1

ICT and the New Range of Conflict:

Online cooperation as an asymmetrical threat.
Three case studies: Israel, Russia, Moldova.

Course: Science, Technology & National Security Professor James A. Lewis

By Gregory Asmolov MA Candidate, Global Communication Elliott School of International Affairs

The George Washington University May 5, 2009

The content:
Introduction ....3 A literature review .........6 The battles for a story: Israeli case of state-network cooperation for advocacy purpose...16 Russian-Georgian war: hacktivism, network collaboration and states role. ....22 Moldova: The offline consequences of online cooperation........31 Conclusion.36 References,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,...42

Introduction.
On January 20 I was standing at the National Mall with millions of Americans and foreigners who decided to see the Inauguration of 44th president of the United States with their own eyes. However, the most significant impression was not made by the inauguration itself, but by the crowd. Despite the huge number of people it was extremely well organized. On my way to the Mall, and back, every several minutes I received a text message on my phone that indicated, according to my location, where I should go and what the restrictions were. The event was unique not only due to the huge crowd that it gathered but also because it served as an example that information technologies can make a significant contribution for crowd management. In the case of inauguration, Information Communication Technologies (ICT) have mitigated the risk of chaos that can be caused by two million of people that gathered in a same place. However, one might ask if crowd management technologies are only a solution for security problems or also are a part of a new problem. According to the Websters dictionary crowd is a large number of things close

together and a great body of people. The Internet created the greatest crowd in the human history. First, it is a great body of people (1,596,270,108 people, according to the recent statistics1). Secondly, they are sharing the same space which makes people as nodes in one global network that provides an option for immediate connection with one another. Therefore,

1

http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm

we can claim that they are close together. Certainly, the actual number of crowd, as nodes accessible to each other, is lower than 1.6 billion. However, the ICT provides an ability to expand the global crowd on permanent basis and make the interaction with its members (nodes) more convenient. The same dictionary says that mob - implies a disorderly crowd with the potential for

violence. According to this definition the disorder is the main threat from the crowd. However, I would like to argue that order makes the crowd even more dangerous than the feared disorder. The organizational potential and capabilities of new information technologies should be among the main concerns of those who are responsible for the U.S. and the global security. The main argument of this paper is that the emergence of the online crowd and new technologies to its management create a new asymmetrical threat. This threat is especially significant since the engagement of non-combatants crowd can be used by state and non-state actors. The threat is relevant for online reality, as well as for offline the physical domain of our life, while actually these two spaces are interconnected. In this paper I will address three main issues: the ICT methods for mob management the effect of mob management: for what purposes it might be used and how online reality provide new opportunities not only for crowd management but also for crowd impact within the offline activities particular role of state actors in the mob management

To address these three issues the paper will present a brief literature review and analysis of three case studies of online crowd management: 1. Israeli online advocacy effort during January 2009 operation in the Gaza strip(online dimension): The case study will describe crowds management as a mechanism for agenda setting and framing (promoting pro-Israeli content and balancing the media coverage narrative). 2. Activities of Russian hackers during Russian-Georgian war: a method of violating online content (preventing access /replacement / erasing) based on crowd management and networks members cooperation (online dimension). 3. Moldova's Twitter revolution: case study will focus on offline effect of online crowd management. In addition, it will deal with the gap between the abilities of the ICT crowd management to organize/trigger an offline protest and lack of ability to command/control it within offline reality. The case studies will be followed by a short discussion and conclusions.

A literature review:
Conflicts and role of information technologies: In his book entitled Information and American democracy: technology in the evolution of political power Bruce Bimber claims that the cost of communication is the major factor in shaping the political reality. He focuses on the ability of political entrepreneurs to overcome resource barriers by using comparatively inexpensive information technology2. According to Bimber a change in a cost means a change in information regime which is reflected in different set of political elites and institutions. In the past only the wealthy could afford to build organizations and manage flow of information. However, today, due to decreases in cost of communication, the new elite are those who know how to operate in the highly fluid, networked world of new information technology. The consequences of these changes are debatable. Howard Rheingold presents an optimistic point of view and emphasizes the democratization impact of the new communication technologies and ability of the mob to bring positive change. Rheingold defined the new social phenomenon Smart mob - a form of self-structuring social organization through technology- mediated, intelligent, emergent behavior"3. According to Rheingold social networks provide

2

Bimber B, Information and American democracy: technology in the evolution of political power, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.5. 3 Rheingold H., Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution, Basic Books, 2003.

option of new forms of human cooperation. People who do not know each other are consolidating around same goal during very short period of time and working together to achieve it. One of the most famous examples of smart mob impact is the Orange revolution in Ukraine. In a very short period of time thousands of people in different locations who did not know each other joined protest against government that lead to political upheaval. It happened owing to effective usage of SMS and the Internet social networks. However, there are many researches who do not share Rheingolds optimistic position. The critics emphasize the ambivalent nature of information technologies. It can contribute to democratization as well as be an instrument of control in the hand of a totalitarian state4. It can help promote peace or be an instrument in promoting war. It can provide new strategies for security as well as create new vulnerabilities. The classical example of the latter is a problem of cyber security. New information technologies can be used to commit various crimes ranging from stealing money and information to causing damage to critical infrastructures. It might be done by a small group of people or one person, the fact that make it an asymmetrical threat. However, according to some experts the danger of cyber threat is exaggerated5. Furthermore, some states, like Russia, are using the cyber security threat as an excuse to increase control over the cyberspace. Myth of cyber threat is manipulated by authorities. The idea that the most dangerous thing is penetration to our informational systems by foreign country is based on perceptions that were

4

First time this topic was developed in a book Open networks, closed regimes: the impact of the Internet on authoritarian rule by Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, Carnegie Endowment, 2003.
5

Lewis J., Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats, Center for Strategic and International Studies , December 2002

relevant during the cold war, but not today, - says a Russian well-known information security expert Andrey Soldatov6. Soldatov defines the information policy of the Russian government as a defense against shadows. According to Soldatov the real asymmetrical threats that caused by ICT are different. He argues that radicals can use ICT for communication and organization of their activities, as well as for the propaganda purposes7. Understanding of this threat demands analysis of the role of information within conflicts. E. Schattschneider in a book Semisovereign people explains that nature of conflict depends on the degree of audience involvement. The outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of its contagion. The number of people involved in any conflict determines what happens; every change in the number of participants, every increase or reduction in the number of participants, affect the result. writes the researcher8. Using as a an example Madisons Federalist 10, Schattschneider explains that ideas of controlling /limiting the scope of conflict and preventing from audience to be involved in conflict were the fulcrum in creating the U.S. as a stable federal state. The new informational technologies eliminate the ability of state to control the conflict. It works as a mechanism of conflict socialization. Furthermore, the social networks and other web platforms not only involve people in conflicts by the fact of exposure to the information about the conflict. To some extent they also make for a very easy

