semi-ready storage area. The loader must maintain a running count of ready ammunition available and keep the TC informed of the tanks ammunition status. In turn, the platoon leader and PSG must monitor the status of their wingmen. In addition, because all four tanks cannot transfer ammunition at the same time, the platoon leader must issue guidance on how and when each tank will conduct the transfer. 2-203. As ready ammunition is depleted, each crew must be ready to transfer rounds. Based on the platoon leaders guidance, the tank backs into its hide position and completes ammunition transfer when the situation allows. The platoon leader needs to ensure that if prestock is available, he takes advantage of it during low points in the battle to keep his tanks as close as possible to full load of main gun ammunition. Movement Out of a Defensive Position 2-204. Changes in the mission or battlefield situation may require the platoon to move out of a BP, either to move to a successive position or to conduct another mission such as a delay. 2-205. Movement considerations. When the situation requires the platoon to move, the platoon leader and his TCs must make sure the movement does not expose the flank or rear of their tanks to enemy fire. If a concealed route out of the position is not available, the TC should mask the tanks movement with terrain
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before turning around. To accomplish this, he turns over control of the main gun and coax machine gun to the gunner. He faces the rear and quickly guides the tank backward to a covered route by giving the driver short commands (for example, LEFT FAST or HARD RIGHT). The gunner acquires, engages, and adjusts fire on targets while the TC maintains command of the vehicles movement. Use of Covering Smoke 2-206. The tank smoke systems can be used to screen the move when the unit is in contact. The TC may use grenade launchers during initial movement, and then switch to the vehicle engine exhaust smoke system (VEESS) after the tank has built up speed and momentum. The gunner uses battlesight gunnery while the tank is obscured. He must use exhaust smoke judiciously; however, improper employment or careless movement techniques may cause the tank to become silhouetted against its own smoke. Note. If exhaust smoke prevents the crew from seeing where the tank is going and the tank is no longer screened by the first salvo of smoke grenades, the TC should use a second salvo of grenade-launched smoke.
CAUTION
VEESS will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use of VEESS when burning any other type of fuel will cause a fire hazard.
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Offensive Operations
Offense is the decisive form of war. While tactical considerations may call for the platoon to execute defensive operations for a period of time, defeat of the enemy requires a shift to offensive operations. To ensure the success of the attack, the tank platoon leader must understand the fundamentals of offense and apply troop-leading procedures during the planning and preparation phases of the operation.
SURPRISE
3-3. Platoons achieve surprise by following OPSEC procedures and making the best possible use of vehicle speed, covered and concealed routes, vehicle optics, firepower, and stand-off capabilities during tactical movement.
CONCENTRATION
3-4. Platoons achieve concentration by massing the effects of their weapon systems without necessarily massing platoon vehicles at a single location. Modern navigation and position location/reporting systems allow the platoon leader to disperse his vehicles while retaining the ability to quickly mass the effects of the platoons weapon systems whenever necessary. In addition, these advanced systems allow him to maintain command, control, and OPSEC at all times. The platoon leader must remember that it is more important to move using covered and concealed routes to positions from which the platoon can mass fires and engage the enemy than it is to maintain precise formations and predetermined speeds.
TEMPO
3-5. Tempo, the rate of military action, can range from fast to slow. While a fast tempo is preferred, the platoon leader must remember that synchronization sets the stage for successful platoon operations. Leaders must understand the different rates of speed when comparing dismounted forces to mounted forces. To support the commanders intent, he must ensure that his platoons movement is synchronized with the movement of other company or troop elements as well as with adjacent and supporting units. If the platoon is forced to slow down because of terrain or enemy resistance, the platoon leader reports this change so the commander can alter the tempo of company or troop movement to maintain synchronization.
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AUDACITY
3-6. At the platoon level, audacity is marked by violent execution of the mission and a willingness to seize the initiative. Knowledge of the commanders intent two levels up allows the platoon leader to take advantage of battlefield opportunities whenever they present themselves, enhancing the effectiveness of the platoons support for the entire offensive operation.
FORMS OF OFFENSE
3-7. The four general forms of tactical offense described in FM 3-0 are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Characteristics include the following: z Movement to contact is conducted to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact with the enemy force. z An attack is conducted to defeat, destroy, and neutralize the enemy, as well as seize and secure terrain. The attack can be deliberate or hasty, depending on the amount of planning time available. z An exploitation extends the destruction of the enemy by maintaining offensive pressure. z A pursuit is conducted against a retreating enemy force and follows a successful attack to complete the destruction of the enemy force. 3-8. The company can execute movements to contact and either hasty or deliberate attacks on their own; the nature of these operations depends largely on the amount of time and enemy information available during the planning and preparation phases. Companies execute an exploitation or pursuit as part of a larger force.
WAR-FIGHTING FUNCTIONS
3-10. In conducting his planning and preparation for offensive operations, the platoon leader pays close attention to the considerations applicable for the war-fighting functions, which are outlined in the following discussion. The war-fighting functions, which help the platoon leader to logically organize his thoughts to cover the mission, are the following: z Movement and maneuver. z Fire support. z Intelligence. z Protection. z Sustainment. z Command and control. Note. Sections II and III of this chapter, which cover, respectively, the planning and preparation phases of the offense are organized using the war-fighting functions in the order listed above. Included in each section is a discussion of the human aspect of operations, focusing on intangible, Soldier-related factors.
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SECTION II - PLANNING
3-11. The planning phase begins when the platoon receives the higher WARNO or OPORD and ends when the platoon leader issues his own OPORD or FRAGO. During this phase, the platoon leader conducts troop-leading procedures as outlined in Chapter 2. In developing his OPORD or FRAGO, the platoon leader must take into account the considerations applicable for the operating systems, which are outlined in this section. 3-12. After he issues the WARNO, the platoon leader may initiate rehearsals of tactical movement, battle drills, or breaching actions. These generic rehearsals allow the platoon to begin preparing for the mission. Once the platoon leader completes his plan, the generic rehearsals are matched to the actual terrain and anticipated actions on enemy contact.
DIRECT FIRES
3-14. The platoon leader identifies multiple attack-by-fire and support-by-fire positions along the direction of attack from which the platoon can engage known or suspected enemy positions. He designates TRPs and assigns sectors of fire, observation, and weapons orientation. He specifies platoon fire patterns (if different from those identified by SOP) and addresses restrictions on direct fire imposed by the ROE for the operation.
OBSTACLE TYPES
3-15. The platoon will encounter two types of obstacles, existing and reinforcing. The platoon leader can expect the enemy to employ both types in executing his defensive plan.
Existing Obstacles
3-16. Existing obstacles are those that are present on the battlefield but were not emplaced through military effort. They may be natural (such as streams, lakes, thick forests, and mountains) or cultural (towns or railroad embankments).
Reinforcing Obstacles
3-17. These are obstacles that are placed on the battlefield through military effort to slow, stop, turn, or canalize the enemy. Examples include minefields, wire, road craters, log cribs, and tank ditches.
BREACH PLANNING
3-18. The commander will designate each platoon to be part of the support force, the breach force, or the assault force. The support force usually leads the company during movement and identifies the obstacle. It then suppresses any enemy overwatching the obstacle. A tank platoon can conduct breach force operations only if it is equipped with the assets required to breach the type of obstacle encountered; such assets include demolitions, grappling hooks, rakes, mine plows, and mine rollers. The breach force is responsible for creating, proofing, and marking a lane through the obstacle and for securing the far side. It then
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suppresses remaining enemy forces as the assault force moves through the breach to continue the attack. (See Chapter 5 of this manual for more information on breaching operations.)
FIRE SUPPORT
3-19. Most fire support planning is conducted at company level and higher. The platoon leader reviews the plan to ensure that responsibilities for initiating, lifting, and shifting indirect fires are designated. As necessary, he identifies additional indirect fire targets on known or suspected enemy positions and submits recommendations to the company FIST. When working with light forces the platoon leader must ensure he has an understanding of the fire support capability inherent within the light force structure. The platoon leader evaluates and recommends the use of smoke to help conceal or obscure movement and suppress likely enemy positions while the platoon is moving through danger areas; in addition, he evaluates the need for illumination or smoke rounds for marking and/or to assist in navigation. See the discussion of navigation in Chapter 2 of this manual.
INTELLIGENCE
ENEMY
3-20. Most analysis of the enemy situation and probable enemy COAs is done at the battalion and company level; however, it is the platoon leaders responsibility to understand how the enemys disposition and possible COAs may affect the platoons area of operations and the accomplishment of its mission. The platoon leader uses what is developed from higher, but must be able to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) refining information received from higher. The platoon leader identifies and plots on his overlay all known and suspected enemy positions that affect his area of operations and identifies indirect and direct fire range fans of enemy weapon systems. The enemy overlay for FBCB2 should also be updated to include the latest enemy information. 3-21. The platoon leader then identifies terrain features or determines the standoff distance of friendly weapon systems that will negate the effects of enemy weapons if possible. Next, he determines the enemys most probable COAs. Using information from his own analysis and from higher headquarters, he identifies anticipated contact situations. This process includes estimating whether the enemy will defend in place, delay, or counterattack upon contact; when and where contact is most likely to be made; what type and size of enemy force the platoon will face; and what is then the enemys intent. Finally, the platoon leader must develop specific plans for the platoons actions against the enemy. Refer to the discussion of enemy analysis in the explanation of troop-leading procedures in Chapter 2 of this manual.
TERRAIN
3-22. The platoon leader conducts a map reconnaissance and uses the factors of OAKOC, as discussed in Chapter 2, to systematically analyze the terrain in his AO. He pays close attention to key terrain that could support positions offering unobstructed observation and fields of fire. These are danger areas that can be used by enemy or friendly forces when contact is made during the execution of the mission. This analysis is followed by a ground reconnaissance, conducted with the commander as far forward as possible and as extensively as time and security considerations permit. The ground reconnaissance covers the platoons movement routes to the LD, routes to the objective, and the objective itself. The platoon leader should check and record the time-distance factors to any SPs or to the LD.
PROTECTION
3-23. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power. Some of the tasks related to protection are: z Air and missile defense. (Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of planning considerations for air defense.) z Countermobility/survivability.
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z z
Note. CBRN defensive operations are a critical consideration during offensive operations. These are discussed in detail in Section V of this chapter (as part of the execution of battle drills) and in Appendix E of this manual.
SUSTAINMENT
3-24. The platoon leader ensures that Soldiers are familiar with procedures for maintenance and medical treatment and evacuation; these as outlined in paragraph 4 of the platoon OPORD or in the unit SOP. See Chapter 7 of this manual for more details concerning sustainment operations.
STANDARDIZED DRILLS
3-30. If possible the platoon should develop standardized drills for the following that will allow the platoon to operate in a near automatic mode. It should cover the following subjects: z Movement from current positions.
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z z z z z z z z z z
Routes. Platoon and company formations and movement techniques. Vehicle positions within the platoon formation. Weapons orientation and fire control. Triggers. Actions on contact. Actions on the objective (consolidation and reorganization.) Reporting procedures. Signals. Breaching drills.
3-31. Actions at obstacles should be rehearsed during the preparation phase. Breaching equipment should be checked durin PCCs and PCIs.
FIRE SUPPORT
3-32. During the rehearsal, the platoon leader should address responsibility for targets in the platoon AO. He should cover any scheduled indirect fires and the effects of smoke on the battlefield. In addition, he should discuss the direct-fire plan, with emphasis on platoon responsibilities, known and suspected enemy locations, friendly unit locations, and applicable ROE.
INTELLIGENCE
3-33. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader will receive updated SPOTREPs listing known and suspected enemy locations as well as the latest friendly actions. He should plot the updated enemy and friendly locations on his overlay and on the enemy overlay (digital systems); based on his terrain reconnaissance, he adjusts the maneuver plan accordingly. It is critical that the platoon has a standard method of either the PSG or platoon leader relaying this information to the wing tanks to maintain situational understanding for all crews.
PROTECTION
3-34. Air defense preparations during this phase should include a rehearsal of the react to air attack drill, which is outlined in Section V of this chapter.
SUSTAINMENT
3-35. During the preparation phase, tank crews conduct resupply operations to replenish their combat loads. They also perform preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on their vehicles and equipment. 3-36. Rehearsals should cover aspects of the logistical plan that will support the upcoming operation, including emergency resupply and personnel and vehicle evacuation procedures. For more information on sustainment, refer to Chapter 7 of this manual.
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3-44. An important part of offensive fire planning is the assignment of overlapping sectors of fire for each element in the platoon (see Figure 3-1). These sectors, also called sectors of responsibility, are covered in the platoon SOP and are based on the formation and movement technique the platoon will use. During the operation, as the situation requires, the platoon leader then adjusts the sectors he assigned initially. Factors that may necessitate a change in sectors of fire include the following: z Changes in terrain or visibility. z Contact with previously unknown enemy positions. z Use of fires or smoke to conceal or cover the platoons movement. z The scheme of maneuver of adjacent units.
Figure 3-1. Example sectors of fire in a moving engagement (platoon moving in wedge formation)
ENGAGING TARGETS
3-45. Once movement begins but before contact is made, the platoon leader maneuvers the unit to take full advantage of his tanks, whose capabilities are maximized in the offense. Crews should stay aware of visible TRPs and control points as they come into view. The platoon leader uses these to adjust sectors of responsibility. He may also use the clock or cardinal direction method to designate sectors of responsibility. As noted, he modifies assigned sectors of fire as necessary while the platoon is moving. 3-46. Each TC identifies the tanks sector of fire for his gunner and then monitors the gunners target search to make sure it covers the entire sector and does not stray beyond it. In addition, some offensive situations may require the platoon to operate in an area where the line of sight between tanks in the sections is interrupted by terrain or vegetation. The platoon leader and TCs must ensure that each crew conducts a 360-degree search for air and ground targets and maintains effective communications with the other tanks.
Moving Engagements
3-47. Most moving engagements begin with one tank in the platoon acquiring surprise targets. These targets should be engaged immediately. The TC who makes first contact gives a contact report after he has engaged a target. The other tanks may orient their gun tubes in the direction the tank in contact is firing, but continue to maintain 360-degree security. The tanks do not change direction unless the platoon leader orders an action drill; they scan and return fire on additional targets. 3-48. When targets are identified, the platoon leader or PSG sends a contact or spot report (depending on the enemy situation and the amount of time available) to the company team commander. The commander
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and/or platoon leader will already have assigned engagement priorities according to the mission and other factors. As an example, offensive engagement priorities might be the following: z Priority 1. Most dangerous targets (tanks, ATGMs). z Priority 2. Dangerous targets. z Priority 3. Command and control assets (vehicles with the most antennas). z Priority 4. Air defense assets. z Priority 5. Engineer assets. z Priority 6. Least dangerous targets (supply vehicles). 3-49. After initial contact, the platoon leader controls the platoon fires by issuing fire commands and additional instructions as appropriate. He keeps the company team commander informed while developing the situation.
TECHNIQUES OF MOVEMENT
3-52. The commander or platoon leader selects a technique of movement based on several battlefield factors: z The likelihood of enemy contact. z The availability of another element to provide overwatch for the moving element. z The terrain over which the moving element will pass. 3-53. In open terrain, such as deserts, one company will normally overwatch the movement of another company. In close terrain, such as rolling hills or countryside, platoons will normally overwatch other platoons. In restricted terrain, such as mountains, forests, or urban areas, a tank section will rely on another tank section or dismounted infantry to overwatch movement.
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3-54. The tank platoon must be able to employ any of the following techniques of movement: z Traveling. Characterized by continuous movement of all elements, traveling is best suited to situations in which enemy contact is unlikely and speed is important. z Traveling overwatch. Traveling overwatch is an extended form of traveling that provides additional security when contact is possible but speed is desirable. The lead element moves continuously. The trail element moves at various speeds and may halt periodically to overwatch the movement of the lead element. The trail element maintains dispersion based on its ability to provide immediate suppressive fires in support of the lead element. The intent is to maintain depth, provide flexibility, and sustain movement in case the lead element is engaged. z Bounding overwatch. Bounding overwatch is used when contact is expected. It is the most secure, but slowest, movement technique. Bounding may be no greater than one-half the weapons planning range. This allows the overwatch section to have effective fires forward of the bounding section. There are two methods of bounding: Alternate bounds. Covered by the rear element, the lead element moves forward, halts, and assumes overwatch positions. The rear element advances past the lead element and takes up overwatch positions. The initial lead element then advances past the initial rear element and takes up overwatch positions. Only one element moves at a time. This method is usually more rapid than successive bounds. (Refer to Figure 3-2.)
Successive bounds. In this method, the lead element, covered by the rear element, advances and takes up an overwatch position. The rear element advances to an overwatch position abreast of the lead element and halts. The lead element then moves to the next position, and so on. Only one element moves at a time, and the rear element avoids advancing beyond the lead element. This method is easier to control and more secure than the alternate bounding method, but it is slower. (Refer to Figure 3-3.)
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FORMATIONS
3-55. Formations are used to establish tank positions and sectors of responsibility during tactical operations. They facilitate control; alleviate confusion, and increase protection, speed, and the effectiveness of fires. 3-56. Formations are not intended to be rigid, with vehicles remaining a specific distance apart at every moment. The position of each tank in the formation depends on the terrain and the ability of the wingman driver to maintain situational understanding in relation to the lead tank. At the same time, individual tanks should always occupy the same relative position within a formation. This will ensure that the members of each crew know who is beside them, understand when and where to move, and are aware of when and where they will be expected to observe and direct fires. Weapons orientation for all tanks should be adjusted to ensure optimum security based on the position of the platoon in the company formation. 3-57. The following paragraphs and illustrations describe the six basic movement formations the platoon will use. Note. In these examples, vehicle numbers are used to illustrate the wingman concept. In the field, the location and sequence of vehicles in the formation will be prescribed in the platoon SOP and/or the OPORD. The tactical situation will also influence vehicle location.
COLUMN
3-58. The column formation provides excellent control and fire to the flanks, but permits less fire to the front (see Figure 3-4). It is used when speed is critical, when the platoon is moving through restricted terrain on a specific route, and/or when enemy contact is not likely.
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STAGGERED COLUMN
3-59. The staggered column formation is a modified column formation with one section leading and one section trailing to provide overwatch (see Figure 3-5). The staggered column permits good fire to the front and flanks. It is used when speed is critical, when there is a limited area for lateral dispersion, and/or when enemy contact is possible.
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WEDGE
3-60. The wedge formation permits excellent firepower to the front and good firepower to the flanks (see Figure 3-6). It is employed when the platoon is provided with overwatch by another element and is moving in open or rolling terrain. Depending on the platoon location within the company formation, the platoon leader and PSG (with wingmen) can switch sides of the formation. When the platoon leaders tank is slightly forward, one flank has more firepower.
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ECHELON
3-61. The echelon formation permits excellent firepower to the front and to one flank (see Figure 3-7). It is used to screen an exposed flank of the platoon or of a larger moving force.
VEE
3-62. The vee formation provides excellent protection and control, but limits fires to the front (see Figure 3-8). This formation is used when terrain restricts movement or when overwatch within the platoon is required.
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LINE
3-63. The line formation provides maximum firepower forward (see Figure 3-9). It is used when the platoon crosses danger areas and is provided with overwatch by another element or when the platoon assaults enemy positions.
Coil
3-65. When it is operating independently, the platoon uses the coil formation to establish a perimeter defense during extended halts or lulls in combat (see Figure 3-10). The lead vehicle will halt his vehicle in the direction of travel (12 oclock) while the other vehicles position themselves to form a circular formation covering all suspected enemy avenues of approach.
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Herringbone
3-66. The herringbone formation is used when the platoon must assume a hasty defense with 360-degree security while remaining postured to resume movement in the direction of travel (see Figure 3-11). It is normally employed during scheduled or unscheduled halts in a road march. If terrain permits, vehicles should move off the route and stop at a 45-degree angle, allowing passage of vehicles through the center of the formation.
OVERWATCH
3-67. Overwatch is the tactical mission in which an element observes and provides direct fire support for a friendly moving element. Situational understanding is a crucial factor in all overwatch missions, whose objective is to prevent the enemy from surprising and engaging the moving unit. 3-68. The overwatch force must maintain communications with the moving force and provide early warning of enemy elements that could affect the moving force. It also scans gaps and dead space within the moving elements formations. If the overwatch is unable to scan dead space and engage the enemy, it must alert the moving element of the lapse in coverage. The overwatch must also be able to support the moving force with immediate direct and indirect fires. 3-69. The overwatch element can be either stationary or on the move. Figure 3-12 suggests what to look for and where to look during an overwatch mission. Note. While the main function of overwatch is to provide early warning and/or timely supporting fires for a moving element, overwatch crews must also maintain 360-degree observation and security for themselves.
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STATIONARY OVERWATCH
3-70. The section or platoon occupies hull-down firing positions that provide effective cover and concealment, unobstructed observation, and clear fields of fire. (Note. Firing positions are discussed in Chapter 4 of this manual.) 3-71. The section or platoon leader assigns sectors of fire. Individual crews aggressively scan their sectors using applicable search techniques to identify enemy positions. They employ all available sights, including the thermal channel (using various polarities) and daylight channel of the gunners primary sight, binoculars, PVS-7s, and CITV. (Note. See FM 3-20.12 for a discussion of search techniques.) 3-72. The overwatch element scans the area of operations of the moving element, paying close attention to gaps and dead space. If contact is made, the overwatch element initiates a high volume of direct and indirect suppressive fires; it moves as necessary between primary and alternate positions to avoid being decisively engaged.
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3-78. The four-step process is not a rigid, lockstep response to the enemy contact. Rather, the goal is to provide an orderly framework that enables the platoon to survive the initial contact, and then apply sound decision-making and timely actions to complete the operation. In simplest terms, the platoon must react instinctively and instantly to the contact, and the platoon leader must decide, with equal dispatch, whether to execute a preplanned battle drill or COA or to recommend and execute an alternate drill or action. 3-79. At times, the platoon leader, and the platoon, will have to execute several of the steps simultaneously. This makes thorough preparation an absolute requirement in contact situations. To ensure the platoon functions as a team, reacting correctly and yet instinctively, the platoon leader must establish SOPs and conduct comprehensive training and rehearsals covering each step.
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3-85. There are no hard and fast rules for determining the superiority or inferiority of an enemy; the result is dependent on the situation. An inferior force is defined as an enemy element that the platoon can destroy while remaining postured to conduct further operations. A superior force is one that can be destroyed only through a combined effort of company- or combined arms battalion-level combat and CS assets. 3-86. The platoon leader bases his evaluation on the enemys capabilities, especially the number of lethal weapon systems the enemy force is known to have, and on the enemys current activity. Lethality varies; the enemy may employ rapid-fire antitank weaponry, slow-firing wire-guided systems, or dismounted Soldiers with automatic weapons. Likewise, enemy activity can range from an entrenched force using prepared fighting positions to a unit conducting refueling operations with little security. 3-87. After making contact and evaluating the situation, the platoon leader may discover that he does not have enough information to determine the superiority or inferiority of the enemy force. To make this determination, he can further develop the situation using a combination of techniques, including maneuver (fire and movement), reconnaissance by direct and/or indirect fire, and dismounted surveillance. In such a situation, however, the platoon leader must exercise caution, ensuring that his actions support the commanders intent. Mission accomplishment and the survivability of the platoon are crucial considerations. Once he develops the situation sufficiently, the platoon leader sends an updated SPOTREP to the commander.
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Figure 3-13A. Platoon makes initial contact, deploys using an action drill, and reports
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Figure 3-14B. Platoon executes a battle drill; platoon leader evaluates the situation as the drill is executed
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Figure 3-14C. Platoon develops the situation and identifies a superior enemy force
Figure 3-14D. Platoon leader chooses and recommends an alternate COA; platoon executes the new COA
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BATTLE DRILLS
3-103. When the tank platoon makes contact with the enemy, the platoon leader usually initiates a battle drill. Drills can be initiated following reports or observation of enemy activity or ordered upon receipt of enemy fires. 3-104. Battle drills provide virtually automatic responses to situations in which the immediate, violent execution of an action is vital to the platoons safety or its success in combat. Drills allow the platoon leader to protect the platoon from the effects of enemy fires, quickly mass the platoons combat power and fires, or move the platoon to a position of advantage over the enemy. 3-105. Drills are standardized collective actions, executed by each tank crew with minimal instruction and without application of a deliberate thought process. They can be carried out under almost any type of battlefield conditions and from any formation or technique of movement, although execution can be affected by the factors of METT-TC. 3-106. The platoon can expect to execute any of the following standard battle drills: z Change of formation drill. z Contact drill. z Action drill. z React to indirect fire drill. z React to air attack drill. z React to a nuclear attack drill. z React to a chemical/biological attack drill. 3-107. Commanders and leaders at all levels must be ready to augment or adjust these seven basic drills based on the enemy, terrain, and ROE. In addition, they must ensure their platoons rehearse battle drills until they are able to execute the drills perfectly no matter what command and control problems arise. Note. In the figures that accompany the following discussion of the seven battle drills, vehicle numbers are used to illustrate the wingman concept. In the field, the location and sequence of vehicles during the drill will be prescribed in the platoon SOP, OPORD, or tactical situation.
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CONTACT DRILL
3-109. The contact drill enables the platoon to orient weapon systems and engage an enemy without changing its direction or speed of movement along the axis of advance. This drill is used when contact is made with small arms fire, non-armor-defeating weapons, or when the platoon sights the enemy without being engaged and does not want to stop or slow its movement. The platoon leader initiates the contact drill using visual signals and/or the radio. Over the radio, he uses the contact report format and adds the execution element FIRE as a platoon fire command. 3-110. Figure 3-16 illustrates a contact drill from a wedge formation. Note the main gun orientation for wingman Tank 2. If a tanks weapon systems are masked by another tank, the masked tank maintains weapons orientation and flank security as prescribed in the OPORD; this helps to prevent fratricide.
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ACTION DRILL
3-111. The action drill permits the entire platoon to change direction rapidly in response to terrain conditions, obstacles, FRAGOs from the commander, or enemy contact. The platoon leader uses visual signals or the radio to order the action drill, which can be initiated with or without enemy contact.
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artillery impact area, individual crews place their hatches in the appropriate position, open ballistic doors (M1A2 and M1A2 SEP crews scan with CITV), check antennas, and return to positions or continue the mission.
Figure 3-19. React to indirect fire drill 3-116. The commander should address the platoons reaction to anticipated indirect fires in the actions on contact subparagraph of the OPORD. When the platoon receives anticipated indirect fires, it reacts according to the commanders guidance. It is important to note the different drills conducted by mounted forces and light forces, and address the differences. If the platoon needs to execute a COA different from that directed by the commander, the platoon leader should request permission from the commander before executing the alternate action.
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Step 3. Prepare to engage. TCs and loaders get ready to engage the aircraft with machine-gun and/or main-gun fire on order of the platoon leader.
3-118. If the platoon leader determines that the platoon is in the direct path of an attacking aircraft, he initiates the active react to air attack drill, which entails these actions:
z
z z
Step 1. The platoon initiates fire. The primary intent is to force aircraft to take self-defense measures that alter their attack profile and reduce their effectiveness. The platoon leader may use a burst of tracers to designate an aim point for platoon machine gun antiaircraft fires (see Figure 3-20). Volume is the key to effectiveness of these fires; tanks throw up a wall of steel through which aircraft must fly. The main gun is effective against hovering attack helicopters. The platoon leader may also direct some vehicles to engage high-performance aircraft with multipurpose antitank (MPAT) main gun rounds. Step 2. Tanks create a nonlinear target by moving as fast as possible at a 45-degree angle away from the path of flight and toward attacking aircraft (see Figure 3-21). The platoon maintains an interval of at least 100 meters between tanks, forcing aircraft to make several passes to engage the entire platoon. Step 3. Tanks move quickly to covered and concealed positions and freeze their movement for at least 60 seconds after the last flight of aircraft has passed. Step 4. The platoon leader sends a SPOTREP to update the commander.
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z z
Within 8 minutes, assume MOPP 4 (refer to the discussion in Appendix E). Step 2. Implement SOPs in these areas: Administer self-aid and buddy-aid to crewmen with symptoms of chemical/biological agent poisoning (see Appendix E). Ensure individual crewmen decontaminate their skin. Conduct operators spraydown and decontamination of equipment as necessary. Initiate continuous monitoring with M256/M256A1 detection kits, and submit NBC-1 and follow-up reports as needed. Step 3. Continue the mission. Step 4. Monitor for chemical/biological agents; as the situation warrants, initiate actions to reduce MOPP levels and discontinue agent monitoring. (Note. See Appendix E for additional information.)
Note. If the M256/M256A1 detection kit records a negative reading inside an overpressurized M1A1, M1A2, or M1A2 SEP tank, the crew can initiate unmasking procedures.
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ATTACK BY FIRE
3-126. The commander may order the platoon to execute this task, either as specified in his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader. The task is to destroy the enemy using long-range fires from dominating terrain or using standoff of the main gun. The platoon can use an attack by fire to destroy inferior forces when the platoon leader does not desire to close with the enemy or when the platoon is part of a company-level effort. In addition, the platoon may occupy an attack-by-fire position as part of a company-level hasty defense with the goal of destroying a superior force. 3-127. In executing this task, the platoon uses tactical movement to move to a position that allows it to employ weapon standoff or that offers cover for hull-down firing positions. It also must be ready to move to alternate firing positions for protection from the effects of enemy direct and indirect fires. 3-128. As time permits, the platoon leader designates TRPs and assigns sectors of fire and tentative firing positions for individual tanks. He issues a platoon fire command specifying the method of fire, firing pattern, and rate of fire the platoon must sustain to accomplish the task in support of the company. 3-129. A successful attack by fire destroys the enemy force. Figures 3-232A and 3-23B illustrate attackby-fire situations.
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Figure 3-23B. Platoon uses attack by fire against an enemy reconnaissance platoon as part of a hasty defense
OVERWATCH/SUPPORT BY FIRE
3-130. Either as specified in his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader, the commander may order the platoon to provide overwatch or support by fire during the movement of a friendly force. The purpose is to suppress the enemy using long-range direct and indirect fires from a dominating piece of terrain or using the standoff of the main gun. This support sets the conditions that allow moving (supported) friendly elements to engage and destroy the enemy. 3-131. The techniques involved in occupying an overwatch or support-by-fire position and in focusing and controlling fires are similar to those for an attack by fire. Some specific considerations exist, however. As noted, the overwatch/support-by-fire task is always tied directly to the movement and/or tactical execution of other friendly forces. In executing overwatch or support by fire, the platoon must maintain a high level of situational understanding relative to the supported force so it can lift and shift direct and indirect fires as required to prevent fratricide. Throughout this type of operation, the supporting platoon maintains cross talk with the moving force on the company net. In addition to reducing fratricide risk, cross talk allows the platoon to provide early warning of enemy positions it has identified and to report battle damage inflicted on the enemy force. 3-132. A successful overwatch/support-by-fire operation suppresses the enemy, permitting the moving (supported) force to conduct tactical movement, breaching operations, or an assault. Figure 3-24 illustrates a support-by-fire situation in support of an assault.
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Figure 3-24. Platoon supports by fire to suppress an enemy element during a company assault
ASSAULT
3-133. The commander may direct the platoon to execute an assault, either on its own or as part of a larger assault force. The purpose of the assault is to seize key terrain or to close with and destroy the enemy while seizing an enemy-held position. Designation of the platoon as the assault force may be made as part of the commanders original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader. 3-134. The platoon usually assaults the enemy while receiving supporting fires from an overwatch element. If supporting fire is not available, the platoon conducts tactical movement to a position of advantage over the enemy, and then conducts the assault. A successful assault destroys the enemy elements or forces them to withdraw from the objective. 3-135. To prepare for the assault, the assault force occupies or moves through an assault position. This should be a predetermined covered and concealed position that provides weapon standoff from the enemy. The platoon leader receives updated enemy information from support-by-fire elements. He assigns targets or weapons orientations and confirms the axis of advance and the LOA for the assault. On order, the platoon assaults on line, moving and firing as quickly as possible to destroy the enemy and seize the objective. 3-136. The assault must be extremely violent. If the platoon assaults buttoned up, machine gun fire from the support force or wingman tanks can provide close-in protection against dismounted enemy elements on the objective. If tanks are unbuttoned, the TCs and loaders use personal weapons, hand grenades, and machine guns to provide close-in protection. 3-137. Following a successful assault, the assault force occupies a defensible position, either on the objective or on the far side of it, and begins consolidation and reorganization procedures. Figures 3-25A and 3-25B illustrate two assault situations.
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Figure 3-25A. Tank section assaults an inferior force as another section supports by fire
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Figure 3-25B. Platoon executes an assault as two other platoons support by fire
BYPASS
3-138. As part of his original plan or on recommendation of the platoon leader, the commander may order the platoon to bypass the enemy to maintain the tempo of the attack. This COA can be taken against either an inferior or superior force. The commander may designate one platoon to suppress the enemy, allowing the other platoons to use covered and concealed routes, weapon standoff, and obscuration to bypass known enemy locations. (Note. Units may have to execute contact drills while conducting the bypass.) 3-139. Once clear of the enemy, the supporting platoon hands the enemy over to another force, breaks contact, and rejoins the company. If necessary, the platoon leader can employ tactical movement to break contact with the enemy and continue the mission; he can also request supporting direct and indirect fires and smoke to suppress and obscure the enemy as the platoon safely breaks contact. See Figures 3-26A and 3-26B for an example of a bypass.
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RECONNAISSANCE BY FIRE
3-140. Based on his original plan or a recommendation from the platoon leader, the commander may direct the platoon to execute reconnaissance by fire when enemy contact is expected or when contact has occurred but the enemy situation is vague. The platoon then conducts tactical movement, occupying successive overwatch positions until it makes contact with the enemy or reaches the objective. 3-141. At each overwatch position, the platoon leader may designate TRPs. He then either requests indirect fires or employs direct fires on likely enemy locations to cause the enemy force to return direct fire or to move, thus compromising its positions. He directs individual tanks or sections to fire their caliber .50 and/or coax machine guns into targeted areas. (Note. In some situations, main-gun fire can also be used.) 3-142. Individual tanks and sections not designated to reconnoiter by fire observe the effects of the firing tanks and engage enemy forces as they are identified. Focus of the reconnaissance by fire is on the key terrain that dominates danger areas, on built-up areas that dominate the surrounding terrain, and on wooded areas not yet cleared. Note. A disciplined enemy force may not return fire or move if it determines that the pattern or type of fires employed will be nonlethal. The platoon leader must analyze the situation and direct the use of appropriate fires on suspected positions. For example, he would use small-arms fire against suspected dismounted elements but employ main guns to engage bunkers or other fortified positions.
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BREACHING OPERATIONS
3-144. When they expect to make contact with enemy obstacles, the commander and platoon leader must plan and rehearse actions at an obstacle, tailoring their preparations to templated locations for the expected obstacles. They must ensure the platoon knows how to accomplish early detection of both anticipated and unexpected obstacles and how to react instinctively when contact is made. 3-145. A critical consideration is that the tank platoon has only limited ability to deal independently with an obstacle or restriction. If it is equipped with mine plows or other breaching assets, the platoon can create track-width lanes through most wire, mine, and other reinforcing obstacles. The commander and platoon leader must keep in mind, however, that the platoon cannot internally accomplish all of the SOSRA elements of the breach (suppress the enemy; obscure the breach; secure the far side; reduce the obstacle; and assault through the obstacle). Refer to the discussion of breaching operations, including SOSRA procedures, in Chapter 5 of this manual. 3-146. When tanks encounter an unexpected obstacle, crew members must assume that the enemy is covering the obstacle with observation and fire. They must immediately seek cover and establish an overwatch to evaluate the situation. The overwatch tanks scan for evidence of enemy forces in and around the obstacle and on dominant terrain on the far side of the obstacle. They attempt to locate a bypass so the operation can continue without delay. If no bypass is found, the overwatch determines the dimensions of the obstacle and sends a report to the commander so he can designate a COA. Note. It is critical that the tank platoon initially remain under cover while evaluating the situation. The platoon must NEVER attempt to approach the obstacle area or breach the obstacle without first killing or obscuring enemy elements overwatching the obstacle. 3-147. If he needs to develop the situation further, the commander ideally will use scouts or infantry to reconnoiter the obstacle, with the tanks continuing to provide overwatch. This usually requires him to move mounted or dismounted elements to the far side. If this reconnaissance locates a bypass route, the commander often will order the unit to execute a bypass as the preferred COA. If a bypass is not possible, he may order a breaching operation, with the tanks either executing an in-stride breach within their capabilities or supporting a deliberate breach. 3-148. Deliberate breaching operations are conducted at the company or higher level and require engineer augmentation. The HBCT has one engineer company for mobility support that is capable of establishing, proofing, and marking two lanes through a complex wire and mine obstacle. Tank platoons generally operate in support of deliberate breaching operations by overwatching engineer forces, providing suppressive fires, and/or assaulting to the far side of the obstacle to establish a foothold. Tank platoons may also be called upon to serve as a breaching or proofing force if BCT assets are unavailable or disabled.
