A Scandinavian Federation, including the Baltic States and possibly also Britainand Ireland.
An East European Federation (Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, the states of theNorth Caucasus, plus
Poland and the Czech Lands).
A Balkan Federation.But all this is music of the future: right now we are saddled with the current set-up,with a Parliament to match. A key requirement is that the powers of this Parliamentbe maximised. It is allowed under the draft Constitution to elect the CommissionPresident (Article I-19). It should be given the power to ratify all the Commissionersas well, and, contrary to Article I-33, should have power to override the Council ofMinisters in cases where the two bodies are in conflict. It should also be allowed toappoint the EU Foreign Minister, a role reserved in the draft for the otherwise whol-ly advisory European Council
a body which would appear to serve no usefulpurpose whatever (see Article I-20). The EU Parliament should also be empoweredto remove individual commissioners if so desired, not being obliged (as at present)to sack the whole Commission if it wishes to censure that body (see Article I-25.5).Interestingly, the draft Constitution specifies a procedure whereby states canwithdraw from the EU if they wish. This procedure should be retained.The draft contains a Charter of Fundamental Rights, containing much that so-cialists would support, and one formulation that they would not endorse. The draft
speaks of the need ‘to promote balanced and sustainable development’ involving‘free movement of persons, goods, services and capital’ (Preamble).
Article III-46, however, states t
hat: ‘The European Parliament and the Council
of Ministers shall endeavour to achieve the objective of free movement of capital be-tween Member States and third countries to the greatest extent possible and withoutprejudice to other provisions of the Const
The right of free movement of capital is thus
, even if it can apparentlymove unhindered between EU member states. It will presumably be up to the judi-cial authorities to resolve any disputes that may arise in this area, but we cannot relyon the judges to rule in the desired direction. What the working class requires is aclause upholding the right to work, with provision for adequate income for thoseunemployed or disabled or otherwise unable to work. Such a clause requires para-mount status. It is here that we see the real deficiencies of the draft, not in the re-strictions upon national sovereignty, or voting rights in the Council of Ministers.Similar objections can be made as regards the EU competition rules as set out.Article I-3 up
holds ‘a si
gle market where competition is free and undistorted’, as
does Article III-69 on economic and monetary policy. Furthermore, Article III-70
states that: ‘Member states shall conduct their economic policies in order to contri
b-ute to the achieveme
nt of the Union’s objectives, as defined in Article I
Member States and the Union shall act in accordance with the principle of an openmarket economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources,and in compliance with the principles set out in Article III-
All this is reprehensible, as it clearly prescribes any kind of democratic plan-ning. Such principles ought not to feature in the Constitution at all, and it is on thatground that the draft should be condemned in a referendum.
Similar considerations apply in the case of the ‘i
dependence’ of the European
Central Bank as set out in Article III-80. The rationale behind this, of course, is thatmonetary policy is technically complex and best left to experts
but then, if so, why