6 7

., : , " " 4 2006, I have no intent to minimize the danger. There is no doubt that cyber security is a significant problem and real threat that increase with the increasing role of the internet in our daily live. 8 Schattschneider E. E,.The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1975.

transformation from conflicts spectator to its participant, since the social networks suggest not only information, but also a participation options. The consequences of ability to expand the range of conflict by using ICT and the threat that is posed by new organizational abilities were described in the John Arquillas and David Ronfeldts Netwar concept (1996). Through netwar, numerous dispersed small groups, using the latest communications technologies could act conjointly across great distances., - write the authors of Netwat concept9. Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe the main patterns of activities of networks members within the netwar. The first is swarming - a seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions at a particular point or points.10 The authors explain that the overall aim of swarming is sustainable pulsing swarm networks must be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, then dissever and redisperse, immediately ready to recombine for a new pulse.11 The second pattern of the netwarriors actions is not violent. It is a joint effort to win the battle of the story. Soldatov considers it as a threat of propaganda caused by new ICT abilities. But the propaganda in this case is not just a matter of convincing who are the good guys and who are the bad, it is a method for conflict socialization and attracting the audience to become a part of your network, to take a side within the conflict by joining it. The propaganda in this case is primarily an instrument of network expanding and building the social

Arquilla J. & D. Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Revisited) in Arquilla J. & D. Ronfeldt (Eds.) Networks and netwars : The future of terror, crime, and militancy, Rand, 2001. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid.

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capital - group of people that share the common understanding of developing story and common network identity. The evolution of network: conflicts and mobile technologies. The question of networks structure and its cooperation mechanism is crucial for understanding of netwars. According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, despite the fact that networks might not have a hierarchical and clear leadership structure, the efficiency of networks is based upon the strong social ties and ability to communicate through secured channels. The Netwar concept derives from Manuel Castell's approach that describes networks are spreading and gaining strength as a distinct form of organization.12 At the same time Arquilla and Ronfeldt reject the Francis Fukuyamas understanding of network not as a type of formal organization, but as social capital 13 However, the recent technological developments should trigger a reconsideration of the assumption regarding the nature of network in the Netwars concept. The wide proliferation of mobile phones and handheld devices cause an emergence of what Yochai Benkler calls the "networked public sphere14. The new information environment is characterized by both the potential for many-to-many communications (instead of just one-to-one or one-to-many), and

12

Arquilla J. & D. Ronfeldt, What Next for Networks and Netwars, in Arquilla J. & D. Ronfeldt (Eds.) Networks and netwars : The future of terror, crime, and militancy, Rand, 2001. 13 Ibid. 14 Goldstein J. and J. Rotich, Digitally Networked Technology in Kenyas 20072008 Post-Election Crisis, Berkman Center Research Publication, September 2008.

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the near elimination of the cost of communication.15 In the new society every holder of the mobile device is a node that might be connected at any time. The network in this case is not the organized structure of interaction but the field of potential interactions that might emerge depending on a context. In other words the network is not an organization, but infrastructure for communication. The increasing convergence of computers and handle devices (e.g., Iphone) only contributes to this tendency. Joshua Goldstein and Juliana Rotich analyzed the post-election violence in Kenya as a case study for an emergence of conflict in networked public sphere. They describe a phenomenon of viral hatred and claim that mass SMS tools are remarkably useful for organizing explicit, systematic, and publicly organized campaign of mob violence16. On the other hand, the authors express hope that voices of moderation can make themselves heard by the usage of mobile phones.17 The most comprehensive study of this issue was conducted by Patrick Meier, from the Tufts University. In his doctorate research Meier shows that an increase in cell-phone availability increases the likelihood (at least as perceived by the public) that the government might be overthrown by violent means18. The author of NetEffect Foreign Policy Blog Evgeny Morozov defines the mobile and virtual based threat as a rise of networked protest

15 16

Ibid. Goldstein J. and J. Rotich, Digitally Networked Technology in Kenyas 20072008 Post-Election Crisis, Berkman Center Research Publication, September 2008. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.

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phenomenon based on thousands of "freelance radicals" who outnumber professional (organizational based) anti-globalists.19 To conclude, emergence of networked public sphere, based on mobile phones, should strengthen the unorganized mob factor in Netwars dynamics. The new phenomenon might be described as an emergence of situational conflict identity, based on networked infrastructure which functions as an enabler of fast and effective socialization of conflict in local and global dimensions. Global consequences: ICT and complexity. The network based socialization of conflicts is escalated by the fragmentation and an increase in a number of conflicts and conflict identities. The phenomenon might be called a long tail of identities as a paraphrase of a long tail economic concept by Chris Anderson.20 Anderson claims that the Internet changed the dynamics of demand since it provided an option for easy search of low demanded goods. Despite the fact that the demand is low, the total number of low demanded goods is higher than the number of popular goods, and therefore the economic gain from the tails of demands normal distribution (the low demanded goods) might be higher than the center of the distribution graph (the popular goods). The same situation can be witnessed with groups. The small groups could not exist in the past since their potential members couldnt find each other due to a lack of communication and an obstacle of distance. Currently members of any minority group can find each other through the Internet. Therefore,

19 20

Morozov E., The Alternative's alternative, openDemocracy, December 29,2008 Anderson, C., The Long Tail", Wired, October 2004.

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the total number of people who belong to small groups may overcome the number of those who belong to big ones21. Furthermore internet and social networks trigger development of local identity based groups. For instance, Globe claims that the increase of local identities factor based on ICT can contribute to fragmentation process in the territory of former Soviet Union and increase the threat of collapse of Russia as a federal state.22 This argument works well if we recall the previously discussed Madisons claim in the Federalist 10. The socialization of conflict, fragmentation of identities and low cost of communication cause a significant increase in a degree of worlds complexity. It means a decrease in stability and a difficulty in forecasting any relation between cause and its effect. Moreover, it means that even a minor factor can cause a major effect. This situation is summarized by a developer of the self organization theory and a Nobel Prize Laureate Ilya Prigozhin: Especially in this time of globalization and the network revolution, behavior at the individual level is the key factor in shaping the evolution of the entire human species. Just a few particles can alter the macroscopic organization in nature.23 The state-networks cooperation

21

The difference is that in the case of identities every person can share several identities and be a part of several groups. However in this particular case we are talking about conflict oriented identities that tend to be dominant due to their offensive orientation. 22 Goble P., Window on Eurasia: Will the Internet Integrate the Russian Federation or Tear It Apart?
23

Prigogine I., Is Future Given? World Scientific Publishing Company, 2003.