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CONSOLIDATION
3-150. Consolidation consists of actions taken to secure an objective and to defend against an enemy counterattack. The company commander designates platoon positions and weapons orientations. The platoon takes these steps: z Eliminate remaining enemy resistance and secure detainees. z Establish security and coordinate mutual support with adjacent platoons. z Occupy positions on defensible terrain as designated in the OPORD or FRAGO. Tanks move to hull-down positions, and the platoon leader assigns sectors of fire. If the location designated in the OPORD/FRAGO is not defensible, the platoon leader notifies the commander and searches for terrain that is defensible and supports the commanders intent. The platoon leader informs the commander of the new location. z Execute procedures for a hasty defense to prepare for possible counterattacks (see Chapter 4 of this manual for details on hasty defense).
REORGANIZATION
3-151. Reorganization, the process of preparing for continued fighting, is normally accomplished by SOP. Responsibilities during reorganization include the following: z TCs take these actions: Reload machine guns and redistribute main gun ammunition to ready areas. Move crewmen who are wounded in action (WIA) to a covered position and provide first aid. Send a SITREP to the PSG reporting casualties and supply status of equipment, ammunition, and fuel. Conduct essential maintenance. z The PSG takes these actions: Compile SITREPs from TCs and, as required by unit SOP, submit a consolidated report to the platoon leader or 1SG. Direct cross-leveling of supplies within the platoon. Oversee evacuation of casualties. Coordinate the movement of detainees to the detainee collection point. z The platoon leader takes these actions: Forward a consolidated SITREP to the commander. Redistribute personnel as necessary to maintain combat readiness. Oversee consolidation of Soldiers who have been killed in action (KIA). Reestablish communications with elements that are out of contact. Note. SITREPs are sent using voice or digital format (or a combination). Refer to ST 3-20.153 and unit SOPs for additional information.
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effect on the ability of Soldiers to see the battlefield. There are, however, other conditions that restrict visibility; the most common are the following: z Dust, smoke, and other obscuration factors caused by weapon firing and movement of Soldiers and equipment. z Weather conditions, including rain, snow, fog, and blowing sand and dust. 3-153. If it is to use its superior technology and basic combat skills to sustain continuous operations and destroy the enemy, the tank platoon must train to fight effectively in all types of visibility conditions. The platoon must first master the execution of tasks under optimum visibility conditions and then continue its training in progressively more difficult situations.
EQUIPMENT
3-154. The tank platoon is equipped with the following types of equipment for use in limited visibility conditions: z Drivers night-vision viewer. This sight is either passive (the vehicle visualization system (VVS)-2/drivers vision enhancer [DVE]) or thermal (the drivers thermal viewer [DTV]). It enhances the drivers ability to move the tank and enables him to assist in target acquisition and to observe rounds in darkness or other limited visibility conditions. z PVS-7. This passive-vision device enables the TC to observe from his opened hatch to control movement and provide close-in security. There are normally two PVS-7s per tank. z Gunners primary sight and commanders extension. This integrated thermal sight gives the gunner and TC the capability to see and engage targets under almost any visibility condition. z CITV. This is a fully integrated, full-target engagement sight on the M1A2. It provides the TC with a redundant target acquisition and surveillance capability equivalent to that of the gunners primary sight and the TIS. The CITV extends the TCs field of view, giving him 360-degree observation capability independent of the gunners primary sight.
NAVIGATION
3-155. The platoon leader uses the GPS and/or POSNAV (if available), terrain association, and the compass and odometer method to navigate in limited visibility conditions. When they are fired to create a ground-burst effect, artillery or mortar illumination rounds can be helpful in confirming locations. Refer to Chapter 2 of this manual for a detailed discussion of navigation techniques.
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION
3-156. The problem of vehicle identification is compounded in limited visibility conditions. TCs must be able to distinguish vehicles of their platoon and company/troop and of other friendly elements from those of the enemy. Most unit SOPs cover vehicle marking and identification procedures. In addition, the platoon can use the following techniques to enhance command and control and to help prevent fratricide (see also Appendix F, this FM, for information about fratricide prevention): z Attach color-coded lights or chemical lights to the rear of the turret or the hull. z Replace the brake light cover with color-coded plastic. z Use luminous or thermal tape to outline vehicles or to make battle boards. z Use radio and digital systems (if available) to provide the platoon with frequent updates of friendly unit locations.
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PLANNING
3-158. During the planning phase, the platoon leader must pay particular attention to routes, formations, and navigational aids. He must conduct a thorough reconnaissance to identify locations where the platoon could become disoriented. The reconnaissance must also focus on finding rough or restricted terrain that will be even more difficult to negotiate with limited visibility. Such terrain may require a change in formation or movement technique or employment of dismounted ground guides.
PREPARATION
3-159. In the preparation phase, the platoon leader conducts rehearsals in as many types of adverse conditions as possible to prepare the platoon for potential command and control problems. He must stress light discipline. During PCCs and PCIs, the platoon leader or PSG views each tank using a passive sight to ensure that sources of light have been dimmed or covered so they are not visible to the enemy. During confirmation briefs and rehearsals, the platoon leader must ensure that all personnel understand the platoons projected actions during each phase of the operation. One technique is to designate waypoints or phase lines as trigger points for platoon actions.
EXECUTION
3-160. During the execution phase, TCs use the PVS-7 and the CITV (if available) to assist their drivers with navigation and to enhance situational understanding. The platoon leader must assume that the enemy possesses the same limited visibility observation capabilities as friendly units. Use of terrain to mask movement and deployment remains critical since limited visibility may create a false sense of protection from observation. During movement, the distance between platoon vehicles is reduced to allow vehicles to observe each other and to decrease the time necessary to react to enemy contact. 3-161. When the platoon encounters enemy elements, an effective technique is to have the vehicle that makes contact fire a steady burst of machine gun fire in the direction of the enemy to orient the rest of the platoon. The platoon must adhere strictly to applicable control measures, especially those covering the employment of direct fires and maintain strict situational understanding of friendly force locations.
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Defensive Operations
The immediate purpose of any defensive operation is to defeat an enemy attack. Military forces defend until they gain sufficient strength to attack. Additionally, defensive operations are undertaken for purposes that include the following: z To gain time. z To hold key terrain. z To fix the enemy so friendly forces can attack elsewhere. z To erode enemy resources at a rapid rate while reinforcing friendly operations.
PREPARATION
4-2. The critical element affecting preparation is time management, beginning with receipt of the WARNO, OPORD, or FRAGO. Effective use of the available time allows the platoon leader to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of engagement areas, BPs, displacement routes, and the axis for possible counterattacks. Section III of this chapter describes preparation at the platoon level in detail.
SECURITY
4-3. The OPSEC measures discussed in Appendix D of this manual will assist the platoon leader in maintaining security during the planning, preparation, and execution of the defense. The platoon leader must integrate his security plan with that of the company or troop. He enhances the platoons early warning capability by identifying potential mounted and dismounted avenues of approach and then positioning early warning devices and OPs to cover these avenues.
FLEXIBILITY
4-5. The platoon leader contributes to the flexibility of company or troop operations by developing a thorough understanding of the company/troop plan, including on-order and be-prepared missions. He must be alert to any possible contingencies that have not been addressed by the commander. During the preparation phase of the defense, the platoon increases flexibility by conducting thorough reconnaissance and mounted rehearsals of all possible plans. A crucial indicator of platoon flexibility is the ability to
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move quickly under all battlefield conditions, between primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions as well as subsequent BPs.
WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS
4-9. In conducting planning, preparation, and execution of defensive operations, the platoon leader must pay close attention to the considerations applicable for the war-fighting function (WFF), which help him to logically organize his thoughts to cover the mission. The WFFs are the following: z Movement and maneuver. z Fire support. z Intelligence. z Protection. z Sustainment. z Command and control. Note. Sections II and III of this chapter, which cover, respectively, the planning and preparation phases of the defense, are organized using the WFFs in the order listed above. Included in each section is a discussion of the human aspect of operations, focusing on intangible, Soldier-related factors.
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SECTION II - PLANNING
4-10. The planning phase of a defensive operation is a continuous process that begins when the platoon leader receives the higher order (WARNO, FRAGO, or OPORD). It ends when the platoon leader issues his own OPORD or FRAGO. Planning may continue into the preparation phase as the platoon gains more information through the plan of the higher headquarters and from further reconnaissance and rehearsals.
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Note. Primary and alternate fighting positions are oriented on the same sectors of fire. Supplementary fighting positions orient on different sectors of fire (see Figure 4-1). Subsequent BPs are oriented on sectors of fire along the same avenue of approach as the primary/alternate positions. Supplementary BPs are oriented on sectors of fire along different avenues of approach (see Figure 4-2).
FIRE SUPPORT
4-18. The platoon leader posts targets on his overlays (in both traditional and digital format). Although most fire support planning is done by the company or troop FIST, the platoon leader can, if necessary,
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provide the FIST with nominations for additional targets for inclusion in the company fire support plan. As these targets are approved, the platoon leader plots them on his overlays. If a target is disapproved, he notes its grid coordinates so he can, if needed, submit a speedy call for fire using the grid method. See Chapter 6 of this manual for methods of transmitting calls for fire. 4-19. The platoon leader should plan and request artillery targets on potential avenues of approach, at choke points along the avenues of approach, at possible enemy support by fire positions, at obstacles, and in dead space within the platoons AO. He should also be prepared to request a mix of smoke and dualpurpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) rounds in front of his BP to disrupt an enemy assault or behind his BP to help the platoon disengage from the enemy. 4-20. Each artillery target should have a trigger line overwatched by at least a crew or section. The trigger line triggers the call for fire on a target to ensure that the impact of the rounds coincides with the enemys arrival. The platoons laser range finders or target designation capabilities (on digitally equipped tanks) enhance its effectiveness in requesting artillery fires using trigger lines. The location of the trigger line is based on the enemys expected rate of advance over the terrain, the time of flight of the rounds, and the priority of fires. The company or troop FIST should assist in determining all trigger points. 4-21. The platoon leader should plan and coordinate mortar targets on dismounted avenues of approach. In addition, because mortar smoke is generally more responsive than smoke delivered by FA, he may be able to gain a tactical advantage by employing mortar support in certain situations. Mortars should be the platoon leaders first choice as indirect fire due to the probability of the companys or troops low priority of FA fires. (See Appendix E of this manual for information on smoke operations.)
INTELLIGENCE
4-22. Security decisions are based on enemy capabilities. Platoons use OPs to provide early warning of the enemys actions; their REDCON status and other OPSEC preparations then enable them to respond in a timely manner. See Appendix D of this manual for more information on OPSEC measures. 4-23. OPSEC is especially critical during the platoon leaders ground reconnaissance. The platoon leader ensures that he provides security for the reconnaissance based on the commanders guidance. Because it is probable that enemy elements are already in the area, he must ensure that platoon reconnaissance elements have the capability to protect themselves effectively. 4-24. As he conducts the reconnaissance, the platoon leader orients his map and references graphic control measures to the terrain. He conducts a terrain analysis, using the results in conjunction with his knowledge of possible enemy COAs to identify key terrain that may define potential enemy objectives. He identifies mounted and dismounted avenues of approach and determines the probable formations the enemy will use when occupying support-by-fire positions or when assaulting the platoons position. Based on his analysis and available fields of observation and fire, the platoon leader confirms vehicle positions that will allow the platoon to mass fires into the company or troop engagement area. 4-25. The platoon leader should complete his reconnaissance by conducting initial coordination with adjacent platoons to establish mutual support and to cover dead space between the platoons. At the conclusion of the reconnaissance, he may leave an OP to report enemy activity in the area of operations.
PROTECTION
Survivability
4-26. The platoon leader may be responsible for supervising engineer efforts. He should incorporate plans for linkup, supervision, and handoff of engineer assets into his time line.
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both the platoon and the company or troop have only limited ability to transport and emplace obstacles. This means that in most situations the platoon will have to depend on the task force or squadron for obstacle planning and transport and on engineers for emplacement. 4-28. The commanders intent will guide the emplacement of obstacles based on the following principles and characteristics: z Obstacles are integrated with and reinforce the scheme of maneuver and the direct fire plan. z They are integrated with existing obstacles. z They are employed in depth and positioned where they will surprise enemy forces. z They should be covered by direct and indirect fires at all times. 4-29. In general, obstacles are used to disrupt, turn, fix, and block the enemy based on the factors of METT-TC. Figure 4-3 illustrates considerations for obstacle employment in relation to platoon BPs. If the commander does not specify the intent for obstacles, the platoon leader should analyze the situation and plan hasty or engineer-emplaced obstacles to meet these purposes: z To block the final assault of an enemy force to the front of the platoon. z To block the seams between vehicles or between adjacent platoons. z To disrupt enemy forces that are assaulting on the flanks of the platoon. z To shape the engagement area by forcing enemy elements to turn, slow down, stop, or flank themselves at known ranges in the engagement area.
Survivability Considerations
4-30. The platoon leader must plan the priority of survivability efforts. His plan should specify the sequence (first through fourth) in which his tanks will receive digging assets. When designating priorities, he considers the survivability of unimproved positions and the relative importance of each firing position within the BP. The engineer platoon leader, section leader, or dozer operator can estimate how much time it will take to improve firing positions. These estimates will range from 45 minutes to 2 hours depending
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on soil and light conditions and the type and amount of engineer equipment available. illustrates dug-in positions and lists considerations for their construction and use.
Figure 4-4
Air Defense
4-31. Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for a discussion of air defense planning and employment.
SUSTAINMENT
4-32. The platoon leader conducts resupply operations to replenish basic loads in accordance with the company or troop plan. Ammunition may be pre-positioned on the battlefield to facilitate resupply once the battle begins. The platoon leader determines prestock requirements based on the commanders intent and scheme of maneuver. He discusses prestock requests with the commander, identifying resupply locations, the types (usually ammunition) and amounts of supplies involved, the time required to conduct resupply, and any necessary security considerations.
PHASE OF PREPARATION
4-35. The commander may designate the phase of preparation for each BP. There are three phases, listed here in descending order of thoroughness and time required: (Note. The platoon leader may raise but not lower the phase of preparation directed by the commander.)
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z z z
Reconnoiter. This phase of preparation consists of the steps conducted during the ground reconnaissance of the planning phase. Prepare. This phase includes the steps conducted during the planning and preparation phases for the deliberate occupation of a BP. Occupy. This is complete preparation of the position from which the platoon will initially defend. The position is fully reconnoitered, prepared, and occupied prior to the defend NLT time specified in the OPORD.
PREPARATION TASKS
HASTY OCCUPATION
4-36. Tank platoons conduct a hasty occupation under a variety of circumstances. During a movement to contact, the platoon may prepare to destroy a moving enemy force by conducting a hasty occupation of BPs or attack-by-fire positions in defensible terrain. During defensive operations, hasty occupation may take place during counterattack missions, after disengagement and movement to subsequent BPs, or in response to FRAGOs reflecting a change of mission.
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DELIBERATE OCCUPATION
4-43. The tank platoon can conduct deliberate occupation of a BP when all of the following conditions exist: z Time is available. z The enemy is not expected or has not been located within direct fire range. z A friendly element is forward of the BP with the mission of providing security for the occupying force. 4-44. The platoon begins by occupying a hide position behind the BP. It assumes a formation that will provide 360-degree security based on considerations of METT-TC and OAKOC. TCs move to the platoon leaders vehicle and prepare to reconnoiter the position. The platoon leader briefs his gunner on actions to take if the reconnaissance group does not return by a specified time or if contact occurs.
Occupation Procedures
4-52. After completing the reconnaissance and coordination, the platoon leader and TCs move back to their vehicles. The TCs remount, start vehicles simultaneously, and move to hide positions behind their
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primary fighting positions. On order, the platoon moves simultaneously into turret-down firing positions (see Figure 4-6A). These positions allow the tanks to fire only their caliber .50 or loaders M240 machine gun. Observation can be executed using the CITV (if available); the gunners primary sight also provides observation capability.
Figure 4-6A. Turret-down positions 4-53. The platoon leader checks with the OPs to ensure that the enemy situation has not changed, then orders platoon vehicles to occupy their primary hull-down firing positions (see Figure 4-6B). Tank crews orient on the engagement area and complete their sketch cards. Each crew sends its completed sector sketch to the platoon leader, either by messenger or by digital transmission (FBCB2, if available); the crew retains a copy of the sketch card for its own reference. Tanks then move individually to their hide positions and assume the appropriate REDCON status. (Note. See Chapter 2 of this manual for a discussion of REDCON levels.)
Figure 4-6B. Hull-down positions Sector Sketches and Platoon Fire Plan 4-54. As each tank crew prepares their vehicle for deliberate or hasty defensive operations, they will be required to develop a sector sketch card (see Figure 4-7 on page 4-15). This is a rough topographical sketch of the tanks assigned sector, which may be prepared traditionally (handwritten) or using the tanks digital equipment (FBCB2). The sketch card aids the crews in target acquisition and paints a better picture of the battlefield for the platoon leader to be able to develop his platoon fire plan (see Figure 4-8 on page
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4-17). The fire plan should provide information necessary to distribute and control the fires of all available direct and indirect fire weapons, both organic and attached. It is prepared using the same two methods (handwritten or FBCB2). 4-55. Traditional sketch card development. The ability to create traditional, handwritten sketch cards, while important for all tank crewmen, is especially critical for crews of the M1 and M1A1. These tanks lack the digital capabilities that provide valuable assistance to crews of later-model vehicles in preparing their sketch cards. The process begins with the platoon leader designating the primary and supplementary positions for his tanks and each TC selecting his alternate fighting position. After the positions have been designated and reconnoitered (time permitting), the platoon leader will designate the sector limits of fire for each tank and the TRPs within the sector. The platoon leader must give the TC the number designators for the TRPs. 4-56. As the positions are prepared, the TC and gunner will prepare the sketch cards for each position. When the cards are completed (normally within 20 minutes), one copy will be sent to the platoon leader and the other copy will be kept with the tank. 4-57. When the tank is moved into position, and before engineer assets are released from the position, the crew will make sure the target areas and obstacles within the sector can be fired upon, and determine if assigned TRPs can be engaged. A TRP that could be engaged before the position was prepared may be masked when the tank is dug in. The platoon leader must be informed of any inability to engage assigned TRPs and may direct a change in position. If time permits, the TC will make physical contact with his wing or flanking elements to determine overlapping fire within the sectors and the position of friendly OPs. 4-58. As a minimum, the traditionally drawn sketch card, which is illustrated in Figure 4-7 on page 4-14, will depict the following: z All key terrain features. z TRPs. TRPs should be marked with a cross and their assigned number in the upper right quadrant of the cross. Mark all TRPs that are visible, whether they are in your sector or not. z High-speed avenues of approach. z Symbol indicating north. z Preplanned fires (direct and indirect). These may be added after the platoon leader receives this information from the FIST officer and constructs a platoon fire plan. These should be marked with a cross, with the letter designation in the top left block and numeric designation in the top right. z Range bands. These will help when the LRF fails. The number of bands will be determined by the terrain or mission. (If terrain permits, range bands of 1,200, 1,800, and 2,400 meters will be used.) A minimum of three range bands should be used. z Right and left limits of assigned sector. These limits are marked by double lines beginning at the tanks position and extending through the terrain feature that designates the boundary limit. z Reference point. This is located near the center of the sector and, ideally, at or beyond the tanks maximum engagement range. The reference point should be a prominent, immovable, and readily identifiable feature; it should not be a target and should not be easily destroyed. The reference point should be depicted using a military map symbol, sketch of feature, or brief word description, and marked with the letters Ref Pt inside a circle. z Obstacles and dead space. Obstacles should be marked on the sketch card using approved military symbols. Dead space should be marked using diagonal lines with the words DEAD SPACE. z The positions of elements to the left and right and of friendly OPs/listening posts (LPs). These positions should be marked with standard symbols. (This information will be omitted if the tactical situation does not allow enough time to make contact with wing and flank elements, or otherwise determine their exact location). z Identification data. This consists of the vehicle bumper number, placed directly below the tank symbol, and the firing position (primary, alternate, or supplementary), marked with a capital P, A, or S and placed below the vehicle bumper number.
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Marginal information. Placed in the bottom left third of the sketch card, this information includes the following: List of TRPs. Range to TRPs. Reference points. Description of TRPs. Description of obstacles and other likely target areas visible to your position. Range to obstacles and other likely targets. Legend. The legend, placed in the bottom right third of the sketch card, includes an explanation of symbols used on the card and other control measures and pertinent information, as required.
4-59. Creating sketch cards using FBCB2 (M1A1D and M1A2 SEP). While FBCB2 currently does not have the capability to produce a tank sketch card, crews can use the range card tool to produce a rough, nondoctrinal sketch card. Upon receipt of these tank sketch cards, the platoon leader must redraw them onto the platoon fire plan before forwarding it to the commander. Future software upgrades of the FBCB2 will include the sketch card function. 4-60. Sketch card verification. As he receives the platoons sketch cards, the platoon leader must verify them. Either he or the PSG mounts each tank and views its sector through the gunners primary sight, gunners primary sight extension (GPSE), or CITV. The sketch card check should ensure that the TCs have covered each of the following considerations: z Tank sectors are mutually supporting and overlapping. z Each tank crew understands and has recorded the designated TRPs and FPF. z All TRPs assigned to the platoon are covered by fire. z Each crew has marked ranges to all TRPs or identifiable targets within the tanks sector. These ranges are especially critical in limited visibility or degraded (LRF) operations. z The risk of fratricide between platoon tanks and adjacent elements has been evaluated and appropriate adjustments or restrictions implemented. (Note. Each crew member needs to know the location of adjacent vehicles and OPs and what they look like through the tanks sights. Using pickets to indicate left and right limits for individual tank main gun fire can help TCs to observe their limits of fire. Rehearsals are the best method of achieving fratricide reduction.) z The sketches show friendly obstacles, with each obstacle covered by machine gun or main gun fire from at least one tank. z Dead space is covered by indirect fire or alternate positions. z Each tank and the platoon as a whole has identified alternate positions that cover the same area as the primary positions and supplementary positions that cover additional areas of responsibility assigned to the tank or platoon.
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Figure 4-7. Traditional sector sketch card 4-61. Backbriefs. The sketch card verification process provides an optimum opportunity for the platoon leader to conduct backbriefs to confirm that each TC understands his mission. If time permits, the backbrief includes a field-expedient sand table or chalkboard exercise (using a chalked side-skirt, micro armor, or a rough terrain model scratched in the dirt). The platoon leader can use the exercise to reinforce operational considerations for the mission, including the following:
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z z z
Individual tank responsibilities (which tank will engage where within the platoon sector). Tactical contingencies, such as which tank will pick up a sector if another tank is knocked out or what happens if a particular tanks sector is overloaded with targets. Adjustments to positions, such as when a tank is unable to cover its entire assigned sector. (Note. This should be verified immediately after the position has been prepared, while engineer assets are still on site.)
4-62. Graphics, maps, and overlays. These are critical elements of fire plan development. As discussed earlier in this chapter, they are the platoon leaders primary tool for organizing information and synchronizing his assets on the battlefield. They assist him in depicting the fire plan accurately. 4-63. The platoon leader must have both maneuver and fire support graphics posted on his map and make sure that all the TCs have done the same. He then prepares the overlay, which, like the fire plan, can be developed by either traditional (handwritten) or digital means. The overlay technique eliminates the tedious process of recopying operational graphics onto a sketch. As an example, if the platoon leader believes a TRP should be added to the company graphics, he marks it on his overlay. He also places at least two reference marks on the overlay to ensure proper alignment with his map. 4-64. The platoon leader prepares two copies of the overlay. He gives one copy to the company commander during the OPORD confirmation brief. The commander can then apply the platoon overlays to ensure his assigned engagement area is covered. After evaluating the platoon overlays, he may wish to adjust platoon positions or assign supplementary positions if the entire engagement area is not covered by either observation or direct fire. If a portion of the engagement area appears as dead space on all platoon overlays, the commander may wish to plan indirect fires to cover the area. 4-65. Depiction of the fire plan. With the information from the individual tank sector sketches, the platoon leader uses the available tools to prepare the platoon fire plan. As with other tactical products, the fire plan product can be handwritten or displayed on the tanks digital display. Figure 4-8 shows a handwritten fire plan. 4-66. To enhance the platoons understanding of the fire plan and the operation itself, the platoon leader must know how to make effective use of marginal data. These notations cover numerous types of tactical information. They may vary according to mission, means of fire plan development (handwritten or digital), and higher unit guidance. As an example, marginal data required on the fire plan for an M1 or M1A1 platoon might include the following types of entries: z Unit designation. z Date. z Type of position (primary, alternate, or supplementary). z Information on TRPs (description, range, list of tanks that can engage each TRP). z Additional notes as necessary, covering such areas as specific coordination with adjacent units and engagement criteria and priority. Note. On digitally equipped vehicles, much of the information normally included in marginal data can be developed and transmitted using FBCB2.
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Figure 4-8. Traditionally prepared fire plan (handwritten) Priorities of Work 4-67. At this point, the platoon executes its defensive priorities of work. (Note. Some tasks will be performed simultaneously. Figure 4-9 is an example of a platoon time line to assist the platoon leader in managing the defensive preparation and division of labor based on the defend NLT time.) Priorities of work include, but are not limited to, the following tasks:
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z z z z z z z
Maintain platoon OPSEC and surveillance of the engagement area. (Note. See Appendix D for more information.) Verify each vehicles location, orientation, and sector of fire. Supervise any allocated engineer assets. Conduct reconnaissance and mark supplementary engagement areas and subsequent BPs as time permits. Conduct rehearsals. Oversee vehicle maintenance and prepare-to-fire checks. Improve the position by emplacing M8/M22 alarms and hot loops and by upgrading camouflage protection.
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Despite this complexity, however, engagement area development resembles a drill in that the commander and his subordinate leaders use an orderly, fairly standard set of procedures. Beginning with evaluation of METT-TC factors, the development process covers these steps: z Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach. z Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver. z Determine where to kill the enemy. z Plan and integrate obstacles. z Emplace weapon systems. z Plan and integrate indirect fires. z Rehearse the execution of operations in the engagement area. 4-70. Tank leaders need to be experts in building their sectors of the company engagement area using the same seven steps outlined above. By doing this, they will be able to destroy the enemy force where the command wants. A detailed discussion of each of the seven steps can be found in FM 3-90.1.
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Prevent Fratricide
4-80. The platoon leader must be proactive in reducing the risk of fratricide and noncombatant casualties. He has numerous tools to assist him in this effort: identification training for combat vehicles and aircraft; the units weapons safety posture; the weapons control status; recognition markings; FBCB2 and situational understanding (see also Appendix F, this FM, for additional information about fratricide prevention). Situational awareness and employment of applicable ROE are the primary means of preventing noncombatant casualties. (Note. Because it is difficult to distinguish between friendly and enemy dismounted Soldiers, the commander must constantly monitor the position of friendly dismounted squads.)
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COORDINATION
4-83. Throughout the preparation phase, the platoon leader coordinates with adjacent platoons and other elements to ensure that platoon sectors of fire overlap and that CS and sustainment requirements are met. Coordination is initiated from left to right and from higher to lower. The platoon leader, however, should initiate coordination through the chain of command if he desires support not specified in the company or troop OPORD. He must also ensure that the platoon conducts necessary internal coordination.
Platoon Coordination
4-85. Effective internal coordination within the platoon enhances the situational understanding of tank crews and alerts them to the actions needed to prepare the defense. One method of ensuring this coordination is dissemination of enemy and friendly information in the form of intelligence updates, which were discussed earlier in this chapter. In addition, sector sketches and the platoon fire plan facilitate coordination of fires before the fight begins. 4-86. Rehearsals are especially effective in helping the platoon to practice and coordinate necessary tactical skills, including these: z Occupation procedures. z Calls for fire. z Initiation, distribution, and control of direct and indirect fires. z Movement to alternate and supplementary fighting positions. z Displacement to subsequent BPs. 4-87. Rehearsals can begin as soon as the platoon receives the company or troop WARNO, with individual crews practicing berm drills, snake board exercises, and ammunition transfer drills. Initial walk-through rehearsals on a sand table can focus on deliberate or hasty occupation procedures, fire distribution, and the disengagement plan. The platoon can then conduct mounted movement rehearsals and force-on-force rehearsals, continually raising the level of difficulty by conducting the rehearsals at night and at various MOPP levels. The platoon leader should integrate voice and digital radio traffic as well as calls for fire during all rehearsals.
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INTELLIGENCE
4-90. OPSEC is critical during defensive preparations. The platoon should adhere to the procedures outlined in Appendix D of this manual to limit the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance efforts. 4-91. Intelligence is constantly updated by higher headquarters as the battlefield situation develops, such as when the enemy fights through a screening or covering force. The platoon leader keeps the platoon informed with periodic intelligence updates. The updated information may force him to reevaluate and adjust his time line to ensure preparations are as complete as possible. For example, the platoon leader may determine that engineer assets only have time to dig hull-down firing positions rather than turret-down and hide positions; in another situation, he may direct the engineers to prepare fighting positions for only one section because the other section has access to terrain that provides excellent natural hull-down firing positions. 4-92. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader may conduct reconnaissance of subsequent or supplementary BPs. Simultaneous planning for these positions during the preparation of initial positions is a critical component in effective time management.
PROTECTION
4-93. Because engineer assets are at a premium during defensive preparations, they should never be allowed to remain idle for any reason other than maintenance checks and services. A member of the platoon, either the platoon leader or a designated TC, must physically link up with the engineers as directed in the platoon OPORD and escort them to each firing position. The escort provides local security and instructions to the engineers.
Survivability Considerations
4-94. Engineers improve the platoons survivability by digging or improving hide, turret-down, or hulldown positions (see Figure 4-4 on page 4-7). Each TC should be responsible for the improvement of his firing position. He must make sure that the location, orientation, and depth of the hole are correct before the engineer departs for the next fighting position. He should also be aware of the importance of selecting a site with a background that will break up the silhouette of his vehicle (see Figure 4-10); this helps to prevent skylining.
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Figure 4-10. Using background to prevent skylining 4-95. Several factors can help the platoon to significantly increase the number of kills it achieves while executing the defense. Firing positions should maximize weapon standoff and/or the platoons ability to mass fires from survivable positions. As discussed previously, firing positions and obstacles should be complementary. The platoon leader must coordinate with engineers to ensure that the platoons direct fires can cover the entire area of any obstacle that the commander intends to emplace in the platoons sector of fire. Additionally, the platoon should know the exact location of the start point, end point, and turns of the obstacle. This knowledge contributes to the accuracy of calls for fire. The platoon leader can also locate a TRP on the obstacle to ensure more accurate calls for fire.
Engineer Considerations
4-96. Engineer mobility operations in the defense normally are of lower priority than those involving survivability and countermobility. Engineers can improve routes from the platoons hide position to its primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions as well as to subsequent BPs. Such efforts are labor-intensive, however, and should be evaluated carefully based on the commanders priority of work for the engineers.
SUSTAINMENT
4-97. Resupply methods and procedures are discussed in detail in Chapter 7 of this manual. If the commander authorizes pre-positioning, the platoon leader determines the amount and type of prestock (normally ammunition) that will be required for the operation. For example, to calculate ammunition requirements, he evaluates the number and type of enemy vehicles the platoon expects to engage and the amount of time available to conduct resupply between engagements. He then directs the PSG to select and prepare the prestock location and coordinate the delivery of the prestock supplies. 4-98. Prestock resupply can be accomplished successfully in virtually any location where supplies can be hidden and protected, such as in or behind the primary fighting position, along the displacement route, or in the firing positions of a subsequent BP. Preparation of the site includes providing cover, concealment, and protection for platoon and delivery personnel and vehicles during the transfer process. The site must also protect the supply materials from enemy observation and the effects of artillery and weather.
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4-99. Once the supplies are delivered, the prestock site should be concealed. The platoon should conduct periodic security checks or keep the site under constant surveillance to ensure safekeeping of the prestock.
SECTION IV - EXECUTION
4-101. This section contains a best case, chronological discussion of the procedures and considerations that apply during the execution of a typical tank platoon defensive mission.
HIDE POSITION
4-102. The platoons hide positions are located behind its primary battle and/or fighting positions. The platoon occupies hide positions in one of two ways: either as a unit, using perimeter defense techniques discussed in Chapter 5 (this method is used when hide positions are behind the BP), or with individual vehicles occupying hide positions behind their primary fighting positions. 4-103. While in the hide position, the platoon employs all applicable OPSEC measures to limit aerial, thermal, electronic, and visual detection. It deploys OPs as discussed in Appendix D of this manual to provide surveillance of its sectors of fire and early warning for vehicles in the hide position. It also maintains the REDCON status prescribed in the OPORD. The hide position should not be located on or near obvious artillery targets. Note. The platoon leader may decide to occupy turret-down positions rather than hide positions based on terrain considerations, such as availability of cover and concealment, or if the enemy situation is vague and observation of the engagement area is necessary.
INDIRECT FIRES
4-106. As the enemy approaches the direct-fire trigger line, the platoon leader updates his crews on the situation reported on the company or troop net. He monitors the SPOTREPs and calls for fire being sent on the company/troop net and compares these reports with the SPOTREPs from his platoon net. He reports any new enemy information higher using the SPOTREP format (see ST 3-20.153). The platoon leader employs available artillery to engage targets that are not being requested by other platoon leaders or the company/troop commander. He initiates calls for fire on moving enemy elements using previously
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identified triggers and the AT MY COMMAND method of control (calls for fire are discussed in Chapter 6 of this manual). 4-107. Crews of M1A2 SEP tanks can track enemy vehicle movement toward a target location by employing the vehicles far target designate capability; they can use this information to initiate artillery fires. Additionally, they can use the far target locator capability to determine the location of stationary targets and to quickly process a tactical fire (TACFIRE) direction system or FBCB2 call-for-fire message to attack unplanned targets.
DIRECT FIRES
FIRE COMMANDS
4-108. The platoon leader initiates tank direct fires using a fire command as discussed in Chapter 2 of this manual. The fire command enables him to engage single targets (for example, a reconnaissance vehicle) using a single section or an individual vehicle without exposing the entire platoon. It also allows the platoon to maintain the element of surprise by simultaneously engaging multiple targets with a lethal initial volley of tank fires. Sectors of fire and the preplanned fire pattern should be selected to help prevent target overkill and the resulting waste of ammunition.
TRIGGER LINE
4-109. The trigger line is a backup to the fire command. In the absence of communications from the platoon leader, a preestablished direct-fire trigger line allows each TC to engage enemy vehicles in his sector of fire. The criteria for the direct-fire trigger line should specify the number of enemy vehicles that must pass a designated location before the TC can engage without any instructions from the platoon leader. Selection of the trigger line is dependent on METT-TC factors. Considerations might include the following: z A maximum range or a point, such as an obstacle, at which the platoon will initiate fires to support the company or troop scheme of maneuver. z The survivability of enemy armor. z The fields of fire that the terrain allows. z The planning ranges for the platoons weapon systems. The planning range for the 105-mm main gun is 2,000 meters; for the 120-mm main gun, it is 2,500 meters.
MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
4-110. Individual TCs move from hull-down to turret-down firing positions within their primary and alternate positions based on two considerations: the necessity to maintain direct fire on the enemy and the effectiveness of enemy fires. Influencing each TCs decision to move between firing positions are such factors as enemy movement rates, the number of advancing enemy vehicles, the accuracy with which the enemy is acquiring and engaging friendly fighting positions, and the lethality of enemy weapon systems.
REPORTING
4-111. During the direct-fire fight, TCs describe the situation for the platoon leader, who in turn describes what is happening for the commander. Contact reports, SPOTREPs, and SITREPs are used as appropriate. In the defense, contact reports are used to alert the platoon to previously unidentified enemy targets. SPOTREPs and SITREPs are sent to list the number, types, and locations of enemy vehicles observed, engaged, and/or destroyed and to provide the strength and status of friendly forces. Everyone involved in the reporting process must avoid sending redundant or inflated descriptions of the situation. Such reports not only are confusing, but also may trigger unnecessary, and possibly dangerous, actions by higher headquarters.
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RESUPPLY
4-112. The platoon may expend main gun ammunition quickly in a direct-fire fight. Based on the terrain and expected enemy situation, the platoon leader must develop and execute resupply procedures to maintain a constant supply of main gun rounds. He must balance the necessity of maintaining direct fires on the enemy against the demands imposed on the platoons crews by the ammunition transfer process and the retrieval of prestock supplies.
DISPLACEMENT
4-113. Displacement may become necessary in several types of situations. For example, a numerically superior enemy may force the platoon to displace to a subsequent BP. In another situation, a penetration or enemy advance on a secondary avenue of approach may require the platoon or section to occupy supplementary BPs or fighting positions.
METHODS OF DISPLACEMENT
4-115. The platoon leader chooses between two methods of displacement depending on whether or not the move is conducted with overwatch (and cover) by an adjacent platoon.
CAUTION
On-board smoke (VEESS) will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use of VEESS when burning any other type of fuel will cause a fire hazard.
Figure 4-11. Displacement with cover from another element (entire platoon moves at once)
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4-117. The platoon leader issues instructions or uses a prearranged signal to initiate movement. The platoon simultaneously backs down to hide positions, keeping front hulls toward the enemy until adequate cover protects each tank. Individual tanks orient weapon systems toward the enemy as they move to the subsequent or supplementary positions along previously identified and reconnoitered routes.
