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De Castro vs.

JBC Facts: All the petitions before the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. That question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation, because the appointment of the Chief Justice is any Presidents most important appointment. The consolidated petitions trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Issues Does Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution apply to appointments to positions in the Judiciary under Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution? May President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo make appointments to the Judiciary after March 10, 2010, including that for the position of Chief Justice after Chief Justice Puno retires on May 17, 2010?

Ruling/Ratio

No for the first issue Yes for the second issue The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, the framers neither mentioned nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments, or its effects on such period, or vice versa; That had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. The OSG urges that there are now undeniably compelling reasons for the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice, to wit:

(a) a deluge of cases involving sensitive political issues is quite expected; o (b) the Court acts as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en banc, is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President and Vice President and, as such, has the power to correct manifest errors on the statement of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC); o (c) if history has shown that during ordinary times the Chief Justice was appointed immediately upon the occurrence of the vacancy, from the time of the effectivity of the Constitution, there is now even more reason to appoint the next Chief Justice immediately upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno; and o (d) should the next Chief Justice come from among the incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, thereby causing a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon the JBC to start the selection process for the filling up of the vacancy in accordance with the constitutional mandate. The SC held that o Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in o

Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners, vs. SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor. (Guys, Im including a two digest for Sarmiento vs. Mison. The short digest c/o of Prinzs compiled digest. Kayo na bahala pumili Febb) Facts: S files a petition for prohibition to enjoin M from performing the functions as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. S contends that Ms appointment is unconstitutional because of the lack of confirmation from the Commission on Appointments. Issue: Will Ss petition prosper? Ruling: No. Ms appointment is valid and constitutional. Appointment of bureau heads is excluded in the first sentence of Article 6, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution.

Thus, it is independent of the approval of the Commission on Appointments. In addition, the 1986 Constitutional Commission records reveal that bureau heads was deleted by the framers from the list of appointees subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Facts: The petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a conflict between two (2) great departments of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution.

respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. Ruling/Ratio: Yes. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution elucidates (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are: o First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2 o Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3 o Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; o Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be

Issue: WON the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing

appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

application for naturalization. He was declared a Filipino citizen on 28 April 1955; the declaration was made final and executory on 15 May 1957. He took his Oath of Allegiance and was issued a corresponding certificate of Naturalization. Jose Ong, Jr. was then a minor, nine years of age, and still finishing his elementary education in Samar when his father took his oath. After completing his elementary education, he went to Manila to complete his higher education and eventually found employment there. He, however, frequently went home to Samar where he grew up. In 1971, his elder brother was elected a delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Emils status as a natural-born citizen was challenged. The Convention, however, declared Emil as a natural-born Filipino. In 1984 and 1986, Jose Jr. registered and voted in Samar. He ran and won in the 1987 elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar. His opponents protested his election to the post on the grounds that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The Court affirmed the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal declaring Jose Ong, Jr. a natural-born Filipino citizen. Article IV Section 2 of 1987 constitution defines natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship,] as well as those born before 17 January 1973, of Filipino mothers, who

Co v. HRET: In the case of Co vs. Electoral Tribunal the major issue was whether Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution. Records show that Ong Te, the grandfather of Jose Ong, Jr., arrived in the Philippines in 1895. He established his residence in Laoang, Samar. As such, he was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the Spanish colonial administration. Jose Ong Chuan, Jose Ong Jr.s father, was born in China in 1905. In 1915, he was brought by Ong Te to Samar where he grew up. He was baptized into Christianity. He married a natural-born Filipina, Agripina Lao. He also established his residence in Laoang, Samar. In 15 February 1954, he filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an

elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Section 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution was interpreted by the Court as applying to those who elected Filipino citizenship not only after 2 February 1987 but also to those who elected citizenship before that date. It was intended to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of natural-born citizen while one born of Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship, whereby under earlier laws, he was not a natural-born citizen. The Courts based its resolution of the issue by tracing Jose Ong, Jr. citizenship to his mother who was a natural-born Filipina. What is material to the case is whether he elected Filipino citizenship when he reached the age of majority as provided for by Section 1 (4) Article IV of the 1935 Constitution which was the operative law when he was born. Under the 1987 Constitution, natural-born status can only be accorded to individuals who elected citizenship upon reaching majority. In the opinion of the Court it is not necessary for Ong, Jr. to formally or in writing elect citizenship when he came of age as he was already a citizen since he was nine by virtue of his mother being a naturalborn citizen and his father a naturalized Filipino. Furthermore, election can be both formal and informal. In In Re Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) it was held that the exercise of the right of suffrage when one comes of age constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The rule in the Mallare case was applied

whereby Jose Ongs exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises were considered positive acts of electing Philippine citizenship. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice. These, according to the court, cannot be less binding than the filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration. Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 23, 2005, the committee of the senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the executive department and Military officials for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project, and on the issues of Gloriagate, Wire-tapping of the President, Electoral fraud, as was shown in the respective privileged speeches of the Senators. On September 27 & 28 2005, after being invited most of those resource persons were not able to make it due to prior commitments (i.e. military officials), while on 27 September then Senate President Drilon, received a letter from Executive Secretary Ermita requesting a postponement of the hearing (re: Northrail). On September 28, 2005 the president issued E.O 464, and Ermita sent a letter to the Senate President, informing him of the E.O. and that the resource persons from the executive dept would not be able to attend w/o the consent of the president. With regard to the hearing on the wire-tapping of the President, Col. Balutan and Gen. Gudani were relieved from their military posts and faced court martial proceedings for testifying w/o the presidents approval. Other summoned officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Is E.O. 464 provisions VALID?

HELD: Not entirely. Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Sec. 22, Art. VI The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec. 22, Art. VI, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of EO 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege...is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons. The claim of executive privilege must be accompanied by specific allegation of basis thereof Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive

considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected. Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination. The claim of privilege under Sec. 3, EO 464 in relation to Sec. 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for

the claim, it merely invokes EO 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of EO 464 must be invalidated. EO 464 unlawfully delegated authority to the heads of offices in Sec. 2(b) to determine certain information as privileged Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence. Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exception nature of the privilege. Executive privilege...is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the

fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is By order of the President, which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. Sec(s) 2(b) &3 of E.O. 464 ARE DECLARED VOID. Sec(s) 1&2(a) ARE HOWEVER, VALID. FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (FROM BOTH FILES)

[1] Initiating an impeachment means filing of the impeachment complaint and acting upon it by the House of Representatives.

[2] More than one impeachment complaint cannot be filed against the same person within the same year.

Art XI Sec 1 - Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Francisco v HRET

Art XI Sec 2 -The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Ratio Decidendi:

Art XI Sec 3

(4)

(1)The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.

(5) (2)
A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(6)

(7) (3)

(8)The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

FRANCISCO V NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC. CARPIO-MORALES; November 10, 2003

FACTS:

Art 11, Sec 8 Constitution Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this Section.

Initiated. In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.

November 2001 - 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) superseding the Rules approved by 11th Congress

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official.

Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed

July 2002 House of representatives adopted a Resolution directing Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation on the manner of disbursements and

expenditures by the Development Fund

Chief

Justice

of

the

Judiciary

June 2003 Pres. Estrada filed the first impeachment complaint against Davide and 7 associate justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora, and Dilangalen House Committee on Justice dismissed the complain because insufficient in substance

HELD: 1. Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for judicially discoverable standards for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion through power of judicial review.

October 2003 Rep. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed second impeachment complaint founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry; resolution of endorsement/impeachment was signed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives

o Locus standi - Case is of transcendental pubic


importance.

o Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had

ISSUES: 1. WON issue is justiciable. 2. WON Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by 12th Congress is constitutional and second impeachment complaint is valid

been filed and the 2001 rules had been promulgated and enforced. o Lis mota (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

o Judicial Restraint not an option because the Court is

not legally disqualified; no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred.

2. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or 2. once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or 3. by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term initiate a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

o Interpretation of the term initiate takes place

by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by filing by at least 1/3 of the members of the HR with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Sec 3 (5) of Art XI becomes clear. o Sec 3 (5) of Article XI once an impeachment complains has been initiated, another complaint may not be filed against the same official within a period of one year. o Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated: 1. if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified

Manila Lodge vs. CA

Facts: On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act. No. 1360 authorizing the city of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the city of Manila and that the city of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the

reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension at the north end not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred feet in size, for a hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of the governor general, to a responsible person or corporation for a term not to exceed ninety-nine years. Subsequently, the Philippine commission passed in May 18, 197 Act No. 1657, amending Act. No. 1657, amending Act. No. 1360, so as to authorize the city of Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as the hotel site. Both petitioner vendees claim that the property subject of the action, pursuant to provisions of Act. No. 1360, as amended by act no. 1657 was patrimonial property of the city of Manila and not a park or plaza

area was granted to the city of Manila as its patrimonial property, the city could, by virtue of its ownership, dispose of the whole reclaimed area without need of authorization. However, the act states that the city of manila is hereby xxx to lease or sell said tract of land. Secondly, if the reclaimed area is an extension to the Luneta, then it is of the same nature which is a park for public use. Thirdly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel site. The subject property is not the northern portion authorized to be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion.

Held: It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover the said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular provision should be considered. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act. No. 1360 as amended, in order to discover the legislative intent.

Hence, the provisions of the act all taken together therefore shows that the legislature intended the property to be of public dominion for public use. The sale of the property to the petitioner vendees is null and void.

Commissioner of Customs V. Court of Tax Appeals walang makitang copy online.

In this case, the court ruled that the property in question is of public dominion intended for public use and not one of patrimonial in nature. Firstly, if the reclaimed

The Commissioner of Customs vs. Caltex (Philippine) Inc., et al. F:

June 20, 1953, Caltex was granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources a petroleum concession with the right to establish and operate a petroleum refinery in the municipalities of Bauan and Batangas. The concession contains the following proviso: the Government hereby also grants all the rights of a Petroleum Refining Concession and the Concessionaire hereby accepts all the obligations of the said Petroleum Refining Concession in accordance with the provision of Republic Act No. 387 as approved 18 June 1949, the provisions of which are made a part of this deed of Concession. The petroleum refinery was completely constructed and commenced operation sometime October 1954, using crude oil, imported from abroad, as one of its basic materials. On May, July and September 1954, the corporation filed with the Collector of Customs a claim for refund of the custom duties it paid on imported petroleum products consumed in connection with its refinery project pursuant to Art. 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides that during the first five years following the granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories. Collector of Customs denied said claim for refund and the Commissioner of Customs affirmed the earlier ruling.

Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision ordering Petitioner to refund Caltex the amount representing customs duty on the petroleum products imported by it for its own use in the construction of its Batangas refinery.

I: Whether or not the imported crude oil used by Caltex for its refinery construction falls is exempted to customs duties pursuant to Art 103 of RA No. 387. H: Petitioner contends that the exemption clause contained in the law cannot apply to the corporation for the reason that the refinery is being operated on imported crude petroleum and not on crude petroleum produced in the Philippines, contrary to the very objective of RA 387 which is to promote and encourage the exploration, development, production and utilization of the petroleum resources of the Philippines Art 79 of said act which requires any established refinery to refine crude petroleum produced in the Philippines in preference over any imported crude petroleum, which means that imported crude petroleum may be allowed as long as no crude petroleum is produced in the Philippines. It was well known that there was then no Philippine crude petroleum available for the use of any refinery in the Philippines which makes its obvious that Congress could not have intended that before the exemption may be extended to a concessionaire, the latter

should only refine crude petroleum produced in the Philippines, for that would defeat the very objective of the act. The Court also held that indirectly, Caltex is contributing immeasurably to the exploitation of our hidden and undeveloped oil resources as the establishment of a petroleum refinery in the Philippines, has given the necessary incentive to those already engaged or who intend to engage in drilling oil wells in the Philippines.

an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution? Section 5(d) provides: Sec. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act: d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. Section 2, Article V of the 1987 Constitution states that, The Congress shall provide for a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

Phil. Sugar Central Agency V. Collector of Customs 51 Phil 131 walang Makita sa net. MACALINTAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Facts: Petitioner Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, filed a petition for the declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 suffer from constitutional infirmity. Petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated R.A. No. 9189 An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes Issue: W/N Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing

Held: By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. It bears to stress that R.A. 9189 is a law which implements Section 2, Article V of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, Section 5(d) of the same Act is not violative but rather an exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 of ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 152259 PANGANIBAN, J.: July 29, 2004

July 29, 1975, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the Sandiganbayan], said [petitioner], brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of the Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by affinity within the third civil degree, did then and there wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interested [sic] and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00. 'Contrary to law.' The petitioner claims that the term intervene is vague.