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According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, most of the networks are stateless. However, extremists have a significant advantage in using networks. Ariel Cohen from the Heritage Foundation claims that the problem of new information technologies is that radicals adopt ICT faster than the state actors who are supposed to oppose the extremists. In addition, democratic states have a significant number of restrictions for usage of ICT, especially when dealing with the involvement of citizens in conflicts. According to Bimber, network's leaders are the new elites within the new information regime. If the state does not want to lose the control, it should adopt its structure, institutions and the method of governance to the new information reality. Manuel Castells shares the same point. He writes: The increasing inability of nation-states to confront and manage the processes of globalization of the issues that are the object of their governance leads to ad hoc forms of global governance and, ultimately, to a new form of state. Nation-states in spite of the multidimensional crisis do not disappear; they transform themselves to adapt to the new context.24" But what is the meaning of these transformations in regard to the threat posed by networks as tools of conflicts socialization (expanding the range of conflict among wide audience) and organization of mob based collective action? Does it mean that a state learns to mobilize and manage the mob? What are the methods of management and mobilization, and especially which states have an advantage in development if these techniques? We may

24

Castells M., "The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance", 2008

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assume that the lack of balance in adaptation may appear not only between states and non- state entities, but also among more and less democratic states. Today we are witnessing an emergence of military and security state doctrines that make an effort to apply the network approach and incorporate the factor of non-combatants mobilization, engagement and management of civic actors as a part of warfare. The well known Chinese concept of Unrestricted warfare presents a model that include usage of non- combatants, a civil population, as a part of warfare managed by the state. The U.S. concept of Hybrid threats as is defined by Frank G. Hoffman also addresses this issue: Hybrid threats incorporate a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts (including indiscriminate violence and coercion), and criminal disorder. Hybrid wars can be also be multinodalconducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors. These multimodal/multinodal activities can be con- ducted by separate units or even by the same unit but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the phys- ical and psychological dimensions of conflict. The effects can be gained at all levels of war.25 In the following case studies I would like to analyze the networked socialization of conflicts and network coordination as an optional element of hybrid warfare managed by state actors as well as to try to describe patterns of state-network cooperation and their possible impact.

25

Hoffman F. G., Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict, Strategic Forum, April 2009

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The battles for the story: Israeli case of state-network cooperation for advocacy purpose.26 Israeli attempts to explain its policy to international community has a long history, namely since the establishment of the state. It is a permanent effort that intensifies during major military operations due to sharp criticisms from the international public opinion. This advocacy policy by the Israeli government is defined by a special term: hasbara or explanation policy. The Second Lebanon War (Summer 2006) was the first major conflict in Israeli history in which the new media technologies, social networks, and user generated content played significant role in painting the image of the war. However, the online pro and anti-Israeli activities were rather chaotic and unmanaged by state actors. After two weeks of war the head of the Knesset committee for Science and Technology, Zvulun Orlev, conducted a special discussion on the issue of the Internet and a struggle for Israeli Image. He asked the Israeli

26

The case study based on research that was conducted by me during and following the operation in Gaza strip, and it was presented to the faculty of the School of Media and Public Affairs, GW. It is important to mention, that the author of this paper worked at the Asper Institute for New Media Diplomacy, which activities are a major part of the case study. The sources of information for this case study include personal experience and interviews that were conducted by the author with his colleagues.

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Internet users and private corporations to join the action against anti Israeli PR actions and called it the virtual call-up paper27. Among the participants of discussion was Eran Reshef, the CEO of Collactive, a company for development of social media management platforms. During the days of war Reshef released a Giyus (recruitment in Hebrew) Megaphone desktop tool, a special application for the management of community of users who are interested in contributing to an Israeli advocacy effort28. It provided an option for organization of collective coordinated one-time action of users by sending an action alert to all members of the Giyus network (those who downloaded the application). Since the visibility of content on some of major international news sites, as well as on social media platforms (e.g. Youtube) depends on the rate of consumption of a particular item, the one-time collective visit contributed to visibility of pro- Israel content and optimized its place in search engines. The tool also suggested a simplification options for different pro-Israeli action (e.g. sending protests for anti-Israel policy to the U.N. officials). The activity of Giyus community was rather successful. At the end of war the Giyus social network has included almost 30000 members. The role of new media and social networks during the second Lebanon war, as well as a success of Giyus convinced the Israeli officials including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to start thinking about the development of strategies for new media field. The first mission on the agenda was providing a pro Israeli content within different Web platforms. However, in the reality of information overload, the most complicated mission was not creating content, but its

28

YNET , : " 8 "

27

www.giyus.org

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promotion and distribution. It could be done only by the engagement of a wide web audience. Giyus was a good model for this kind of action, but its impact was very limited (only 30000 members) comparing to potential influence of social networks like Facebook. Using the social networks potential of hundreds thousands people worldwide for promoting pro-Israeli information demanded a concept for management, or at least building an impact, at the social networks sphere. The MFA started to work on this concept. At the same time the concept of the situation room for new media and social networks management was developed at the Asper Institute for New Media diplomacy, a part of the Communication school at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya (IDC). The idea behind this initiative was that promoting content is more important than creating the content, while within the new information reality making a content visible demands a collective and well organized action (if it is a consumption-based promotion or viral distribution). On December 27, 2008 Israel launched a military campaign in Gaza strip, codenamed Operation Cast Lead. The first days of Israeli air strikes caused a significant number of victims on the Palestinian side, including a lot of civilians. Obviously it created a significant image problem for Israel and a wave of international protests that demanded from Israel to cease fire. At the beginning of the conflict a U.S. based pro-Israel advocacy organization Stand with us together with the IDC Communication School established three situation rooms for coordinating online networked activities. At the same time a special website Helpuswin.org was uploaded to the Internet. Both initiatives were actually online and offline platforms for network

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management. The main missions of the situation rooms, which were also reflected at the website, included: 1. Content monitoring in the overload information reality (discovering the pro-Israeli items to promote and anti-Israeli items to react). 2. Development/ expanding of pro-Israeli networks within global social networks platforms (creating pro-Israeli groups). Developing of relations and coordination with Diaspora online networks (Israelis out of the country or emigrants inside Israel). 3. Pro-Israeli Content distribution/ promotion through Social networks, Search optimization, Social Bookmarking on a Web 2.0 sites, like Youtube, and within traditional online media platforms. 4. Balancing the discourse: sending pro-Israeli Internet users to respond to pro Palestinian content/ comments in traditional media comments, forums, polls. 5. Development and translation of content for promoting within foreign social networks. 6. Assistance and advice to pro-Israeli activists (e.g. providing talking points). 7. Development of technological tools for advocacy purposes (e.g. Kassam count - a Facebook application that automatically updated the Facebook users status with a number of exploded Kassam rockets). To summarize the situation rooms coordinated not only the timing and goals of activities, but also expanded their range for different platforms and different language segments of the Web, made participation more user-friendly (simplification) and provided technical assistance for content promoting.