Figure 4-12. Displacement without cover from another element (sections move using bounding overwatch)
COMPLETION OF DISPLACEMENT
4-119. The displacement is complete when the platoon has occupied the subsequent BP and all vehicles are prepared to continue the defense. If the platoon leader and TCs were able to reconnoiter and rehearse the disengagement and occupation, the occupation should go quickly. If reconnaissance and rehearsals were not possible, the platoon leader must conduct the steps of a hasty occupation outlined earlier in this chapter.
COUNTERATTACKS
4-120. The platoon is capable of conducting limited counterattacks, either alone or as part of a larger force (usually the company team). It can employ one of two methods: counterattack by fire and counterattack by fire and movement.
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Defensive Operations
PURPOSES
4-121. The platoon may conduct (or take part in) a counterattack to accomplish the following purposes: z Complete the destruction of the enemy. z Regain key terrain. z Relieve pressure on an engaged unit. z Initiate offensive operations.
COUNTERATTACK METHODS
Counterattack By Fire
4-123. When the company team executes a counterattack by fire, one platoon conducts tactical movement on a concealed route to a predetermined BP or attack-by-fire position from which it can engage the enemy in the flank and/or rear. The remaining platoons hold their positions and continue to engage the enemy (see Figure 4-13). The intent of this method is to use weapon standoff and/or cover to full advantage and destroy the enemy by direct fires.
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Consolidation
4-126. To consolidate a defensive position, the platoon takes these steps: z Eliminate remaining enemy resistance by conducting a counterattack as directed by the commander. z Reestablish communications. z Ensure positions are mutually supporting; check all sectors of fire to eliminate gaps and dead space that result when tanks are disabled. z Secure detainees. z Reestablish OPSEC by emplacing OPs and early warning devices (such as M8 alarms) and enhancing camouflage for platoon positions. z Replace, repair, or fortify obstacles. z Improve positions in accordance with procedures for a deliberate defense and established priorities of work.
REORGANIZATION
4-127. Reorganization, the process of preparing for continued fighting, is usually conducted by unit SOP. Reorganization in the defense is accomplished in the same manner as in the offense. Refer to Section VII in Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed discussion.
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Defensive Operations
PLANNING
4-129. In the planning phase, the commander, the platoon leader, and the TCs conduct a thorough reconnaissance, usually during daylight hours, to mark positions and routes. They must keep in mind that obscurants that limit visibility may also degrade the effectiveness of their thermal sights and laser range finders. This may force them to designate engagement areas that are closer than anticipated to the units BPs. In marking their positions, they use materials that will facilitate occupation either in daylight or under limited visibility conditions.
PREPARATION
4-130. During the preparation phase, the platoon leader ensures that TRPs and artillery targets are thermalized to allow for positive identification during limited visibility. Used with a sector sketch during direct fire engagements, thermalized TRPs also help TCs to more accurately estimate the range to their targets when smoke or other factors inhibit the use of the LRF. Ideally, rehearsals of occupation and displacement are conducted in limited visibility conditions; the same applies to preparation and occupation of fighting positions and to any necessary repositioning. 4-131. OPSEC is strictly enforced during all phases of defensive preparation. OPs are critical in providing security and early warning of enemy activities. The platoon leader emplaces mounted OPs to take advantage of the capabilities of his vehicles thermal sights in scanning the engagement area and the platoons assigned sector. Dismounted OPs provide local security and augment mounted OPs with shorterrange observation and the ability to listen for approaching enemy elements.
EXECUTION
4-132. As the platoon enters the execution phase, the platoon leader must ensure that all crewmen thoroughly understand the occupation and displacement criteria and TCs strictly enforce all fire control measures. TCs use sketch cards and the CITV (if available) to estimate target range when visibility factors prevent use of the LRF.
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COMPOSITION
5-5. A road march is composed of three elements: z The quartering party (or advance party). z The main body. z The trail party. 5-6. The tank platoon normally travels as a unit in the main body. Before the march begins, the platoon may provide individual Soldiers or a vehicle and crew to assist with quartering party activities (see Section II of this chapter).
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MARCH COLUMNS
5-7. The following discussion focuses on the three primary road march techniques. (Note. The commander bases his decision on the formation used during the march on which technique is employed. The road march is usually executed in column or staggered column formation.)
OPEN COLUMN
5-8. The open column technique is normally used for daylight marches. It can be used at night with blackout lights or night-vision equipment. The distance between vehicles varies, normally from 50 meters to 200 meters depending on light and weather conditions.
CLOSE COLUMN
5-9. The close column technique is normally used for marches conducted during periods of limited visibility. The distance between vehicles is based on the ability to see the vehicle ahead; it is normally less than 50 meters.
INFILTRATION
5-10. Infiltration involves the movement of small groups of personnel or vehicles at irregular intervals. It is used when sufficient time and suitable routes are available and when maximum security, deception, and dispersion are desired. It provides the best possible passive defense against enemy observation and detection. (Note. Infiltration is most commonly used by dismounted elements.)
CONTROL MEASURES
5-11. The following discussion covers control measures the platoon leader can use in effectively controlling his platoon during the conduct of a road march.
DIGITAL OVERLAYS
5-13. When available, digital overlays serve as the platoons primary source of graphic control measures, although the traditional hard-copy map and overlay must be maintained as a backup. Digital overlays display waypoints and information concerning unit locations along the route of march that can assist TCs in navigation and help them in maintaining situational understanding.
CHECKPOINTS
5-14. Locations along the route of march where interference with movement may occur or where timing is critical are represented using checkpoints. The SP, RP, and all checkpoints are considered critical points.
STRIP MAPS
5-15. A strip map can be used to assist in navigation. It must include the SP, RP, and checkpoints and must list the distances between these points. Detailed blow-up sketches should be used for scheduled halt
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locations and other places where confusion is likely to occur. Strip maps are included as an annex to the movement order; if possible, a copy should be provided to all TCs. See Figure 5-1 for an example of a strip map.
VISUAL SIGNALS
5-16. Hand-and-arm signals provide an alternate means of passing messages between vehicles. This becomes important because the enemy may have the ability to interfere with FM communication. Leaders must understand that this is a perishable skill.
TRAFFIC CONTROL
5-17. Road guides and traffic signs may be posted at designated traffic control points by the headquarters controlling the march. At critical points, guides assist in creating a smooth flow of traffic along the march route. Military police, members of the battalion scout platoon, or designated elements from the quartering party may serve as guides. They should have equipment that will allow march elements to identify them during periods of limited visibility.
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columns and conduct final inspections and briefings before movement. Other units require platoons to move directly to the column from their current positions. To avoid confusion during the initial move, the platoon leader and TCs conduct a reconnaissance of the route to the SP, issue clear movement instructions, and conduct thorough rehearsals, paying particular attention to signals and timing.
MARCH SPEED
5-19. An elements speed in a march column will change as it encounters variable routes and road conditions. This can produce an undesirable accordion effect. The movement order establishes the speed of march and maximum catch-up speed. During the march, the platoons lead vehicle must not exceed either the fixed march speed or the top catch-up speed. In addition, it should accelerate slowly out of turns or choke points; this allows the platoon to gradually resume the speed of march after moving past the restriction.
ORIENTATION
5-20. Each tank in the platoon has an assigned sector of fire (see Figure 5-2). TCs assign sectors of observation to crewmen both to cover their portion of the platoon sector and to achieve 360-degree observation.
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HALTS
5-21. While taking part in a road march, the platoon must be prepared to conduct both scheduled and unscheduled halts.
Scheduled Halts
5-22. These are executed to conduct maintenance, refueling, and personal relief activities and to allow other traffic to pass. The time and duration of halts are established in the movement order; unit SOP specifies actions taken during halts. The first priority at a halt is to establish and maintain local security (see Appendix D of this manual). A maintenance halt of 15 minutes is usually taken after the first hour of the march, with a 10-minute break every two hours thereafter. 5-23. During long marches, the unit may conduct a refuel-on-the-move (ROM) operation. Depending on the tactical situation and the company or troop OPORD, the platoon may conduct ROM for all vehicles simultaneously or by section. The OPORD will specify the amount of fuel or the amount of time at the pump for each vehicle. It will also give instructions for security at the ROM site and at the post-fueling staging area.
Unscheduled Halts
5-24. Unscheduled halts are conducted under a variety of circumstances, such as when the unit encounters obstacles or contaminated areas or if a disabled vehicle blocks the route. The platoon conducts actions on contact and establishes 360-degree security. 5-25. A disabled vehicle must not be allowed to obstruct traffic. The crew moves the vehicle off the road immediately (if possible), reports its status, establishes security, and posts guides to direct traffic. If possible, the crew repairs the vehicle and rejoins the rear of the column. Vehicles that drop out of the column should return to their original positions only when the column has halted. Until then, they move at the rear just ahead of the trail element, usually comprised of the maintenance team with the M88 recovery vehicle and some type of security. If the crew cannot repair the vehicle, the vehicle is recovered by the maintenance element.
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company/troop XO or 1SG or by a senior NCO. The quartering party takes these actions in preparing the assembly area: z Reconnoiter for enemy forces, CBRN contamination, condition of the route to the assembly area, and suitability of the area (covering such factors as drainage, space, and internal routes). If the area is unsatisfactory, the party contacts the commander and requests permission to find a new location for the site. z Organize the area based on the commanders guidance. This includes designating and marking tentative locations for the platoon, trains, and CP vehicles. z Improve and mark entrances, exits, and internal routes. z Mark and/or remove obstacles (within the partys capabilities). z Mark tentative vehicle locations.
OCCUPATION PROCEDURES
5-29. Once the assembly area has been prepared, the quartering party awaits the arrival of the company or troop, maintaining surveillance and providing security of the area within its capabilities. Quartering party members guide their elements (including the platoon) from the RP to their locations in the assembly area. SOPs and prearranged signals and markers (for day and night occupation) should assist the TCs in finding their positions. The key consideration is to move quickly into position to clear the route for follow-on units. 5-30. Once in position, the platoon conducts hasty occupation of a BP as described in Chapter 4 of this manual. It establishes and maintains security (see the OPSEC discussion in Appendix D) and coordinates with adjacent units. These actions enable the platoon to defend from the assembly area as necessary. The platoon can then prepare for future operations by conducting troop-leading procedures and the priorities of work in accordance the company or troop OPORD. Priorities of work are: z Establish and maintain security (REDCON status). z Position vehicles. z Emplace OPs. z Emplace CBRN alarms. z Establish lateral communications/flank coordination. z Prepare range cards and fire plans. z Establish wire communication (if directed by unit SOP). z Camouflage vehicles. z Select alternate, supplementary positions, and rally points. z Develop an obstacle plan. z Conduct troop-leading procedures. z Perform maintenance activities on vehicles, communications equipment, and weapon systems. z Verify weapon system status; conduct boresighting, muzzle reference system (MRS) updates, test-firing, and other necessary preparations. z Conduct resupply, refueling, and rearming operations. z Conduct rehearsals and training for upcoming operations. z Conduct PCCs and PCIs. z Eat, rest, and conduct personal hygiene. z Establish field sanitation. 5-31. Normally, the platoon occupies an assembly area as part of a company team or troop. The team or troop may be adjacent to or independent of the task force or squadron (see Figures 5-3A and 5-3B). The company or troop commander assigns a sector of responsibility and weapons orientations for each platoon. If the platoon occupies an assembly area alone, it establishes a perimeter defense (explained later in this chapter).
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Figure 5-3A. Battalion assembly area; company team adjacent to other company teams
OCCUPATION BY FORCE
5-32. In some cases, a company or troop will occupy an assembly area without first sending out a quartering party. During this occupation by force, the platoon leader orders a hasty occupation of a BP at the platoons designated location. He establishes local security, directs adjacent unit coordination, begins troop-leading procedures, and establishes priorities of work.
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variety of units and because some vehicles may not have tactical radios. The order should follow the standard five-paragraph OPORD format, but special emphasis should be placed on the following subjects: z Route of march (with a strip map provided for each vehicle commander). z Order of march. z Actions at halts. z Actions if a vehicle becomes disabled. z Actions on contact. z Chain of command. z Communications and signal information.
TACTICAL DISPOSITION
5-38. During all escort missions, the convoy security commander and tank platoon leader must establish and maintain security in all directions and throughout the length of the convoy. They can adjust the disposition of the platoon, either as a unit or dispersed, to fit the security requirements of each particular situation. As noted, several factors, including convoy size and METT-TC, affect this disposition. Perhaps the key consideration is whether the platoon is operating as part of larger escort force or is executing the escort mission independently.
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5-43. When the platoon is deployed as a unit during a large-scale escort operation, it can provide forward, flank, or rear close-in security. In such situations, it executes tactical movement based on the factors of METT-TC. Figures 5-5A through 5-5C illustrate the platoon using various formations while performing escort duties as a unit.
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Figure 5-6. Platoon performing convoy escort independently 5-45. In some independent escort missions, variations in terrain along the route may require the platoon to operate using a modified traveling overwatch technique. Figure 5-7 illustrates such a situation. It shows one section leading the convoy while the other trails the convoy. Dispersion between vehicles in each section is sufficient to provide flank security. Depending on the terrain, the trail section may not be able to overwatch the movement of the lead section.
ACTIONS ON CONTACT
5-46. As the convoy moves toward its new location, the enemy may attempt to interdict it. This contact will usually occur in the form of an ambush, often with the use of a hastily prepared obstacle or improvised explosive device (IED). The safety of the convoy then rests on the speed and effectiveness with which escort elements can execute appropriate actions on contact. 5-47. Based on the factors of METT-TC, portions of the convoy security force, such as the tank platoon or a tank section, may be designated as a reaction force. The reaction force performs its escort duties, conducts tactical movement, or occupies an assembly area as required until enemy contact occurs; it then is given a reaction mission by the convoy commander.
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ACTIONS AT AN AMBUSH
5-48. An ambush is one of the most effective ways to interdict a convoy. Conversely, reaction to an ambush must be immediate, overwhelming, and decisive. Actions on contact must be planned for and rehearsed so they can be executed as a drill by all escort and convoy elements, with care taken to avoid fratricide. 5-49. In almost all situations, the platoon will take several specific, instantaneous actions when it must react to an ambush. These steps, illustrated in Figures 5-8A and 5-8B, include the following: z As soon as they acquire an enemy force, the escort vehicles conduct action toward the enemy (see Figure 5-8A). They seek covered positions between the convoy and the enemy and suppress the enemy with the highest possible volume of fire permitted by the ROE. Contact reports are sent to higher headquarters as quickly as possible. z The convoy commander retains control of the convoy vehicles and continues to move them along the route at the highest possible speed (see Figure 5-8A). z Convoy vehicles, if they are armed, may return fire only if the escort has not positioned itself between the convoy and the enemy force. z Security forces must plan to secure all damaged or disabled vehicles and equipment. The platoon leader or the convoy commander may request, as a last resort, that any damaged or disabled vehicles be abandoned and pushed off the route (see Figure 5-8B). z The escort leader (in the example included here, this is the tank platoon leader) uses SPOTREPs to keep the convoy security commander informed. If necessary, the escort leader or the convoy security commander can then request support from the reaction force; he can also call for and adjust indirect fires.
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Figure 5-8B. Convoy continues to move 5-50. Once the convoy is clear of the kill zone, the escort element executes one of the following COAs based on the composition of the escort and reaction forces, the commanders intent, and the strength of the enemy force: z Continues to suppress the enemy as combat reaction forces move to support (see Figure 5-9A). z Assaults the enemy (see Figure 5-9B). z Breaks contact and moves out of the kill zone (see Figure 5-9C). 5-51. In most situations, tanks continue to suppress the enemy or execute an assault to destroy enemy forces. Contact should be broken only when the tactical situation requires.
Figure 5-9A. Escort suppresses the ambush to facilitate attack by the reaction force
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ACTIONS AT AN OBSTACLE
5-52. Obstacles are a major threat to convoys. Obstacles can be used to harass the convoy by delaying it or stopping it altogether. In addition, obstacles may canalize or stop the convoy to set up an enemy ambush. 5-53. The purpose of the route reconnaissance ahead of a convoy is to identify obstacles and either breach or bypass them. In some cases, however, the enemy or its obstacles may avoid detection by the reconnaissance element. If this happens, the convoy must take actions to reduce or bypass the obstacle.
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5-54. When an obstacle is identified, the convoy escort faces two problems: reducing or bypassing the obstacle and maintaining protection for the convoy. Security becomes critical, and actions at the obstacle must be accomplished very quickly. The convoy commander must assume that the obstacle is overwatched and covered by the enemy. To reduce the time the convoy is halted and thus to reduce its vulnerability, the following actions should occur when the convoy escort encounters a point-type obstacle: z The lead element identifies the obstacle and directs the convoy to make a short halt and establish security. The convoy escort overwatches the obstacle (see Figure 5-10) and requests that the breach force move forward. z The convoy escort maintains 360-degree security of the convoy and provides overwatch as the breach force reconnoiters the obstacle in search of a bypass. z Once all reconnaissance is complete, the convoy commander determines which of the following COAs he will take: Bypass the obstacle. Breach the obstacle with the assets on hand. Breach the obstacle with reinforcing assets. z The convoy security commander relays a SPOTREP higher and requests support by combat reaction forces, engineer assets (if they are not part of the convoy), and/or aerial reconnaissance elements. z Artillery units are alerted to be prepared to provide fire support.
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Figure 5-10. Convoy escort overwatches an obstacle 5-55. Tanks equipped with mine plows are ideal for breaching most obstacles encountered during convoy escort missions. If the convoy escort is required to breach limited obstacles using plow tanks, the platoon leader must maintain the security of the convoy, ensuring that adequate support forces are in place to overwatch the breach operation.
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z z
Once the convoy is in column, local security elements (if used) return to their vehicles, and the escort vehicles rejoin the column (see Figure 5-11C). When all elements are in column, the convoy resumes movement.
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OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
5-58. Units are highly vulnerable during a passage of lines. Vehicles may be concentrated, and fires may be masked. The passing unit may not be able to maneuver and react to enemy contact. 5-59. Detailed reconnaissance and coordination are critical in overcoming these potential problems and ensuring the passage of lines is conducted quickly and smoothly. The commander normally conducts all necessary reconnaissance and coordination for the passage. At times, he may designate the XO, 1SG, or a platoon leader to conduct liaison duties for reconnaissance and coordination. The following items of information are coordinated (Note. An asterisk indicates items that should be confirmed by reconnaissance): z Unit designation and composition, including type and number of passing vehicles. z Passing unit arrival time(s). z Location of attack positions or assembly areas. * z Current enemy situation. z Stationary units mission and plan (to include OP, patrol, and obstacle locations). * z Location of contact points, passage points, and passage lanes. (Note. The use of GPS/POSNAV waypoints will simplify this process and, as a result, speed the passage.) * z Guide requirements. z Order of march. z Anticipated and possible actions on enemy contact. z Supporting direct and indirect fires, including location of the restrictive fire line (RFL). * z CBRN conditions. z Available CS and sustainment assets and their locations. * z Communications information (to include frequencies, digital data, and near and far recognition signals). z Chain of command, including location of the battle handover line (BHL). z Additional procedures for the passage.
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TYPES OF OBSTACLES
5-68. Obstacles are any obstructions that stop, delay, divert, or restrict movement. They are usually covered by observation and enhanced by direct or indirect fires and as such the platoon leader needs to plan for this possibility. This discussion examines the two categories of obstacles.
EXISTING OBSTACLES
5-69. Existing obstacles are already present on the battlefield and are not emplaced through military effort. They fall into two major classifications: z Natural obstacles, which include these types: Ravines, gullies, gaps, or ditches over 3 meters wide. Streams, rivers, or canals over 1 meter deep. Mountains or hills with a slope in excess of 60 percent (30 degrees). Lakes, swamps and marshes over 1 meter deep. Tree stumps and large rocks over 18 inches high.
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Forests or jungles with trees 8 inches or more in diameter and with less than 4 meters of space between trees on a slope. Man-made obstacles, which include built-up areas such as towns, cities, or railroad embankments.
REINFORCING OBSTACLES
5-70. Reinforcing obstacles are placed on the battlefield through military effort and are designed to slow, stop, or canalize the enemy. Whenever possible, both friendly and enemy forces will enhance the effectiveness of their reinforcing obstacles by tying them in with existing obstacles. The following discussion focuses on several types of reinforcing obstacles.
Minefields
5-71. The minefield is the most common reinforcing obstacle the platoon will encounter on the battlefield. It is easier and quicker to emplace than other obstacles and can be very effective in destroying vehicles. The minefield may be emplaced in several ways: by hand, by air or artillery delivery using scatterable mines, or by mechanical means (the Volcano system). It can be used separately or in conjunction with other obstacles; refer to Figure 5-12 for possible minefield locations.
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Antitank Ditch
5-72. The antitank ditch, illustrated in Figure 5-13, may be reinforced with wire and/or mines to make it more complex and more difficult for the attacker to overcome. In addition, soil from the ditch can be built up into a berm on the emplacing unit side.
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Road Craters
5-73. Road craters can be rapidly emplaced and are especially effective where restricted terrain on the sides of a road or trail prevents a bypass (refer to Figure 5-14). Craters are at least 1.5 meters in depth and 6 meters in diameter and are usually supplemented with mines and/or wire.
Abatis
5-74. An abatis provides an effective barrier against vehicle movement. Trees are felled either by sawing or by use of explosives; the cut is made at least 1.5 meters above the ground, with the main trunks crisscrossed and pointed toward the enemy at approximately a 45-degree angle. The abatis is usually about 75 meters in depth and ideally is located on trails where there is no bypass; the trunk of each tree should remain attached to the stump to form an obstacle on the flanks of the abatis (see Figure 5-15). Abatis are usually mined or booby-trapped.
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Log Crib
5-75. A log crib is a framework of tree trunks or beams filled with dirt and rock (see Figure 5-16). It is used to block roads or paths in wooded and mountainous terrain.
Wire Obstacles
5-76. Wire obstacles provide an effective and flexible antipersonnel barrier; they are frequently employed on dismounted avenues of approach in the form of tanglefoot, double- or triple-strand concertina, and fourstrand fences. Employed in depth or in conjunction with mines, wire obstacles are also very effective against tanks and similar vehicles (see Figure 5-17). A single wire obstacle, however, will have little effect on armored vehicles; the sprocket of M1-series tanks is designed to cut wire.
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BREACHING PROCEDURES
5-79. Breaching operations entail the coordinated efforts of three task-organized elements: the support force, the breach force, and the assault force. The discussion in this section covers the actions and responsibilities of these elements, as well as the tank platoons role in the operation.
SOSRA STEPS
5-80. The following actions, known by the abbreviation SOSRA, occur during a breaching operation: z Sufficient support elements are employed to suppress enemy elements that are overwatching the obstacle. The support force uses direct and indirect fires to accomplish its mission. z The support force requests immediate or preplanned smoke to obscure the enemy and prevent observation of the breach operation. z The breach force must organize in such a manner as to secure the reduction area to prevent the enemy from interfering with the obstacle reduction. z The breach force takes actions to reduce the obstacle and allow follow-on forces to assault enemy forces beyond the obstacle after the lane is proofed and marked.
BREACHING ORGANIZATION
5-81. The commander in charge of the breaching operation will designate support, breach, and assault forces. He may task the tank platoon to serve in any of these elements, as detailed in the following discussion. During operations with light forces the platoon leader may need to be prepared to cover any one or several of the above missions. The light forces will not have the capability to create a breach large enough for a tank force.
Support Force
5-82. This element usually leads movement of the breach elements. After identifying the obstacle, it moves to covered and concealed areas and establishes support-by-fire positions. The support force leader sends a voice or digital SPOTREP to the commander. This report must describe the location and complexity of the obstacle, the composition of enemy forces that are overwatching the obstacle, and the location of possible bypasses. The commander decides whether to maneuver to a bypass or to breach the obstacle. (Note. He must keep in mind that a bypass may lead to an enemy kill zone.) 5-83. In either case, the support force suppresses any enemy elements that are overwatching the obstacle to allow the breach force to breach or bypass the obstacle. The support force should be in position to request suppressive artillery fires and smoke for obscuration. As the breach and assault forces execute their missions, the support force lifts or shifts supporting fires. Because the enemy is likely to engage the support force with artillery, the support force must be prepared to move to alternate positions while maintaining suppressive fires.
Breach Force
5-84. The breach force receives a voice or digital SPOTREP identifying the location of the obstacle or bypass. It then must organize internally to fulfill these responsibilities: z Provide local security for the breach site as necessary. z Conduct the actual breach. The breach force creates, proofs, and marks a lane through the obstacle or secures the bypass. z Move through the lane to provide local security for the assault force on the far side of the obstacle. In some instances, the breach force may move to hull-down firing positions that allow it to suppress enemy elements overwatching the obstacle. At other times, it may assault the enemy, with suppressive fires provided by the support force.
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Breaching Methods 5-85. The tank platoon can create a lane by itself if it is equipped with the assets required to breach the type of obstacle encountered. If the platoon does not have this capability, it may be required to provide close-in protection for attached engineers with breaching assets. Three breaching methods are available to the platoon: z Mechanical breaching, usually with mine plows or mine rakes. z Explosive breaching, employing such means as the mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC), M173 line charge, or 1/4-pound blocks of TNT. z Manual breaching, with Soldiers probing by hand or using such items as grappling hooks, shovels, picks, axes, and chain saws. Manual breaching is the least preferred method for the tank platoon. Note. In extreme cases, the commander may order the platoon to force through an obstacle. This technique requires the breach force to move in column formation through the obstacle location. If available, a disabled vehicle can be pushed ahead of the lead breach vehicle in an attempt to detonate mines. Creating and Proofing the Lane 5-86. The mine plow is the breaching device most commonly employed by the tank platoon. The battalion or company commander may allocate one to three plows per platoon. When properly equipped and supported, the platoon can create up to two lanes through an obstacle. 5-87. Plow tanks lead the breach force. Immediately following them are vehicles that proof the lane; these are usually tanks equipped with mine rollers. This process ensures that the lane is clear. Note. If the location and/or dimensions of the obstacle are unknown, the platoon leader may choose to lead with tanks equipped with mine rollers to identify the beginning of the obstacle.) 5-88. If the platoon is allocated one plow, the PSGs wingman normally serves as the breach tank. The PSG follows immediately behind to proof the lane and provide overwatch. The platoon leaders section follows the PSG. 5-89. If the platoon has two or more plows, it can create multiple lanes, usually 75 to 100 meters apart. The wingman tanks are normally equipped with the plows, with the section leader tanks following to proof the lanes and provide overwatch (see Figure 5-19).
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Figure 5-19. Plow tanks create multiple lanes while the section leaders tanks provide overwatch Marking the Lane 5-90. After the lane is created and proofed, it can then be marked to ensure safe movement by vehicles and personnel; this is critical for follow-on forces that may not know the exact location of the cleared lane. Distinctive markers must show where the lane begins and ends. A visible line down the center is effective. Another technique is to mark both sides of the breached lane. Figure 5-20 shows a sample marking method. To minimize the necessary breaching time, the proofing vehicle may simultaneously mark the lane. Unit SOPs will dictate marking methods and materials, which commonly include the following: z Cleared lane mechanical marking system (CLAMMS). z Pathfinder system. z Engineer stakes with tape. z Guides. z Chem lights. z Expended shell casings.
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Figure 5-20. Sample technique for obstacle lane marking Completing the Breach 5-91. Throughout the operation, the platoon leader provides continuous updates of the breach forces progress to higher headquarters and other elements involved in the breach. He also coordinates with the support force for suppressive fires. 5-92. After marking is complete, the platoon leader uses voice and digital systems to report the location of the lane and the method of marking to expedite the movement of the assault force. Digital overlays enable units to move quickly to the breach lanes using the POSNAV or GPS. Note. The assault force will often move behind the breach force and closely follow the breach vehicles through the new lane.)
Assault Force
5-93. While the breach is in progress, the assault force assists the support force or follows the breach force while maintaining cover and dispersion. Once a lane is cleared through the obstacle, the assault force then moves through the breach. It secures the far side of the obstacle by physical occupation and/or continues the attack in accordance with the commanders intent. 5-94. Tank units, including the tank platoon, are ideally suited for assault force operations against mobile enemy defenses in open terrain. Consideration should have mechanized infantry as an assault force attacking dug-in enemy positions in close terrain.
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Chapter 5
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tank platoon may be required to break contact or conduct a withdrawal and then execute a passage of lines. These tasks are discussed in other sections of this chapter. 5-99. In a moving flank screen (platoons normally execute this as a follow and support operation, discussed earlier in this chapter), the tank platoon conducts tactical movement to the rear of scout platoons. It may periodically occupy hasty BPs. When the scouts identify enemy elements, the commander issues a FRAGO for the tank platoon to occupy a hasty defensive position or attack-by-fire position or to conduct a hasty attack to destroy the enemy. 5-100. It is critical that the tank platoon leader keep these considerations in mind during all screen operations: z OPSEC requirements. During screen missions, the platoon may be required to operate apart from other units. z Location and identification of friendly forces. The platoon leader should know all patrol routes and OP locations within the platoons AO. The platoon should maintain voice and digital (if available) communications with the OPs. z Engagement criteria. To reduce the potential for fratricide, engagement criteria should be as specific as possible when friendly units operate to the front and flanks of the tank platoon as it executes a screen mission.
SECTION IX DELAY
5-101. A delay operation is a continuous series of defensive actions over successive positions in depth. The purpose is to trade the enemy space for time while retaining freedom of action. Units involved in a delay maximize the use of terrain and obstacles, maintaining contact with the enemy but avoiding decisive engagement. In some instances, local counterattacks are used to assist units during disengagement or to take advantage of battlefield opportunities. 5-102. The tank platoon conducts the delay as part of a company team. In some cases, it will occupy either a hasty or deliberate BP; it will then disengage and occupy successive BPs in depth as part of the delaying force. The platoon may also be required to conduct local counterattacks or to support the movement of other platoons during the delay. The considerations involved in planning and executing a delay at platoon level are the same as for offensive operations (refer to Chapter 3 of this manual) and defensive operations (refer to Chapter 4).
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Chapter 5
z z z z z z z
Unit level obstacle plans. Routes to be used during the operation The location of weapons and fighting positions. Sketch cards and fire plans (including grid locations for input into digital systems). Details of the relief, to include the sequence, the use of recognition signals and guides, and the time of change of responsibility for the area. Procedures for transferring excess ammunition, POL, wire lines (hot loops), and other materiel to the incoming unit. Command and signal information.
5-106. Reconnaissance of relief positions is the same as for any BP. The incoming platoon leader should obtain information on the following: z The engagement area, to include triggers, and trigger lines, TRPs, obstacles, and the break point. z Primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions. z Routes to and within the BP. z Hide positions. z Location of guides.
RELIEF PROCEDURES
5-107. After reconnaissance and coordination are complete, the platoon leaders continue with their troopleading procedures and prepare to execute the relief. Initially, the relieving unit moves to an assembly area behind the unit to be relieved. Final coordination is conducted, and information is exchanged between the two units. 5-108. The relieving unit links up with guides or finalizes linkup procedures. Individual vehicles then relieve forward positions using one of three techniques: z The relieving vehicles occupy primary positions after the relieved unit has moved to alternate positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit can withdraw. z The relieving vehicles occupy alternate positions while the relieved unit remains in primary positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit withdraws. The platoon leader then orders the relieving unit to occupy primary positions as necessary. z The relieving unit occupies a hide position while the relieved unit occupies hide, primary, or alternate positions. Once OPs are in place, the relieved unit withdraws.
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The relieving unit never loses the digital link (if applicable) as it assumes the new mission. Once the relief is complete, the relieved unit simply logs off the digital net and switches to an alternate FM frequency; it can then reestablish a digital link after leaving the relief site. Maintaining radio traffic on the same frequency before, during, and after the operation will help deceive the enemy as to whether a relief has occurred.
SECTION XI - WITHDRAWAL
5-112. The purpose of this retrograde operation is to free a force in contact with the enemy so it can execute a new mission. Conducting a withdrawal at platoon level is identical to disengagement (see the discussion in Chapter 4 of this manual). The withdrawal may be conducted under pressure (with direct or indirect fire enemy contact) or with no pressure.
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Chapter 6
MORTAR SUPPORT
6-2. Mortars afford immediate and responsive indirect fire support to maneuver forces. Each combined arms battalion (CAB) has four 120-mm mortar systems organized into two sections. Each reconnaissance squadron has six 120-mm mortar systems organized with two systems organic to each troop.
CAPABILITIES
6-3. With a maximum effective range of 7,200 meters, 120-mm mortars can provide a heavy volume of accurate, sustained fires. They are ideal weapons for attacking a variety of targets, including the following: z Infantry in the open. z Targets on reverse slopes. z Targets in narrow ravines or trenches. z Targets in forests, towns, and other areas that are difficult to strike with low-angle fires. 6-4. In addition to these highly flexible targeting options, mortars have the following capabilities and advantages: z Rapid response time. z Effective against low-density targets. z Highly destructive target effects.
LIMITATIONS
6-5. Mortars are limited in the following ways: z Maximum range is limited in comparison to the indirect fire support capability of FA elements. z They cannot be used against targets inside their minimum indirect fire effective range (200 meters from the mortar tube position). z Only limited types of ammunition are available.
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z z
Mortar elements carry limited amounts of ammunition. Their fire direction center (FDC) and tubes are not linked to the TACFIRE system.
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
6-6. Mortars can be extremely effective when used for the purposes outlined in the following discussion.
Destruction
6-7. High-explosive (HE) rounds, mounted with variable-time (VT) fuses, can be used to destroy or disperse dismounted infantry and vehicles that are in the open. HE mortar rounds have the capability to destroy or disable some armored vehicles.
Suppression
6-8. HE rounds can be used to force the enemy to button up or move to less advantageous positions.
Smoke
6-9. Mortar smoke builds up more rapidly than artillery smoke. White phosphorus (WP) rounds are used for obscuration and screening. See Appendix E of this manual for detailed information on the use of smoke.
Illumination
6-10. Illumination rounds are used to light an area or enemy position during periods of limited visibility. Illumination can increase the effectiveness of the tank platoons image intensification devices (passive sights). This helps the platoon in gathering information, adjusting artillery fire, and engaging enemy targets. Ground-burst illumination can also be used to mark enemy positions and to provide a thermal TRP for control of fires. 6-11. Units must be careful, however, not to illuminate friendly positions. Also, because U.S. night-vision devices may or may not be superior to those of most potential adversaries, illuminating the battlefield may be unnecessary or even counterproductive.
CAPABILITIES
6-14. In support of the tank platoon, FA elements can accomplish the following tasks: z Provide immediate suppression on unplanned targets. z Provide continuous fire support on planned targets in all weather conditions and types of terrain. z Allow commanders and platoon leaders to shift and mass fires rapidly. z Offer a variety of conventional shell and fuse combinations. z Provide obscuration and screening smoke to conceal movement. z Fire battlefield illumination rounds as necessary.
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LIMITATIONS
6-15. FA support has the following limitations: z Limited capability against moving targets. z Limited capability to destroy point targets without considerable ammunition expenditure or use of specialized munitions. z Highly vulnerable to detection by enemy target acquisition systems.
SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS
6-17. FISTs are organized, equipped, and trained to provide the following personnel and support to the company or troop: z A fire support advisor and coordinator. z A communications link to all available indirect fire support assets. z On-the-spot support for infantry companies (ten-man team) or for armor companies and cavalry troops (four-man team).
COMMUNICATIONS
6-18. The armor or mechanized infantry FIST normally monitors the following radio nets: z Attached unit command net (battalion, company team, or troop). z Battalion mortar fire direction net. z Direct support (DS) battalion fire direction net (digital). z Battalion fire support net (voice). 6-19. The armored cavalry troop FIST normally monitors these radio nets: z Troop command net. z Troop fire support net. z Supporting artillery fire direction net (digital and voice). z Squadron fire support net. 6-20. The FIST serves as the net control station (NCS) on the unit fire support net, while the fire support element (FSE) serves as the NCS on the maneuver battalion fire support net. The FIST relays calls for fire to supporting artillery on a digital net (TACFIRE) or sends the fire mission to the mortar platoon or section. The command net allows the FIST to monitor operations and links the FIST to the commander and platoon leaders for planning and coordination.
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Chapter 6
6-4
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Chapter 6
Polar Plot Method 6-29. This method requires that the observer and the FDC know the observers exact location. The observer determines the direction (to the nearest 10 mils) of the observer-target (OT) line and the distance (to the nearest 100 meters) from his position to the target (see Figure 6-3).
Figure 6-3. Polar plot method of target location Shift From a Known Point Method 6-30. This method can be used if the observer and the FDC have a common known point (see Figure 6-4). Normally, this point is an artillery target. To locate the target, the observer must first determine the direction to the known point to the nearest 10 mils. If the observer has no compass, he can determine the direction by using a map and protractor or by using his binocular reticle pattern and a known direction to the known point. He then determines direction to the target using the RALS rule (right add, left subtract).
Figure 6-4. Shift from a known point method using direction (in mils) 6-31. The observer then determines the lateral and range shifts (see Figure 6-5). Lateral shifts are left or right from the known point to the OT line and are given to the nearest 10 meters. Range shifts are given as ADD (when the target is beyond the known point) or DROP (when the target is closer than the known
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point). Range shifts are given to the nearest 100 meters. FM 6-30 explains in detail how to determine lateral and range shifts.
