High Quality
Open the downloaded document, and select print from the file menu (PDF reader required).
Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromesof corruption
Michael Johnston
#
Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007
Abstract
Both generalizations about
“
Asian corruption
”
, and claims about greater or lesser amounts of corruption, tend to overlook the many variations existing among and withinAsian societies, and among the corruption problems they experience. I suggest that deeper influences in social, political and economic development, and contrasting institutionalsettings, create four distinctive syndromes of corruption, each with its own set of implications for relationships between wealth and power. Japan is an example of
“
influencemarkets
”
in which private interests buy or rent influence over relatively specific policyoutcomes within a strong state. Korea is a case of
“
elite cartels
”
, in which collusion andcorrupt incentives enable several kinds of elites to cooperate in governing, enrichingthemselves, and resisting rising political competition. The Philippines is marked by
“
oligarchs and clans
”
, with powerful families and their entourages plundering a weak statein a climate of uncertainty and insecurity. China experiences
“
official mogul
”
corruption, inwhich officials abuse state power with impunity, although that process is becomingincreasingly fragmented. The four syndromes may help us understand why corruption andrapid growth have coexisted in some, but not all, Asian states for long periods of time, andmay also help us understand why some of those states will adapt to new global realitiesonly with some difficulty. They also show how
“
consensus
”
-driven reforms emanating fromthe west may not only be ineffective, but may actually make matters worse.
Introduction
Is there such a thing as
“
Asian corruption
”
, in the sense of a particular pattern of corruptionthat extends across Asia, reflects distinctively regional characteristics, and is not foundelsewhere? If not, what variations are there, what are their sources, and what are their implications for development and reform?Those questions are significant not just at a theoretical or typological level, but in termsof policy as well. Numerous observers have invoked notions of
“
Asian corruption
”
to
Crime Law Soc Change (2008) 49:205
–
223DOI 10.1007/s10611-007-9095-zM. Johnston (
*
)Department of Political Science, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY 13346, USAe-mail: mjohnston@mail.colgate.edu
account for the ways extensive abuses have coexisted with
–
and in some cases, haveseemed to aid
–
rapid economic growth in a number of states in the region. Often suchcomparisons are made with reference to
“
African corruption
”
or other suggested patterns,with the inference being that there is something about Asia, its corruption, and/or its growththat has exempted many societies from the worst consequences of abusive connections between wealth and power. If such distinctions hold any validity then nuanced responses tocorruption, taking regional factors into account, would make sense as aspects of botheconomic development policy and strategies for reform.Equally apparent, however, is that what might be called the
“
consensus playbook
”
of reforms
–
transparency, enhanced public management, building up civil society, economicand political liberalization, privatization, independent judiciaries and news media
–
variessurprisingly little from one society to the next. Even if we do not posit a single pan-Asianform of corruption with distinctively local roots, a good idea in country A
–
say, the USA
–
might be unworkable in country B, irrelevant to corruption in country C, and downright harmful in country D. Appropriate reforms require an understanding of the deeper, long-term forces shaping and sustaining corruption, their links to observable local characteristicsand contrasts, and careful thought as to how corruption controls might function in a givencontext. Indeed, that sort of deeper analysis is essential if we are to sort out important commonalities and contrasts among cases from more superficial similarities and differences
–
and if we are to avoid
“
explanations
”
that consist mostly of putting the label
“
Asian
”
onwhatever we see in the region.If important variations among Asian societies are found alongside similarities tocorruption elsewhere, which are more important, and what deeper influences do theyreflect? This paper offers a discussion of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and China asexamples of four
“
syndromes of corruption
”
(the analysis draws upon Johnston [35]).Those syndromes, I argue, reflect deeper trends and contrasts in
participation
and
institutions
–
in the ways people pursue, use, and exchange wealth and power, and in thestate, political, and social institutions that both restrain and sustain those processes. To besure, the four syndromes do not explain all contrasts among societies
–
and, the discussionwill be incomplete in the sense that differences
within
countries, and a systematic approachto cultural factors, are left for future analysis. Nonetheless, the goal is to demonstrate that behind the façade of
“
Asian corruption
”
lie important variations that are as broad as anyfound globally, yet can be traced to trends in the development of specific societies.