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However, the most interesting component of the Israeli New Media and social networking strategy was the model of cooperation and a division of responsibilities between state and non-state actors. It was almost the first time when the government uploaded its content (primarily video footage) to the Web 2.0 platform (e.g. opening a special MFA and IDF channel on Youtube, blogs). It made the content to more promoting friendly. However, the state had no capabilities to build network cooperation for content promotion and take on itself the mission of networks leadership. This task was taken by non-government advocacy organizations (e.g. Stand with Us) and academic institutions (e.g. IDC). Both have a young motivated activists and students as available and qualified force for this kind of tasks. In addition to situation rooms, the IDC has organized several offline briefings to instruct the potential network leaders (primarily the student body) how to build cooperation on Web. The situation rooms were unofficially affiliated and worked with some degree of coordination with the Israeli MFA. In addition to providing promoting-friendly content the government also supplied guidelines for online activities (e.g. sharing talking points). The last element of the cooperation model is members of social networks, nodes of networked sphere, who contributed their time and effort to promoting and distributing the pro-Israeli content under the guidance of the networks leaders. To conclude, first we might see here an emergence of state non-state actors networked sphere cooperation model as a response to situation when the goal might be achieved only by cooperation and networked coordinated actions. Second, the activity was not based on the existing networks (organizations), but on socialization of conflict by ICT and an

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emergence of conflict engagement of non-combatants. It should be mentioned that the Palestinian side also tried to use social networks managements strategies including creation of special platforms, sending an instructions for promoting content, organized commenting and creating a special advocacy applications (e.g. automatic Facebook status How many Palestinians were killed today as a response to Kassam count application). There is no specific research on this issue, but some facts and statistics support a hypothesis that the number of pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian engaged members of social networks was pretty equal. The Palestinian side had an advantage of a very big community of the Arab world. The Israeli side had an advantage of aggressive management and conflict socialization strategies that made a percent of active members to higher than among the pro Palestinian community. Additional explanation is that digital divide at the Arab world is more significant than in Israel and other places with most of Israeli supporters (e.g. U.S., Canada). Despite the collective mode of action, the effect of the social networks management was limited. The balancing effect was significant. It caused an equal representation of Palestinian and Israeli sides on many content platforms. However, in my opinion the main role of these activities was shaping the pro-Israel network identity in global dimension. Despite the lack of organizational structure, participation in this kind of activity might be seen as a part of building social capital of state supporters and training of coordinated activity that might be required again in a further conflict. It should be mentioned also that in the Israeli case, coordinated activity took place also on hacktivist field (e.g. providing software for contribution a computer for Botnet). However,

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promoting and distribution of content as a part of agenda setting and framing strategies were much more significant in the Israeli case than any hackers activity. The latter is more about attacking content than promoting it. The next case study based on Russian-Georgian war looks on a model of state-network cooperation as a method of content attacking. Russian-Georgian war: hacktivism/cyberpatriotism, network collaboration and states role. The August 2008 five-days war between Russia in Georgia raised a lot of discussion not only about the relationship between the Kremlin and the West, but also the cyber threat posed by Russians. Dozens of Georgian and Russian sites including major government offices and news agencies were attacked. In some cases the web sites were not only blocked but their content was changed or even erased. However the major instrument of cyber activities were Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, when botnets bombard web sites with fake visits. I am not going to discuss here the targets and the effect of these attacks and only mention that high visibility of attacks does not always mean high efficiency. The impact of visibility itself is also debatable since one may claim that attacking symbolical and informational platforms has a crucial role within information warfare29. However, the main purpose of this case study is to analyze the network cooperation patterns of Russian hacktivists and the role of state in the inspiration/encouragement of these activities. The analysis based on monitoring the discourse in Russian hackers forums during the Russian-Georgian war, and interview with hackers from the Russian media (they were framed

29

For instance, from point of view of 4th generation warfare approach by W. Lind (2004)

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by Russian media as patriots and heroes). It should be mentioned that the main cooperation occurred within IRC (Internet Relay Chats) platform that on the one hand was more secured than forums, and on the other hand provided an option for immediate live collaboration. User X: Go and read what are they writing, bastards. I cant do them alone. Help me to finish these bastards. User Y: We did it. They are finished (from Hacker.ru forum). This is an example of a typical conversation from a hackers forum. The targets sharing is a crucial part of cooperation. Similar to an Israeli case when promoting a content requires collective activity, the efficiency of hackers activity, especially if it deals with DDoS, depends on a collective action or/and mutual assistance. There are two different possible reasons why user X cannot achieve his goal alone: he is not qualified enough to do it or he cant do it alone since collective activity is required: The site of Georgian ministry of Defense is still alive. We should finish it!, - says one of the users. I have found the back door to hack them!!!, - says another forum member. This kind of invitation that may help to express the pattern of cooperation on the metaphorical level one of the users suggests to others to follow him into the opened door. Another example is a hacker who looks for other hackers from Uzbekistan and other former Soviet republics. He does it since the access to Georgian domain .ge from Runet was blocked by Georgia authorities. The attack is international. There are a lot of Russian immigrants dispersed within the former Soviet Union (and not only) who identify themselves with Russia and therefore want to participate the anti Georgian cyber activity. We can also see live monitoring

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of the status of Georgian sites: Our blockade worked only three minutes. Bastards, they are monitoring our activity. I am not aware of the establishment of any situation rooms for management, as it was done in the Israeli case, however similar to Israeli experience we could witness creation of a special platforms for cooperation from both sides: www.stopgeorgia.ru (from the Russian side) and www.stoprussia.ge/ www.stop-russian-terror.org (from the Georgian side). It has improved coordination and made participation easier for those who are not members of hackers community and were looking for visible opportunity to join hacktivists activity. These platforms, as well as forums, also serve as a place for discussion of ideological justification for attacks. A woman with a nick Dany writes: Shutting down Georgian sites cannot bring us victory. But its also important, since Americans together with Saakashvili have declared information war against us and it has been waged by Western media. They are doing it by claims about Russian aggression against peaceful Georgia that just tried to restore law on its territory. Tell me what is it if not an information war? Our guys that hacked Georgian sites are really great. We have been attacked and we are just defending ourselves in cyberspace. The entire world should know that we will not shut up and smoke at the corner, when we have been attacked. All aggression against Russia will get the appropriate answer. This interaction inspires others to become a part of emergence of situational conflict identity.