Target Description, Method of Engagement, and Method of Fire and Control (Third Transmission)
6-32. The observer includes the target description, method of engagement, and method of fire and control in his call for fire using the guidelines discussed in the following paragraphs. Target Description 6-33. The observer describes the target to the FDC; see Figure 6-6 for examples. The FDC then determines the type and amount of ammunition needed. The target description should be brief but accurate. This is the last required element in the call for fire.
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Chapter 6
Figure 6-6. Target description Method of Engagement 6-34. The observer tells how he wants to attack the target (including type of ammunition, fuse, and distance from friendly troops). The FDC may change the ammunition type and fuse based on availability or other constraints. If the target is within 600 meters of friendly troops, the observer announces DANGER CLOSE to supporting mortars and artillery. Method of Fire and Control 6-35. The observer will state who will give the command for fire to begin firing. If the observer wants to control the time of firing, he will say, AT MY COMMAND. The FDC will tell the observer when the unit is ready to fire. At the proper time, the observer will say, FIRE. If the observer does not say, AT MY COMMAND, the FDC will fire as soon as the platoon or battery is ready.
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6-39. After receiving the company offensive fire plan, the platoon leader checks it to ensure that targets are planned on all known or suspected enemy positions in front of, on, behind, and to the flanks of the objective. The company defensive fire plan should list planned targets in front of, on, behind, and to the flanks of BPs; likely areas for these targets include observed choke points, avenues of approach, obstacles, and likely support-by-fire positions. If more targets are necessary for either the offensive or defensive plan, the platoon leader coordinates them with the commander and the FIST.
AIR CAVALRY
6-41. Armed reconnaissance, found in combat aviation brigades, is organized, equipped, and trained to conduct reconnaissance and security missions.
ATTACK HELICOPTERS
6-42. Attack helicopter units operate either as a separate element within a division or as part of the air cavalry. Attack helicopter companies are maneuver units and are normally integrated into the ground scheme of maneuver. When working with ground maneuver units, the attack helicopter unit may be placed OPCON to the ground force. Normally, it is OPCON to a maneuver brigade or regiment; on rare occasions, it can be OPCON to a battalion or squadron. 6-43. The primary aircraft in air cavalry units is the OH-58D. This helicopter provides substantial limitedvisibility and all-weather acquisition capability. The aircraft features a stabilized mast-mounted sight (MMS) with a low-light TV camera, TIS, and laser range finder/designator. It can acquire armored vehicle targets at night at ranges up to 10 kilometers. It can be armed with a wide assortment of weapons and thus can be configured for a variety of threat situations (see Figure 6-7).
Figure 6-7. OH-58D armed helicopter 6-44. Aeroscouts usually arrive before attack aircraft, establish communications with ground forces, and coordinate the situation and mission with the commander. Aeroscouts identify targets, choose general BPs, and control attack helicopter fires. 6-45. The attack helicopter is primarily employed as an anti-armor weapon system. Figure 6-8 shows the type of attack aircraft in the Armys inventory, the AH-64 Apache.
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Chapter 6
CAPABILITIES
6-47. The combat engineer platoon is organized, trained, and equipped to conduct mobility, countermobility, and survivability missions in support of ground operations. The higher unit commander determines the engineers specific tasks and responsibilities in these three roles.
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Equipment
6-49. The platoon may also be supplemented with equipment from the engineer company.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
6-50. In mobility operations, the engineer platoon can provide the following support: z Obstacle reduction. The engineers can reduce or negate the effects of obstacles, thereby improving their supported units maneuver capability. z Route construction. The engineers can construct, improve, and maintain roads, bridges, and fords. 6-51. In a countermobility role, engineers can assist with obstacle construction to obstruct the enemys scheme of maneuver. They can reinforce terrain and existing obstacles to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the enemy force. 6-52. Engineers can improve survivability by constructing dug-in positions and overhead protection to reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapons.
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Chapter 6
ATTACK AVOIDANCE
6-58. If an enemy pilot cannot find friendly elements, he cannot attack them. The platoon should use concealment, camouflage, deception, communications security, and any other necessary action to prevent enemy detection. Refer to the discussion of OPSEC in Appendix D of this manual. 6-59. Whenever possible, static positions must provide effective overhead concealment. When concealment is not available, vehicles must be camouflaged to blend into the natural surroundings. Track marks leading into the position must be obliterated. All shiny objects that could reflect light and attract attention must be covered.
DAMAGE-LIMITING MEASURES
Dispersion
6-60. Dispersion is one of the most effective ways to reduce the effects of enemy air attack. It is essential when a unit is occupying static positions such as assembly areas or is preparing to cross a water obstacle or pass through a breached obstacle. When the platoon is on the move and air guards identify an enemy air attack, vehicles disperse quickly, move to covered and concealed positions if possible, and stop (a stationary vehicle is more difficult to see than a moving vehicle). Refer to the discussion of the react to air attack battle drill in Chapter 3 of this manual. An early warning system that includes both visual and audible signals can help to limit damage by enabling the platoon to begin dispersion at the earliest possible moment.
Cover
6-61. Another damage-limiting measure is the use of natural or man-made cover to reduce the effects of enemy munitions. Folds in the earth, depressions, buildings, and sandbagged positions can provide this protection.
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and the capabilities of organic weapon systems. All platoon members must understand that they can defend against a direct attack but cannot engage aircraft that are not attacking them unless the weapon control status allows it.
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Chapter 6
USAF, USAF Reserve, USAF NG USAF USAF, USAF Reserve, USAF NG USN, USMC
F/A-18
AC-130
Note. Typical load is average load for typical support mission; maximum load is the amount the aircraft can carry in an ideal situation. Ammunition load is for information purposes only, as the platoon has no control of aircraft configurations. This will help platoon leaders understand which aircraft would best be able to support the platoon for a certain type of mission.
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AREA SECURITY
6-74. The MPs perform the area security (AS) function to protect the force and enhance the freedom of units to conduct their assigned missions. The MPs, who provide AS, play a key role in supporting forces in operations outside main battle area. The MPs act as a response force that delays and defeats enemy attempts to disrupt or demoralize military operations in the AO. The MPs mobility makes it possible for them to detect the threat as they aggressively patrol the AO, MSRs, key terrain, and critical assets. The MPs organic communications enable them to advise the appropriate headquarters, bases, base clusters, and moving units of impending enemy activities. With organic firepower, the MPs are capable of engaging in decisive operations against a Level II threat and delaying (shaping) a Level III threat until commitment of the tactical combat force (TCF).
DETAINEE OPERATIONS
6-75. The Army is the Department of Defenses (DOD) executive agent for all detainee operations. Additionally, the Army is DODs executive agent for long-term confinement of U.S. military prisoners. Within the Army and through the combatant commander, the MPs are tasked with coordinating shelter, protection, accountability, and sustainment for all types of detainees. A detained person in the custody of US armed forces who has not been classified as an RP (retained person) or a CI (civilian internee) is treated as an EPW until a legal status is ascertained by competent authority. 6-76. The I/R function is of humane as well as tactical importance. In any conflict involving U.S. forces, safe and humane treatment of detainees is required by international law. Military actions on the modern battlefield will result in many detainees. Entire units of enemy forces, separated and disorganized by the shock of intensive combat, may be captured. This can place a tremendous challenge on tactical forces and can significantly reduce the capturing units combat effectiveness. The MPs support the battlefield
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Chapter 6
commander by relieving him of the problem of handling detainees with combat forces. The MPs perform their I/R function of collecting, evacuating, and securing detainees throughout the AO. In this process, the MPs coordinate with military intelligence (MI) to collect information that may be used in current or future operations.
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Chapter 7
Sustainment
Sustainment elements arm, fuel, fix, feed, clothe, and provide transportation and personnel for the platoon. The platoon leader is responsible for supervising sustainment within the platoon. The PSG is the sustainment operator for the platoon, as the 1SG is for the company and troop. The PSG advises the platoon leader of logistical requirements during preparation for combat operations. He also keeps the platoon leader informed of the platoons status. During combat operations, the PSG coordinates directly with the 1SG, informing him of the platoons supply, maintenance, and personnel requirements. The PSG is assisted by the other TCs and the gunners on the platoon leaders and PSGs vehicles.
SECTION I - ORGANIZATION
7-1. The platoon has no organic sustainment assets. The PSG coordinates directly with his 1SG for all sustainment assets. The PSG is also the primary recipient of all maintenance, supply, and personnel reports within the platoon. He is assisted by the TCs, but it is his responsibility to keep the platoon leader informed of the current status of the platoon. 7-2. Most routine sustainment functions are accomplished by SOP. These procedures and services include the following: z Accountability, maintenance, and safeguarding of the units assigned equipment. z Reporting of the status of personnel, equipment, and classes of supply. z Requests for resupply. z Turn-in of equipment for repair. z Evacuation of personnel (WIA, KIA, detainees). z Evacuation of equipment and vehicles for replacement and/or repair.
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7-6. For ammunition (Class V), the basic load is the quantity of ammunition required to be on hand to meet combat needs until resupply can be accomplished. The basic ammunition load is specified by the theater army and is expressed in rounds, units, or units of weight, as appropriate.
COMBAT LOAD
7-7. The combat load is the quantity of supplies, in all classes, that the platoon must have on hand to sustain operations in combat for a prescribed number of days. The platoons parent unit must be capable of moving the combat load, using organic transportation assets, into combat in a single delivery. Like the basic load, the platoons combat load is specified by higher headquarters.
CLASSES OF SUPPLY
CLASS I
7-8. Class I includes subsistence items (rations, water, and ice) as well as gratuitous issue of items related to health, morale, and welfare. 7-9. Each vehicle maintains a supply of rations, usually a three- to five-day stock, in the form of meals, ready-to-eat (MRE). Hot meals are brought forward whenever possible. All meals should be eaten in shifts, and they should never be served at one centralized location. The platoon leader and PSG must make sure not only that the platoon is fed, but also that their Soldiers eat nutritious meals to maintain the energy levels required in combat. During continuous or cold-weather operations, Soldiers will eat more than three meals per day. This extra allowance must be planned and requested. 7-10. Potable water should be replenished daily, either by refilling from the water trailer or by rotating 5gallon cans with the 1SG or supply sergeant. Each combat vehicle should maintain a minimum of 10 gallons of potable water, more during operations in arid climates or in MOPP gear. The platoon should also maintain a minimum amount of nonpotable water for vehicle and equipment maintenance; one technique is to recycle water previously used for personal hygiene.
CLASS II
7-11. Class II includes items of equipment, other than principal items, that are prescribed in authorization and allowance tables. Among these items, which are requested through the supply sergeant, are individual tools and tool sets, individual equipment and clothing items, chemical lights, batteries, engineer tape, tentage, and housekeeping supplies. Supply sergeant should also keep 10-percent overage of central issue facility (CIF) items in order to replace Soldiers equipment that is lost or damaged during operations.
CLASS III
7-12. Class III comprises all types of POL products. Rearming and refueling usually occur daily or at the conclusion of major operations; for optimum security, they should be executed simultaneously under the cover of limited visibility. The two techniques of refueling and rearming and tailgate and service-station resupply are covered later in this section. 7-13. The platoon leader must control redistribution of fuel and ammunition when these supplies cannot be delivered or when only limited quantities are available. The PSG continually monitors the platoons supply status through CS reports and, on digitally equipped vehicles, automated SITREPs. Refer to ST 3-20.153 for report formats. The PSG notifies the platoon leader before a specific vehicle or the platoon as a whole is critically short of these major classes of supply. 7-14. In planning for refueling operations, the platoon leader should balance the range and fuel capacity of his vehicles against the requirements of future operations. The platoon must top off vehicles whenever the tactical situation permits. When time is limited, however, the platoon leader must choose between topping off vehicles that need the most fuel first and giving limited amounts to each vehicle. Vehicle crews must maintain a stock of oil, grease, and hydraulic fluid, replenishing these POL products every time they refuel.
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Sustainment
CLASS IV
7-15. Class IV includes construction and barrier materials used by the platoon to construct OPs and obstacles and to improve fighting positions. Barrier materials include lumber, sandbags, concertina or barbed wire, and pickets. Based on unit SOP, some Class IV materials may be part of the tank load plan; other materials are requested through the company or troop headquarters. Prior planning for resupply is required due to long delivery and large amounts of haul assets required.
CLASS V
7-16. Class V is ammunition, to include small arms, artillery and tank rounds, mines and demolitions, fuses, missiles, and bombs. 7-17. He should take steps to ensure ammunition is equally distributed throughout the platoon before the start of any tactical operation, after direct-fire contact with the enemy, and during consolidation on an objective.
CLASS VI
7-18. Class VI covers personal-demand items. Tobacco products, candy, and toiletry articles are normally sold through the exchange system during peacetime or for units not in a combat environment. In a combat environment, these items are sent with Class I as health and comfort packs.
CLASS VII
7-19. Class VII includes major-end items. These are major pieces of equipment, assembled and ready for intended use, such as combat vehicles, missile launchers, artillery pieces, and major weapon systems. Major-end items that are destroyed are reported immediately by means of CS reports (see ST 3-20.153 for report formats). The items will be replaced by the parent unit as they are reported and as available.
CLASS VIII
7-20. Class VIII includes medical supplies, which are provided through the battalion or squadron medical platoon and ordered through the medical team supporting the platoon, company, or troop. Included are individual medical supplies such as first-aid dressings, refills for first-aid kits and combat lifesaver bags, water purification tablets, and foot powder.
CLASS IX
7-21. Class IX comprises repair parts carried by the maintenance team. These basic-load supplies are part of the PLL. PLL items carried by the platoon usually include spare track, road wheels, assorted bolts, machine gun parts, and light bulbs. Class IX supplies are requisitioned through the company or troop maintenance section by using the DA Form 2404, Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet.
METHODS OF RESUPPLY
7-22. The tank platoon uses three methods in conducting supply operations: pre-positioning, routine resupply, and emergency resupply. The method to be used is determined after an analysis of the factors of METT-TC.
PRE-POSITIONING
7-23. Pre-positioning of supplies, also known as prestock resupply, may be required in some defensive operations. Normally, only Class V items will be prestocked, but Class I and Class III supplies may be included in some situations. Prestock operations are fairly rare in the offense and generally are limited to refueling.
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Operational Considerations
7-24. The location and amount of a prestock must be carefully planned and then verified through reconnaissance and rehearsals. Each TC must be informed of prestock locations. The following considerations influence selection of prestock sites and execution of the resupply operation: z Availability of overhead cover for the prestock location. z Cover and concealment for the location and routes that vehicles will take to reach it. z Security procedures required to safeguard the resupply operation. z Procedures for protecting friendly personnel and vehicles in the event prestock ammunition is ignited.
ROUTINE RESUPPLY
7-28. These operations include regular resupply of items in Classes I, III, V, and IX and of any other items requested by the company or troop. Routine resupply is planned at battalion level and normally takes place at every opportunity. The LOGPAC comprises company/troop and battalion/squadron assets that transport supplies to the company or troop (see Figure 7-1).
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Sustainment
Figure 7-1. Example company or troop LOGPAC 7-29. The company or troop supply sergeant assembles his LOGPAC in the battalion/squadron field trains area under the supervision of the support platoon leader from the FSC and the company 1SG. Replacements and hospital returnees travel to company/troop locations on LOGPAC vehicles as required. 7-30. Once the LOGPAC is prepared for movement, the supply sergeant moves the vehicles forward from the field trains as part of the battalion/squadron resupply convoy to the logistics resupply point (LRP). The 1SG or his representative meets the LOGPAC and guides it to the company or troop resupply point. The company or troop then executes tailgate or service-station resupply; refer to the discussion of these resupply techniques later in this section.
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Chapter 7
EMERGENCY RESUPPLY
7-31. Emergency resupply, normally involving Class III and Class V, is executed when the platoon has such an urgent need for resupply that it cannot wait for the routine LOGPAC. Emergency resupply procedures start with immediate redistribution of ammunition in individual vehicles, followed by crossleveling of ammunition within the platoon. It is better to have four tanks with 20 rounds of ammunition each than two tanks with 40 rounds and two others with none. 7-32. Once requested through the commander or 1SG, emergency supplies are brought forward by the battalion/squadron support platoon. Based on the enemy situation, the tank platoon may have to conduct resupply while in contact with the enemy. Two techniques are used to resupply units in contact: z Limited supplies are brought forward to the closest concealed position, where the tailgate technique of resupply is used. z Individual vehicles or sections disengage and move to a resupply point, obtain their supplies, and then return to the fight. This is a version of the service-station technique. Note. Refer to the following discussion of the tailgate and service-station resupply techniques.
TECHNIQUES OF RESUPPLY
7-33. The tactical situation will dictate which technique of resupply the platoon will use: tailgate, service station, a variation of one type, or a combination of both types. The situation will also dictate when to resupply. Generally, the platoon should attempt to avoid resupply during the execution of offensive operations; resupply should be done during mission transition. Resupply is unavoidable during defensive missions of long duration.
TAILGATE RESUPPLY
7-34. In the tailgate technique, fuel and ammunition are brought to individual tanks by the 1SG or another responsible individual who is assisting him (see Figure 7-2). This method is used when routes leading to vehicle positions are available and the unit is not under direct enemy observation and fire. It is timeconsuming, but it is useful in maintaining stealth during defensive missions because tanks do not have to move. If necessary, supplies can be hand carried to vehicle positions to further minimize signatures.
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Sustainment
SERVICE-STATION RESUPPLY
7-35. In the service-station technique, vehicles move to a centrally located point for rearming and refueling, either by section or as an entire platoon (see Figure 7-3). Service-station resupply is inherently faster than the tailgate method; because vehicles must move and concentrate, however, it can create security problems. During defensive missions, the platoon must be careful not to compromise the location of fighting positions.
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Chapter 7
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7-42. The platoon leader is concerned primarily with supervising operator maintenance. He also must ensure that personnel perform scheduled services as part of organizational maintenance. In addition, he must ensure that personnel provide support for DS maintenance elements when equipment must be evacuated.
LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
PLATOON LEADER
7-43. The platoon leader has ultimate responsibility for the condition and performance of the platoons equipment and materiel. In that role, his duties include the following: z Ensuring, within the platoons maintenance capabilities, that all platoon vehicles, weapon systems, and equipment such as night-vision devices, mine detectors, and communications equipment are combat ready at all times. The platoon leader also ensures that equipment that cannot be repaired at platoon level is reported to organizational maintenance as soon as possible using DA Form 2404. z Knowing the status of current platoon maintenance activities, including corrective actions for equipment faults, job orders to DS maintenance elements, and requisition of repair parts. The platoon leader keeps his commander informed of the platoons maintenance status. z Coordinating with the maintenance officer in planning, directing, and supervising unit maintenance for the platoon. z Developing and supervising an ongoing maintenance training program. z Ensuring that tank crews have appropriate technical manuals on hand and are trained and supervised to complete operator maintenance properly. z Ensuring that unit-level PMCS are performed on all assigned equipment in accordance with appropriate operators manuals. z Ensuring that drivers are trained and licensed to operate platoon vehicles and equipment. z Planning and rehearsing a maintenance evacuation plan for every mission.
PLATOON SERGEANT
7-44. The PSG has primary responsibility for most of the platoons maintenance activities. His duties include the following: z Directing and supervising unit maintenance of platoon equipment, vehicles, and weapon systems. Because time constraints will not allow all equipment to be PMCSd every day, the PSG will need to develop a schedule to ensure all equipment is checked in a reasonable time. At a minimum, weapons and vehicles must be checked daily. z Helping the platoon leader to comply with his responsibilities and assuming these responsibilities in his absence. z Coordinating with the 1SG to arrange organizational or DS maintenance. z Supervising and accounting for platoon personnel during maintenance periods. z Ensuring that repair parts are used or stored as they are received. z Collecting reports of the platoons maintenance status in the field and sending the appropriate consolidated reports to maintenance personnel. z Ensuring that vehicles are always topped off with fuel in garrison and that they receive adequate fuel in the field. z Keeping the platoon leader informed of the platoons maintenance and logistics status.
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LEVELS OF MAINTENANCE
FIELD MAINTENANCEOPERATOR
7-46. Operator maintenance includes proper care, use, and maintenance of assigned vehicles and crew equipment such as weapons, CBRN equipment, and night-vision devices. Checks and services prescribed for the automotive system, weapon systems, and turret are divided into three groups: z Before-operation. z During-operation. z After-operation. 7-47. The driver and other crew members perform daily checks and services on their vehicle and equipment, to include inspecting, servicing, tightening, performing minor lubrication, cleaning, preserving, and adjusting. The driver and gunner are required to record the results of checks and services, as well as all equipment faults and deficiencies that they cannot immediately correct, on the equipment inspection and maintenance worksheet (DA Form 2404). The worksheet is the primary means of reporting equipment problems through the TC to the PSG and platoon leader and ultimately to organizational maintenance personnel. 7-48. The M1A2 is equipped with embedded nonintrusive and intrusive diagnostic test capabilities; these include the built-in test (BIT) and fault isolation test (FIT). These tests enable crews to identify and isolate many system and component failures prior to the arrival of organizational mechanics. Unit SOP should specify how to report the results of these tests as well as identify the duties of organizational mechanics.
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Special Note
Detailed vehicle and equipment checks and services are outlined in every operators manual and should always be conducted as stated in the manual. Although operators must learn to operate equipment without referring to the manual, maintenance must be performed using the appropriate technical manualnot from memory!
SUSTAINMENT MAINTENANCE
7-53. Sustainment maintenance entails operations employing job shops or bays or production lines; it gives units the capability to task-organize to meet special mission requirements. Sustainment maintenance assets operate at echelons above corps (EAC). Based on METT-TC factors and the tactical situation, platoon- or team-size elements may be moved as far forward as necessary to fulfill support requirements.
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7-57. If a recovery vehicle is not available or if time is critical, other platoon vehicles can evacuate the damaged vehicle for short distances. The decision to do this rests with the platoon leader. Towing procedures are outlined in the operators manual. Self-evacuation by the platoon is a last resort that should be considered only to prevent losing the damaged vehicle to the enemy. 7-58. If the damaged vehicle will be lost for an extended period, the platoon can replace other vehicles damaged equipment (such as weapons and radios) with properly functioning items from the damaged vehicle within the commanders controlled substitution policy. Damaged equipment can then be repaired or replaced while the vehicle is being repaired.
PERSONNEL SERVICES
7-59. Many of the personnel services required by the platoon are provided automatically by higher-level support elements; nonetheless, the platoon leader is ultimately responsible for coordinating personnel services and providing them to his platoon. These services are nearly always executed and supervised by the PSG and TCs and include the following: z Personal needs and comfort items, such as clothing exchange and showers. z Awards and decorations. z Leaves and passes. z Command information. z Mail. z Religious services. z Financial services. z Legal assistance. z Rest and relaxation. z Any other service designed to maintain the health, welfare, and morale of the Soldier.
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
7-60. Personnel management includes classification, assignment, promotions, and reenlistments. Although the platoon leader requests these actions through the company or troop, they are normally performed by the battalion or squadron staff or by a division-level organization. The platoon leader must submit accurate strength reports to ensure that crew positions, in which critical shortages exist, such as TCs and gunners, are filled with qualified personnel.
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refer to FM 21-10. Each platoon should have an NCO designated a field sanitation representative to ensure the platoon follows proper procedure when operating in a decentralized environment.
EVACUATION PROCEDURES
7-65. If wounded crewmen require evacuation, the platoon leader or PSG takes one of the following steps: z Coordinate with the 1SG or company/troop aidman for ground evacuation. z Coordinate with the company or troop commander for self-evacuation using organic platoon assets. z Coordinate with the 1SG or company/troop commander for aerial evacuation. 7-66. Regardless of the method of evacuation, all TCs must have the necessary sustainment graphics available, including casualty collection points for the company/troop and/or combined arms battalion/squadron. Evacuation procedures must be included in the platoon plan and should be rehearsed as part of mission preparation. 7-67. Aerial evacuation, if it is available, is preferred because of its speed. The platoon leader or PSG coordinates with higher headquarters and then switches to the designated frequency to coordinate directly with aerial assets for either MEDEVAC or casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) services. He must pick a relatively flat, open, and covered and concealed position for the aircrafts landing zone. The location should be given to the aircraft by radio and marked with colored smoke as the aircraft approaches the area. The tank platoon provides local security of the landing zone until the evacuation is complete.
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Figure 7-5B. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card (back side) 7-69. A wounded crewmans individual weapon becomes the responsibility of the TC, or senior remaining crewmen. Personal effects, weapons, and equipment are turned in to the company or troop supply sergeant at the earliest opportunity. The crewmans protective mask stays with him at all times. All sensitive items remain with the vehicle; these include maps, overlays, and SOPs.
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personal effects of the KIA Soldier remain with the body. The Soldiers weapon, equipment, and issue items become the responsibility of the TC until they can be turned over to the supply sergeant or 1SG. 7-71. As a rule, the bodies of KIA Soldiers should not be placed on the same vehicle as wounded Soldiers. If the PSG or 1SG cannot expedite evacuation, however, a vehicle may have to carry dead and wounded personnel together to its next stop. In the attack, this may be the objective. In the defense, it may be the next BP.
SECTION VI - DETAINEES
7-72. If enemy soldiers want to surrender, it is the tank crews responsibility to take them into custody and control them until they can be evacuated. Detainees are excellent sources of combat intelligence; however, this information will be of tactical value only if the prisoners are processed and evacuated to the rear quickly. 7-73. The unit SOP or company/troop OPORD should designate specific detainee handling procedures, such as collection points, responsibilities for safeguarding prisoners, and procedures for moving prisoners. The following discussion focuses on considerations that may apply when the platoon must deal with detainees, captured equipment and materiel, and civilians. (See FM 3-19.40 for additional information on the handling of detainees.)
HANDLING DETAINEES
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
7-74. The basic principles for handling detainees are covered by the five-Ss and T procedures (search, segregate, silence, speed, safeguard, and tag) outlined below.
SEGREGATE
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y Special circumstances of capture (how the person was captured, if he resisted, if he gave up, and so forth). Note. The capturing unit must complete a capture tag because failure to do so hinders further processing and disposition. 7-75. The first rule that platoon members must keep in mind is that they must never approach an enemy soldier, even when it appears certain that he wants to surrender. He may have a weapon hidden nearby, or he may be booby-trapped. The following procedures apply for taking the prisoner into custody: z Gesture for him to come forward, and then wait until it is clear that he is honestly surrendering and not trying to lure friendly troops into an ambush. z Use a thermal sight to locate possible ambushes. z When searching the prisoner, always have another friendly Soldier cover him with a weapon. z Do not move between the enemy and the Soldier covering him. 7-76. As directed by the platoon leader, crewmen take the detainees to an area designated by the commander. The prisoners are then evacuated to the rear for interrogation. If a detainee is wounded and cannot be evacuated through medical channels, the platoon leader notifies the XO or 1SG. The detainee will be escorted to the company or troop trains, or the 1SG will come forward with guards to evacuate him.
TAGGING OF DETAINEES
7-79. Before evacuating the detainee, attach a DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag to him listing all pertinent information and procedures. DD Form 2745 tags are not available by electronic media, but may be obtained through supply channels or made from materials available on the battlefield. An example is illustrated in Figure 7-6.
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Figure 7-6. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag
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7-81. The platoon should tag each captured item (see Figure 7-7 for an example). If the item is found in the detainees possession, include the prisoners name on the tag and give the item to the guard. The guard delivers the item with the detainee to the next higher headquarters. Platoons may find themselves in a fastpaced operation where equipment that is not of significant intelligence value may not be transported or recovered. In such cases, the platoon needs to have a plan on destroying the equipment so it will not fall back into the enemys hands. (Note. Enemy medical equipment will never be destroyed.)
CIVILIANS
7-82. Civilians who are captured as the result of curfew violations or suspicious activities are treated the same other detainees. The platoon evacuates them quickly to higher headquarters using the five-Ss and T principles discussed earlier in this section.
EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS
7-84. If the brigade or battalion task force is tasked to facilitate the evacuation of civilians from the AO, the unit is normally augmented by CA personnel. Infantry units may provide security and command and control for the execution of this operation, which is accomplished in two separate but supporting actions. z CA personnel coordinate with the military police and local police officials for evacuation planning. They plan for establishing evacuation routes and thoroughfare crossing control, and for removing civilians from the MSRs. z CA personnel coordinate with U.S. Army PSYOP assets, local government officials, radio and television stations, newspapers, and so on, to publicize the evacuation plan.
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TACTICAL PSYOP
7-86. Tactical PSYOP in support of urban operations are planned and conducted to achieve immediate and short-term objectives. PSYOP are an integral and coordinated part of the overall tactical plan. They provide the tactical commander with a system that can weaken the enemy soldiers will to fight, thereby reducing his combat effectiveness. They can also help prevent civilian interference with military operations. PSYOP are designed to exploit individual and group weaknesses. For example, infantry units may be given the mission to clear a specific urban objective where it has been determined that a graduated response will be used. The PSYOP unit would be in support of the unit conducting this mission, and they use loudspeakers to broadcast warnings and or incentives not to resist.
OTHER PSYOP
7-87. PSYOP units also provide support during urban operations using television, radio, posters, leaflets, and loudspeakers to disseminate propaganda and information. Television, including videotapes, is one of the most effective media for persuasion. It offers many advantages for PSYOP and is appropriate for use during urban operations. In areas where television is not common, receivers may be distributed to public facilities and selected individuals. Note. See FM 3-05.40 for further discussion on civil affairs.
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Urban Operations
The platoon may take part in large-scale urban operations as part of a larger force. This chapter examines the basic characteristics of urban operations as well as special planning considerations and techniques of offensive and defensive operations as well as employment of attack and assault/cargo helicopters. For more detailed information, refer to FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1) or FM 3-06.11 (FM 90-10-1).
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installations (examples, Camp Lejeune, Fort Huachuca, Travis Air Force Base, and Norfolk Navy Base).
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Figure 8-3. Tank main gun and coax dead space above street level
Employment
8-5. The primary consideration that impacts the employment of machine guns within urban areas is the limited availability of long-range fields of fire. 8-6. The caliber .50 machine gun is often employed on its vehicular mount during both offensive and defensive operations. The caliber .50 machine gun can be used as an accurate, long-range weapon and can supplement sniper fires. 8-7. The M240 machine gun is useful to suppress and isolate enemy defenders.
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8-8. The M240 is less effective against masonry targets than the caliber .50 machine gun because of its reduced penetration power.
Weapon Penetration
8-9. The ability of the 7.62-mm and caliber .50 rounds to penetrate is also affected by the range to the target and type of material fired against. The 7.62-mm round is affected less by close ranges than the 5.56mm; the caliber .50 rounds penetration is reduced least of all. 8-10. At 50 meters, the 7.62-mm ball round cannot reliably penetrate a single layer of well-packed sandbags. It can penetrate a single layer of sandbags at 200 meters, but not a double layer. The armorpiercing round does only slightly better against sandbags. It cannot penetrate a double layer but can penetrate up to 10 inches at 600 meters. 8-11. The penetration of the 7.62-mm round is best at 600 meters. Most urban targets are closer. The longest effective range is usually 200 meters or less. Table 8-1 explains the penetration capabilities of a single 7.62-mm (ball) round at closer ranges. Table 8-1. Penetration capabilities of a single 7.62-mm (ball) round
Range (meters) Penetration (inches) Pine Board Dry, Loose Sand Cinder Block Concrete
25 100 200
13 18 41
5 4.5 7
8 10 8
2 2 2
8-12. The caliber .50 round is also optimized for penetration at long ranges (about 800 meters). For hard targets, obliquity and range affect caliber .50 penetration. Both armor-piercing and ball ammunition penetrate 14 inches of sand or 28 inches of packed earth at 200 meters, if the rounds impact perpendicular to the flat face of the target. Table 8-2 explains the effect of a 25-degree obliquity on a caliber .50 penetration. Table 8-2. Number of rounds needed to penetrate a reinforced concrete wall at a 25-degree obliquity
Thickness (feet) 100 Meters (rounds) 200 Meters (rounds)
2 3 4
Protection
8-13. Barriers that offer protection against 5.56-mm rounds are also effective against 7.62-mm rounds with some exceptions. The 7.62-mm round can penetrate a windowpane at a 45-degree obliquity, a hollow cinder block, or both sides of a car body. It can also penetrate wooden frame buildings easily. The caliber .50 round can penetrate all the commonly found urban barriers except a sand-filled 55-gallon drum.
Wall Penetration
8-14. Continued and concentrated machine gun fire can breach most typical urban walls. Such fire cannot breach thick, reinforced-concrete structures or dense, natural-stone walls. Internal walls, partitions, plaster, floors, ceilings, common office furniture, home appliances, and bedding can be penetrated easily by both 7.62-mm and caliber .50 rounds (Tables 8-3 and 8-4).
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Table 8-3. Structure penetrating capabilities of 7.62-mm round (NATO ball) against typical urban targets (range 25 meters)
Type Thickness (inches) Hole Diameter (inches) Rounds Required
Reinforced concrete Triple brick wall Concrete block with single brick veneer Cinder block (filled) Double brick wall Double sandbag wall Log wall Mild steel door
8 14 12 12 9 24 16 3/8
7 7 6 and 24 * * * * *
* Penetration only, no loop hole. (A small hole or slit in a wall, especially one through which small arms may be fired.)
Table 8-4. Structure penetrating capabilities of caliber .50 ball against typical urban targets (range 35 meters)
Type Thickness (inches) Hole Diameter (inches) Rounds Required
Reinforced concrete
10 18 12 12 1 24 16
12 24 7 8 26 10 33 * * *
50 100 140 15 50 25 45 1 5 1
Triple brick wall Concrete block with single brick veneer Armor plate Double sandbag wall Log wall
* Penetration only, no loop hole. (A small hole or slit in a wall, especially one through which small arms may be fired.)
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ROE/ROI and civilians. The ROE and/or ROI may restrict the use of certain weapon systems and TTPs. As an integral part of urban operations, noncombatants create special operational problems. To deal with these concerns, units operating in urban terrain must know how to effectively employ linguists and counterintelligence and civil affairs teams. The slow pace of urban operations. This will usually prevent the platoon from taking full advantage of the speed and mobility of its tanks. When buttoned up, the tank platoons command and control and freedom of maneuver will be reduced due to limited visibility.
MANEUVER
PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
8-16. The following factors related to maneuver will affect the platoons urban operations planning and execution: z The need for detailed centralized planning and decentralized execution. Urban operations are usually executed as a deliberate attack, demanding extensive intelligence activities and rehearsals. z Requirements for cooperation. Urban operations are most successful when close cooperation is established between dismounted forces, armored vehicles, and aviation elements at the lowest level. z Formation of combined arms teams at the lowest levels. Whereas task organization normally is done no lower than platoon level, urban operations may require task organization of squads and sections. The tank platoon may face a variety of organizational options, such as a tank section or an individual tank working with an infantry platoon or squad. Leaders must strive to employ armored vehicles in sections at a minimum. Whether conducting operations as a twotank section or a tank/Bradley section, armored vehicles must work together to overwatch movements and defeat threats outside the capabilities of dismounted forces. Integration of aviation assets and their ability to communicate and act in coordination with small-unit ground forces greatly increases the chances of mission success. For a detailed discussion of employment of Army aviation in an urban environment, see Section IV of this chapter. z Vulnerability of friendly forces. Tanks can provide firepower to effectively support accompanying infantry squads, but they are, in turn, vulnerable to attack from enemy infantry. The attacking force in urban operations must also guard against local counterattacks. z Absolute necessity to maintain all-around security and situational awareness. When conducting urban operations, it is absolutely imperative that leaders and units at all levels maintain all-around situational awareness and security. The ability of the enemy to move rapidly within an urban environment to gain positions above, behind, or below friendly forces necessitates an active and vigilant reconnaissance and IPB of the tank platoons area of operations and area of interest. In addition, individual tanks, sections, and platoons must be extremely vigilant in conducting local security of their vehicles and formation as well as providing overwatch for attached mechanized or dismounted elements. z The role of infantry. Infantry squads are employed extensively during urban operations as part of the combined arms team. They can be employed against both enemy vehicles and enemy dismounted elements. 8-17. Additionally, the infantry can help the tank platoon by z Locating targets for tanks to engage. z Destroying antitank weapons. z Assaulting enemy positions and clearing buildings with tank support. z Protecting tanks from antitank fires.
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z z z
Light infantry forces lack heavy supporting firepower, protection, and long-range mobility. Exposed light infantry forces are subject to a high number of casualties between buildings. Light infantry forces are more vulnerable to fratricide-related casualties from friendly direct and indirect fire.
HULL DOWN
8-24. If fields of fire are restricted to streets, hull-down positions should be used to gain cover and fire directly down streets (Figures 8-4A and 8-4B). From those positions, tanks and BFVs are protected and
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can move to alternate positions rapidly. Buildings collapsing from enemy fires are a minimal hazard to the armored vehicle and crew if operating in a closed hatch configuration.