Corruption in real societies: influences and contrasts
Understanding the variations among cases that are most important requires careful study of the opportunities available in societies, of the people who seek and use them, and of theinstitutions and norms that shape and constrain their choices. In a 2005 book [35] I proposed four corruption syndromes, called
“
influence markets
”
,
“
elite cartels
”
,
“
oligarchsand clans
”
, and
“
official moguls
”
, that reflect frequently encountered combinations of political and economic participation, on one hand, and institutions
–
state, social, political,and cultural
–
on the other. Statistical analysis of country-level indicators sorted ninety-eight countries into groupings that broadly fit the expected syndromes.The issue raised by the four syndromes is not just more versus less corruption, but rather contrasts in kinds of corruption problems. To search for syndromes of corruption is, ineffect, to ask
what are the underlying developmental processes, and problems, of which a society
’
s corruption is symptomatic
206 M. Johnston
where economic opportunities are more plentiful than political ones, ambitious people usewealth to seek power. Where political opportunities abound and economic ones are scarce, by contrast, power pursues wealth. Where institutions are weak, other contrasts mayemerge: A weak state may be vulnerable to illicit private pressures, while weak propertyrights or civil societies might leave citizens vulnerable to official demands.Four categoriesParticipation and institutions can combine in a variety of ways, and for every generalizationthere will be exceptions. The challenge is to identify categories of societies broad enough to preserve important commonalities yet specific and numerous enough to bring out significant contrasts. Such categories will not exhaust all possible combinations of participation and institutions
–
far from it. They are only useful simplifications, offeredas ideal types (Weber
’
–
224)intended to highlight patterns and connections for closer study.Participation and institutions come in many forms, but the main issue is how wealth and power are sought, used, and exchanged, and whether state, political, cultural and socialinstitution effectively sustain and restrain such activities. We can differentiate amongsocieties in terms of range and openness of political and economic opportunities they offer;strong institutions protect economic, political, and property rights, guarantee fair play, and protect society from abuses by the wealthy and/or powerful. It is entirely possible for weak official institutions to coexist with a coercive state, and with strong social institutions and patterns of interactions: China
’
s weakened Communist Party and its enduring traditions of
guanxi
are case in point. Conversely, strong public institutions do not guarantee all is well:the USA, for example, scores well on institutional indicators yet, if Putnam [60] is correct,has a civil society in decline.Still, variations in participation and institutions tend to fall into identifiable patterns.Established democracies often have mature market economies, for example. But there arealso consolidating or reforming democratic/market societies in which political competitionis still emerging; often their economies are becoming more open too. Institutionalframeworks in such societies seem likely to be moderately strong, but weaker than thosein the first group. Countries in a third group are undergoing major, simultaneous transitionsin politics and their economies: political and economic opportunities are both rapidlyexpanding, with relationships between them being difficult to predict. The weak institutionsfrequently seen in such settings are both cause and effect of rapid, broad-based, oftenunpredictable change. Finally, most undemocratic regimes, while offering few politicalopportunities by definition, have been liberalizing to varying degrees over the past generation, if only because of global economic trends and pressures. Political institutions insuch societies are likely to be weak and personalized; leaders may even be widely feared, but that is not institutional strength in the sense outlined above. Not surprisingly, their economic opportunities are controlled and exploited by a powerful few.These intentionally general groupings, I argue, correspond to four major syndromes of corruption:influencemarkets,elitecartels,oligarchsandclans,andofficialmoguls.Theproposedconnections are summarized in Table1; brief descriptions of each corruption syndrome follow.
Influence market corruption
Influence markets deal in access to decision makers and policyimplementers within strong state institutions; often politicians serve as middlemen, tradingconnections for contributions both legal and otherwise. Mature market democracies offer extensive political and economic opportunities, and generally have strong, legitimate
Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption 207
Add a Comment