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Similar to the Giyus case we can see also a usage of software as a part of cooperation. I am uploading hack software, for those who want to join the attack on Georgian sites, - write one of the hackers. He gives a link for downloading the software and instructions on how to use it for attacks against Georgian targets. The software has two functions. First, it is simplified for those who dont have enough skills. Second, it is synchronized, since everyone who downloads the software becomes by definition a part of the same network/botnet. The voluntary joining of botnet (it was also used in Israeli-Palestinian case) has another interesting side. It is not sharing an experience or cooperation, but sharing resources. We know this mode of cooperation from the world of science as grid projects. For instance, Internet users are asked to contribute their computers to research of cancer or universe. Donate the time your computer is turned on, but is idle, to projects that benefit humanity!, - says the world community Grid web site30. Botnets also use the private computers resource but (usually) without the permission of their owners. The offer to join botnet for cyber attacks purposes might be considered as creation of war-grid, contribution of private non-combatants resources for warfare. It is a good option for those who lack any hackers skill but want to take a part in the warfare. So far we have seen some similar patterns comparing to Israeli case as coordination of collective actions, simplification, establishment of a special online platforms etc. However, the second question is if it is self-organized action or there is some degree of cooperation with the government. The answer should differentiate between direct and indirect activities.

30

http://www.worldcommunitygrid.org/

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The most indirect activities are creating an atmosphere that shapes a motivation among a wide non-combatant population to participate the warfare. The 24-hours media coverage by major Russian TV channels with the emphasis on atrocities made by Georgians and cruelty of Georgian soldiers who kill thousands of innocent Ossetians caused a significant rise of patriotism. I think that among participants of these forum there are no people who can take Kalashnikov, put on military uniform and go fight in South Ossetia, - writes one of Russian Internet users and explains that hacking is the only way he can help his country. The wave of patriotism is kind of energy wave that cant find an exit. The hacktivism provides the most convenient option for realization of patriotic intents without any physical effort, without even leaving your room. The Russian media plays a crucial role in total socialization of conflict and shaping situational conflict identity that is translated to networks of people who want to participate in the warfare. In addition, the media creates a feeling that cyber attacks are a legitimate mean of protest since it is an action against the cruel enemy. Now you have a 'license to kill' from the state, - writes on the forum one of the Russian hackers (according to the 274 chapter of Russian criminal law, DDoS attack may cause a punishment till 4 years in jail, but this chapter is almost never used by Russian courts). However, there is another relatively more direct way to engage the hackers community. It could be done by establishing points of contact between those who have a capability for network leadership and state officials. The search for this kind of government vs. network- leaders linkage gives interesting results.

27

On August 8th a group of leaders of five Russian major youth movements published a statement: About a military aggression in Ossetiya: Georgian army, armed and trained by Americans, kills our fellows. Actually, the Georgian puppet government is only instrument of the American aggression against Russia and Russian citizens. We, leaders of Russian youth organizations, appeal to our activists in all regions of Russia, to all Russias youth: We declare information war against the regime of Saakashvili. It will be managed on any information platform. We should demonstrate our solidarity against the American-Georgian propaganda based on double standards.31 Two days later the Russian parliament organized a special meeting for leaders of Russian youth. The purpose of the meeting was a discussion about possible actions during the war in South Ossetia. Among the discussed issues were creating bank of English speakers, writing texts in English and distributing it among the Western media. The forum also discussed the necessity of western media monitoring and participating in Western internet based polls about the war (e.g. CNN polls). According to the Russian sources the strategy was very effective. For instance, 92 percent (aprox. 329 thousand people) voted in favor of Russian position in the CNN poll which asked who is responsible for the war.32 The mob, especially when it is a smart mob, is a very powerful mechanism. But sometimes the mob should be advised what path to choose to express their emotions. In any activity

31 32

http://www.nashi.su/news/25672 : , 8.8.08

28

someone has to guide and provide ideas. Someone has to open the thread about Georgia on the hackers forums. Someone has to take the first initiative and advise what instruments to chose. Usually the following dynamic resembles a snowball. The five youth movements who signed the declaration are affiliated and sponsored by Kremlin and have under their control a big networks of Russian youth (young people is usually the group that have the best Internet skills). We may assume that some of the network's cooperation activities for hacktivism purposes were managed by leaders of groups who were inspired/ guided by the Russian officials. Actually, the past history gives us some indication for state-hackers networks cooperation. In 2002 the pro-Chechen website Kavkaz center was hacked by a group of students who called themselves The Siberian network brigade. Following this action the local branch of FSB (a former KGB) distributed a press-release stating that the hackers action is not against the law and what the Tomsks programmers have done should be considered as declaration of citizens position and worth respect.33 Andrey Soldatov, Russian cyber security expert, published in 2007 a special investigation that provides evidence that Russian authorities were looking for cooperation with a group of hackers to shut down the sites of radicals.34 Soldatov adds that attacks against Western media might also be considered as a civic position since the Russian Doctrine of Information Security (signed by Putin in 2000) considers the Western information

33

., : , Agentura.Ru, 34 Ibid.