HIDE
8-25. The hide position (Figure 8-5) covers and conceals the vehicle until time to move into position for target engagement. Since the crew will not be able to see advancing enemy forces, an observer from the vehicle or a nearby infantry unit must be concealed in an adjacent building to alert the crew. The observer acquires the target and signals the armored vehicle to move to the firing position and to fire. After firing, the tank or BFV moves to an alternate position to avoid compromising one location.
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BUILDING HIDE
8-26. The building hide position (Figure 8-6) conceals the vehicle inside a building. If basement hide positions are inaccessible, engineers must evaluate the buildings floor strength and prepare for the vehicle. Once the position is detected, it should be evacuated to avoid enemy fires.
INTELLIGENCE
8-27. Threats to the U.S. have one common goal: to coerce the U.S. military or a U.S.-led multinational force to redeploy out of the theater of operations. The primary means of accomplishing this goal is for the threat to cause a politically unacceptable level of casualties to friendly forces. Urban areas provide a casualty-producing and stress-inducing environment ideally suited for threat operations. Moreover, urban areas provide the threat with an unmatched degree of cover and concealment from friendly forces.
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community. Even conventional and paramilitary troops may often have a civilian look. Western military forces adopted the clean-shaven, close-cut hair standard at the end of the nineteenth century to combat disease and infection, but twenty-first-century opponents might very well sport beards as well as civilian-looking clothing and other non-military characteristics. The civil population may also provide cover for threat forces, enhancing their mobility in proximity to friendly positions. Allowing the enemy to shoot and then disappear into the crowd. 8-32. Threat forces may take advantage of U.S. moral responsibilities and attempt to make the civil population a burden on the Armys logistical and force-protection resources. They may herd refugees into friendly controlled sectors, steal from U.S.-paid local nationals, and hide among civilians during offensive operations. 8-33. The civil population may also serve as an important intelligence source for the threat. Local hires serving among U.S. Soldiers, civilians with access to base camp perimeters, and refugees moving through friendly controlled sectors may be manipulated by threat forces to provide information on friendly dispositions, readiness, and intent. In addition, threat SPF and hostile intelligence service (HOIS) assets may move among well-placed civilian groups.
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FIRE SUPPORT
8-39. The urban operations environment affects how and when indirect fires are employed. The following factors may have an impact on planning and execution of indirect fire support: z When taking part in urban operations, the platoon must always keep in the mind that the urban operations environment creates unique requirements for centrally controlled fires and more restrictive fire control measures. z An urban operation requires the careful use of VT ammunition to prevent premature arming. z Indirect fire may cause unwanted rubble. z The close proximity of friendly troops to enemy forces and other indirect fire targets requires careful coordination. z WP ammunition may create unwanted fires or smoke. z Artillery may be used in direct fire mode against point targets. z Fuse delay should be used to ensure rounds penetrate fortifications as required.
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z z
VT and ICM rounds are effective for clearing enemy positions, observers, and antennas on rooftops. Illumination rounds can be effective in the urban setting; however, employment must be carefully planned to ensure friendly positions remain in the shadows while enemy positions are highlighted. Tall buildings may mask the effects of illumination rounds. Mortars are the most responsive indirect fires available to the platoon in the urban environment. They are well suited for combat in built-up areas because of their high rate of fire, steep angle of fall, and short minimum range. In employing mortars, however, the platoon faces difficulties in target acquisition and the effects of the rounds (rubble).
SUSTAINMENT
8-40. Guidelines for providing effective sustainment to units fighting in built-up areas include the following: z Plan for a higher consumption rate of supplies when operating in an urban environment due to the slow pace. z Plan the locations of casualty collection points and evacuation sites. z Plan for the use of carrying parties and litter bearers. z Plan for and use host-country support and civil resources when authorized and practical. z Develop plans for requesting and obtaining special equipment such as ladders and toggle ropes with grappling hooks.
HASTY ATTACK
8-43. Task forces and company teams conduct hasty attacks in a variety of tactical situations: z As a result of meeting engagements. z When unexpected contact occurs and bypass has not been authorized. z When the enemy is in a vulnerable position and can be quickly defeated through immediate offensive action. 8-44. The following special considerations apply for hasty attacks in the urban environment: z In built-up areas, incomplete intelligence and concealment may require the maneuver unit to move through, rather than around, the unit fixing the enemy in place (the base of fire element). Control and coordination become important factors in reducing congestion at the edges of the built-up area. z Once its objective is secured, an urban hasty attack force may have to react to contingency requirements, either by executing on-order or be-prepared missions or by responding to FRAGOs.
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DELIBERATE ATTACK
8-45. A deliberate attack is a fully integrated operation that employs all available assets against the enemys defense. It is employed when enemy positions are well prepared, when the built-up area is large or severely congested, or when the element of surprise has been lost. Deliberate attacks are characterized by precise planning based on detailed information and reconnaissance and thorough preparations and rehearsals. 8-46. Given the nature of urban terrain, the techniques employed in the deliberate attack of a built-up area are similar to those used in assaulting a strongpoint. The attack avoids the enemys main strength, instead focusing combat power on the weakest point in the defense. A deliberate attack in a built-up area is usually conducted in four phases: reconnoiter the objective, isolate the objective, secure a foothold, and clear the built-up area. The following discussion examines these phases in detail.
WARNING
Friendly elements may still be operating in the area; therefore, extra caution must be taken to prevent fratricide.
GAIN A FOOTHOLD
8-50. Gaining a foothold involves seizing an intermediate objective that provides attacking forces with cover from enemy fire as well as a place at which they can enter the built-up area. When the tank platoon is operating with the company, the foothold is normally one to two city blocks. As the platoon attacks to gain the foothold, it should be supported by direct and indirect suppressive fires and by obscuring or screening smoke.
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z z
Enemy resistance is light or fragmented. Buildings in the area are of light construction with large open areas between them. In this situation, the commander would clear only those buildings along the approach to his objective or those necessary to ensure the units security.
8-52. On the other hand, the attacking unit may have a mission to systematically clear an area of all enemy forces. Through detailed analysis, the commander may anticipate that the unit will be opposed by a strong, organized resistance or will be operating in areas where buildings are close together. The platoons move slowly through the area, clearing systematically from room to room and building to building. Other maneuver elements support the clearing elements and are prepared to assume their mission as necessary.
TASK ORGANIZATION
8-54. The task organization of a platoon taking part in an attack during an urban operation may vary according to the specific nature of the built-up area and the objective. In general, the parent task force and/or company team will employ an assault force, a support force, and a reserve; in some cases, a security force is also used. Normally, there is no separate breach force; however, breaching elements may be part of the assault or support force, depending on the type and location of anticipated obstacles.
SUPPORT FORCE
8-55. Most mounted elements of the urban unit, such as the tank platoon, are generally task organized in the support force. This allows the task force/company team commander to employ the firepower of the fighting vehicles without compromising their survivability, a distinct danger when heavy forces move into an urban area. The support force isolates the area of operations and the actual entry point into the urban area, allowing assault forces to secure a foothold.
ASSAULT FORCE
8-56. The assault force is the element that gains a foothold in the urban area and conducts the clearance of actual objectives in the area. This force is normally a dismounted element task organized with engineers, with specific augmentation by armored vehicles.
RESERVE FORCE
8-57. The reserve force normally includes both mounted and dismounted forces. It should be prepared to conduct any of the following tasks: z Attack from another direction. z Exploit friendly success or enemy weakness. z Secure the rear or flank of friendly forces. z Clear bypassed enemy positions. z Maintain contact with adjacent units. z Conduct support by fire or attack by fire as necessary.
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8-59. The commander may position the platoon outside the built-up area, where it will remain for the duration of the attack to cover high-speed avenues of approach. This is especially true during the isolation phase. (Note. Before providing support for the attack, tanks must be able to maneuver into overwatch or base-of-fire positions; this will normally require support from organic infantry weapons to suppress enemy strongpoints and ATGM assets.) Additionally, the tank platoon can conduct the following urban offensive operations: z Neutralize enemy positions with machine gun fire. z Destroy enemy strongpoints with main gun fire. z Destroy obstacles across streets. z Force entry of infantry into buildings. z Emplace supporting fires as directed by the infantry. z Establish roadblocks and barricades.
MUTUAL SUPPORT
8-60. In house-to-house and street fighting, tanks move down the streets protected by the infantry, which clears the area of enemy ATGM weapons. The armored vehicles in turn support the infantry by firing their main guns and machine guns from a safe standoff range to destroy enemy positions. Particular attention must be paid to the layout of the urban area. Streets and alleys provide ready-made firing sectors and killing zones for tanks to use. Note. Figure 8-8 illustrates a situation in which two tank platoons are participating in a task force attack in an urban operations environment.
Figure 8-8. Example task force attack in an urban environment, with tank platoons in the support and assault forces
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adjacent to buildings (using the buildings to mask enemy observation), or in culverts. Refer to Figure 8-5 on page 8-9 for an example of a tank using an urban hide position. Since the crew will not be able to see the advancing enemy from the hide position, an observer from the tank or a nearby infantry unit must be concealed in an adjacent building to alert the crew (see Figure 8-5 on page 8-9). When the observer acquires a target, he signals the tank to move to the firing position and, at the proper time, to fire. After firing, the tank moves to an alternate position to avoid compromising its location.
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evacuation, and support by fire for ground forces. Army aviation also enhances the combined arms teams ability to quickly and efficiently transition to new missions.
MARKING METHODS
8-75. Table 8-5, page 8-21 describes different marking methods.
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Smoke (IR)
D/N
All NVD AT
Good
Good
D/N D
All All
NA Good
Good NA
Spotlight
All
Good
Marginal
IR Spotlight
All NVD
Good
Marginal
N N
Good Good
Marginal Good
Visual Laser
All
Good
Marginal
Laser Designator
D/N
NA
Good
Tracers
D/N
NA
Marginal
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Strobe (Overt)
All
Marginal
NA
Strobe (IR)
All NVD
Good
NA
D/N N N
NA NA NA
Combat ID Panel
D/N
All FLIR
Good
NA
D D/N
Marginal Poor
NA NA
All
Marginal
NA
All NVD
Marginal
NA
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such as, The third floor of the Hotel Caviar, south-east corner. This transition should be facilitated by using a big to small acquisition technique.
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Note. Ground forces should make every attempt to pass along accurate 8-digit grid coordinates. The AH-64D can easily and accurately engage targets using this method.
WEAPONS MIX
8-78. Armed helicopters can carry a mix of weapons. Commanders must choose the weapons to use on a specific mission based on the effects on the target, employment techniques, and the targets proximity to ground forces. Leaders must consider proportionality, collateral damage, and noncombatant casualties. Leaders and air crew must consider the following when choosing weapons: z Hard, smooth, flat surfaces with 90-degree angles are characteristic of man-made targets. Due to aviation delivery parameters, munitions will normally strike a target at an angle less than 90 degrees. This may reduce the effect of munitions and increase the chance of ricochets. The tendency of rounds to strike glancing blows against hard surfaces means that up to 25 percent of impact-fused rounds may not detonate when fired onto rubbled areas. z Identification and engagement times are short. z Depression and elevation limits create dead space. Target engagement from oblique angles, both horizontal and vertical, must be considered. z Smoke, dust, and shadows mask targets. Additionally, rubble and man-made structures can mask fires. Targets, even those at close range, tend to be indistinct. z Urban fighting often involves units attacking on converging routes. The risks from friendly fires, ricochets, and fratricide must be considered during the planning of operations. z The effect of the weapon and the position of friendly and enemy personnel with relation to structures must be considered. Chose weapons for employment based on their effects against the buildings material composition rather than against enemy personnel. z Munitions can produce secondary effects, such as fires.
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from the ground maneuver battalion on the enemy and friendly situations. The battalion also verifies frequencies and call signs of the unit in contact. By this time, the ground maneuver battalion has contacted the ground maneuver unit leader in contact to inform him that attack aviation is en route to conduct a hasty attack. Figure 8-15 shows an example of radio traffic and what may occur.
Figure 8-15. Example radio conversation 8-82. Upon receiving the required information from the ground maneuver battalion, the attack team leader changes frequency to the ground companys FM command net to conduct final coordination before progressing on attack routes to BPs or ABF/SBF positions. Coordination begins with the ground maneuver company commander and ends with the leader of the lowest-level unit in contact. 8-83. Regardless of which key leader the attack team leader conducts coordination with, the ground command net is the most suitable net on which both air and ground elements can conduct the operation. It allows all key leaders on the ground, including the FIST chief and the attack team leader and his attack crews, to communicate on one common net throughout the operation. Operating on the command net also allows the attack team to request responsive mortar fire for either suppression or immediate suppression of the enemy. The AH-64 Apache and the AH-1 Cobra are limited to only one FM radio due to aircraft configuration; however, the OH-58 is dual-FM capable, which gives the attack team leader the capability to maintain communications with the ground maneuver company, as well as its higher headquarters or a fire support element (see Figure 8-16).
Attack Team HARDROCK 06, THIS IS BLACKJACK 26 ON FH 478, OVER. Ground Maneuver Battalion BLACKJACK 26, THIS IS HARDROCK 06, L/C, OVER.
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Attack Team HARDROCK 06, BLACKJACK 26, GOOD COPY. STANDING BY AT HOLDING AREA FOR ACF REQUEST, OVER. HARDROCK 16, BLACKJACK. ELEMENTS WILL ATTACK FROM THE SOUTHEAST. TURN ON IR STROBES AT THIS TIME. WE WILL ESTABLISH A BP 100 METERS TO THE WEST OF YOUR POSITION, OVER. ROGER HARDROCK, BLACKJACK HAS YOUR POSITION, EN ROUTE FOR ATTACK, 30 SECONDS, OVER. HARDROCK 16, BLACKJACK 26, ENGAGEMENT COMPLETE, TWO T-80s DESTROYED, OVER.
Ground Maneuver Battalion BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 06. STAND BY FOR UPDATE. FRIENDLY PLATOON IN CONTACT LOCATED AT VQ 96000050, MARKED BY IR STROBES. ENEMY PLATOON-SIZE ARMOR ELEMENT IS 800 METERS DUE NORTH. THERE HAS BEEN SPORADIC HEAVY MACHINE GUN FIRE AND MAIN TANK GUN FIRE INTO OUR POSITION. FIRE APPEARS TO BE COMING FROM ROAD INTERSECTION VICINITY VQ 96204362. NEGATIVE KNOWLEDGE ON DISPOSITION OF ENEMY ADA. ILL BE HANDING YOU DOWN TO HARDROCK 16 FOR THE ACF REQUEST, OVER. ROGER BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 16. REQUEST FOLLOWS. FRIENDLY LOCATION VQ 96000050, 360-DEGREES TO TARGET, 800 METERS, TWO T-80S AT THE ROAD INTERSECTION, TARGET LOCATION VQ 96000850, AN/PAQ-4 SPOT ON, NO FRIENDLIES NORTH OF THE 00 GRID LINE, LOW WIRES DIRECTLY OVER OUR POSITION, OVER. BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 16, STROBES ON AT THIS TIME, OVER. HARDROCK 16, ROGER. BLACKJACK 26, HARDROCK 16, ROGER TWO T80s DESTROYED, END OF MISSION, OUT.
Figure 8-17. Example request for immediate ACF 8-89. After receipt of a request for immediate ACF, the attack team leader informs the ground unit leader of the BP, SBF, or the series of positions his team will occupy that provide the best observation and fields of fire into the engagement or target area. z The BP or SBF is a position from which the attack aircraft will engage the enemy with direct fire. It includes a number of individual aircraft firing positions and may be preplanned or established as the situation dictates. Size will vary depending on the number of aircraft using the position, the size of the engagement area, and the type of terrain. z The BP or SBF is normally offset from the flank of the friendly ground position, but close to the position of the requesting unit to facilitate efficient target handoffs. This also ensures that rotor wash, ammunition casing expenditure and the general signature of the aircraft does not interfere with operations on the ground. The offset position also allows the aircraft to engage the enemy on its flanks rather than its front, and lessens the risk of fratricide along the helicopter gun target line. 8-90. The attack team leader then provides the ground maneuver unit leader with his concept for the teams attack on the objective. This may be as simple as relaying the direction the aircraft will be coming from or attack route, time required to move forward from their current position, and the location of the BP. Only on completion of coordination with the lowest unit in contact does the flight depart the holding area for the battle position. As the attack team moves out of the holding area, it uses nap of the earth (NOE) flight along attack routes to mask itself from ground enemy observation and enemy direct fire systems. The attack team leader maintains FM communications with the ground unit leader while he maintains internal communications on either his very high frequency (VHF) or ultra high frequency (UHF) net. Note. Grid locations may be difficult for the ground maneuver, depending on the intensity of the on-going engagement, and actual FM communications between the ground and air may not work this well.
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BALANCED MINDSET
9-2. A balance must be achieved between the mindset of peacetime military engagement in areas of stable peace through major combat operations during general war. Soldiers cannot become too complacent in their warrior spirit, but also must not be too eager to rely on the use of force to resolve conflict. This balance is the essence of full-spectrum operations and the fundamental aspect that will enable the company team to perform its mission successfully and avoid an escalation to combat. Proactive leaders that are communicating and enforcing the ROE are instrumental to achieving this mindset.
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PEACETIME
9-4. In peacetime, a variety of measures are employed to achieve national objectives; these include political, economic, and informational measures, as well as military actions short of combat operations or active support of warring parties. Within this environment, U.S. forces may conduct training exercises to demonstrate national resolve; conduct peacekeeping operations; participate in nation-building activities; conduct disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; provide security assistance to friends and allies; or execute shows of force. Confrontations and tensions may escalate during peacetime to reach a point of transition into a state of conflict.
CONFLICT
9-5. Conflict can encompass numerous types of situations, including the following: z Clashes or crises over boundary disputes and land and water territorial claims. z Situations in which opposing political factions engage in military actions to gain control of political leadership within a nation. z Armed clashes between nations or between organized parties within a nation to achieve limited political or military objectives. 9-6. While regular military forces are sometimes involved, the use of irregular forces frequently predominates in conflict actions. Conflict is often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and limited in weaponry and level of violence. In this state, military response to a threat is exercised indirectly, usually in support of other elements of national power. Limited objectives, however, may be achieved by the short, focused, and direct application of military force. Conflict approaches the threshold of a state of war as the number of nations and/or troops, the frequency of battles, and the level of violence increase over an extended time. 9-7. Stability operations and civil support operations involving tank platoons often occur in the state of peacetime. Refer to Section IV of this appendix for examples of stability and support situations in which the tank platoon may participate.
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Civil control. Regulating the behavior and activity of individuals and groups to reduce risk to individuals or groups and to promote security. Control channels the populations activity to allow for the provision of security and essential services while coexisting with a military force conducting operations. A curfew is an example of civil control. Essential services. Essential services include emergency life-saving medical care, the prevention of epidemic disease, provision of food and water, provision of emergency shelter from the elements, and the provision of basic sanitation (sewage and garbage disposal). Governance. The provision of societal control functions that include regulation of public activity, taxation, maintenance of security, control and essential services, and normalizing means of succession of power.
9-10. The degree to which Army forces engage in these types of stability operations is circumstantial. In some operations, the host nation is capable of carrying out these types of operations and Army forces are engaged in civil-military operations to minimize the impact of military presence on the populace. Army forces located in Kuwait but supporting operations in Iraq is an example of this. On the other hand, Army forces within Iraq may be responsible for the well-being of the local population, while working with other agencies to restore basic capabilities to the area or region. (Note. See FM 3-07 [FM 100-20] for detail on stability operations.)
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populations in unstable areas. They support this by isolating irregular forces from the population. Forces engaged in an operation where stability predominates may have to defend themselves. Conversely, they may conduct defensive and offensive operations to physically isolate, defeat, or destroy forces seeking to undermine the effectiveness or credibility of the stability mission. Following conventional hostilities, forces conduct stability operations to provide a secure environment for civil authorities. Security is vital to achieving reconciliation, providing governance, rebuilding lost infrastructure, and resuming vital services.
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UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL FOR UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL-UNIT ACTIONS
9-20. Individual and small-unit actions can have consequences disproportionate to the level of command or amount of force involved. In some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic impact. Recognizing and avoiding these potential problems requires trained, disciplined, and knowledgeable leaders and Soldiers at every level. Every Soldier must be aware of the operational and strategic context of the mission. Additionally, each Soldier must understand the potential military, political, and legal consequences of the actions they take or fail to take. Dissemination of this information throughout the force minimizes any possible confusion regarding desired objectives.
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LEADER REQUIREMENTS
9-26. Flexibility and situational understanding are paramount requirements, especially for the tank platoon leader. The platoons role and/or objectives in stability operations and civil support operations will not always be clear. The platoon leader will sometimes be called upon to make on-the-spot decisions that could have an immediate, dramatic effect on the strategic or operational situation. In this uniquely tense setting, leaders who disregard the will of belligerent parties and the lethality of these groups weapons compromise the success of their mission and risk the lives of their Soldiers.
Tempo
9-29. The speed of military action can vary widely, from fast, violent tactical movement by a reaction force for the purpose of relieving encircled friendly forces to the deliberate occupation of stationary defensive positions to provide overwatch at traffic control points. Although extreme tension may underlie stability operations and civil support operations, the tempo of these operations is generally slow. 9-30. Throughout stability operations and civil support operations, belligerents can be expected to execute both overt and covert operations to test friendly reaction times and security procedures. Units that are predictable or that lack sound OPSEC leave themselves susceptible to attack. For the tank platoon, the key to a secure environment is not only to maintain the highest possible level of OPSEC, but also to vary the techniques by which security procedures are executed.
INTELLIGENCE
9-32. Intelligence is crucial during the planning, preparation, and execution of stability operations and civil support operations. The threats faced by military forces in these operations are more ambiguous than those in other situations because combatants, guerrillas, and terrorists can easily blend with the civilian population. Before forces are committed, intelligence must be collected, processed, and focused to support all planning, training, and operational requirements. (Note. See FM 3-07 [FM 100-20] for additional information.)
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DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS
9-33. Although stability operations are normally centrally planned, execution takes the form of smallscale, decentralized actions conducted over extended distances. Responsibility for making decisions on the ground will fall to junior leaders. Effective command guidance and a thorough understanding of the applicable ROE and/or ROI (refer to the following discussions) are critical at each operational level.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
9-34. ROE are politically imposed restrictions on military operations. The ROE are directed by higher military authorities based on the political and tactical situations and the level of threat. For example, these restrictions may require that the forces involved limit their use of firepower to a certain geographical area or that they limit the duration of their operations. Refer to Figure 9-1 for an example of ROE for one possible situation. 9-35. While ROE must be considered during the planning and execution of all operations, understanding, adjusting for, and properly executing ROE are especially important to success in stability operations and civil support operations. The units SOP will require adjustment based on each particular situations ROE. The restrictions change whenever the political and military situations change; this means ROE must be explained to friendly Soldiers continuously. 9-36. ROE provide the authority for the Soldiers right to self-defense. Each Soldier must understand the ROE and be prepared to execute them properly in every possible confrontation. In addition, ROE violations can have operational, strategic, and political consequences that may affect national security; the enemy can be expected to exploit such violations. All enemy military personnel and vehicles transporting enemy personnel or their equipment may be engaged subject to the following restrictions: A. Armed civilians will be engaged only in self-defense. B. Civilian aircraft will not be engaged, except in self-defense, without approval from division level. C. All civilians should be treated with respect and dignity. Civilians and their property should not be harmed unless necessary to save U.S. lives. If possible, civilians should be evacuated before any U.S. attack. Privately owned property may be used only if publicly owned property is unavailable or its use is inappropriate. D. If civilians are in the area, artillery, mortars, AC-130s, attack helicopters, tubelaunched or rocket-launched weapons, and main tank guns should not be used against known or suspected targets without the permission of a ground maneuver commander (LTC or higher). E. If civilians are in the area, all air attacks must be controlled by FAC or FO, and CAS, WP weapons, and incendiary weapons are prohibited without approval from division. F. If civilians are in the area, infantry will shoot only at known enemy locations. G. Public works such as power stations, water treatment plants, dams, and other public utilities may not be engaged without approval from division level. H. Hospitals, churches, shrines, schools, museums, and other historical or cultural sites will be engaged only in self-defense against fire from these locations. I. All indirect fire and air attacks must be observed. J. Pilots must be briefed for each mission as to the location of civilians and friendly forces. K. Booby traps are not authorized. Authority to emplace mines is reserved for the division commander. Riot control agents can be used only with approval from division level.
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L. M.
Prisoners should be treated humanely, with respect and dignity. Annex R to the operational plan (OPLAN) provides more detail. In the event this card conflicts with the OPLAN, the OPLAN should be followed.
Distribution: One for each Soldier deployed (all ranks). Figure 9-1. Example rules of engagement
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9-38. ROI are based on the applicable ROE for a particular operation; they must be tailored to the specific regions, cultures, and/or populations affected by the operation. Like ROE, the ROI can be effective only if they are thoroughly rehearsed and understood by every Soldier in the unit.
FORCE PROTECTION
9-39. Because of the influence of local politics and news media in stability operations and civil support operations, precautions and operations required to minimize casualties and collateral damage become a particularly important operational consideration during these operations. At the same time, however, force protection must be a constant priority. Armored forces are commonly deployed in a force protection role. 9-40. In attempting to limit the level and scope of violence used in stability operations and civil support operations, leaders must avoid making tactically unsound decisions or exposing the force to unnecessary risks. On the other hand, an overpowering use of force correctly employed and surgically applied, can reduce subsequent violence or prevent a response from the opposing force. These considerations must be covered in the ROE and the OPORD from the battalion or brigade. 9-41. OPSEC, tempered by restrictions in the ROE and ROI, is an important tool for the platoon leader in accomplishing his force protection goals. Security procedures should encompass the full range of antiterrorist activities for every Soldier and leader. Examples include proper RTP; strict noise, light, and litter discipline; proper wear of the uniform; display of the proper demeanor for the situation; as well as effective use of cover and concealment, obstacles, OPs and early warning devices, the protection afforded by armor vehicles, and safe locations for eating and resting. 9-42. A final consideration in force protection is hygiene. Proper field sanitation and personal hygiene are mandatory if Soldiers are to stay healthy.
TASK ORGANIZATION
9-43. Because of the unique requirements of stability operations and civil support operations, the tank platoon may be task organized to operate with a variety of units. As noted, this may include armor or mechanized company team or a light infantry company or battalion. In addition, the platoon may operate with other elements with linguists, counterintelligence teams, and civil affairs teams.
SUSTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS
9-44. The operational environment that the platoon faces during stability operations and civil support operations may be very austere, creating special sustainment considerations. These factors include, but are not limited to, the following: z Reliance on local procurement of certain items. z Shortages of various critical items, including repair parts, Class IV supplies (barrier materials), and lubricants. z Special Class V supply requirements, such as pepper spray. z Reliance on bottled water.
SOLDIERS RESPONSIBILITIES
9-46. U.S. Soldiers may have extensive contact with civilians during stability operations and civil support operations. As a result, their personal conduct has a significant impact on the opinions, and thus the
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support, of the local population. As noted, Soldiers must understand that misconduct by U.S. forces (even those deployed for only a short time) can damage rapport that took years to develop. U.S. Soldiers must treat local civilians and military personnel as personal and professional equals, affording them the appropriate customs and courtesies. 9-47. Every Soldier must be updated continuously on changes to operational considerations (such as environment, ROE/ROI, media, and force protection). Such changes can have an immediate impact on his freedom to react to a given situation. Keeping the Soldier informed of changes enhances his situational understanding and his ability to adapt to changing conditions. Leaders must disseminate this information quickly and accurately. 9-48. Every individual is an intelligence-collecting instrument. The collection of information is a continuous process, and all information must be reported. Intelligence is provided by many sources, including friendly forces, enemy elements, and the local populace. From the friendly standpoint, each Soldier must be familiar with the local PIR and other applicable intelligence requirements. At the same time, enemy Soldiers or other outside countries intelligence agencies will be continuously seeking intelligence on U.S. actions, often blending easily into the civilian population. U.S. Soldiers must be aware of this and use OPSEC procedures at all times. 9-49. To emphasize Soldier responsibilities, leaders conduct PCCs and PCIs that focus on each Soldiers knowledge of the environment and application of the ROE. These checks and inspections should also identify possible OPSEC violations and deficiencies that could place the Soldier and his equipment at risk. Leaders should stress that terrorists and thieves may attempt to infiltrate positions or mount vehicles either to steal equipment and supplies or to cause harm to U.S. forces or facilities. 9-50. To enhance civilian cooperation and support, the tank platoon leader is responsible for obtaining a key word and phrase card from the S2 to assist in translation of key english phrases into the language of the host nation. These phrases should apply specifically to the area of operations.
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training prepare Soldiers and units to address the ambiguities and complexities inherent in civil support operations.
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Figure 9-4. Traffic control point, choke point, blockade, convoy escort, and route proofing missions
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OVERWATCH A BLOCKADE/ROADBLOCK
9-65. The tank platoon (or section) overwatches a blockade or roadblock, either a manned position or a reinforcing obstacle covered by fires only (the circled E in Figure 9-4). It coordinates with dismounted infantry from the company for local security (OPs and dismounted patrols). Positions are improved using procedures for deliberate occupation of a BP (see Chapter 4). Also see Figures 9-7A and 9-7B for examples of tank platoon roadblocks set up and a list of equipment needed to conduct the operation.
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Figure 9-8. Cordon and search operations 9-70. The tank platoon (or section) must be prepared to take immediate action if the search team or OPs identify enemy elements. Enemy contact may require the platoon to execute tactical movement and linkup; it would then coordinate with other units to destroy the enemy using techniques discussed in Chapter 3 of this manual. 9-71. Additionally, the tank platoon may support the infantry by conducting vehicle and personnel searches as part of the search operation or traffic control points. Refer to FM 3-20.98 (FM 17-98), Appendix E, for a detailed discussion on vehicle and personnel search procedures.
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Appendix A
Digitization
Army digitization is the result of the desire to employ existing and emerging technology to enhance Army operations from the strategic to the tactical level by providing its Soldiers an automated, near real-time capability for planning, coordinating, monitoring, controlling, and executing operations. At the tactical level, the Army is capitalizing on this technology by digitizing its vehicles, weapons, and equipment. Digitized systems enhance operational effectiveness in many ways. Providing the user the ability to take the initiative on the battlefield and achieve combat superiority over an enemy through increased situational understanding especially enhances it. Situational understanding is the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental picture of relevant information and the tactical situation. This picture includes the knowledge of both the friendly and threat situation and of relevant terrain. (Note. Even with the addition of these digital enablers, the basic combat skills of tankers must be mastered and reinforced in the event digital technology is compromised or fails. Once the basic skills are mastered, the digital enablers can be exploited to their fullest capabilities.) As outlined throughout this manual, the tank platoons primary tools on the digitized battlefield is the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) system. This appendix focuses on the impact of these systems on various phases of platoon operations and on the duties and responsibilities of platoon leaders and crewmen employing these systems while conducting tactical operations. This appendix also provides a brief overview of the structure of the tactical Internet (TI) and its major subcomponents.
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relation to the mission. Both the lower and upper TIs support FBCB2 communications. (Figure A-1 shows the FBCB2 system.)
Figure A-1. FBCB2 computer system A-4. FBCB2 displays the relevant information regarding the situational understanding environment. This information shows the user his location, the location of other friendly forces, reported enemy locations, and known enemy and plotted friendly battlefield obstacles. The warfighter receives data pushed from all the battlefield systems to maintain real-time battle information. (Figure A-2 shows the FBCB2 tactical display.)
Figure A-2. FBCB2 tactical display A-5. FBCB2 receives data across the TI via the Internet controller (INC). The INC is a tactical router built into the SINCGARS. The enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) data radio, blue force tracker (BFT), and SINCGARS data/voice radio transmit and receive digital information between vehicles. Each FBCB2 derives its own location via the precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR). Utilizing these interfaces, the FBCB2 automatically updates and broadcasts its current location to all other FBCB2 and embedded battle command (EBC) platforms. EBC platforms, such as selected M1A2s and M2A3s, are not installed with FBCB2 hardware, but are equipped with software capabilities that allow them to share situational understanding and command and control information with the FBCB2 platforms. (Figure A-3 shows the tank platoon FBCB2 TI architectural diagram.)
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Figure A-3. Tank platoon FBCB2 TI architecture diagram A-6. Digital systems on the battlefield pass messages using the joint variable message format (JVMF). The JVMF is a Department of Defense standardized message format. It prescribes uniform message formats for all branches of the armed services.
WINGMAN CONCEPT
A-8. The FBCB2 system allows tank sections and platoons to maneuver outside their direct line of sight of each other and still maintain situational understanding and mutual support (see Figures A-4A and A4B). Even as they improve command and control within the platoon, however, these digital systems increase the command and control demands on the individual TC. They require the platoon to make more effective use of the wingman concept.
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Figure A-4A. Tank sections maneuvering separately on actual terrain outside of their direct line of sight of each other
Figure A-4B. FBCB2 display of the tank sections maneuvering separately A-9. The M1A1D, M1A2, or M1A2 SEP platoon must be able to operate as two independent sections. This capability provides the platoon leader and company/troop commander with the flexibility to maneuver using sections. (Note. Although FBCB2 allows the ability to spread forces over a large area, the platoon leader must still consider mutual support between sections.)
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NAVIGATION
A-10. The POSNAV system (a built-in navigational system on digitally-equipped tanks that operates through FBCB2) significantly improves navigation for the company team and platoon. This inertial navigation system allows the unit to maintain greater depth and dispersion. It also enhances the ability of the company team commander or platoon leader to maneuver his unit on the battlefield. A-11. On the M1A2, the navigation system must be periodically updated to increase accuracy; however, the POSNAV system on the M1A2 SEP automatically updates itself with a GPS built into the system. This allows the platoon leader and TCs to use waypoints to orient vehicles during movement. The tank driver can then steer to these waypoints to maintain orientation and dispersion within the company team or platoon. A-12. One method of controlling platoon movement is for the platoon leader to preselect checkpoints and add them to the FBCB2 overlay. He then sends the overlay to the remainder of the platoon. Each TC uses the CID or commanders display unit (CDU) to designate these checkpoints as waypoints for the driver in accordance with the platoon leaders guidance, movement orders, and designated movement technique. Once the TC selects a waypoint to which he wants the driver to steer, the DID will display direction and distance information to that waypoint. (Note. The DID does not display terrain relief. The driver must not become fixed on driving the tank via the DID only, but should maneuver the tank visually and periodically check the DID to apply course corrections as needed. Also, the platoon leaders driver, using his DID steer-to capability, can lead the platoon via the waypoint designated by the platoon leader. The remainder of the tanks will orient on the lead tank and maintain their position in the formation.) A-13. Unless the tank is in contact, the loader should be up in the hatch to assist the driver and provide security. The TC must ensure that the loader is knowledgeable of tank platoon formations and active in acquiring targets. This loaders assistance will give the TC more freedom to send and receive digital traffic and monitor the CID or CDU. As a result, the TC can focus more effectively on the tactical situation and maintain better overall command of the tank.
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Appendix A
A-15. Battle command of the tank platoon is significantly enhanced through the use of FBCB2. It allows the platoon to z Maintain friendly situational understanding (Blue SU). z Track actual and templated enemy positions and obstacles (Red SU). z Submit preformatted, standardized reports (SALUTE, SITREP, MEDEVAC, NBC, call-for-fire, and so forth). z Rapidly disseminate graphic overlays and written FRAGOs. z Maneuver in dispersed formations. z Enhance situational understanding and decrease dependency on graphic control measures.
ROLE OF TRAINING
A-17. The skills required to operate and maintain the highly technical systems on the M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP are extremely perishable. To ensure combat effectiveness of their units, leaders in both the company team and platoon must place special emphasis on the training of individual tank crews. Constant sustainment training is a must in order to remain proficient on the digital systems particular to their vehicle. A-18. A comprehensive training program must include cross training. Even though each crewman has specific duties and responsibilities, success in battle often depends on his ability to function at any position on the tank. Every crewman must be proficient in the operation of all tank systems, including the FBCB2, CITV, and SINCGARS. In addition, tank crew members must have a thorough understanding of how to maintain and service the tank and its component parts to keep the vehicle fully mission capable. (Note. Training programs for digitized units must be coordinated with the training programs of nondigitized units. Digital units must understand that they need to push situational understanding information to nondigitized units and attachments.)
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Digitization
Executive Officer
A-23. Before the battle, the XO conducts tactical coordination with higher, adjacent, and supporting units as required or directed. Acting as the company team NCS, he assists in the command and control of the teams maneuver. He receives tactical FBCB2 reports from the platoons, and then submits consolidated reports via digital means (FBCB2) and FM voice to the task force S3 and/or commander as required. A-24. The XO performs most of his sustainment responsibilities before and after the battle. In coordination with the 1SG, he plans and supervises the teams sustainment preparations. A-25. The FBCB2 system also enables the XO to receive, verify, and consolidate other required reports from the platoons. He can forward the company teams consolidated reports digitally (with FM voice confirmation) to the task force XO, S3, S4, and/or commander. (Note. In the event that the task force TOC does not possess FBCB2 capability, these reports will have to be sent by FM voice.) A-26. If units that are cross attached to the company team lack digital capabilities, the XO must coordinate with that unit to ensure it remains informed throughout the attachment.
