War on Terror 2.0: Will It Be Different Post Jan 20?

 
 
 
 
 
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President-elect Barack Obama, January 20th onward, will not be saying “US has one president at a time”. Anymore. He cannot remain muted on foreign policy issues as he would be the only president of US. Here, now, I would not be interested in reloading how historic a day it would be for US and the world in general (it is). So, straight to the point: Will “war on terror” continue to be the same under President Obama? How would it impact India? In short: Obama's diagnosis in front of the subject (world) might differ; but the prescription paradoxically might not be dramatically different form Bush's second term. Obama might discuss the ailment in elaborate erudition instead of the raw “you-are-with-us-or-again st-us” talk; but, he would most probably continue the more measured Bush's last years (barring the use of torture). And, how would this impact India would largely depend on how India engages with Obama administration.
UK foreign secretary David Miliband, tipped to be the next labor party leader, young too, wrote in The Guardian right after his Mumbai visit (+ an exclusive “discovery of India” trip to Amethi) that the “notion 'war on terror' is misleading and mistaken”. He is partly right when he says that this phrase primarily deals with military option. However, this was wholly true during Bush's first term.
A prosperous Pakistan is good news to everyone. However, arguments that more foreign aid would help Pakistan combat terrorism will not be effective because: One, Pakistan was not “occupied” by coalition forces (or any other “force[s]”) like in Iraq and Afghanistan that resulted in its institutions, governance and economic failures, which plainly scream-suggests that Pakistan is basically a state with fundamentally flawed institutions – both political and economic. Two, Pakistan was not “occupied” by coalition forces (or any other “force[s]”) to trigger numerous terror outfits growth (in Pakistan), which plainly reemphasizes that Pakistani polity's prolonged fornication with religious extremism is the real concern. Now, if one makes a lame excuse saying, like India, Pakistan “too” is fighting the same terrorists. Then, we have to finger-point how Iraq-Afghan centered an argument this would be. When Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and Afghan President Hamid Karzai are criticized for not doing enough – they can afford to say that we are fighting the same battle, and we need more foreign aid. For these two countries were bombed for years and do need help for nation-building. Contrarily, Pakistan always was a “functioning” state. So, why did Pakistan reach this stage? Similar destruction has occurred in Somalia where the state simply doesn't exist (since years). This arguably shows that institutions in Pakistan are deeply flawed and non-functional, in conventional way. And, unlike Somalia, this has happened in Pakistan despite either under democracy or under strong dictators – state always did exist. You don't need to be a security studies expert to say: Pakistani state machinery is one way or the other responsible. Conversely, foreign aid should be used to force Pakistan to act firmly and measurably against terrorists based on its soil – this is a challenge for India to diplomatically engage with the new Obama administration.
On Lashkar-e-Toiba. Like Miliband, there will be a tendency to relate LeT and others with Kashmir or at least restrict it to Indo-Pak perspective. Here, India has to play war-like diplomacy to establish – LeT is no different from Al-Qaeda. Look: Al-Qaeda started as a facilitating body that also kept track of jihadis (from various countries) who “somehow” turned-up in Peshawar (Pakistan) in huge numbers to wage “holy war” against the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan. At that point in time, Al-Qaeda was attached to Abdullah Azzam's – a charismatic Palestinian scholar and mentor of Osama bin Laden – organization Maktab al-Khidamat (Office of Services). Maktab al-Khidamat primarily dealt wi

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01/17/2009

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