29

agencies as a threat for freedom of Russian media and independence of Russian spiritual, economical and political life35. There is evidence suggesting that Nashi (a major Russian youth movement) activists participated in organization of hackers attacks. Sergei Markov, a member of Russian Duma said within a Russia-U.S. videoconference (March 2009) that one of his assistants had planned and implemented the hackers attack against Estonia36. The Markovs assistant is Konstantin Goloskokov, a "commissar" in the youth group Nashi. Following the Markovs talk Goloskov gave an interview to several Western and Russian media: "We did not do anything illegal. We just visited the various internet sites, over and over, and they stopped working - told Goloskov to Financial times37. He denied that he and his associates were acting on the orders of the Russian government. According to Goloskov the action is legal since it has not used any malicious software or botnet. The result was achieved only by collective coordinated visiting of the Estonian websites at the same time. The network leadership included seven people who were interacting by ICQ and e-mail. They created a situational network of several hundred people from Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Goloskov also said that similar, but improved methods were used against Georgia, while he emphasized that it was used for

35

, : -89, 2004

36 37

., ", , " , 05.03.2009 Clover C., Kremlin-backed group behind Estonia cyber blitz, Financial Times, March 11 2009.

30

providing information about Russia for international audience (a goal that similar to the Israeli case)38. According to Estonian sources at least 20000 computers participated in attacks against the Estonian Web sites. A security expert from Kaspersky Lab says that Goloskovs version is not credible, and the effect could not be achieved without botnets activation.39 Therefore, the statements by Markov and Goloskov and hackers interview should be approached with a high degree of skepticism. To some extent it is an attempt to gain some PR points among the Russian audience and portray themselves as high tech warriors. However, we also should remember, that cooperation might occur not only between common users, but professional hackers that make it to much more effective (e.g. if anyone controls his own botnet). The recent report by Canadian SecDev group that was presented at the InforwarCon 2009 in Maryland tries to clarify the question of responsibility by suggesting 3 different versions40. The first Deliberated, planned action by Russian authorities is considered as unlikely since there is no indication that such capabilities exist with state institutions. The second, Encouraged action is considered as possible since a denial of access is a part of the political culture in the CIS and security forces have deferred prosecution of known cyber criminals. The third version named as Storm in cyberspace and considered as a probable given past precedent and strong indication of self-organization by pro-Russian groups.

38 39

, , ., . , Damian LJ. 40 The source is a session at the conference InfowarCon 2009.

31

Unlike the Israeli case, where we could see clear evidences for State-network cooperation, the role of the Russian government in cyber attacks against Georgia is debatable. But what is clear is that the Russian-Georgian war included a very wide engagement of civil population in warfare that was based on emergent cooperation and collective action efforts that were mediated by technology. The traditional electronic media controlled by the government made a significant contribution to socialization of conflict and creation of motivation to participate in the warfare. In addition, even if the government were not dealing with guiding network leaders directly, we have enough strong evidences that the ideas of engagement of social networks within state actions is widely discussed by the Russian political establishment. Therefore, in my opinion, we should not be surprised if in the future the state will call for its citizens to Give your computer to homeland as a part of creation of a war grid that will be used against a new enemy or encourage them to participate by themselves. Another difference between the Israeli and the Russian case is a goal of cooperation. If in the Israeli case it was used primarily to promote pro Israeli content, in Russian case the activity focused primarily on attacking the adversarys content. However, in both cases, the activity contributed to shaping a conflict identity and training of collective action and collaboration, on the basis of networked sphere without any organizational structure. Both cases might be considered as what Soldatov calls cyberpatriotism. In addition, in both cases the engagement had a global dimension and included Diasporas in other countries. Therefore we might expect that the same pattern of cyberpatriotic activities will take place again at the time of further conflicts and could be expected to be even more effective.

32

MOLDOVA: The offline consequences of online cooperation. So far we have seen two cases of collective behavior in the virtual reality. However, the original Rheingolds idea of Smart Mob is talking about the collective offline behavior. In particular Rheingold mentions the political protest in Philippines. I was ousted by a coup dtext, -said president Estrada after losing power to a Smart Mob during the 2001 elections. The same pattern could be witnessed during the Orange revolution in Ukraine. However, both cases approach the Smart Mob as a positive phenomenon. I would like to claim that the Smart Mob could be a threat to security and put in doubt the ability of mob being smart, even if its action is to some extent coordinated. The Moldovan Twitter revolution41 does not present a clear case of state-network relationship. However, it is a good opportunity to examine what the optional offline effect of networked cooperation is. We can witness the same patterns of collective action that we have seen in the Israeli and the Russian case studies. However in this case, the mobile handheld devices had a significant role as a network's nodes that expand the size of a networked sphere, as well as a tool of digitalization (coverage) of reality within social media. Following the victory of a communist party group, Moldovan democrats decided to organize a Flash Mob protest in the center of Chisinau. "Six people, 10 minutes of brain storming and decision making. A few hours for distribution of information on networks, Facebook, blogs, SMS and e-mails, described the process in her blog a leader of

41

The name Twitter revolution was given by the Western media. However today is clear that Twitter had a very marginal role in the Moldovan events. There are only 70 Moldovan accounts at the Twiitersphere.

33

'ThinkMoldova' movement Natalya Morar42. The Russian social networks Odnoklassniki.ru and Vkontakte.ru as well as some local Internet forums played a major role in distribution. As a result, about 15,000 people gathered at the central square of Moldovan capital chanting I am not a communist. The first evening of protest was peaceful. However, next morning the crowd went out of control. It destroyed the building of parliament and presidency. The police did almost nothing to stop the riots and the Moldovan capital turned into a place of complete anarchy. Three interesting phenomenon should be mentioned. Firstly, the mobile networks as well as the Internet connection failed during the events. The opposition claimed that it was the attempt of the government to stop the online cooperation behind the offline protest. The officials said that the networks were just overloaded due to the high rate of activity. In any case the failure of networks as a result of the online triggered action is pointing a link between online cooperation and offline activity. Secondly, the event characterized by unprecedented Web 2.0 coverage. Most people who took a part in the protest had photo and video cameras. Some of the information was uploaded immediately to the Web 2.0 social media platforms such as Youtube, Flickr, and Livejournal. In some cases web-cameras were used for live broadcasting of the events. The immediate publishing of Web 2.0 content has a significant effect on socialization of conflict. The live flow of user generated content attracted wider and wider audience, and also provided an option to interact with the content's creators. It should be mentioned, that this process was happening