First Sergeant
A-27. The 1SGs sustainment role in the digital company team is to consolidate all of the A/L reports and send them digitally (with FM confirmation) to the battalion S4/combat trains command post (CTCP). After the battle, the 1SG consolidates the FBCB2 situation rollup reports (covering ammunition, fuel, personnel, and vehicle status) from the platoon leaders and directs cross leveling, as necessary. He forwards the company teams consolidated FBCB2 situation rollup report to the company team commander, XO, and battalion S4/CTCP.
Master Gunner
A-29. The master gunners specific responsibilities include assisting the crews of the M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP platoons in establishing or coordinating boresight lines, plumb and synchronization berms, and
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Appendix A
using live-fire screening ranges and zero ranges. During the planning and preparation phases of an operation, the master gunner may be called upon to help coordinate and execute the sustainment operations, to serve as NCOIC of the command post, and to help the company team commander with his troop-leading procedures. In combat operations, the master gunner may serve as the gunner on one of the command tanks, as a sustainment operator riding on the APC, or as a section NCOIC in the company teams wheeled vehicles with responsibility for handling communications with the task force.
PLATOON RESPONSIBILITIES
Platoon Leader
A-30. Platoon leaders in M1A1D, M1A2, and M1A2 SEP units inform the company team commander and XO on the tactical situation by forwarding FBCB2 contact reports and SITREPs. Prior to contact, they keep FM voice communications to a minimum to facilitate the timely transmission and receipt of FBCB2 reports. The platoon leaders act as forward observers (FO) for the commander and FIST, using the interface between the POSNAV system and LRF to identify targets and initiate calls for fire. They transmit digital reports, overlays, and the ammunition and fuel status of their platoons to the commander and XO as required by unit SOP. A-31. As applicable (either as directed by unit SOP or at the conclusion of the battle), each platoon leader receives a situation rollup report from his PSG containing consolidated individual tank CS reports for the platoon. The platoon leader reviews the situation rollup report and forwards the platoon report to the 1SG and XO.
Platoon Sergeant
A-32. All TCs, including the platoon leader, use the FBCB2 to forward SITREPs to the PSG. The PSG consolidates these reports and forwards an FBCB2 situation rollup report to the platoon leader. He then sends the same report and any other A/L reports to the 1SG, either digitally or via FM voice. A-33. In general, although the PSGs duties will lean more heavily toward sustainment activities, he must be prepared to handle the tactical aspects of digitized operations as well. If the platoon leaders vehicle is destroyed or disabled and standard FBCB2 routing is affected, the PSG must log on as the platoon leader to receive operations overlays from the company team commander or XO. (Note. With custom routing, the commander or XO can send FBCB2 operations overlays to the PSG at any time.)
Tank Commander
A-34. The TC monitors the FBCB2 screen for friendly vehicle position updates, digital overlay updates, and digital reports. He uses FBCB2 to transmit reports as requested by the platoon leader or PSG. He employs the CITV (along with such nondigitized equipment as binoculars and/or the PVS-7) to scan his assigned sector and to assist the driver as necessary during limited visibility. The TC also lases to possible indirect-fire targets and forwards FBCB2 call-for-fire requests to the platoon leader as necessary. A-35. The TC can use waypoints from his digital system to mark his map with key positions that will be critical to mission accomplishment. Examples include checkpoints, the battalion aid station, and rally points.
Gunner
A-36. The gunners duties include many communications tasks that are applicable to digitized operations, including the following: z Monitoring both digital and radio traffic. z Logging onto nets. z Inputting graphic control measures on digital overlays. z Monitoring digital displays during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.
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Digitization
A-37. The gunner also assists the TC in performing other digitized functions. In turn, this allows the TC to participate directly (on the ground) in such activities as orders drills, leaders reconnaissance, and rehearsals. These digital-related duties include the following: z Entering graphics into FBCB2 overlays. z Sending FBCB2 reports. z Building FBCB2 sketch and range cards. z Monitoring the CID or CDU during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.
Driver
A-38. In the M1A2 and M1A2 SEP tanks, the driver can monitor the DID steer-to indicator and select the best tactical route using preselected waypoints as designated by the TC. It is the drivers responsibility to maneuver the tank to the next waypoint, with the loaders assistance, but with minimal guidance from the TC. He uses terrain to conceal the tanks movement at all times.
Loader
A-39. The loaders duties include logging into unit radio nets and being an expert in operating and manipulating the SINCGARS radio and VIC-3 intercom system. Because the loader is ideally positioned to assist the TC in maintaining battlefield awareness, platoon leaders and TCs should give strong consideration to assigning their second-most experienced crewman as the loader. (Note. The loader may assist the TC in entering graphics on FBCB2 overlays, sending FBCB2 reports, and monitoring the CID or CDU during the planning and preparation phases of an operation.) A-40. Once an operation is under way, the loader performs a variety of functions when the TC is occupied with digital traffic on the FBCB2 screen or CITV. These duties include the following: z Assisting the driver in keeping the tank in its position in formation. z Assisting in acquiring targets for the gunner. z Acting as the air guard or ATGM guard. z Dismounting for local reconnaissance and security as required.
DIGITAL TRANSMISSIONS
USES OF DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS
A-42. Digital messaging at the individual, platoon, and company level is recommended as the primary means of communication for the following purposes: z Transmitting graphics and orders, when the situation allows. z Sending routine reports, such as personnel and CS status or requests. z Sending contact reports (vehicles not in contact). z Requesting MEDEVAC support. z Sending enemy SPOTREPs when not in contact (FBCB2 creates an enemy icon). z Transmitting planned call-for-fire missions (follow up via FM). z Sending digital NBC-1 reports. (This creates a contaminated area icon across the network. Follow up with an FM report on the company team or battalion task force command net.)
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Appendix A
A-43. Some other types of orders and reports that can be sent via FBCB2 include the following: z Fragmentary orders. A digital FRAGO can be used to provide changes to existing OPORDs. It should include all five paragraphs of the OPORD. Each paragraph should state either No Change or give the new information to ensure that recipients know they have received the entire FRAGO. z Free-text messages. A free-text message can be used to send an unstructured digital message to other FBCB2 or Army battle command systems (ABCS) (like an e-mail message).
THREADED MESSAGES
A-44. Certain messages require specific routing for them to be effective. These are called threaded messages. The exception to this is the personnel status report and the task management message. The routing for these is SOP driven. Note. Users may add to the threaded message addressee list but should not delete from it. These defaults are dictated by Army doctrine and communication architecture; for example, the size, activity, location, type of resource, and time frame (SALTT) report feeds into the all-source analysis system (ASAS) intelligence database for correlation into the joint common database for higher situational understanding and analysis. A-45. Most threaded messages must follow specific paths for information to reach intended personnel or communication systems or to feed into the correct databases. For example, the call-for-fire (CFF) message must be threaded properly to interface with the advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS). The CFF message originator may add as many recipients as desired to the addressee list; however, if he alters any of the default recipients, the message may not reach AFATDS, and the fire mission will not be processed. If all addressees are not kept on the thread, orphan fire missions will occur. An orphan mission is where a mission task order and target number was not received from AFATDS. A-46. The following are threaded messages: z SALTT reports. z NBC-1 reports. z Obstacle reports. z Fire support messages.
FM TRANSMISSIONS
A-47. FM radio remains the primary means of communication after crossing the LD because it is more responsive. Multiple stations can monitor the net, and parties can convey emotion during the transmissiona critical tool in assessing and understanding the battlefield situation. Light discipline in night operations may dictate the use of FM communications; for example, brigade cavalry troop Soldiers may go to blackout light FBCB2 operations and send SPOTREPs via FM to a vehicle (usually the troop CP, which is stationary and postured to use the FBCB2 display while maintaining light discipline). The CP can generate and manage FBCB2 SPOTREPs based on FM SPOTREPs and updates. A-48. FM radio is recommended as the primary means of communication for z Making initial contact report. z Coordinating operations when in contact or moving. z Calling for fire on targets of opportunity. z Making subsequent adjustment of fires on planned and unplanned targets. z Requesting urgent MEDEVAC support. z Transmitting enemy air reports.
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Appendix B
SECTION I ORDERS
B-1. The tank platoon leader must be familiar with the formats of WARNOs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs. He must be able to convert these into concise, yet thorough, orders for the platoon.
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
B-2. Before the commander issues the OPORD, the platoon leader may receive one or more WARNOs. He analyzes all information in these orders and transmits important details to the platoon as soon as possible. B-3. When the higher headquarters issues a complete five-paragraph OPORD, analysis of the order is a fairly simple, straightforward process for the platoon leader. Commanders, however, do not always have the time to issue a full OPORD; instead, they may have to issue a FRAGO. B-4. The tank platoon leader normally issues instructions to his platoon in the OPORD format. He derives much of the content from the higher order he received during execution of his troop-leading procedures. He should always plan to issue his own five-paragraph order when time permits. When time is short, he still issues as complete an order as possible, but he does so using a FRAGO. B-5. Once an operation begins, FRAGOs become the normal method of issuing orders. Digital systems allow commanders and leaders to supplement oral orders with overlays and a limited text capability; these items can enhance their subordinates understanding of the FRAGOs. B-6. Units may find themselves conducting the same type of operations on a repeat basis, such as route clearance. There will tend to be a point where units will want to stop using the combat orders process. This must be avoided; all operations are combat missions and must be planned as such, to do otherwise leads to the Soldiers not having the combat focus.
WARNING ORDERS
B-7. During the planning phase of an operation, commanders and leaders use WARNOs as a shorthand method of alerting their units and individual Soldiers (see Figure B-1 for a sample of a platoon WARNO). The company or troop commander usually sends a series of WARNOs to his platoon leaders. These orders help subordinates to prepare for new missions by providing directions and guidelines for platoon-level planning and preparation. Each platoon leader immediately analyzes the information, and then issues a WARNO of his own to alert the platoon to the upcoming operation. This allows the platoon to conduct parallel planning and perpetrations.
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Appendix B
B-8. Warning orders generally follow the five-paragraph OPORD format (illustrated in Figure B-2). The key consideration is that they should be as brief as possible while giving units and Soldiers the information they need to begin preparing for the operation. A company-level WARNO normally includes these elements: z Enemy situation. z Higher headquarters mission. z Commanders intent (if available). z Earliest time of movement. z Specific instructions for preliminary actions (including security, reconnaissance, rehearsals, training, maintenance, resupply, rest, movement, and coordination requirements). z Time and place at which the company or troop OPORD will be issued. B-9. Before he issues his own WARNO, the platoon leader should send graphics to the TCs, either by traditional overlay or by using their digital systems (if available). The order is almost always given orally and in person, but it may be issued by radio or, on digitally equipped tanks using the free-text message capability of FBCB2. As a minimum, the platoon WARNO includes the following information: z Updated enemy situation. z Company and platoon mission statement. z Company or troop commanders intent (if available). z A tentative time line, including the following: Earliest time of movement. Specific instructions for preliminary actions (including security, reconnaissance, rehearsals, training, maintenance, resupply, rest, movement, and coordination requirements). Time and location at which the platoon OPORD will be issued. B-10. If he knows other times, events, or details related to the operation, the platoon leader may include the information in the WARNO. (Figure B-1 shows an example of a platoon WARNO.)
RED, THIS IS RED ONE, WARNING ORDER FOLLOWS, PREPARE TO COPY. SUSPECTED SQUAD-SIZE ELEMENT OF INSURGENTS IS REPORTED IN SAFE HOUSE VICINITY NK77368900. WHITE IS MOVING TO PHASE LINE BULLDOG TO PROVIDE OVERWATCH AND SECURE INNER CORDON. BLUE IS MOVING TO CHECKPOINT 32 TO STAGE AND, ON ORDER, ATTACK TO CLEAR COMPOUND. OUR MISSION IS TO BLOCK ROAD JUNCTIONS ALONG AXIS THUNDER VICINITY CHECKPOINTS 24 AND 26 TO ESTABLISH OUTER CORDON. WE WILL MOVE IN A STAGGERED COLUMN FORMATION THROUGH WAYPOINTS TWO AND FIVE. ALPHA SECTION DEFENDS NORTHWEST FROM CHECKPOINT 24; BRAVO SECTION DEFENDS TO THE SOUTH FROM CHECKPOINT 26. SP IN FIVE MINUTES. REPORT RECON 1. ACKNOWLEDGE, OVER. Figure B-1. Sample platoon WARNO
OPERATION ORDERS
B-11. When time and information are available, the company or troop commander will normally issue a complete OPORD as part of his troop-leading procedures. The OPORD provides platoon leaders with the
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essential information required to conduct the operation and to carry out the commanders intent. The commander should distribute graphics (traditional and digital) before issuing the OPORD.
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Appendix B
b. Friendly forces (include the following items as applicable). (1) Mission and intent of higher headquarters two levels above (company team/troop and battalion/squadron), including concept of the operation. (2) Identification (ID)/mission of adjacent units (left, right, front, rear). (3) ID/mission of reserves in higher headquarters. (4) ID/mission of supporting units with a direct support/reinforcing (DS/R) role to higher headquarters (field artillery, engineer, ADA). (5) Which higher headquarters element has priority of fires. (6) CAS allocated to higher headquarters, including number of sorties available. c. Terrain. (1) Obstacles, hills, valleys, road types and conditions, streams, rivers, bridges, and built-up area. (2) Avenues of approach. (a) Size unit that can be supported. (b) Start and end point. (c) Objective. (3) Key terrain (discuss how friendly and/or enemy forces may attempt to use it to their advantage). (4) Observation and fields of fire. (5) Cover and concealment. (6) Engagement areas. (7) Overall effect of terrain on the operation. d. Weather and light data. (1) Light conditions: (for all the days of the operation). BMNT: _____; Sunrise: _____; Sunset: _____; EENT: _____; Moonrise: _____; Moonset: _____; Percent Illumination: _____. (2) Weather forecast for the operation. (3) Effects of weather and light conditions on the operation. (a) Trafficability. (b) Visibility. (c) Effect on lasers/thermals. (d) Effects on air operations. e. Attachments and detachments to the platoon and higher. 2. MISSION. This is the WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, and WHY. State the essential task(s) to be accomplished by the entire unit, to include on-order missions. Clearly define the platoons objective. Task and purpose? 3. EXECUTION. a. Commanders intent. Using the commanders intent as a guideline, the platoon leader may issue his own intent to define the purpose, method, and end state of the operation. The purpose is the WHY of the operation. The method tells how the platoon leader visualizes achieving success with respect to the company/troop mission as a whole and outlines, in general terms, use of combat multipliers. The end state specifies final disposition of forces and explains how the end state will facilitate future operations.
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b. Concept of the operation. This paragraph further explains and expands on the platoon leaders (and/or commanders) intent, particularly his vision of HOW he will conduct the operation and WHO he will assign to execute it. The platoon leader uses a concept statement when he feels more detail is necessary to ensure subordinates will take the appropriate actions in the absence of additional communications or further orders. The sequence of subparagraphs is as follows: (1) Scheme of maneuver. This is how the platoon will maneuver to kill the enemy or to accomplish its mission. It conforms to the commanders intent. In offensive operations, it specifies the platoons formation, movement technique, routes or avenues of advance, and plans for direct fire and overwatch. In defensive operations, it specifies the platoon engagement plan, BPs, orientation of weapons, and the plan for movement to supplementary or successive positions. (2) Fires. (a) Purpose for FA and mortar fires (how fires will be used to support the maneuver). (b) Priority of fires within the platoon and company/troop. (c) Allocation of FPF. (d) Preparation starting time and duration of fires. (e) Triggers (trigger line/point or event). (f) Description of enemy fires in the area of operations. (g) Special fire allocation/use (smoke, illumination, CAS). (h) Restrictions. (i) Target overlay annex. (3) Engineer support (obstacles, mines, and fortifications). (a) Priority of engineer effort (mobility, countermobility, survivability). (b) Priority of engineer support. (c) Obstacle overlay. (d) Obstacle list. (e) Logistical constraints. (f) On-order missions. c. Specific instructions. List the specific missions, in battle sequence, for each tank, including the attached elements. Include movement techniques, flank coordination requirements, other details, and be-prepared missions. Dismount team, detainee team, CBRN team, obstacle team, and bridge team. d. Coordinating instructions. (1) Time schedule for critical events. (a) Rehearsals. (b) Confirmation briefs and backbriefs. (c) PCCs and PCIs. (d) First movement. (e) Arrival of any attachments/detachments. (f) Boresighting. (2) Movement instructions. (a) SP/RP times. (b) Formation and movement technique. (c) Order of march. (d) Route of march.
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Appendix B
(3) (a) (b) (c) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (PIR).
Passage of lines. Contact points. Passage points. Lanes (to include identification/markings). Actions at danger areas. Actions on expected contact. Rally points. ROE/ROI. Intelligence requirements (IR), to include priority intelligence requirements
(9) Air defense warning and weapons control status. (10) MOPP level and operational exposure guidance (OEG). (11) Any changes regarding battlesight and battlecarry ranges. (12) Be-prepared tasks or other general information not provided in concept of the operation or specific instructions. (13) Actions on the objective. 4. SERVICE SUPPORT. a. Trains. Location and movement plan of the company/troop trains (initial and subsequent grids). b. Material and services. (1) Supply. (a) Priorities of supply. (b) Resupply points and prestock sites. (c) Ration cycle. (d) Location of task force trains. (e) LOGPAC instructions. (2) Transportation. (a) Supply routes. (b) LRPs. (c) Priorities established on MSRs. (3) Services. Handling of KIA personnel. (a) Location of water points. (b) Location of deliberate decontamination sites. (4) Maintenance. (a) Maintenance procedures. (b) Vehicle evacuation. (c) Task force UMCP location. c. Medical evacuation and treatment. (1) Location of company/troop medics. (2) Location of battalion/squadron aid station. (3) Procedures for treatment and evacuation of WIA personnel. (4) Aero medical evacuation information. (5) Location of ambulance exchange points (AXP). (6) Handling of contaminated WIA personnel.
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d. Personnel. (1) Handling and disposition instructions for detainees. (2) Detainee guard instructions. (3) Location of detainee collection point. (4) Instructions for interaction with local civil populace (ROI). (5) Number of expected replacements. (6) Cross-leveling procedures. e. Miscellaneous. 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. a. Command. (1) Location of commander, XO, TOC, and/or tactical command post (TAC CP). (2) Succession of command. b. Signal. (1) SOI/ANCD index and edition in effect. (a) Key frequencies. (b) Key call signs. (c) Current item number identifier. (2) KY-57/ANCD fill and changeover data. (3) Listening silence instructions. (4) Challenge and password. (5) Special signals, to include use of pyrotechnics. (6) Code words. (7) Digital traffic instructions (digital systems only). (8) Actions to counteract jamming or hot mike situations. 6. TIME CHECK (for synchronization). Figure B-2. Sample platoon OPORD format
FRAGMENTARY ORDERS
B-16. The FRAGO is a brief oral or written order that can serve any of the following purposes: z Implement timely changes to existing orders. z Provide pertinent extracts from more detailed orders. z Provide instructions until a detailed order is developed. z Provide specific instructions to subordinates who do not require a complete order. B-17. There is no specific format for a FRAGO. For simplicity and complete clarity, it normally follows the five-paragraph OPORD structure; however, it includes only the information required for subordinates to accomplish their mission. To enhance understanding of voice FRAGOs, digitally equipped units can quickly develop hasty graphics and transmit digital overlays. B-18. Platoon FRAGOs normally include the following information: z Updated enemy or friendly situation. z Mission. (Note. The platoon leader must ensure that platoon tasks and purpose are clearly stated.) z Scheme of maneuver. z Specific instructions as necessary.
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Appendix B
B-19. Figure B-3 illustrates a platoon FRAGO transmitted by voice over a secure net.
RED, THIS IS RED ONEFRAGO FOLLOWS. WHITE IS IN CONTACT AND ENGAGING TWO T80s VICINITY NK77368900. BLUE IS MOVING TO CHECKPOINT 26 TO FIX THE T80s. OUR MISSION IS TO ASSAULT AND DESTROY THE T80s AND ALLOW BRAVO COMPANY TO CONTINUE THE ATTACK NORTH. WE WILL MOVE IN A PLATOON WEDGE THROUGH WAYPOINTS 2 AND 5, MANEUVER TO FLANK THE T80s, AND ASSAULT FROM EAST TO WEST. RED 4, ENSURE THAT BLUE AND WHITE SHIFT FIRES WEST AS WE BEGIN OUR ASSAULT, OVER. Figure B-3. Sample platoon FRAGO
SECTION II REPORTS
B-20. Reports are the units primary means of providing information for plans and decisions. They must be accurate, timely, and complete. B-21. Procedures for preparing, transmitting, and safeguarding reports will vary from unit to unit and from situation to situation. Among the factors influencing tank platoon report procedures are the preferences and requirements of the chain of command, the tactical environment in which the platoon is operating, available equipment, terrain, and the electronic warfare situation. Digital systems, for example, enable the transmission of accurate preformatted reports. B-22. For leaders at all levels, two guidelines remain constant throughout the reporting process: the importance of compiling timely, accurate information and the need to relay that information by the clearest, quickest, and most secure method possible. The tank platoon leader, along with the PSG and TCs, can save time, ensure completeness, and reduce confusion by developing and implementing thorough SOPs covering report procedures. Refer to ST 3-20.153 for an extensive sample SOP that includes line-by-line descriptions of voice and digital report formats used by the platoon. (See Figures B-4 through B-7 for sample reports/sample formats.)
BLACK SIX; THIS IS BLUE ONESALTT REPORTOVER. BLUE ONE, THIS IS BLACK SIXSEND ITOVER. BLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONEREPORT FOLLOWS: SIZE: ONE BMP. ACTIVITY: MOVING SOUTH. LOCATION: GRID CG100456. TIME: 180640MAY99 ZULU. TROOPS: TEN DISMOUNTED TROOPS. CONTINUING TO OBSERVEOVER. BLUE ONE; THIS IS BLACK SIX ROGERCONTINUE OBSERVATIONOUT. Figure B-4. Sample FM SALTT report
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BLACK SIX; THIS IS BLUE ONESITREPOVER. BLUE ONE; THIS IS BLACK SIXSEND ITOVER. BLACK SIX, THIS IS BLUE ONEREPORT FOLLOWS: LINE 1 (As of DTG): 181217MAY99 ZULU. LINE 2 (Enemy Activity in Brief): OBSERVING FOUR ENEMY SOLDIERS. LINE 3 (Friendly Locations): CP 28. LINE 4 (FMC Vehicles): FOUR. LINE 5 (Defense Obstacles): NONE. LINE 6 (Personnel Status): GREEN. LINE 7: CLASS THREE AMBERCLASS FIVE GREEN. LINE 8: CONTINUING MISSION. OVER. BLUE ONE; THIS IS BLACK SIXROGEROUT. Figure B-5. Sample FM SITREP
Medical Evacuation/Aero-Medical MEDEVAC
MEDEVAC FREQ: Line 1 Grid Line 2 Line 3 Unit frequency, Call Sign, Suffix Number of Patients by Precedence: Urgent Urgent/Surgical Priority Special Equipment: Aircraft Rescue Hoist Jungle/Forest Penetrator Semirigid Litter Strokes Basic Litter Kendrick Extraction Device Jaws of Life Number of Patients by Type: L = Litter A = Ambulatory If in Wartime: N = No Enemy in Area P = Possible Enemy in Area E = Enemy in Area X = Enemy in Area, Escort Required If in Peacetime: (Type of injury) Gunshot Broken Bones Illness, etc.
Line 4
Line 5
Note. Once complete with Lines 1 through 5, the MEDEVAC can fly. Continue with remainder of report when you can.
Line 6
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Appendix B
Line 7
Method of Marking Site: A = VS-17 B = Pyro C = Smoke D = None E = Other Patient Nationality and Status (Military/Nonmilitary) CBRN Contamination: Y = Yes N = No Description of Terrain at Pick-Up Site Figure B-6. MEDEVAC request format
Line 8 Line 9
BLACK SIX; THIS IS BLUE ONECONTACTTROOPS, EASTOUT. Figure B-7. Sample FM contact report
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Appendix C
Infantry/Armor Operations
Tank units, including the platoon, almost never fight alone. Open terrain such as desert, plains, and flat countryside is conducive to the employment of massed armor formations. In such terrain, mechanized infantry supports the forward movement of the armor units by providing local security, retaining key terrain, clearing dug-in enemy positions, and enhancing direct fires with organic small arms and antitank fires. On the other hand, restricted terrain (such as built-up areas, forests, and jungles) increases the vulnerability of armor units. In close terrain, it is more advantageous for tanks to take a supporting role in the forward movement of the infantry. Armor provides close-in direct fire support against hard and soft targets that could slow the infantrys advance. This appendix examines, in detail, how both elements are employed to support each other. Regardless of terrain, infantry and armor units fight as part of a combined arms team to maximize their respective capabilities and minimize their limitations. Leaders of both tank (heavy) and infantry (light) forces must understand the TTP employed by their operational counterparts. The principles of offense, defense, and movement discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are applicable. Covered here will be the employment of the tank platoon as part of an infantry organization. To cover the employment of an infantry platoon in use in an armor unit would be out of the scope of this manual and is covered as part of the company team manual FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1). Tanks support the infantry by z Leading movement. z Using firepower, mobility, and the ability to protect the infantry by quickly developing the situation on contact. z Leading the assault to provide protection for following infantry when enemy antitank capability is limited. z Destroying enemy armored vehicles, especially tanks. Infantry supports tanks by z Clearing or breaching obstacles and marking lanes, especially in minefields, to allow tanks to exploit their speed and mobility. z Destroying, suppressing, or neutralizing antitank weapons or by destroying bunkers. z Following the tank assault closely to protect the rear and flanks of the tanks from handheld HEAT weapons, to clear the objective, or to reduce bypassed enemy forces. z Securing or clearing choke points such as towns, forests, stream crossings, or narrow defiles. z Providing close security at night or in restricted terrain. z Conducting reconnaissance to support the tank units maneuver.
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Appendix C
INFANTRY ORGANIZATIONS
LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALION
C-5. This is the most austere conventional combat battalion. The light infantry battalion has only three rifle companies and a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). Of the three types of infantry units described in this section, the organization of the light infantry battalion differs most from that of the armor battalion. C-6. There are also differences among this battalion and the air assault and airborne battalions, the greatest being the organization of support and logistics. The light infantry battalion has no trucks larger than its 27 cargo HMMWVs. The battalion has only 18 long-range radios. It has limited antiarmor capability: four HMMWV-mounted TOW systems in one platoon at battalion level and six Dragon (Javelin) launchers at company level. C-7. Infantry leaders must understand the tactical doctrine for employing a heavy company team (as prescribed in FM 3-90.1), a tank platoon (refer to this FM), and a mechanized infantry platoon (refer to FM 7-7 and FM 3-21.71). To effectively employ any armored vehicle, leaders must know the specific capabilities and limitations of the vehicle and its weapon systems. The platoon leader must be able to brief the battalion leadership on how to best use the tank platoon. He is the subject matter expert, and must
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ensure the battalion understands the capabilities and limitations of the tank platoon. For example, M1series tanks provide rapid mobility as well as excellent protection and lethal, accurate direct fires. These tanks are most effective in open terrain with extended fields of fire.
INFANTRY CONSIDERATIONS
C-13. Besides understanding the capabilities and limitations of his tanks, the armor platoon leader must appreciate the tactical assets and liabilities of the infantry. He must realize that infantry elements move much more slowly than tanks over certain types of terrain. At the same time, he will learn that infantry can use terrain very effectively to gain a positional advantage over the enemy and that terrain has a direct impact on survivability for the infantryman. C-14. The tank platoon leader must ensure that the controlling infantry headquarters understands that considerations for positioning and control of the tanks crew-served direct-fire weapon systems are the same as those for the infantrys crew-served and AT weapons. In addition, he must be able to anticipate the effects of his weapon systems on both friendly and enemy forces. As an example, he must remember that sabot ammunition cannot be fired over the heads or flanks of unprotected infantry because of the danger created by the concussion of the main gun and the discarding sabot petals of tank rounds.
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Appendix C
ROLE OF TRAINING
C-15. Finally, light/heavy liaison activities must emphasize the importance of combined arms training. Armor and infantry elements must train together, or they will not be able to execute combined arms operations smoothly in combat. Ideally, this training is conducted prior to deployment. To enhance coordination and execution, however, light/heavy forces must take advantage of every training opportunity that arises. C-16. An important aspect of training is teaching leaders of light and heavy elements how to work together and how their forces can support each other. For example, leaders must know how to communicate by digital, radio, phone, and visual means. Other areas of the training include the following: z Infantrymen help heavy forces by finding and breaching or marking antitank obstacles. They detect and destroy or suppress enemy antitank weapons. The infantry may also designate targets for armored vehicles and protect them in close terrain. z Heavy forces lead infantrymen in open terrain and provide them with a protected, fast-moving assault weapon system. Tanks can suppress and destroy enemy weapons, bunkers, and tanks by fire and maneuver. They can also transport infantrymen when the enemy situation permits.
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close-in protection for the tank; infantrymen can watch for enemy elements while limiting exposure to enemy fires directed against the tank. The use of nonsecure radios is not recommended. Visual signals. Visual signals, as prescribed by SOP or coordinated during linkup, can facilitate simple communications. Platoon leader needs to remember that tanks and infantry use different visual signals, so without prior coordination and training, this method will cause confusion and lead to either infantry or tank leader exposing them selves to enemy fire in an attempt to understand what the other element requires.
INTELLIGENCE
C-20. The tank platoon leader must obtain information from the battalion S2 on enemy capabilities, especially those of antiarmor assets. He should focus not only on direct fire capabilities, but also on the capacity of the enemys mines, artillery, and mortar fires to disable his vehicles. C-21. Terrain analysis is another area of supreme importance in which the platoon leader must work closely with the S2. Platoon leaders must understand and account for the fact that infantry do not view the terrain in the same manner as a mounted element. They determine trafficability of the terrain, examining the effects of weather, obstacles, and limited visibility on the speed and mobility of armored vehicles. Following this detailed analysis, TCs and section leaders conduct a ground reconnaissance of the area of operations. The reconnaissance confirms the trafficability of routes and aids in the effective positioning of weapon systems. The terrain analysis and subsequent reconnaissance also confirm whether the platoon needs to employ ground guides who are knowledgeable of the terrain and the limitations it will impose on tracked vehicle movement.
MANEUVER
C-22. When the light/heavy operation begins, either the tanks or the infantry can lead. The following discussion of moving with infantry covers a situation in which terrain and other factors of METT-TC clearly favor the use of infantry in the lead, supported by armor.
MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
C-25. Infantrymen conduct tactical movement until they identify an enemy force that halts their progress (see Figure C-1). They deploy into position, suppress enemy AT weapons with direct and indirect fires, and request tank support to destroy the enemy. The tanks move forward and link up with the infantry (see Figure C-2). At the linkup point, the tank platoon or section leader (depending on the size of the supporting armor element) dismounts and coordinates the following information with the infantry leader: z Enemy disposition. z Friendly disposition.
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Appendix C
z z
The tentative maneuver plan. Any additional tactical information not already covered in the OPORD or maneuver plan, including the use of guides, control of direct and indirect fires, close-in protection for the tank, and communications and signal information.
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Figure C-2. Tanks move forward to link up with infantry C-26. The armor leader (either the platoon or section leader) conducts a ground reconnaissance of the route to the final firing position and finalizes the plan with the infantry leader. He then returns to the platoon or section and briefs the plan to his platoon or section. C-27. Depending on task organization and terrain factors, the tank platoon or section moves forward to the firing position, using guides provided by the infantry (see Figure C-3). If the entire platoon is involved, one section overwatches the movement of the lead section to the firing position. If a single section is used, the trail vehicle must overwatch the movement of the lead vehicle to the firing position.
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Appendix C
Figure C-3. Infantry guides tanks to the firing position C-28. Depending on the amount of suppressive fires received, the firing tank may move to the position buttoned up, with the ballistic doors closed (M1A2 crews may stow the CITV). This provides better protection for the crew and helps to prevent damage to the gunners sights. At the same time, however, it degrades the tanks target acquisition capability and makes it easier for dismounted enemy forces to attack the tank with small arms or machine gun fires.
ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
C-29. If tank crews cannot immediately identify targets when they reach the firing position, the infantry designates each target using tracers, mortars, smoke, or grenades fired from the M203 grenade launcher. TCs open the ballistic doors as necessary to acquire and lase to their targets; tanks then suppress or destroy targets using main gun or machine gun fire. When targets are destroyed, the infantry signals the tanks to cease fire (see Figure C-4).
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SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
C-30. Tank and infantry leaders at all levels must be aware of the safety considerations involved in light/heavy operations. Leader awareness and involvement is particularly important if the infantry unit has had little training with armored vehicles. All personnel in both the light and heavy units must be aware of these considerations to prevent unnecessary casualties. C-31. Tank crewmen are often unable to see infantry Soldiers operating close to their vehicle. This limitation is worse during limited visibility and when the hatches are closed; in these conditions, the crew is focused on the enemy or on potential enemy locations rather than any nearby infantrymen. It is the infantrys responsibility to stay alert and to maintain a safe position in relation to the vehicle. C-32. Infantry Soldiers operating near tanks are exposed to the effects of any fires the enemy directs against the vehicles. This is true whether the infantry and vehicles are moving or stationary. Proximity also severely degrades the infantrys to avoid detection by the enemy. It therefore becomes the responsibility of infantry leaders to maintain sufficient distance to avoid the effects of fires directed against the tanks, even when they are required to provide security or close support. C-33. Tanks fire high-velocity, armor-piercing, discarding sabot rounds that pose hazards to infantry. Dismounted Soldiers should be at 70 meters to the left or right of the line of fire and/or at least 1,000 meters to the front of a firing tank. Any infantry within this danger area must have overhead cover and protection (a berm or tree) from the rear.
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Appendix C
C-34. The exhaust from an M1-series tank may reach more than 1,700F. Dismounted Soldiers following behind the tank must position themselves either to the side of the exhaust grill or, if they are directly behind the vehicle, at a safe distance away. The use of exhaust shield will overcome this problem. The shield is a critical element in tanks recovering other tanks, so they should be readily available in the tank platoons. Consideration should be given to fabricating enough for all tanks as a leader will not know when he will be working with the infantry. C-35. Infantrymen may ride on tanks if conditions allow, but they must be aware of the serious safety concerns involved.
TRANSPORTING INFANTRY
C-36. At times, the tank platoon may be required to transport infantrymen on its tanks (as illustrated in Figure C-5). This is done only when contact is not expected. This is the least preferred method of transporting infantry and should only be used when both the mounted and dismounted element have had time to train and have a firm understanding of how each element will work. If the platoon is moving as part of a larger force and is tasked to provide security for the move, the lead section or element should not carry infantry.
Figure C-5. Sample positions for infantry riding on a tank C-37. Infantry and armor leaders must observe the following procedures, precautions, and considerations when infantrymen ride on tanks: z Infantry teams should thoroughly practice mounting and dismounting procedures and actions on contact. z Passengers must always alert the TC before mounting or dismounting. They must follow the commands of the TC. z Infantry platoons should be broken down into squad-size groups, similar to air assault chalks, with the infantry platoon leader on the armor platoon leaders vehicle and the infantry PSG on the armor PSGs vehicle. z Platoon leaders, PSGs, and team leaders should position themselves near the TCs hatch, using the external phone (if available) to talk to the TC and relay signals to the unit. z If possible, the lead vehicle should not carry infantrymen. Riders restrict turret movement and are more likely to be injured or killed on initial contact. z Tank crewmen must remember that the vehicle cannot return fire effectively with infantry on board. z Whenever possible, passengers mount and dismount over the left front slope of the vehicle. This ensures that the driver can see the infantrymen and that the infantrymen do not pass in front of the coax machine gun. Passengers must ensure that they remain behind the vehicles smoke grenade launchers. This will automatically keep them clear of all weapon systems.
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z z z z z
z z z z z z z
Passengers must always have three points of contact with the vehicle; they must watch for lowhanging objects like tree branches. All passengers should wear hearing protection. Infantrymen should not ride with anything more than their battle gear. Rucksacks and B-bags should be transported by other means. Infantrymen should scan in all directions. They may be able to spot a target the vehicle crew does not see. Passengers should be prepared to take the following actions on contact: Wait for the vehicle to stop. At the TCs command, dismount immediately (one fire team on each side). Do not move forward of the turret. Move at least 5 meters to the sides of the vehicle. Do not move behind or forward of the vehicle. Do not move in front of vehicles unless ordered to do so. Do not dismount a vehicle unless ordered or given permission to do so. Do not dangle arms or legs, equipment, or anything else off the side of a vehicle; they could get caught in the tracks, causing death, injury, or damage to the equipment or vehicle. Do not carry too many riders on the vehicle. Do not fall asleep when riding. The warm engine may induce drowsiness; a fall could be fatal. Do not smoke when mounted on a vehicle. Do not stand near a moving or turning vehicle at any time. Tanks have a deceptively short turning radius.
FIRE SUPPORT
C-41. The use and control of indirect and direct fires are critical to the effective employment of armor with infantry.
