Worrel 2two pennies with the resemblance between a penny and a sixpence, where the penny has a smoothedge and the sixpence has a milled edge.
He concludes that there is “no single characteristic present inthem both, upon which the resemblance could be dependent.”
(p28) The Aristotelian realist asserts thatresemblance is derivative, not ultimate, that when two objects resemble each other in a given respect, itis only because the very same universal is present in both. Price claims that resemblance nominalismsolves
the insufficiency behind “wholly present universals” versus “not wholly present universals” by
making room for
resemblances. Furthermore, Price concludes that in Aristotelian realism (the
Philosophy of Universals
), what holds a class together is a universal, something of a different ontologicaltype from its members. In resemblance nominalism (the
Philosophy of Resemblances
), there are justparticular objects without universals.
What are Armstrong’s reasons for taking states of affairs as the basic ontological category?
theory of classifying the most basic constituents of reality, he asserts that
philosophers should treat the world as broken up into “facts” and “states of affairs” rather than
particulars and universals and the relations between them.
Armstrong asks us to “suppose that object
is F,” were F is a universal
. He claims tha
t “for object
to have the universal F,” there must exist a
state of affairs
such that “a is F.” (Armstrong p74)
this observation the “
making principle,” which states
“for every contingent truth, there must
be something in the world th
at makes it true.”
From this principle, he claims that
states of affairs
explain what may appear to be “multiple locations” for properties as well as the “absence of location” for relations.
He goes on to illustrate that states of affairs may be plausible explanations for
among particulars. For instance
, the state of affairs of “
’s being F” may be the cause of “
’s being G,”
and so on. By this understanding, it is plausible to admit that in a Naturalist view of the world (where the
universe is a giant spatiotemporal manifold), there would be “an enormous plurality or c
onjunction of states of affairs in which all the particulars in those states of affairs are linked up together by
spatiotemporal relations.” (Armstrong p82)
When attempting to locate the presence of universals in thisspace-time manifold, however, Armstrong insists that
“universals are constituents of states of affairs”
and that it would be rather absurd to place them inside of the analogy of a space-time manifold box.Furthermore, he concludes that universals and particulars are the
of facts and states of affairs, which themselves are the most basic ontological category.
According to Grossman, what are the differences and similarities between nominalism, realism,and conceptualism with respect to the existence / subsistence of a) particulars, b) universals, and
c) the connecting “nexus” between particulars and universals? What is the main criterion or
reason for adopting each of these views?
Grossman begins his account of the differences between nominalism, realism and conceptualism byidentifying two underlying ontological criterion that separate the theories