42

. ! Natmorar LJ 2009-04-07

34

on both sides of the barricades, since a major part of the content (especially on Russian social media platforms) framed the protest as a criminal activity. To conclude this point, live user generated content can be approached as another mechanism of real time engagement of the networks members. The networks create a content that in turn expands the network. Thirdly, the emerging networks define themselves by tags. In the Moldovan case it was a pman tag at the Twitter. At the Greece riots case it was griots tag. However the main question that is raised by Moldovan events deals with the role of social networks in the organization of offline protests. We could see that the networks can trigger the protest and initiate it. However, the networks themselves cannot necessarily control it and prevent the transformation from a peaceful to a violent action. The events in Chisinau demonstrate how fast the smart mob can become a wild and violent mob. There is a significant gap between the ability of information technologies to facilitate an action and its ability to manage the action during a finite period of time. This gap presents a significant security threat. Natalia Morar rejected the allegations about her responsibility for the violence. She wrote in her blog that she had nothing to do with this disaster and none of the activists in her group took part in the riots. But even so, lost control of the protest became a major failure of opposition and empowered the communist government. Some experts said that the opposition was correct in identification of a big frustration in Moldovan networked public sphere as a significant protest resource, but made a mistake by assuming that it might control it. Other experts claim that we should not exaggerate the role of technology in Moldovan events and

35

look for additional explanations (e.g. a provocation by the government). Nevertheless, the events should serve as a warning for emergence of a security threat that is posed by a gap between online networked coordination as a strategy for organization of offline activity and the lack of ability to use technologies to manage the organized offline action. Evgeny Morozov claims that spontaneous networked protest became a global phenomenon and it might be seen as a threat of networked anarchy.43 He mentions French riots of 2005, when teenagers blogs urged people to burn the cops, the 2006 riots in Budapest and 2008 riots in Greece. In the Moldovan case we can see the tendency to make the protest network global. The Twitter in this case was not a tool to organize a protest inside Moldova, but to socialize the conflict worldwide by raising international awareness. A Moldovan Diaspora played a major role by keeping a story alive via Twitter, as an example of remote participation in the protest. The fact that the events were named as Twitter revolution is a proof for the success of this strategy. It brings us back to the two previous case studies Israeli and Russian. Morozov writes: Just imagine if someone has leveraged all the buzz about events in Moldova by asking those people to lend their idle computer power for a DDOS attack on the entire cyber infrastructure of Romania, which the Moldovan government thinks played a role in the riots. In this scenario, the protests themselves are just a prelude to a much bigger distributed global protest that may be exponentially bigger than events taking place in the square.44

43 44

Morozov E. Rioters of the world unite, The Economist, Dec 18th 2008 Morozov E., More analysis of Twitter's role in Moldova, The New ForeignPolicy.com, 04/07/2009

36

Today we have a problem with separating online and offline protests. Even if there is no evidence of the state-network link in the Molodvan case, it might be a model for the future. The unrestricted and hybrid warfare concepts show that the idea of including non-combatants as a force in warfare emerges in state actor minds. Its impact cannot be limited to battle for the story or shutting down some governments web sites. The deadly potential effect of this scenario might be demonstrated by recent Russian statistics. According to the Russian security officials around 40 people were killed in Moscow area at the so called criminal flash mobs.45 It is especially common for hate crimes by Russian radical nationalists. Following networked distribution of message with a detailed instructions, people, who dont know each other gather at meeting points for one matter to commit a crime, - says an expert of Russian Ministry of Interior Igor Sundiev. According to Sundiev, the Flash Mob participators agree to kill the first non-Russian that they see and run away. That is what they actually do. According to the Russian sources, networked crimes based on usage of information technologies become more common in Russia. Since its a collective crime by people who dont know each other, finding the murderers is very difficult explains Sundiev. Conclusions: The three case studies discussed here present different kind of online social network based cooperation activities: The Israeli battle for a story, the Russian online offensive hacktivist activities, and the Moldovan offline protests with actual impact in physical domain.

45

. . 15 2009, Interfax.ru

37

However the case studies share a number of common denominators and it should be perceived as different elements of the same process. The emergence of networked public sphere creates a framework for new dynamic of conflict socialization. The process of expanding conflicts range is not managed through organized networks, but creates the networks of those who share the same situational conflict identity. In this context the main role of any battle for the story is not competing with the rival opinion, but engagement of more potential supporters. The process has to be managed through open non-secured channel since it aims to reach a wide audience, and not members of particular organization. It is a mistake to believe that there are competent networked organizations, as Netwar concept claims. Facebook and other platforms are networks, but not an organization. It is a framework for the emergence of situational conflict networks. Swarming is primarily not a method of attack, but method of networks self organization and self creation based on sharing same conflict identity. It is a chaotic process since any person can adopt various conflict identities in various contexts. The situational networks have a short life, but there is a process of learning and gaining an experience that makes any new network to become more effective. The globalization on the one hand and fragmentation on the other hand remove any borders from socialization of conflicts, makes the socialization process worldwide and increase

38

the lack of stability. The story of Natalia Morar can be a good evidence for Prigogines claim that in the complexity environment one can start a chain that will cause a global effect. The three case studies also exhibit the same pattern of cooperation and network management. It includes the same coordination strategies (establishing online and offline platforms for management), simplification and technological assistance. The online collaboration makes the engagement more probable since participation in the conflict becomes easier, and today anyone can do it without leaving own apartment. The online participation in conflict is not only easier, but also does not pose any danger for those who decide to take a part in it, since their home is secured environment. The question of networkstate cooperation is the most difficult. In the Israeli case we have seen a model that is based on division of responsibilities between state, non state actors, and the networked society. The Russian case is complicated since, unlike in the Israeli case, we cannot see any direct involvement that is disclosed. However, it shows a significant role of traditional media as a socialization of conflict actor. It shapes information environment that triggers development of conflict identity and motivates network collaboration. The involvement of non-combatants as a decisive factor in warfare becomes today a part of a discussion within military doctrine concepts as hybrid warfare. This involvement might be considered as a principle change in the nature of warfare, provider of RMA capabilities, since any person (besides young children) becomes potential fighter. We start to see that the security experts think about this factor as threat, as well as something that should be considered as a

39

part of security strategy (Hybrid warfare)46. However, as I have argued, the concept of Smart Mob as an instrument of influence is problematic. The gap between engagement and management is still significant, while the words smart and mob might be considered as oxymoron. Therefore the threat is not only the intent to use non-combatants as a part of warfare, but also to lose the control over the engaged networks. The balance between states and networks is very fragile. Arquilla and Ronfeldt write that some networks may be agents of a state, but others may try to turn states into their agents.47 The further the role of the Internet increases in our lives, the more its degree of complexity grows, , the higher the risk that a situation when the global socialization of conflict process will engage more and more people in more and more tangible ways. As consequence clash of situational conflict networks may go out of states control. This reality of clash of networks becomes more probable due to the fact that in the Internet there is no distances between members of different networks and it causes a situation of permanent friction, that might be transferred to physical offline domain. Consequently, I would like to conclude that the increase in involvement of non combatants in warfare that becomes possible due to the development of ICT should be addressed as a significant security threat.