INDIRECT FIRES
C-42. Indirect fires are used to suppress enemy AT weapons and dismounted infantry in the area of operations. The tank platoon uses its optics to detect targets and its communications systems to initiate
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Appendix C
calls for fire in support of infantry. In addition, the noise of mortar and artillery fires, combined with the use of smoke, helps to conceal the movement of tanks moving forward, adding the element of surprise to the operation. The platoon leader needs to have an understanding of the light forces indirect capabilities and limitations. He must understand they do not have the same capabilities and limitations as a self propelled artillery unit.
DIRECT FIRES
C-43. One of the primary assets that tanks offer in working with infantry is their ability to provide accurate, lethal direct fires from a mobile, survivable platform. The weapon systems on each tank offer unique capabilities and limitations that must be considered in relation to infantry support; these characteristics are covered later in this discussion.
Target Acquisition
C-44. The target acquisition capabilities of the tank exceed the capabilities of all systems in the infantry battalion. The thermal sight provides a significant capability for observation and reconnaissance. It can also be used during the day to identify heat sources (personnel and vehicles), even through light vegetation. Infantry units can take advantage of the tanks laser range finder to enhance their capabilities in establishing fire control measures (such as trigger lines and TRPs) and in determining exact locations on the battlefield.
Machine Guns
C-45. The TCs caliber.50 machine gun is effective against both personnel and materiel. The 7.62-mm coax machine gun is an effective AP weapon. These machine guns provide a high volume of supporting fires for the infantry.
Main Gun
C-46. The main gun remains the best antitank weapon on the battlefield. The main gun is extremely accurate and lethal at ranges up to 2,500 meters. Tanks with stabilized main guns can fire effectively even when moving at high speeds across country. C-47. All current tanks fire sabot, MPAT, and HEAT rounds. These have great penetrating power against armored vehicles, but may not have the destructive capability necessary to destroy prepared fighting positions or penetrate walls in built-up areas. High explosive, obstacle-reducing with tracer (HE-OR-T) rounds (the M908) have enough destructive power to destroy most prepared positions and to create large holes in walls. The canister is an AP round that is extremely effective for area suppression.
Tank Capabilities
C-48. The Armys tanks have the following firepower capabilities and limitations: z M1A1 and M1A2. Both vehicles are limited in ammunition storage capacity (40 rounds in the M1A1, 42 in the M1A2). They can fire sabot, HEAT, and MPAT ammunition, as well as the HE-OR-T and canister rounds. On the M1A1, the TC can fire the M2 caliber .50 without exposing himself. The M1A2 TC must expose himself to fire the M2, unless equipped with common remotely operated weapons station (CROWS). Both vehicles consume fuel at a high rate, and their mobility is limited in terrain that does not support heavy tracked vehicles.
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Ground reconnaissance. The platoon leader should use ground reconnaissance by a knowledgeable member of the platoon (preferably a section leader or TC) to confirm or deny the S2s estimate. Ground guides. In restricted terrain, the use of ground guides is critical in leading tanks to their firing positions, especially during periods of limited visibility. The ground guide can be either an infantryman or the section leader who conducted the reconnaissance. Knowledge of vehicle capabilities. The tank has an awesome ability to bull or force through walls, small trees (up to 12 inches in diameter), wire obstacles, and other hasty barricades such as cars or trucks blocking a road or trail. The addition of a mine plow or mine roller enhances the tanks breaching capability, but also hinders movement in rough terrain. Engineer support. Engineers can enhance tank mobility by spanning unfordable rivers or gaps, reducing obstacles, and cutting down larger trees to construct hasty tank trails.
C-51. The survivability of the Armys tanks differs by system. They offer varying degrees of protection against small arms fire, time-fused artillery, and AT weapons. The tank platoon can enhance the survivability of the various systems using these techniques: z Terrain driving. The old maxim still holds true: What can be seen can be hit; what can be hit can be killed. Every potential enemy has the ability to employ weapons that can disable or destroy any tank. Terrain driving techniques, discussed in Chapter 3 of this manual, are still extremely important for the tank platoon. z Overwatch. Wingman tanks or sections scannot only their sector of fire, but also the area around moving vehicles. This enables overwatch vehicles to fire their coax machine guns to protect the moving vehicles if they are attacked by dismounted forces. z Moving into the attack-by-fire position buttoned up. When tanks move into an attack-by-fire position to engage a prepared enemy position, they will face intense small arms, artillery, mortar, sniper, or AT fires. In addition to the factors listed previously, the survivability of the crew depends on its ability to take full advantage of the armor protection of the vehicle. z Suppression. Suppression of enemy AT assets and dismounted infantry forces by artillery and close infantry support is critical. z Having individual weapons ready. Crew members must be ready to use their M4 carbine, M16A2, and/or 9-mm personal weapons, as well as grenades, to repulse close-in dismounted attacks.
AIR DEFENSE
C-52. The tank platoon leader must be familiar with the air defense considerations applicable to light/heavy operations, including ADA capabilities and employment considerations. Refer to the discussion in Chapter 6 of this manual.
SUSTAINMENT
C-53. When attached to infantry, the tank platoon must prepare to operate under austere conditions. The key to effective combat support in this situation is to maintain a constant flow of reports updating the platoons supply status and requirements. C-54. In an infantry task force, the tank platoon leader and PSG will do much of their logistical coordination directly through the battalion staff. They coordinate reporting procedures within the platoon and notify the staff when classes of supply fall below the levels of 80 percent (identified by the code word AMBER), 70 percent (RED), and 60 percent (BLACK). When a class of supply falls below 70 percent, the platoon leader or PSG requests resupply.
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Appendix C
C-55. Fuel, ammunition, recovery, and maintenance are the primary concerns of the attached platoon. Other logistical needs are usually handled through the normal sustainment functions of the battalion. These considerations apply: z Fuel. Fuel conservation must be a priority at all times. Engines should be shut down whenever possible. REDCON status should be used to help regulate engine start-up requirements and to assist in operational preparations. The tank platoon can normally support infantry operations for 24 hours before refueling. Infantry units normally do not understand the amount of fuel that tanks will consume. If fuel support is coming through the infantry battalion only, it will be critical that fuel requests are forecasted in advance so that the battalion will have the required amounts on hand or request support from their parent brigade. z Ammunition. The tank platoons ammunition requirements present a unique challenge for the infantry battalion. The type of rounds requested should be based on the S2s analysis to fit the needs for direct fire support of the light/heavy mission. A basic load of ammunition should be on hand to provide for emergency resupply during periods of heavy contact. Infantry battalions will not be able to support the requirements of main gun ammunition, but can support the platoon for small arms and grenade requirements. Platoon sergeants must constantly think about CS constraints, and not limit themselves to only one area (the parent company) for support. z Recovery and maintenance. When a tank is disabled, the platoon should first attempt selfrecovery. If this is not possible, the crew makes the necessary coordination to secure the vehicle until recovery and maintenance personnel reach it. Infantry personnel can be employed to provide local security during recovery operations or to protect the vehicle as the attack progresses. Recovery and maintenance assets may be part of the infantry battalions attached slice within the brigade forward support battalion, or they may be on call from the tank platoons parent company or troop headquarters.
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Appendix D
Operational Security
Throughout the area of operations, the enemy will, at any given moment, be attempting to acquire intelligence information and gain a tactical advantage. Tank platoon leaders must understand the demands of continuous operations under all possible conditions. They then must provide their Soldiers with the training and leadership they will need to meet the challenges of the battlefield.
Identifying those actions that can be observed by enemy intelligence systems. Determining which indicators enemy intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical intelligence in time to be useful to the enemy. Selecting and executing measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to enemy exploitation.
D-2. OPSEC measures consist of countersurveillance, information security (INFOSEC), signal security, and physical security.
COUNTERSURVEILLANCE
D-3. Maneuver units use countersurveillance measures to protect against surprise, observation, and infiltration. In future operations, tank platoons may find themselves to be high-value targets for the enemy. One destroyed M1-series tank would not be a large military victory, but would be a large victory from a propaganda standpoint. The enemy will continue to further his use of precision weapons in place of massed artillery fire. As was true in the past is even more so now, what can be seen, can be hit, and what can be hit will be destroyed. The following considerations and procedures will assist the tank platoon in executing countersurveillance operations:
z
Enforce noise and light discipline. Follow these procedures: Turn off the circuit breaker for the brake lights. Dim or cover all sources of light in the turret. Use a passive night observation device (NOD) to check vehicles for light leaks before operations begin. Move only when necessary. Use headsets or the combat vehicle crewman (CVC) helmet to monitor the radio; do not use the radios external speakers. Do not slam hatches. Use short-count procedures to start engines simultaneously. Use terrain to mask resupply and maintenance areas. Use hand-and-arm signals and digital communications whenever possible. Do not allow smoking outdoors at night. Collect and turn in all garbage during LOGPAC. As a last resort, garbage will be burned and buried.
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Appendix D
Use camouflage to best advantage. Follow these procedures: Place vegetation on vehicles to break up their profile. Drape camouflage nets over gun tubes and turrets. Park vehicles in natural concealment, such as shadows. Cover all headlights and optics whenever possible. Consider the effects of dust and exhaust smoke when moving. Minimize track, tire, and foot trails that could be detected from the air or from enemy positions. Drive vehicles in previously made tracks when possible. In heavily used areas such as CPs and trains, ensure that vehicles travel on existing tracks or roadways. Maintain effective concealment. Follow these procedures: Disperse vehicles and personnel under foliage or inside structures whenever possible. Conceal vehicles and personnel behind objects that block the thermal line of sight of enemy devices. Ensure vehicles in hide positions protect against aerial observation by minimizing or eliminating their thermal signatures. Tie antennas down. Use challenges and passwords.
INFORMATION SECURITY
D-4. INFOSEC entails the protection of all materials, both classified and unclassified, that may be of intelligence value to the enemy. Refer to the discussion in Appendix A of this manual. The following procedures will assist the platoon in maintaining INFOSEC: z Ensure that Soldiers do not put critical information in the mail. This includes unit identification, location, and capabilities; the commanders name; and information on combat losses or morale. z Before leaving an area, police it to make sure items of intelligence value are not left behind. z Garbage will be turned in with LOGPAC or burned to prevent the enemy from gathering any type of information. z As operations are conducted near and around foreign nationals, care must be taken in exchanging information between Soldiers. Soldiers tend to assume that local people do not speak English and could inadvertently give up details of operations to enemy agents who appear as local population.
SIGNAL SECURITY
D-5. The discussion of communications in Chapter 2 of this manual outlines considerations and procedures for establishing and maintaining signal security. Refer to the discussion of INFOSEC in Appendix A.
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Operational Security
Conducting area sweeps right before or right after BMNT/EENT will allow the platoon to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements, and or dismounted elements. This when used in a varied method will keep the enemy off guard and will force him to react to the platoon and not the other way around. Do not allow foreign nationals and unauthorized observers in or near the units area or positions during operations. In accordance with ROE/ROI and the company or troop commanders intent, establish procedures for handling civilian intruders. In urban areas, the platoon will not be able to stop every person walking in the area. Attention must be paid to ensure the civilians stay out of a stand off zone to prevent them from placing explosives on the vehicles. Also, platoons need to be observant of civilians taking too much interest in unit actions or missions. During all operations and especially during areas of close-in terrain, it is critical that the platoons tanks have an M4 rifle positioned on the turret, ready to be used rapidly. Close-in terrain, or more restrictive ROE, will allow the enemy to get closer to the tank prior to the crew being able to engage him. Due to dead space of the turret machine guns and limited stopping power of the pistol, the M4 will allow the crew to engage and destroy dismounted threats as they approach the tank. Crews must ensure that the caliber .50 machine gun and tank radios are manned at all times, and the Soldier is looking around to prevent the enemy or unknown personnel from getting too close to the tank. The enemy will constantly be watching vehicles to detect a period of low security in which to conduct attacks. Local vehicles will not be allowed to park near or place objects close to the platoon. An IED or a VBIED could, but may not, cause catastrophic damage to the tank itself, but would be deadly to exposed crewmen or supporting infantry. Crews faced with multi-echelon threats will need to ensure they wear their protective equipment. The wearing of interceptor body armor (IBA) with the small arms protective inserts (SAPI) by the loader and TC will reduce their vulnerability to small-arms fire when they are exposed out of the turret hatches. In addition, crews may be required to conduct dismounted operations or OPs and will be required to wear IBA as a force protection measure. Employ OPs to maintain surveillance on avenues of approach into the platoons AO.
OBSERVATION POSTS
D-7. OPs are especially important in maintaining the platoons OPSEC and enhancing its AO. They help to protect the platoon when long-range observation from current positions is not possible; this can occur when the platoon is in a hide position or when close terrain offers concealed avenues of approach to the platoons position. OPs can be employed either mounted or dismounted.
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Appendix D
A location that is within range of platoon small-arms fire. This enables the platoon to cover the OP if withdrawal becomes necessary.
The platoon leader or PSG briefs the OP personnel to ensure that they are trained in reporting procedures and individual camouflage techniques and that they have the proper equipment as designated in the unit SOP. Equipment will normally include the following: Individual weapons, M4 rifle, and grenades. Communications equipment (such as wire, flag set, flashlight, and/or radio). (Note. The use of nonsecure radios, to include hand-held types, is not recommended. If used; however, platoons must exercise extreme caution.)
Note. Flag use will be based on local SOP, but a general rule of thumb is green flag for friendly elements, yellow flag for unknown elements, and red flag for enemy elements.
Seasonal uniform with load-bearing equipment (LBE) and appropriate MOPP gear. Binoculars and NODs. Paper and pen/pencil for making a sector sketch.
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Map with overlay, protractor and compass. Local security measures such as trip flares and claymore mines. The platoon leader or PSG leads OP personnel to the OP site and briefs them on the following information: Ensure OP personnel understand that their mission is to see and report and not become engaged with the enemy dismounts. When and how to report. When and how to withdraw. The withdrawal criteria should be specific; examples include withdrawal when a CBRN attack is detected, when an enemy tank section crosses a phase line, or when enemy dismounted infantrymen approach to within 300 meters of the OP. Challenge and password. When they will be replaced. As a general rule, OP personnel should be replaced every 2 hours. During cold weather, this rotation may be done more frequently. OP personnel must execute a plan for night-vision operations. Rotating between Soldiers with one Soldier not scanning for longer than 20 minutes, will allow them to keep their night vision and maintain good scanning techniques. Once in place, OP personnel take these steps to improve the position: Establish communications. Camouflage the position and routes into and out of it. Prepare a sector sketch based on the platoon fire plan (see Chapter 4 of this manual). Dig in to provide protection from indirect and direct fires. A good rule of thumb is to dig when dismounted infantry dig. If possible, emplace hasty obstacles for additional protection.
MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS
D-13. The presence of the media is a reality that confronts everyone conducting military operations. All leaders and Soldiers are subject to instantaneous worldwide scrutiny as a result of the growth of news coverage via international television and radio broadcasts and the Internet. They must realize that operations that run counter to official U.S. policy may damage the nations interests and international standing. D-14. Tank platoon crewmen must learn how to deal effectively with broadcast and print reporters and photographers. Training should cover any information restrictions imposed on the media. Soldiers must also gain an understanding of which subjects they are authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer to higher authorities, such as their chain of command or the public affairs office (PAO). PAOs usually issue daily guidance dealing with these subjects.
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D-5
Appendix D
D-6
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Appendix E
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Appendix E
signal security reduces the chances of being acquired as a target. The tank platoon should continually analyze its vulnerability to chemical or nuclear attack and take appropriate protective measures. E-4. Attacks and contamination must be detected quickly and reported to adjacent units and headquarters elements. The tank platoon must have an effective method of quickly giving the alarm in the event of a CBRN attack. Alarms can be passed by radio, audible signals, or hand-and-arm signals. The unit SOP should specify criteria and automatic procedures for employing detection teams and submitting the required CBRN reports following a CBRN attack or when contamination is encountered. E-5. Whenever possible, all movement routes and future positions should be reconnoitered for CBRN contamination. Quartering party personnel should be prepared to conduct monitoring operations; if they detect contaminated areas, they identify, report, and mark them. The quartering party can then evaluate the location and type of hazard (nuclear radiation or chemical/biological agent) to determine the best plan for bypassing, crossing, or operating in the contaminated area. Based on the situation, the platoon leader and company commander must be able to implement protective measures specified in the SOP to minimize personnel losses and limit the spread of contamination.
NUCLEAR DEFENSE
E-7. The best defense against a nuclear attack is to dig in. Unit defensive positions, which range from individual foxholes to full-scale improved fighting positions, should be prepared whenever the tactical situation permits. Personnel should keep their individual weapons, equipment, clothing, and other issue items in their vehicles. Inside the vehicle, equipment and any loose items must be secured because the blast wave can turn unsecured objects into lethal missiles. Supplies, explosives, and flammable materials should be dispersed and protected. E-8. Reverse slopes of hills and mountains give some nuclear protection. The initial radiation and the heat and light from the fireball of a nuclear blast tend to be absorbed by hills and mountains. The use of gullies, ravines, ditches, natural depressions, fallen trees, and caves can also reduce nuclear casualties. E-9. Equipment that would be damaged in the explosion must be safe guarded. One technique is not using all night-vision goggles at the same time, if not required by the mission, to prevent damage to the image enhancing mechanism by the flash.
CHEMICAL DEFENSE
General Guidelines
E-10. Make sure all personnel have their protective masks available, and make sure each mask fits and functions properly. All personnel should wear the proper protective clothing in accordance with the MOPP level designated by the commander. Inform everyone to remain alert and to be constantly aware of the chemical threat. Protect all equipment and supplies from liquid chemical contamination by keeping them organized and covered with a tarp. Exposed gear will not be decontaminated and will be destroyed and
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deprive the platoon of its equipment. The platoon must have a standardized plan for placing M9 tape on the vehicles as part of the early warning process.
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E-3
Appendix E
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in sealed containers; consume it only after washing and cleaning the outside of the container. All water must be boiled for at least 15 minutes. Leaders continue to monitor for signs of delayed acting agents. Note. Refer to the battle drill for reaction to a chemical/biological attack in Chapter 3 of this manual.
NUCLEAR DEFENSE
Defense During a Nuclear Attack
E-19. This discussion focuses on defensive measures the platoon must be prepared to take to protect tank crewmen, whether they are in their vehicle or have dismounted. Mounted Defensive Actions E-20. If time permits, the platoon should take the following actions: z Position each vehicle behind the best available cover with the front of the vehicle toward the blast. z Point the gun away from the blast. z Lock the brakes. z Secure loose equipment inside the vehicle to prevent injuries and equipment damage. z Secure all exterior components that could be damaged by the blast (such as water cans, duffel bags, and antennas) inside the vehicle. z Turn off all radios as well as turret and master power. z Close and lock all hatches, including ballistic shields. z Take actions to protect the head and eyes. As necessary, wear helmets and eye protection whenever possible. Note. Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of the battle drill for reaction to a nuclear attack. Dismounted Defensive Actions E-21. Never run for cover! Immediately drop flat on the ground (face down) or to the bottom of a foxhole, facing away from the fireball. Cover as much exposed skin as possible. Keep eyes tightly closed. Remain down until the blast wave has passed and debris has stopped falling. Stay calm, check for injury, check weapons and equipment for damage, and prepare to continue the mission.
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Appendix E
Fallout Warning E-24. The first person to detect the arrival of fallout is usually a member of the radiological survey and monitoring team. As soon as the recorded dose rate reaches 1 centigray per hour (cGy/hr) or higher, issue a fallout warning. All personnel hearing the warning relay it to others. If the mission allows, Soldiers should get into a shelter with overhead cover and stay there until given an ALL CLEAR signal or until otherwise directed to move. If the mission does not allow the unit to take cover, decontamination becomes more important and, in many cases, more difficult. Supervision of Radiological Monitoring E-25. Designate a point in the platoon area where readings will be taken, and note the grid coordinates of that point. Check the monitor operator to make sure that he takes readings at least once each hour from this point, that he zeroes the radiacmeter (AN/VDR-2) before taking each reading, and that he uses the device properly. Have the operator monitor continuously if any of the following conditions occur: z A reading of 1 cGy/hr or more is obtained. z A fallout warning is received. z A nuclear burst is seen, heard, or reported. z An order to monitor is received. z The unit begins to move. E-26. Ensure that the operator immediately reports all readings showing the presence of radiation, as well as the time of these readings. Use this information and the location of the readings to prepare a NBC-4 report. Continue these operations until monitoring shows a dose rate of less than 1 cGy/hr or until directed to stop. Supervision of Tactical Dosimetry E-27. The tank platoon is normally issued two dosimeters. Select two Soldiers, one from each section, to wear them ideally the TC but at a minimum a loader that is outside the armor to get an accurate reading. Before the operation begins, check all dosimeters; any that do not read zero should be turned in for recharging if applicable. If a charger is not available, note the original reading on the dosimeter and adjust subsequent readings accordingly. Make sure dosimeter readings are reported accurately. Collect readings at least once daily. Average these readings, round to the nearest 10, and report this average to higher headquarters.
CHEMICAL DEFENSE
Defense During a Chemical Attack
E-28. Give the alarm. Have all unmasked Soldiers put on their protective masks and other MOPP gear. All personnel should move inside their tanks; in most cases, they should place their hatches in the closed position to protect against gross contamination. Direct the crews of vehicles that are equipped with CBRN overpressurization to turn the system on. Use M256 chemical agent detector kits to determine the type of agent, and forward a NBC-1 chemical report. Continue the mission. Notes. Tactical and safety considerations (such as observation of the terrain, enemy disposition, and the amount of gross contamination that may be spread inside the vehicle) may outweigh the need to keep the tanks hatches closed. Depending on the tactical situation and unit SOP, platoon members may be required to keep their hatches in the open or open-protected position. Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a discussion of the battle drill for reaction to a chemical/biological attack.
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VOCAL ALARMS
E-31. To give a vocal alarm for any chemical or biological hazard or attack, the person detecting the hazard stops breathing, masks, and shouts GAS, GAS! as loudly as possible. Everyone hearing this alarm must immediately mask, repeat the alarm, and take cover from agent contamination and fragmentation of munitions. It may also be necessary to pass the alarm over the radio or telephone. Visual signals must supplement vocal alarms.
AUTOMATIC ALARMS
E-32. If an M8/M22 automatic chemical agent alarm sounds or flashes, the first person to hear or see it stops breathing, masks, and yells GAS, GAS! This alarm is relayed throughout the unit by vocal and visual signals and radio.
NONVOCAL ALARMS
E-33. One person yelling GAS, GAS! to warn unit personnel may be drowned out by the sounds of the battlefield; therefore, sound signals by means other than voice may be required. These signals must produce noise that is louder than, and not easily confused with, other sounds of combat. The unit SOP should specify nonvocal alarms for CBRN hazards. Following are some suggestions: z Rapid and continuous beating together of any two metal objects to produce a loud noise. Sample SOP entry: The audible warning of a chemical attack is rapid and continuous beating of metal on metal. z A succession of short blasts on a vehicle horn or other suitable device. Sample SOP entry: While in convoy, five short blasts on a vehicle horn is the audible signal for a chemical attack. z An intermittent warbling siren sound. Sample SOP entry: The audible alarm for impending chemical attack is the sounding of the installation siren as follows: 10 seconds on, 5 seconds off; sequence repeated for 2 minutes.
VISUAL SIGNALS
E-34. Visual signals may replace sound alarms when the sound may be lost amid battlefield noises or when the situation does not permit the use of sound signals. The standard hand-and-arm signal for a CBRN hazard is illustrated in Figure E-2. Signaling is done by extending both arms horizontally to the sides with the fists closed and facing up, then rapidly moving the fists to the head and back to the horizontal position. This is repeated until other elements react. Colored smoke or flares may also be designated as visual signals for a CBRN hazard, but these must be specified in unit SOPs.
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Appendix E
NUCLEAR CASUALTIES
E-39. Blast injuries. These can range from minor cuts and broken bones to severe lacerations and critical damage to vital organs. The first-aid treatment will be the same as that used for conventional combat casualties suffering similar injuries. E-40. Thermal radiation injuries. The intense heat generated by a nuclear detonation can cause burn injuries. As with other types of burns, there are three degrees of injury: z First-degree burns should heal without special treatment, and there will be no scar formation. z Second-degree burns resemble severe sunburn with blistering; they should be treated as a burn to prevent infection. z In third-degree burns, the full thickness of the skin is destroyed; the victim should be treated as a burn casualty and evacuated.
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Nerve Agents
E-42. Nerve agent poisoning can lead to a quick death; for this reason, quick recognition of its symptoms is crucial. Immediate self-aid or buddy-aid is needed if most or all symptoms appear. Poisoning Symptoms E-43. Early symptoms usually appear in the following progression: z Runny nose. z Redness and tearing of the eyes. z Sudden headache. z Excessive flow of saliva (drooling). z Tightness in the chest, leading to breathing difficulty. z Impaired vision. z Muscular twitching in the area of exposed or contaminated skin. z Stomach cramps. z Nausea. E-44. Severe nerve agent poisoning is likely when any of the early symptoms are accompanied by all or most of the following symptoms: z Strange or confused behavior. z Gurgling sounds when breathing. z Severely pinpointed pupils. z Loss of bladder and/or bowel control. z Vomiting. z Convulsions. z Breathing that becomes extremely labored or stops. Self-Aid Procedures E-45. No effective drug exists to remedy the effects of nerve agents on vision. If Soldiers experience any of the other mild symptoms of nerve agent poisoning, they must perform the following self-aid measures, which are covered in more detail in FM 4-25.11 (FM 21-11): z Step 1. Immediately put on the protective mask. z Step 2. Remove a Mark I nerve agent autoinjector kit (NAAK) from the protective mask carrier (see Figure E-3). z Step 3. Inject one thigh with the first injector from the kit (atropine in the small autoinjector). Hold the injector against the thigh for at least 10 seconds. Remove the injector. z Step 4. Immediately inject the thigh with the second injector (pralidoxime chloride in the large injector). Hold the injector against the thigh for at least 10 seconds. z Step 5. Remove the injector and place each injector needle through the jacket pocket flap of the overgarment, bending each needle to form a hook. z Step 6. Massage the injection area, if time permits and the overgarment suit is not contaminated. z Step 7. If symptoms persist or recur, wait 10 to 15 minutes and repeat both injections. Repeat a third time if needed. Allow 10 to 15 minutes between each set of injections. Do not
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Appendix E
administer more than three NAAK sets. administration of more than three sets.
Figure E-3. Nerve agent autoinjector kit (NAAK) Buddy-Aid Procedures E-46. If a Soldier experiences severe symptoms from nerve agent poisoning and is unable to administer self-aid, another Soldier must perform the following buddy-aid measures, which are covered in more detail in FM 4-25.11 (FM 21-11): z Step 1. Mask the casualty. z Step 2. Using the victims NAAK, administer three sets immediately and in rapid succession in the thigh muscle of either leg. Do not wait between injections. z Step 3. Administer the back-pressure armlift method of artificial respiration if the casualtys breathing is labored or has stopped. z Step 4. Hook the expended autoinjectors to the casualtys overgarment jacket pocket flap. z Step 5. If necessary to stabilize the casualtys heart rate, administer the convulsive antidote nerve agent (CANA) injection Diazepam (see Figure E-4). Use the following procedure: Tear open the protective plastic packet and remove the injector. Grasp the injector with the needle (black) end extending beyond the thumb and two fingers (index plus next finger). With the other hand, pull the safety cap off the injector base to arm the injector. (CAUTION: Do not touch the black portion, which is the injector needle. You could accidentally inject yourself.) Place the black end of the injector against the casualtys injection site. Push the injector into the muscle with firm, even pressure until it functions. Hold the injector in place for at least 10 seconds. Push the needle of each used injector (one at a time) through one of the pocket flaps of the casualtys protective overgarment and, being careful not to tear protective gloves or clothing; bend each needle to form a hook. z Step 6. Obtain immediate medical attention for the victim. Note. This information is covered in task 031-503-1013, Decontaminate Yourself and Individual Equipment Using Chemical Decontamination Kits.
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Blister Agents E-47. Casualties resulting from blister agents may not be noticeable immediately. Symptoms may take several hours or days to appear. They include the following: z Redness or inflammation of the eyes. z Temporary blindness or, with severe poisoning, permanent blindness. z Itching, burning, or reddening of the skin. z Welts or, in an advanced state, blisters on the skin. z Hoarseness. z Coughing. z Difficult or labored breathing. z Stomach pain. z Nausea. z Vomiting. z Diarrhea. E-48. If a blister agent comes in contact with skin or eyes, remove it immediately. To remove an agent from the eyes, flush repeatedly with plain water. Decontaminate the skin using the M258A1/M291 kit. If severe blisters form, seek medical attention as soon as possible. Blood Agents E-49. A seemingly mild case of blood agent poisoning can progress to death within 10 minutes. Symptoms include the following: z Rapid or shallow respiration (panting). z Headache. z Dizziness or giddiness. z Red or pink color change in light-colored skin. z Convulsions. z Coma. E-50. There is no self-aid or buddy-aid treatment for blood agent poisoning. When hit with blood agent the platoon must mask as soon as possible. Victims must receive immediate medical attention. Blood agent leads to a break down of protective mask filters and leaders must plan actions accordingly. Choking Agents E-51. These agents produce casualties by means of inhaled vapors. They damage blood vessels in the lung walls, causing body fluid to slowly fill the lung cavity. Ordinary field concentrations do not cause death, but prolonged exposure to high concentrations of the vapor, coupled with neglect or delay in masking, can be fatal. Maximum damage will occur between 12 and 24 hours after exposure. In most cases, the excess fluid in the lungs will absorb back into the body. Slow recovery will begin approximately 48 hours after exposure. E-52. During and immediately after exposure, choking agent symptoms may include the following: z Coughing. z Choking. z Tightness in the chest. z Nausea. z Headache. z Tearing of the eyes. E-53. Following the early symptoms, a symptom-free period of 2 to 24 hours is likely. This will be followed by these signs of fluid collecting in the lungs: z Rapid, shallow breathing.
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Appendix E
z z z
Painful coughing. Blue lips and fingernails. In severe cases, clammy skin and rapid heartbeat.
E-54. No self-aid or buddy-aid treatment exists for choking agent symptoms. If only minimum amounts were inhaled, the Soldier may continue with normal duties. If definite symptoms occur, the Soldier should keep warm and seek immediate medical attention and rapid evacuation to an aid station.
TYPES OF MARKERS
E-56. U.S. forces use NATO standard markers (illustrated in Figure E-5) to make it easier for allies to recognize the hazards. These markers are in the standard CBRN marking set. The colors and inscriptions on a marker indicate the type of hazard. Additional information is written on the front of the sign.
MARKING PROCEDURES
E-57. Markers face away from the contamination. For example, if markers are placed on the edge of a contaminated area to mark a radiological hot spot, they face away from the point of the highest contamination reading. Markers are placed along roads and trails and at other likely points of entry. When time and mission permit, additional markers should be emplaced. The distance between signs varies. In open terrain, they can be placed 25 to 100 meters apart; in hilly or wooded areas, they should be placed more frequently. An observer should be able to stand in front of a marker and see the markers to the left and right of it.
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E-58. Units discovering a marked contaminated area do not have to conduct elaborate, time-consuming surveys. They simply check the extent of contamination and use the information to adjust their plans, if necessary. If the size of the hazard has changed, they relocate the signs. If the hazard is gone, they remove the signs. Changes are reported to higher headquarters.
UNMASKING PROCEDURES
E-59. Soldiers should unmask as soon as possible except when a live biological or toxin attack is expected. Use the following procedures to determine if unmasking is safe.
ALL-CLEAR SIGNAL
E-62. Units pass the all-clear signal by word of mouth through their chain of command. Leaders initiate the signal after testing for contamination proves negative. The commander designates the specific all-clear signal and includes it in the unit SOP or the OPORD. If required, standard sound signals may be used, such as a continuous, sustained blast on a siren, vehicle horn, or similar device. When ALL CLEAR is announced on the radio, the receiving unit must authenticate the transmission before complying.
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Appendix E
IMMEDIATE DECONTAMINATION
E-68. Immediate decontamination is a basic Soldier survival skill. Any contact between chemical or toxic agents and bare skin should be treated as an emergency. Some agents can kill if they remain on the skin for longer than a minute.
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OPERATIONAL DECONTAMINATION
E-72. Operational decontamination allows a force to continue fighting and sustain momentum after being contaminated. It limits the hazard of transferring contamination by removing most of the gross contamination on equipment and nearly all the contamination on individual Soldiers. E-73. Operational decontamination speeds the weathering process and allows clean areas (people, equipment, and terrain) to stay clean. When they complete the decontamination process, Soldiers who have removed sources of vapor contamination from their clothing and equipment can use hazard-free areas to unmask temporarily and eat, drink, and rest. E-74. Operational decontamination is accomplished using assets of the parent unit. It makes use of two decontamination techniques: z Vehicle wash down. z MOPP gear exchange. E-75. These procedures can be performed separately from each other; both are best performed at crew level. Uncontaminated vehicles and personnel should not go through either technique.
THOROUGH DECONTAMINATION
E-80. Thorough decontamination operations restore the combat power of maneuver units by removing nearly all contamination from Soldiers and individual equipment. Executed promptly and correctly, these detailed procedures reduce the danger of contamination exposure to negligible risk levels. Just as important, they allow Soldiers to operate equipment safely for extended periods at reduced MOPP levels.
PROCEDURES
E-81. Contaminated units conduct detailed troop decontamination (DTD) for their crewmen under the supervision of the chemical unit. When detailed equipment decontamination (DED) operations are
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Appendix E
required, the chemical unit usually selects a site, sets it up, and performs detailed procedures with assistance from the contaminated unit. E-82. After completing thorough decontamination, the unit moves into an adjacent assembly area for reconstitution. Support elements from the brigade, division, or corps support area replenish combat stocks, refit equipment, and replace personnel and equipment. The newly reconstituted unit leaves the assembly area fully operational and fit to return to battle. A small risk from residual contamination remains, so periodic contamination checks must be made following this operation.
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USES OF SMOKE
E-93. Smoke has four general uses on the battlefield, as described in the following discussion.
OBSCURATION
E-95. Smoke can be fired on enemy positions to degrade the vision of gunners and known or suspected OPs, preventing them from seeing or tracking targets and thereby reducing their effectiveness. Employed against an attacking force, nonthermal smoke (white phospherous) can cause confusion and disorientation by degrading the enemys command and control capabilities; at the same time, friendly units retain the ability to engage the enemy using thermal sights and from your sketch card. In addition, enemy vehicles become silhouetted as they emerge from the smoke. If smoke employment is planned and executed correctly, this will occur as the enemy reaches the trigger line. (Figure E-6 illustrates this use of smoke.)
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Appendix E
Figure E-6. Using smoke to confuse the enemy and silhouette his vehicles
DECEPTION
E-96. Smoke can mislead the enemy regarding friendly intentions. For example, it can be employed on several avenues of approach at once to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the main attack. In the defense, smoke may be fired at a remote location for the sole purpose of attracting attention and confusing the enemy.
SCREENING
E-97. Smoke is used in friendly areas of operation or in areas between friendly and enemy forces to degrade enemy ground and aerial observation and to defeat or degrade enemy acquisition systems. Screening smoke helps to conceal the platoon as it displaces from a BP or as it conducts tactical movement approaching enemy positions. Smoke can also be employed to conceal a platoon as it conducts a bypass, breach, or assault mission. Figures E-7 through E-9 illustrate uses of screening smoke.
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Appendix E
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SOURCES OF SMOKE
E-98. There are a number of sources of smoke on the battlefield, including the residual effects of burning vehicles, equipment, and storage facilities. Depending on availability, the tank platoon can employ the following smoke delivery systems during tactical operations.
MORTARS
E-99. Mortar support, provided by the CAB mortar platoon or cavalry troop mortar section, is the most rapid and responsive means of indirect smoke delivery. The tank platoon leader coordinates the planning and execution of mortar smoke missions with the commander and the company or troop FIST. Mortars use WP rounds, which can degrade the effectiveness of thermal sights and can also produce casualties to friendly troops. Refer to FM 3-11.11 (FM 3-11).
FIELD ARTILLERY
E-100. FA can place smoke on distant targets. Artillery-delivered smoke is not as responsive as mortar smoke support and may not be available if it is not planned and coordinated well in advance. Artillery smoke is made up of hexachloroethane (HC) and has less effect on thermal sights than does WP smoke.
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Appendix E
SMOKE POTS
E-101. These produce a large volume of white or grayish-white smoke that lasts for extended periods. The smoke has minimal effect on thermal sights. This is the only system that floats on water and that can be delivered by hand or vehicle. The tank platoon will normally employ smoke pots to screen displacement or breaching operations.
CAUTION
VEESS will be used only when the vehicle is burning diesel fuel. Use of VEESS when burning any other type of fuel will cause a fire hazard.
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Note. Even types of smoke that do not affect thermal sights may prevent the tanks laser range finder from computing an accurate ballistic solution. Under such conditions, crewmen must rely on such techniques as range bands, range estimation, and battlesighting.
NAVIGATION
E-108. Navigational aids such as POSNAV, GPS, and thermal sights assist individual vehicles during movement through smoke, while FBCB2 and other digital systems help the platoon leader to maintain situational understanding and control of the platoon. The platoon leader also decreases the interval between vehicles to further enhance control of the platoon.