Facts The Presidential Commission on Good Government PCGG, filed on July 12, 1989 an information before [the anti-graft court] charging the accused [with] violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The Information reads: 'That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to

Issue: Whether Section 5 of Republic Act No.3019 is unconstitutional because of its vagueness. Held:

The Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. Said section penalizes certain presidential relatives who "intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government." This provision is not vague or "impermissibly broad," because it can easily be understood with the use of simple statutory construction. This Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General that the word can easily be understood through simple statutory construction. The absence of a statutory definition of a term used in a statute will not render the law "void for vagueness," if the meaning can be determined through the judicial function of construction. Elementary is the principle that words should be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning. The term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary acceptation, which is to "to come between." Criminally liable is anyone covered in the enumeration of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- any person who intervenes in any manner in any business, transaction, contract or application with the government. As we have explained, it is impossible for the law to provide in advance details of how such acts of intervention could be performed. But the courts may pass upon those details once trial is concluded. Thus, the alleged vagueness of intervene is not a ground to quash the information prior to the commencement of the trial.

Facts: On 27 August 1996, information for violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 was filed against Simplicio Delantar. Sometime in 1994 to August 1996, in Pasay City, Delantar through coercion and influence promote, facilitate and induce a female child (AAA) below 12 years of age, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for money, profit and other consideration. RTC rendered a decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation of Section 5(a), paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 of Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when he delivered AAA to an Arab national by the name of Mr. Hammond from their house sometime in 1994 selling her in prostitution to the said Arab who committed acts of lasciviousness on her person by kissing her on her lips, her breast, her private parts and even rubbing his penis against her private parts. Likewise, the Court finds accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5(a) paragraph 1, 4, and 5 of Article III of R.A. [No.] 7610 when the accused Simplicio Delantar pimped and delivered the complainant, an eleven 11 year old minor to Congressman Romeo Jalosjos where he committed 8 times of acts of lasciviousness on her person when he kissed her on her lips, private organ and even raped her. Held:

People vs. Delantar

Section 31(c), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610 states:

(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an establishment which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has been revoked. In the case at bar, the only evidence presented to establish AAAs alleged relationship to appellant is her birth certificate which mentions appellant as the father. However, said document does not bear appellants signature. In fact, appellant, in his testimony, denied that he is AAAs father. He claimed that, sometime in 1983, AAA was brought to him by a certain Salvacion Buela, AAAs real mother, who could not support her. Salvacion Buela told appellant that AAA was born on 11 May 1983 and that her natural father was a Japanese national. We thus hold that the birth certificate of AAA is prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not of her relation to appellant. After all, it is undisputed that appellant is not AAAs biological father. At best, appellant is AAAs de facto guardian. According to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the

maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the wards biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law. Tan V. Comelec 142 S 747 ----- In pari materia Facts: Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law. Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is expressly mandated that

See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are: SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income.

Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not violate the Constitution Respondents also maintain that the requisites under the Local Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte have all been duly complied with, Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations that the requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers as so prescribed in the Local Government Code for a new province to be created has not been satisfied. Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte, would only be about 2,856.56 square kilometers and which evidently would be lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this regard, point out and stress that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. Issue: Which law will prevail. Held: It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new

province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act." As this draft legislation speaks of "areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution. We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people necessarily affected. The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, the

factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist. Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the new province of Negros del Norte because of the appointment of the officials thereof, must now be erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should be announced. Its existence should be put to an end as quickly as possible, if only to settle the complications currently attending to its creation. The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province does not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government Code. The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. Article V of the Constitution

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