46 47

Hoffman Arquila and Ronfledts states as actors of networks.

40

Dealing with this challenge certainly requires the states to abandon the hierarchical mode of action and adopt the network approach. It take networks to fight networks, - writes Arquilla and Ronfeldt.48 The task is more difficult in the case of situational networks. One of the options is just limiting the network's infrastructure and restricting the networked public sphere. That is what China does when it blocks more than 250,000 western websites, limiting the scope of search engines and monitoring online surfing of every user. The big brother approach is certainly problematic for democratic countries as the U.S. The answer might be divided to two parts. First, is monitoring of online activity. The task is complicated since you have to be a part of network to monitor its content. In addition, in the reality of overload of information a monitoring of interactive spheres is very difficult, especially since the source of the problem might be one particular node of the network. An active participation in network is also suggesting some methods of impact by network management (for instance creating artificial provocative targets for cyber attacks that will attract most of hackers of adversarys network). However, the most effective methods might be found not on the field of confronting networks but supporting a creation of friendly ones. The good news is that the good guys are usually the majority. The bad news is the they tend to be more passive comparing to the bad guys. Providing a story that can shape around its narrative a situational network with positive attitude might be a part of the solution. Training of network leaders may provide another part of the answer. In November 2008, the State Department made a conference for The Alliance of

48

Arquilla J. & D. Ronfeldt, Challenges for U.S. Policy and Organization, The Advent of Netwar, Rand 1996

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Youth Movements, group of networks leaders from all over the world, and published a field manual Creating Grassroots Movements for Change49 that should guide people who are interested in organizing networks for democratization and fighting terror. There are certainly good examples of these kinds of activities and democratization/ anti radicalization campaigns that were leaded by Smart Mobs (the famous recent example is the Facebook based protest One million against FARC). However, there are three problems with this approach. First, the networks that matter are situational networks and therefore it is more difficult to support their emergence. Second, when you guide and support network leadership, you can never know for what purposes it will be used. Third, creating anti networks only contribute to polarization, and declared involvement of state only help to trigger and manage engagement from the opposite side. The Russian-Georgian war is a good example for it. The Russian narrative claimed that the cyber attacks is a response for information war that was declared by the U.S. The new information technologies provide numerous challenges and opportunities. Addressing both by science and innovation policy should be based not only on providing particular answers for these challenges and leverage of opportunities, but awareness of the possible impacts and attitudes. The goal of this paper was to contribute to understanding of the ICT within the security context, as a decisive factor in shaping both the field of global conflict, as well as the field of global cooperation.

49

http://info.howcast.com/youthmovements/fieldmanual

42

References. Anderson, C., The Long Tail", Wired, October 2004. Arquilla J. & D. Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Revisited) in Arquilla J. & D. Ronfeldt (Eds.) Networks and netwars : The future of terror, crime, and militancy, Rand, 2001. Arquilla J. & D. Ronfeldt, What Next for Networks and Netwars, in Arquilla J. & D. Ronfeldt (Eds.) Networks and netwars : The future of terror, crime, and militancy, Rand, 2001. Arquilla J. & D. Ronfeldt, Challenges for U.S. Policy and Organization, The Advent of Netwar, Rand 1996, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR789/MR789.ch5.pdf Bimber B, Information and American democracy: technology in the evolution of political power, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

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Castells M., "The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance," in Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull (Eds.), The Annals: Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, 2008, Volume 616, No. 1 pp. 78-93. Clover C., Kremlin-backed group behind Estonia cyber blitz, Financial Times, March 11 2009. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57536d5a-0ddc-11de-8ea3-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1 Creating Grassroots Movements for Change: A Field Manual, Alliance of Youth Movements, December 2008, http://info.howcast.com/youthmovements/fieldmanual Goble P., Window on Eurasia: Will the Internet Integrate the Russian Federation or Tear It Apart? http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2009/04/window-on-eurasia-will-internet.html Goldstein J. and J. Rotich, Digitally Networked Technology in Kenyas 20072008 Post-Election Crisis, Berkman Center Research Publication, September 2008. http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/node/4703 Hoffman F. G., Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict, Strategic Forum, April 2009. Kalathil S. and T. C. Boas Open networks, closed regimes: the impact of the Internet on authoritarian rule, Carnegie Endowment, 2003. Lewis J., Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats, Center for Strategic and International Studies , December 2002, http://www.csis.org/tech/0211_lewis.pdf Lind W. S., Understanding Fourth Generation War, AntiWar.com, January 15, 2004, http://www.antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702 Morozov E., Moldova's Twitter Revolution, The New ForeignPolicy.com, 04/07/2009. http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/07/moldovas_twitter_revolution Morozov E. Rioters of the world unite, The Economist, Dec 18th 2008 http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12815678 Morozov E., The Alternative's alternative, openDemocracy, December 29,2008 http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/the-alternatives-alternative Morozov E., More analysis of Twitter's role in Moldova, The New ForeignPolicy.com, 04/07/2009

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http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/07/more_analysis_of_twitters_role_in_mold ova Prigogine I., Is Future Given? World Scientific Publishing Company, 2003. Rheingold H., Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution, Basic Books,2003. Schattschneider E. E,.The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1975. . 2007 , , 06/03/2009, http://www.rian.ru/politics/20090306/164087966.html ., ", , " , 05.03.2009 http://www.echo.msk.ru/blog/n_asadova/576689-echo/ . , , 07.04.2009, http://lenta.ru/articles/2009/04/08/moldblogs/ , : -89, 2004 : , 8.8.08 http://www.nashi.su/news/25672 ., : , " " 4 2006, http://www.agentura.ru/press/about/jointprojects/bigpolitics/cyberterrorism/ ., : , Agentura.Ru, : , 14-15 2007 . http://www.agentura.ru/equipment/psih/info/conferencepole/soldatov/ , , , http://svpressa.ru/issue/news.php?id=5696 ., . , Damian LJ, http://damian.livejournal.com/515909.html . ! Natmorar LJ 2009-04-07 http://natmorar.livejournal.com/36886.html

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., , . 2006. 7. C. 1821 http://www.i-r-p.ru/page/stream-exchange/index-6700.html . , , 05.09.08, http://www.nr2.ru/kiev/194700.html . . 15 2009, Interfax.ru http://www.interfax.ru/society/txt.asp?id=74551 ,YNET , , : " 8 " http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3281689,00.html