MANEUVER
Offense
E-109. A defending enemy may employ smoke to confuse and disorient the attacker. Whenever the platoon is traveling through smoke, whether it is of friendly or enemy origin, the platoon leader must remember that his tanks will be silhouetted as they emerge from the smoke. The critical consideration is for all vehicles to emerge at the same time. The navigational tools discussed previously enable the platoon leader to maintain command and control during movement and to ensure that the platoon is postured, as it exits the smoke, to mass fires against previously unidentified enemy vehicles. E-110. During an assault, friendly smoke should be shifted in advance of the arrival of the assault element. The use of multispectral smoke for obscuration must be carefully planned. The duration of the effects of the smoke should be controlled based on the capability of enemy and friendly units to acquire and engage targets through the smoke and on the ability of friendly units to maintain situational understanding during movement.
Defense
E-111. An attacking enemy may employ smoke on the tank platoons positions or in the platoons engagement area. As noted, this may not only blind thermal sights but also prevent laser range finders from accurately computing ballistic data. One solution is to occupy alternate BPs that conform to the commanders intent but that are not obscured by smoke (see Figure E-10).
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Appendix E
Figure E-10. Tank platoon occupying an alternate battle position that is not obscured by enemy smoke E-112. If multispectral smoke does not disable thermal sights, the TC can use sector sketches with grid lines, range bands, and TRPs to estimate the target range in the absence of a laser-computed range. On the M1A2, the choke sight of the CITV enables the TC to estimate and input ranges for a ballistic solution.
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Appendix F
Combat Identification
Fratricide and collateral damage adversely affect combat operations. In addition to the loss of life and materiel, fratricide can have a devastating effect on operational effectiveness and morale. The advent of continuous operations of highly mobile forces, extended range of operations, and weapon systems of greatly increased range, lethality, and autonomy exacerbates the challenge of combat identification. Based on empirical data from Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Combat Readiness Center, as well as Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, fratricide remains a significant issue. Identification of unknown entities, such as friendly, enemy, or neutral/noncombatant, is increasingly important as weapon system ranges extend beyond visual recognition in the fog of war and the prospect of commonality of friendly and enemy systems increases. It is highly unlikely that US Army forces will operate independent of other US ground, air or naval forces in future combat operations. Combat operations within Joint Task Force structures will invariably place with US Army units in close proximity to other US and multinational units with potentially dissimilar equipment and uniforms. Effective combat identification measures and TTPs will be even more important within this context.
CID MEASURES
F-1. Combat identification measures must be established early in all operational orders and planning cycles to ensure subordinates fully understand and have opportunity to implement all established measures prior to combat operations. F-2. Combat identification measures must be consistent with ROE and not interfere unduly with unit and individual rights and responsibilities to engage adversary forces. F-3. There is no perfect combat identification system, but by analyzing combat identification requirements from planning to execution, friendly forces can be more effective in combat and reduce the potential for fratricide and undesired collateral damage. Soldiers make the engage/dont engage decision at the point of engagement and must be fully proficient in all aspects of CID. This includes situational awareness and TI systems and understanding of doctrine, TTPs, and ROE. Figure F-1 depicts the complete combat identification system. Noncooperative TI does not always work at optimum ranges due to climatic conditions and equipment status. Noncoperative TI systems require no response, equally support friendly, enemy, and neutral ID, and include optics. Cooperative TI (CTI) only identifies friendly entities that have an operational CTI device; it does not identify enemy or neutral entities. Cooperative systems also directly address fratricide avoidance and expedite force sorting for improved combat effectiveness. Other limitations pertain to how many entities are equipped with a blue force tracker (BFT) or similar device. BFT does not automatically report enemy or neutral entities. Accuracy of SA systems and latency is another limitation.
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Appendix F
DEFINITIONS
F-4. Combat identification is the process of attaining an accurate characterization of detected objects in the joint battlefield to the extent that high confidence, timely application of military options, and weapons resources can occur. F-5. Target identification is the accurate and timely characterization of a detected object on the battlefield as friend, neutral, or enemy. This aspect of combat identification is time sensitive and directly supports a combatants shoot or dont-shoot decision for detected objects on the battlefield. TI is shooterfocused for shoot/dont shoot decisions with friendly identification systems like the joint combat identification marking system (JCIMS) that requires no response from either platform observed.
Figure F-1. Combat identification system F-6. Situational awareness is a ...general knowledge of the dynamic, operational, and tactical situation and the events occurring on the battlefield... within their area of operations.
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
F-7. Tank and infantry leaders at all levels must be aware of the safety considerations involved in light/heavy operations. Leader awareness and involvement is particularly important if the infantry unit has had little training with armored vehicles. All personnel in both the light and heavy units must be aware of these considerations to prevent unnecessary casualties. F-8. Tank crewmen are often unable to see dismounted infantry soldiers operating close to their vehicle. This limitation is worse during limited visibility and when the hatches are closed. In these conditions, the crew is focused on the enemy or on potential enemy locations rather than any nearby infantrymen. The use of JCIMS CID marking systems like the dismounted soldier combat identification marking system (DCIMS) and Phoenix IR lights can help identify and illuminate other friendly vehicles and dismounted infantrymen at night. Employment of JCIMS will assist TCs/gunners and allow the driver to assist in positive identification. F-9. JCIMS is used to reduce the risk of fratricide. JCIMS devices include combat identification panels (CIP), thermal identification panels (TIP), DCIMS, Phoenix IR lights, and IR tape. JCIMS marking devices are used in conjunction with forward looking infrared (FLIR) optics and image intensification
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Combat Identification
devices (such as night-vision goggles [NVG]) to assist in identifying friendly vehicles and soldiers at the point of engagement. The markings must be installed, turned on, and visible on friendly vehicles and dismounted soldiers to be effective and operational status in accordance with the unit TACSOP and specifics contained in the OPORD must be included in precombat inspection procedures.
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Appendix G
Risk Management
Risk is the chance of injury or death for individuals and damage to or loss of vehicles and equipment. Risks, and/or the potential for risks, are always present in every combat and training situation the tank platoon faces. Risk management must take place at all levels of the chain of command during each phase of every operation; it is an integral part of all tactical planning. The tank platoon leader, his NCOs, and all other platoon soldiers must know how to use risk management, coupled with fratricide reduction measures, to ensure that the mission is executed in the safest possible environment within mission constraints. The primary objective of risk management is to help units protect their combat power through accident prevention, enabling them to win the battle quickly and decisively, with minimum losses. This appendix outlines the process that leaders can use to identify hazards and implement a plan to address each identified hazard. It also includes a detailed discussion of the responsibilities of the platoons leaders and individual soldiers in implementing a sound risk management program. For additional information on risk management, refer to FM 3-100.14 (FM 100-14).
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Appendix G
Proximity and number of maneuvering units. ENEMY Knowledge of the enemy situation. Enemy capabilities. Availability of time and resources to conduct reconnaissance. TERRAIN AND WEATHER Visibility conditions, including light, dust, fog, and smoke. Precipitation and its effect on mobility. Extreme heat or cold. Additional natural hazards (broken ground, steep inclines, and water obstacles). TROOPS Equipment status. Experience the units conducting the operation have working together. Danger areas associated with the platoons weapon systems. Soldier/leader proficiency. Soldier/leader rest situation. Degree of acclimatization to environment. Impact of new leaders and/or crew members. TIME AVAILABLE Time available for troop-leading procedures and rehearsals by subordinates. Time available for PCCs/PCIs. CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS Applicable ROE and/or ROI. Potential stability and/or support operations involving contact with civilians (such as NEOs, refugee or disaster assistance, or counterterrorism). Potential for media contact/inquiries.
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Risk Management
z z
Taking into account both the probability and severity of a hazard, determine the associated risk level (extremely high, high, moderate, and low). Figure G-1 summarizes the four risk levels. Based on the factors of hazard assessment (probability, severity, and risk level, as well as the operational factors unique to the situation), complete the composite risk management worksheet. Refer to Table G-1 for an outline of the risk assessment matrix used to determine the level of risk. Figure G-2A and B show an example of a composite risk management worksheet (pages 1 and 2). Refer to Table G-2 for instructions on completing the worksheet. (Note. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, can be found on the AKO website, Self-Help, DA Pubs and Forms.)
LEVELS OF RISK
EXTREMELY HIGH Someone will die or suffer permanent disability. HIGH More often than not, someone will suffer an injury that requires less than 3 months to heal. MODERATE More often than not, someone will require first aid or minor medical treatment. LOW (WORST CASE) Someone is likely to need first aid or minor medical treatment. Figure G-1. Risk levels and impact on mission execution
E E H M
E H M L
H H M L
H M L L
M L L L
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Appendix G
Figure G-2A. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 1 of 2 pages
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Risk Management
Figure G-2B. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet, page 2 of 2 pages
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Appendix G
Table G-2. Instructions for completing DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet
Item Instruction
1 through 4 5 6
Self explanatory. Subtask relating to the mission or task in block 1. Hazards Identify hazards by reviewing METT-TC factors for the mission or task. Additional factors include historical lessons learned, experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings, and environmental considerations. Initial Risk Level Includes historical lessons learned; intuitive analyses, experience, judgment, equipment characteristics and warnings; and environmental considerations. Determine initial risk for each hazard by applying the risk assessment matrix (Table G-1). Enter the risk level for each hazard. Controls Develop one or more controls for each hazard that will either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and/or severity) of a hazardous incident. Specify who, what, where, why, when, and how for each control. Enter controls. Residual Risk Level Determine the residual risk for each hazard by applying the risk assessment matrix (Table G-1). Enter the residual risk level for each hazard. How to Implement Decide how each control will be put into effect or communicated to the personnel who will make it happen (written or verbal instruction; tactical, safety, garrison SOPs, rehearsals). Enter controls. How to Supervise (Who) Plan how each control will be monitored for implementation (continuous supervision, spot-checks) and reassess hazards as the situation changes. Determine if the controls worked and if they can be improved. Pass on lessons learned. Was Control Effective Indicate Yes or No. Review during AAR. Overall Risk Level Select the highest residual risk level and circle it. This becomes the overall mission or task risk level. The commander decides whether the controls are sufficient to accept the level of residual risk. If the risk is too great to continue the mission or task, the commander directs development of additional control or modifies, changes, or rejects the COA. Risk Decision Authority Signed by the appropriate level of command.
9 10
11
12 13
14
G-6
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
Risk Management
SUPERVISION
G-12. Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to ensuring that effective risk management controls are implemented. All leaders are responsible for supervising mission rehearsals and execution to ensure standards and controls are enforced. In particular, NCOs must enforce established safety policies as well as controls developed for a specific operation or task. Techniques include spot checks, inspections, SITREPs, confirmation briefs, buddy checks, and close supervision. G-13. During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor risk management controls, both to determine whether they are effective and to modify them as necessary. Leaders must also anticipate, identify, and assess new hazards. They ensure that imminent danger issues are addressed on the spot and that ongoing planning and execution reflect changes in hazard conditions.
EVALUATION
G-14. Whenever possible, the risk management process should also include an after-action review (AAR) to assess unit performance in identifying risks and preventing hazardous situations. Leaders should then incorporate lessons learned from the process into unit SOPs and plans for future missions.
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
G-7
Appendix G
accident risks. The same risk management process is used to manage both types. The platoon leader alone determines how and where he is willing to take tactical risks. With the assistance of his PSG, NCOs, and individual soldiers, the platoon leader manages accident risks. G-16. Sometimes, despite the need to advise higher headquarters of a risk taken or about to be assumed, the risk management process may break down. Such a failure can be the result of several factors; most often, it can be attributed to the following: z The risk denial syndrome in which leaders do not want to know about the risk. z A soldier who believes that the risk decision is part of his job and does not want to bother his platoon leader or section leader. z Outright failure to recognize a hazard or the level of risk involved. z Overconfidence on the part of an individual or the unit in the capability to avoid or recover from a hazardous incident. z Subordinates not fully understanding the higher commanders guidance regarding risk decisions. G-17. The tank platoon leader gives the platoon direction, sets priorities, and establishes the command climate (values, attitudes, and beliefs). Successful preservation of combat power requires him to embed risk management into individual behavior. To fulfill this commitment, the platoon leader must exercise creative leadership, innovative planning, and careful management. Most important, he must demonstrate support for the risk management process. The tank platoon leader and others in the platoon chain of command can establish a command climate favorable to risk management integration by taking the following actions: z Demonstrate consistent and sustained risk management behavior through leading by example and by stressing active participation throughout the risk management process. z Provide adequate resources for risk management. Every leader is responsible for obtaining the assets necessary to mitigate risk and for providing them to subordinate leaders. z Understand their own and their soldiers limitations, as well as their units capabilities. z Allow subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them. z Prevent a zero defects mindset from creeping into the platoons culture. z Demonstrate full confidence in subordinates mastery of their trade and their ability to execute a chosen COA. z Keep subordinates informed. z Listen to subordinates. G-18. For the platoon leader, his subordinate leaders, and individual soldiers alike, responsibilities in managing risk include the following: z Make informed risk decisions; establish and then clearly communicate risk decision criteria and guidance. z Establish clear, feasible risk management policies and goals. z Train the risk management process. Ensure that subordinates understand the who, what, when, where, and why of managing risk and how these factors apply to their situation and assigned responsibilities. z Accurately evaluate the platoons effectiveness, as well as subordinates execution of risk controls during the mission. z Inform higher headquarters when risk levels exceed established limits.
G-8
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
Appendix H
Fratricide Prevention
Fratricide is defined as the employment of friendly weapons that results in the unforeseen and unintentional death or injury of friendly personnel or damage to friendly equipment. Fratricide prevention is the commanders responsibility. He is assisted by all leaders across all operating systems in accomplishing this mission. This appendix focuses on actions the tank platoon leader and his subordinate leaders can take with current resources to reduce the risk of fratricide. Special Note. Prior to all missions, commanders must ensure that their units conduct detailed planning and rehearsals emphasizing fratricide prevention. In any tactical situation, situational understanding on the part of all crewmen, particularly the platoon leader, is critical not only to mission success but also to survival. It is critical that leaders know where other friendly elements are operating. With this knowledge, they must anticipate dangerous conditions and take steps to either avoid or mitigate them. With the new technology becoming more common at all levels the ability to maintain situational understanding is better enhanced, but the platoon leader cannot solely depend on this and must have an understanding of how the different units are moving. The platoon leader must always be vigilant of changes and developments in the situation that may place his elements in danger. When he perceives a potential fratricide situation, he must personally use the higher net to coordinate directly with the friendly element involved.
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
H-1
Appendix H
H-2
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
Fratricide Prevention
WEAPONS ERRORS
H-12. Lapses in individual discipline can result in fratricide. These incidents include charge errors, accidental discharges, mistakes with explosives and hand grenades, and use of incorrect gun data.
BATTLEFIELD HAZARDS
H-13. A variety of explosive devices and materiel may create danger on the battlefield: unexploded ordnance; unmarked or unrecorded minefields, including scatterable mines; booby traps. Failure to mark, record, remove, or otherwise anticipate these threats will lead to casualties.
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
H-3
Appendix H
H-4
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
Fratricide Prevention
Report the following on the next higher unit net: Announce that the unit or vehicle is receiving friendly fire. Request medical assistance as needed. Give the location and direction of the firing vehicles. Warn the higher unit not to return fire if the firing unit is positively identified as friendly.
LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
H-26. In all situations involving the risk of fratricide and friendly fire, leaders must be prepared to take immediate actions to prevent casualties as well as equipment damage or destruction. Recommended actions in fratricide situations include the following: z Identify the incident and order the parties involved to cease fire. z Conduct an in-stride risk assessment. z Identify and implement controls to prevent the incident from recurring.
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
H-5
Appendix I
Sets radio to unused frequency. Opens breech and removes main gun round. Stows round (leaves ammunition door open). Removes coax machine gun back plate and places it in breech. Secures protective mask, individual weapon, rations, and all grenades, to include four thermite grenades. Passes two thermite grenades to TC and two thermite grenades to loader. Before exiting station, removes and gives EPLRS to TC (if equipped). Exits through TCs hatch, secures loaders machine gun and two boxes of ammunition, and dismounts tank. Secures protective mask, individual weapon, M4 rifle, ammunition, rations, and loaders mittens. Places one thermite grenade in breech and stands by. Secures protective mask, individual weapon, ammunition, and rations.
Removes caliber .50 machine gun back plate and places it in breech. Secures protective mask, individual weapon, rations, and automated network control device (ANCD). Places ANCD in breech and receives two thermite grenades from gunner.
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
I-1
Appendix I
Pulls pin on one thermite grenade (as loader exits tank) and places both grenades on top of fuel cell. Dismounts tank and conducts personnel accountability.
WARNING
Crews should take additional safety measures because of the use of depleted uranium (DU) if they are In, on, or near (within 50 meters) a vehicle at the time of impact by DU ammunitions or a DU armored vehicle at the time of impact by munitions. Near (within 50 meters) actively burning fires involving DU. Routinely entering vehicles with penetrated DU armor or that have been struck by DU munitions. Good safety procedures to take in the event of the occurrences listed above are: Wear a protective mask as long as it does not degrade your ability to fight or protect yourself. Cover exposed skin; an increase in MOPP is not required. Dust off your uniform after you leave the vehicle or area. Observe standard field hygiene, including washing your hands before eating. Crews should follow the three basic principles of hazard avoidance, which are: Minimize the time near the radioactive source. Maximize the distance between crew members and the radioactive source. Improve the shielding (use cardboard, tape, and so forth). TB 9-1300-278, Guidelines for Safe Response to Handling, Storage, and Transportation Accidents Involving Army Tank Munitions or Armor Which Contain Depleted Uranium, currently provides operational guidance for incidents involving DU munitions, armor, and battlefield damage.
I-2
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
tank and destroyed. Pour fuel, engine oil, and other combustible liquid over the TA-50 inside the turret and ignite it by lighting it or using hand grenades. The crew must download all main gun ammunition to another vehicle if the situation permits; otherwise, the ammunition must be destroyed. I-3. If enemy contact or capture is imminent, the TC will destroy the ANCD. Note. For training purposes, use practice grenades and simulate rupturing heater fuel lines.
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
I-3
Glossary
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Acronym/Term 1SG A A/L AAD ABCS ABF ACE ACF ACM ACP ACR ADA ADC AFATDS ammo ANCD AOR AP APC APDS ARTEP AS ASAS ASIP aslt pos ASR ATCCS ATGM atk pos AVLB AVLM AXP BCT BDA Definition first sergeant
alternate (position)
administrative/logistical
antiarmor defense
Army battle command system attack by fire armored combat engineer; armored combat earthmover (M9) aviation close fires airspace control measure
air control point
armored cavalry regiment
air defense artillery
area damage control
advanced field artillery tactical data system
ammunition
automated network control device
area of responsibility antipersonnel armored personnel carrier armor-piercing discarding sabot (ammunition) Army Training and Evaluation Program area security all-source analysis system advanced system improvement program (also known as SIP, system improvement program) assault position alternate supply route Army tactical command and control system
antitank guided missile
attack position
armored vehicle launched bridge armored vehicle launched MICLIC
ambulance exchange point
brigade combat team
battle damage assessment
22 February 2007
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Glossary-1
Glossary
BFIST BFT BFV BHL BII BIT BMNT BP C2 C2I CA CAB CANA CAS CASEVAC CBRN CBRNWRS cdr CDU CFF CFV cGy/hr CI CID CIF CINC CIP CITV CLAMMS cm CO COA COMSEC COS CP CROWS CRT CS CTCP CVC DA
Glossary-2
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
Glossary
DCIMS DD DED DID DNBI DOA DOD DPICM DPRE DS DS/R DSO DTD DTV DU DVE EA EAC EBC EENT EN EPLRS EPW FA FAC FARP FBCB2 FDC FHA FIST FISTV FIT FLIR FM FO FPF FRAGO FRS FSC FSCM FSE
dismounted soldier combat identification marking system Department of Defense detailed equipment decontamination dirvers integrated display disease and nonbattle injuries
direction of attack
Department of Defense
dual-purpose improved conventional munitions displaced persons, refugee, and evacuee direct support
direct support/reinforcing
domestic support operations
detailed troop decontamination
drivers thermal viewer
depleted uranium
drivers vision enhancer
engagement area
echelons above corps
embedded battle command
end of evening nautical twilight
enemy (graphic overlay abbreviation)
enhanced position location reporting system
enemy prisoner of war
field artillery
forward air controller
forward arming and refueling point
Force XXI battle command brigade and below
fire direction center
foreign humanitarian assistance
fire support team
fire support team vehicle
fault isolation test
forward-looking infrared
field manual
forward observer
final protective fires fragmentary order forward repair system forward support company fire support control measure
fire support element
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
Glossary-3
Glossary
GAS GIRS GPS GPSE GS HB HC HE HEAT HE-OR-T HHC HMMWV HOIS HQ HRP IBA ICM ID IED IFV INC INFOSEC IPB I/R IR ISR IVIS IZLID JAAT JP JVMF KIA km KY L&O LBE lbs LD LOA LOGPAC LOM
Glossary-4
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
Glossary
listening post
laser range finder
logistics resupply point
line replaceable unit
laser spot tracker
Lieutenant (U.S. Army rank) Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Army rank) mission-essential task list mission, enemy, terrain (weather), troops, time available, and civilian considerations (factors taken into account in situational awareness and in the mission analysis process) military grid reference system military intelligence mine-clearing line charge military load class millimeter(s)
mast-mounted sight, maneuver and mobility support
military occupational specialty (U.S. Army)
Military Police multipurpose antitank (ammunition)
meals, ready-to-eat
muzzle reference system
main supply route
mission training plan
military training teams
major theatres of war military working dog
nerve agent auto-injector kit
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
navigation (FBCB2 display push button)
noncommissioned officer
net control station
noncombatant evacuation operations
National Guard
nongovernmental organizations
not later than
night observation device
nap of the earth
night-vision goggle
observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment
MGRS MI MICLIC MLC mm MMS MOS MP MPAT MRE MRS MSR MTP MTT MTW MWD NAAK NATO NAV NCO NCS NEO NG NGO NLT NOD NOE NVG OAKOC
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
Glossary-5
Glossary
obj OEG OP OPCON OPORD OPSEC OR OT P Pam PAO PCC PGM PH PK PLGR plt PMCS PME PMM PO POL POSNAV PP PSG PSYOP PVO PVS R&S RACO RALS RDL REDCON ref pt RES RFL ROE ROI ROM RPG RTP
objective
operational exposure guidance
observation post
operational control
operation order
operations security
obstacle-reducing (MPAT-OR)
observer-target
primary (position)
pamphlet
public affairs office
precombat inspection
precision guided missile/munition
probability of hit
probability of kill
precision lightweight GPS receiver platoon preventive maintenance checks and services peacetime military engagement preventive medicine measures peace operations petroleum, oils, and lubricants position navigation passage point platoon sergeant psychological operations
private volunteer organization
passive-vision system
reconnaissance and surveillance
rear area combat operations right add, left subtract Reimer Digital Library readiness condition reference point
radiation exposure status
restrictive fire line
rules of engagement
rules of interaction
refuel on the move
rocket-propelled grenade
radiotelephone procedures
Glossary-6
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
Glossary
S S2 S3 S4 SALTT SALUTE SAPI SAW SBF SDS SDZ SEP SFC SGT SINCGARS SINCGARS SIP INC SITREP SM SOI SOP SOSRA SP SSC SSG ST STP SU TAC CP TACFIRE TACSOP TB TC TCF TEP TI TIP TIRS TIS TNT
supplementary (position)
security/intelligence officer (U.S. Army)
operations officer (U.S. Army)
supply officer (U.S. Army)
size, activity, location, type of resource, and time frame size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment
small arms protective inserts
semiautomatic assault weapon
support by fire
(M100) sorbent decontamination system
surface danger zone
system enhancement package
Sergeant First Class (U.S. Army rank)
Sergeant (U.S. Army rank)
single-channel ground/airborne radio system SINCGARS with system improvement program and Internet controller situation report
Soldiers manual
signal operation instructions
standing operating procedures suppress the enemy; obscure the breach; secure the far side; reduce the obstacle; and assault through the obstacle start point
smaller-scale contingency
Staff Sergeant (U.S. Army rank)
special text
Soldiers training publication
situational understanding
tactical command post
tactical fire
tactical standing operating procedures
technical bulletin
tank commander
tactical combat force
theater engagement plan
tactical Internet
thermal identification panel
terrain index reference system
thermal imaging system
trinitrotoluene (explosive)
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Glossary-7
Glossary
TOC TOT TOW TTP TTT TV U.S. UAS UHF UMCP UN UO USAF USMC USN VBIED VEESS VHF VIC VSTOL VT VVS WARNO WIA WMD WP
Glossary-8
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
References
These sources were quoted or paraphrased in this publication, are needed in conjunction with this manual, and/or contain relevant supplemental information. For the latest dates and versions of these references, refer to DA Pam 25-30 or the Reimer Digital Library (RDL).
SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
References-1
References
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card. DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. DA Form 2404, Equipment Inspection Maintenance Worksheet. DA Form 7566, Composite Risk Management Worksheet. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information. The source listed in parenthesis is the superceded manual under the old numbering system.
References-2
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
References
FM 4-0 (FM 100-10), Combat Service Support, 29 August 2003 FM 4-25.12 (FM 21-10-1), Unit Field Sanitation Team, 25 January 2002 FM 5-33, Terrain Analysis, 11 July 1990 w/Change 1, 11 September 1992 FM 5-102, Countermobility, 14 March 1985 FM 5-103, Survivability, 10 June 1985 FM 5-250, Explosives and Demolitions, 30 July 1998 FM 6-20, Fire Support in the Airland Battle, 17 May 1998 FM 6-20-50, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Light), 5 January 1990 FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire, 16 July 1991 FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, 14 December 1990 w/Change 1, 31 October 2000 FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, 6 April l992 w/Change 1, 29 December 2000 FM 7-90, Tactical Employment of Mortars, 9 October 1992 FM 7-92, The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry), 23 December 1992 w/Change 1, 13 December 2001 FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict, 19 October 1992 FM 8-42, Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations, 27 October 1997 FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, 29 May 1998 w/Change 5, 1 April 2005 FM 21-10, Field Hygiene and Sanitation, 21 June 2000 FM 21-60, Visual Signals, 30 September 1987 FM 22-100, Army Leadership, 31 August 1999 FM 31-70, Basic Cold Weather Manual, 12 April 1968 w/Change 1, 17 December 1968 FM 34-2-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance, 19 June 1991 FM 44-8, Combined Arms for Air Defense, 1 June 1999 FM 71-100, Division Operations, 28 August 1976 FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team, 30 September 1992 FM 90-3, Desert Operations, 24 August 1993 FM 90-4, Air Assault Operations, 16 March 1987 FM 90-13, River Crossing Operations, 26 January 1998 FM 90-26, Airborne Operations, 18 December 1990 FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, 1 August 1999 Leadership in Combat: An Historical Appraisal, U.S. Military Academy, History Department, 1984
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
References-3
Index
A
Abrams tank
capabilities, 1-6
limitations, 1-7
actions on contact
battle drills, 3-25
eight forms of contact, 3-19
examples of, 3-21
four steps of, 3-18
offense, 3-18
air and missile defense assets,
6-11
armored cavalry troop
organization, 1-5
Army aviation forces, 6-9
marking friendly positions,
6-14
collective tactical tasks (see
platoon tactical tasks), 3-36
combat engineer assets, 6-10
combat identification
measures, F-1
situational awareness, F-2
target identification, F-2
combat service support (see
sustainment), 7-1
combat support (see combined
arms operations), 6-1
combined arms operations, 6-1
air and missile defense, 6
11
Army aviation, 6-9
close air support, 6-13
combat engineers, 6-10
fire support, 6-1
infantry/armor (see
infantry/armor
operations), C-1
military police assets, 6-15
command, 2-1
contingency plans, 2-10
decision-making, 2-1
leadership, 2-11
troop-leading procedures
(see also troop-leading
procedures), 2-2
command and control
command, 2-1
control, 2-12
communications, 2-24
company/troop command
net, 2-26
digital, 2-25
platoon radio net, 2-26
techniques and guidelines
for effectiveness, 2-26
use of messengers, 2-25
use of pyrotechnics, 2-25
use of radio, 2-25
use of wire, 2-25
visual, 2-25
consolidation and
reorganization, 3-46
control
fire distribution and control
(see also fire distribution
and control), 2-27
readiness conditions, 2-12
situational understanding, 2
12
time management, 2-12
counterattack, 4-28
crew responsibilities, 1-7
communications, 2-26
driver, 1-8
gunner, 1-8
loader, 1-8
platoon leader, 1-7
platoon sergeant, 1-7
reporting initial contact, 2-27
tank commander, 1-7
using fire patterns, 2-29
cultural awareness, 2-15
D
defensive operations, 4-1
actions on contact, 3-18
building the EA, 4-18
combat identification
process, 4-20
coordination for fires, 4-21
deliberate occupation of BP,
4-11
execution, 4-24
fire distribution and control,
2-41, 4-19
fundamentals of, 4-1
hasty occupation of a BP, 4
8
planning, 4-3
preparation of BP, 4-8
preparing the defense (fire
distribution and control),
2-45
priorities of work, 4-17
deliberate occupation of BP, 4
11
platoon fire plan, 4-13
platoon time line, 4-18
priorities of work, 4-17
procedures for, 4-12
sector sketch card, 4-13
detainees
handling principles and
procedures, 7-16
digital communications, 2-25
digitization, A-1
capabilities and limitations,
A-5
digital vs FM operations, A
9
duties and responsibilities,
A-6
B
battle drills, 3-25
action drill, 3-27
actions on contact, 3-25
change of formation drill, 3
25
contact drill, 3-26
react to air attack drill, 3-33
react to chemical/biological
attack drill, 3-35
react to indirect fire drill, 3
32
react to nuclear attack drill,
3-35
C
CBRN operations, E-1
alarms and signals, E-7
avoidance, E-1
chemical defense, E-6
decontamination, E-14
marking contaminated
areas, E-12
MOPP levels, E-3
movement in CBRN
environment, E-16
nuclear defense, E-5
protection, E-3
smoke operations, E-17
symptoms and treatment of
casualties, E-8
unmasking procedures, E
13
civil support operations, 9-1, 9
11
considerations for, 9-12
role of tank platoon, 9-5
close air support, 6-13
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
Index-1
L
light/heavy operations (see
infantry/armor operations),
C-1
limited visibility operations, 3
47
additional considerations for
tactical movement and
attacks during, 3-48
considerations, 4-30
defensive planning for
extreme conditions, 4-20
equipment for use during, 3
47
navigation methods during,
3-47
vehicle ID techniques
during, 3-47
loader responsibilities, 1-8
digitization, A-9
E
EPWs (see detainees), 7-16
F
FBCB2, A-1
operational considerations,
A-3
fire commands, 2-39
alert element for fire control,
2-39
control element for fire
control, 2-40
execution element for fire
control, 2-40
orientation element for fire
control, 2-40
target description element
for fire control, 2-40
weapon or ammunition
element for fire control, 2
39
fire distribution and control, 228
control, 2-38
distribution, 2-29
during defensive operations,
4-19
in defense, 2-41
in offense, 2-41, 3-7
fire patterns
cross, 2-30
depth, 2-31
effective distribution of
direct fires, 2-29
frontal, 2-30
fire support, 6-1
channels for fire request, 6
4
FA, 6-2
fire direction and control, 6
5
FIST, 6-3
mortar, 6-1
planning, 6-8
firing techniques, 2-32
formations
during tactical operations, 3
11
forms of contact, 3-19
fragmentary orders, B-7
sample, B-8
G
graphic control measures, 2-17
assault position, 2-21
assembly area, 2-18
attack position, 2-19
attack-by-fire position, 2-21
axis of advance, 2-20
battle position, 2-22
boundries, 2-17
checkpoint, 2-19
contact point, 2-19
direction of attack, 2-20
objective, 2-20
passage lane, 2-19
passage point, 2-20
phase line, 2-18
route, 2-18
support-by-fire position, 2
21
target reference point, 2-22
gunner responsibilities, 1-8
(gunner on plt ldr tank)
maintenance operations,
7-11
digitization, A-8
M
maintenance operations, 7-9
evacuation of damaged
vehicle, 7-12
levels of, 7-11
maps and overlays
digital overlays, 2-16
types of overlays, 2-16
use of, 2-15
maps, overlays, graphic control
measures, navigation, 2-15
graphic control measures,
2-17
navigation, 2-22
medical treatment and
evacuation operations, 7-13
detainees, 7-16
KIA actions, 7-15
METT-TC analysis
civilian considerations, 2-5
enemy, 2-3
mission, 2-3
terrain and weather, 2-4
time available, 2-5
troops, 2-5
missions
overwatch, 3-16
MOPP levels, E-3
H
hasty occupation of BP, 4-8
initial occupation activities,
4-9
must-have information, 4-9
N
navigation, 2-22
use of fires, 2-23
use of GPS devices, 2-23
use of inertial navigation
systems, 2-23
use of TIRS/GIRS, 2-23
Index-2
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
Index
O
observation posts, D-3
offensive operations
characteristics, 3-1
execution (actions on
contact), 3-18
execution (consolidation
and reorganization), 3-46
execution (platoon tactical
tasks), 3-36
execution (tactical
movement), 3-7
fire distribution and control,
2-41
fundamentals, 3-1
general forms of tactical
offense, 3-2
limited visibility, 3-47
planning using war-fighting
functions, 3-3
preparation using war-
fighting functions, 3-5
war-fighting functions, 3-2
operation orders, B-2
five-paragraph format, B-3
sample, B-3
operational environment
cultural awareness, 2-15
operational security, D-1
orders and reports, B-1
fragmentary orders, B-7
operation orders, B-2
orders, B-1
reports, B-8
warning orders, B-1
organizations
armored cavalry troop, 1-5
light infantry, 1-2
tank company, 1-5
tank platoon, 1-1, 1-2
overwatch, 3-16
P
personnel operations, 7-13
planning
six-point contingency plan,
2-10
platoon fire plan, 4-13
critical elements for
development, 4-16
sample, 4-17
platoon leader responsibilities,
1-7 actions on contact, 3-18
battle drills, 3-25
battlefield visualization, 2-14
characteristics of effective
defense, 4-1
characteristics of successful
combat leader, 2-12
combined arms operations,
6-1
communications, 2-24
communications guidance,
2-26
conducting backbrief, 4-15
contingency plans, 2-10
controlling fires, 2-38
defensive fire planning (fire
distribution and control in the defense), 2-41
defensive planning, 4-3
defensive preparation of
BP, 4-8
digitization, A-8
executing the defense
(defensive fire planning),
2-46
execution of defensive
mission, 4-24
fire coordination, 4-21
fire distribution and control,
2-27
firing techniques, 2-32
graphics, maps, overlays, 4
16
infantry/armor operations,
C-4
knowledge of equipment, 1
6
leadership principles, 2-11
maintenance operations, 7
10
offensive fire planning, 3-7
offensive operations
(technique of movement),
3-7
operating with infantry and
armored forces, 1-3
operating with light and
mechanized infantry
forces, 1-3
planning offensive operations, 3-3
precombat inspections, 2-10
preparing the defense
(defensive fire planning), 2-45
rehearsals, 2-8
reporting, 2-27
troop-leading procedures
(see also troop-leading
procedures), 2-2
understanding operational
environment, 2-15
use of fire commands in fire
control, 2-39
use of terrain (see also
navigation), 2-22
R
REDCON levels, 2-13
reports, 2-27, B-8
digital traffic, 2-27
initial contact, 2-27
routine, 2-27
SALUTE format, 2-27
rules of engagement, 9-7
S
sector sketch card, 4-13
sample, 4-15
using FBCB2, 4-14
verification of, 4-14
situational understanding, 2-12
22 February 2007
FM 3-20.15
Index-3
W
war-fighting functions
defensive preparation
considerations, 4-22
war-fighting functions
defensive planning
considerations, 4-3
offense, 3-2
war-fighting functions
urban operations, 8-6
war-fighting functions
urban operations, 8-7
war-fighting functions
urban operations, 8-10
war-fighting functions
urban operations, 8-12
war-fighting functions
urban operations, 8-13
war-fighting functions
infantry/armor operations,
C-4
warning orders, B-1
sample, B-2
wingman concept, 1-2
T
tactical Internet, A-1
tactical movement
engaging targets, 3-8
execution in offensive, 3-7
formations, 3-11
overwatch, 3-16
techniques of, 3-9
use of terrain for cover and
concealment, 3-9
tactical road march, 5-1
control measures, 5-2
strip map sample, 5-3
tank commander
responsibilities, 1-7
digitization, A-8
maintenance operations, 7
11
reporting, 2-27
treatment of WIA, 7-14
tank company
organization, 1-5
tank platoon
U
urban operations, 8-1
armored vehicle fighting
positions, 8-8
categories of, 8-2
command and control, 8-6
defensive operations, 8-17
fire support, 8-12
intelligence, 8-10
maneuver, 8-7
offensive operations, 8-13
sustainment, 8-13
vehicles, weapons,
munitions, 8-3
Index-4
FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
*FM 3-20.15
22 February 2007
PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army Chief of Staff
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0703202
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 111029, requirements for FM 3-20.15.
PIN: 079435-000